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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the ideological bases of the global governance of nuclear 
weapons by analysing the role of civil society, an actor generally left aside by 
nuclear scholarship. Here the question of nuclear order is tackled with an 
unconventional approach that combines critical works in nuclear studies, 
critical constructivist works on security, and Antonio Gramsci’s theory of 
civil society. Such approach brings civil society to the forefront of analytical 
attention in order to show the cultural domination exercised by the bomb by 
inquiring into the common sense nature of nuclear discourse. This rests on 
the assumption that uncritically accepted ideas about what nuclear weapons 
do have been instrumental in generating the current nuclear order that, 
although under mounting challenges, remains based on a hierarchy between 
states protected by the bomb and all the rest. 
To understand how civil society challenges and reproduces that order, this 
thesis analyses the calls for nuclear disarmament advanced by organised 
collective actors and inquires, in a Gramscian way, into the common sense 
ingrained in those calls as well as their ability to constitute a united front. As 
a result, the thesis problematises the notion of disarmament, marking the 
importance of a struggle on its very concept between reductionist and 
abolitionist frames. It indicates that while the latter are involved in a radical 
opposition, the former are culturally dominated by the system of deterrence, 
thus coming to represent two distinct historic blocs: a counter-hegemonic 
opposition, on one hand, and an unwitting part of the hegemonic apparatus, 
on the other. This thesis concludes that 1) civil society is far from having 
created a unity of intent; and 2) the bases for the reliance on nuclear weapons 
are deeply entrenched, because of the pervasiveness, even inside civil 
society, of a common sense view of the nuclear threat. 
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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction: Global Civil Society and 
the Nuclear Order 
 
Since the end of the Cold War nuclear weapons’ relevance in international 
security has dwindled, yet they are still in the arsenals and postures of a few 
nuclear-armed states continuing to threaten the destruction of the whole 
world. The most powerful weapon ever invented, the atomic bomb – or for 
short ‘the bomb’ – is a remit of a very small fraction of world states, and even 
for them it often does not (or no longer) constitute the centre of national 
security. The bomb is indeed suffering a legitimacy crisis, illustrated by the 
fact that defending it and its role in protecting national security is slowly 
eroding, while calls for eliminating them are on the rise. It was April 2009 
when the President of the United States pronounced his vision of nuclear 
disarmament. ‘So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's 
commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear 
weapons,’ 1  a freshly elected President Barack Obama announced to a 
cheering crowd in Prague; just a few months later he would be awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize, largely on the basis of these words. 
																																																						
1 	The	 White	 House,	 ‘Remarks	 by	 President	 Barack	 Obama,’	 Prague,	 April	 5,	 2009,	
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-
Delivered	(last	accessed	26	October	2016).	
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The anti-nuclear advocates appear to have been increasingly successful at 
convincing world leaders of the importance of disarmament. Ten years before 
Prague an influential critical scholar of nuclear politics, Ken Booth, had 
argued that the anti-nuclear proponents were winning the debate.2  
During the Cold War, when nuclear deterrence was the 'common-sense' 
strategy of the day (in the Gramscian sense of being hegemonical and the 
only option for a reasonable person), the onus of proof in terms of moving 
from the allegedly tried and tested strategy of nuclear deterrence was firmly 
seen to be on the side of the anti-nuclear critics - those wanting change. The 
latter's task was to try and persuade those in power in the West of the 
rationality of moving away from a nuclear policy which they (those in 
power) believed virtually guaranteed peace as long as a robust MAD 
posture was maintained in the face of Soviet ambitions and military power. 
Today, this common-sense is facing unparalleled challenge, in that a 
significant body of its hitherto predictable expert constituency has now 
broken ranks. So although pro-nuclear governments on the whole can rely 
on public nuclear amnesia to continue to allow them to pursue business-as-
usual for the time being, it is now the anti-nuclear advocates who are at the 
cutting edge of the debate for the first time, and the pro-nuclear advocates 
who are the ones pushed into the corner.3 
If the anti-nuclear advocates are really winning why is it that we have not 
witnessed a change towards disarmament? From this puzzle the project takes 
off in an exploration of the crucial juncture identified in Booth’s excerpt: 
expert communities’ role in the cultural domination of nuclear weapons. 
However, this should be broken up in two distinct questions: 1. Is the 
common sense of nuclear weapons actually shifting? 2.  Are the anti-nuclear 
advocates truly attempting to transform this common sense? Let us assess 
them in turn. 
This thesis sides with Booth, among others, in conceiving of the nuclear 
condition as first and foremost a cultural issue.4 The social order in which 
																																																						
2	Ken	 Booth,	 ‘Nuclearism,	 Human	 Rights	 and	 Constructions	 of	 Security	 (Part	 1),’	 The	 International	
Journal	of	Human	Rights	3	n°	2	(1999):	19–20.	
3	Booth,	‘Nuclearism,	Human	Rights	and	Constructions	of	Security	(Part	1),’	21.	
4	Some	 examples	 include	 Benoît	 Pelopidas,	 ‘The	 Oracles	 of	 Proliferation:	 How	 Experts	Maintain	 a	
Biased	Historical	Reading	that	Limits	Policy	Innovation,’	The	Nonproliferation	Review	18	n°1	(2011);	
David	Mutimer,	The	Weapons	State:	Proliferation	and	 the	Framing	of	 Security	 (Boulder,	CO:	 Lynne	
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nuclear weapons are rooted does not simply depend on technological 
developments; instead, ideational factors are the underlying drivers of the 
evolution of global nuclear weapons rule. ‘Well before any physical bomb had 
been built, science had created the bomb in the mind, an intangible thing. 
Thereafter, the bomb would be as much a mental as a physical object.’5 In the 
same way as laissez-faire is not an automatic expression of economic facts, 
deterrence is not a predetermined consequence of security realities.6  
A culture of nuclearism, however, has made sure that nuclear deterrence 
remained the prevalent way to conceive of the nuclear weapons technology.7 
It has been an inability to think of radically alternative strategies that led to 
the continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence by the nuclear-armed. The 
nuclear culture had indeed rendered the tenets of nuclearism incontestable, 
relegating civil society to a subordinate position of radical critique. Booth 
established that a transition from a system of deterrence to one of 
disarmament can happen through a transformation of the common sense, or 
the taken for granted nature of a system of meaning. This concept, taken 
from Antonio Gramsci, will be crucial in this work, which at heart wants to 
offer insights on whether nuclear common sense is changing, and with that 
the cultural basis for the reliance on the bomb.  
																																																																																																																																																										
Rienner	Publishers,	2000);	Jonathan	Schell,	The	Seventh	Decade:	The	New	Shape	of	Nuclear	Danger	
(New	York:	Henry	Holt	and	Company,	2007);	Hugh	Gusterson,	Nuclear	Rites:	A	Weapons	Laboratory	
at	the	End	of	the	Cold	War	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1996).	
5	Jonathan	Schell,	The	Seventh	Decade:	The	New	Shape	of	Nuclear	Danger,	34.	
6	The	 idea	 that	deterrence	works	 is	 examined	here	as	a	 social	 construction	 that	became	 taken	 for	
granted	 because	 the	 conviction	 in	 its	 effectiveness	 was	 so	 widespread.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	
deterrence	 is	 not	 real,	 but	 that	 there	 are	 issues	 for	 which	 it	 does	 not	 work,	 which	 tend	 to	 be	
forgotten	or	dismissed.	Similar	arguments	have	been	made	by	many.	For	one	of	the	most	convincing	
cases,	 refer	 to	Tannenwald’s	work	as	Nina	Tannenwald,	The	Nuclear	Taboo:	The	United	States	and	
the	Non-Use	of	Nuclear	Weapons	since	1945	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2007).	
7	Ken	Booth,	‘Nuclearism,	Human	Rights	and	Constructions	of	Security	(Part	1),’	3.	
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This project is not devoted to a systematic recollection of nuclear common 
sense in its various aspects, but rather to illuminate how that is expressed 
and employed by a particular actor. Following Booth, and Gramsci, we should 
expect the intellectual community of nuclear civil society to have a role in the 
perpetuation and change of a certain system. Indeed, Booth had argued that 
the pro-nuclear experts turning into anti-nuclear advocates were testament of 
a shift away from a culture of deterrence. Only two years before Obama 
announced his disarmament commitment, four former senior US officials 
had famously published an op-ed titled ‘A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,’8 
which is often credited for changing the debate. 9  The so-called four 
horsemen, after all, had undergone a significant change of heart given that 
these novel anti-nuclear advocates were former Secretaries of State Henry 
Kissinger and George Shultz, one-time Defence Secretary William Perry and 
former Senator Sam Nunn. For Booth that would be a tremendous 
demonstration that nuclearism is getting increasingly contested, but here we 
want to critically question that notion. Therefore, this thesis’ underlying 
question: is anti-nuclear activism expressing a revolutionary project or is it 
contributing to the permanence of the current system? 
This thesis is interested in the connection between anti-nuclear thinking and 
the expert constituency of global civil society, which will be better defined 
later in this chapter. These actors are indeed key in the maintenance or 
change of common sense and analysing the ideological character of their anti-
nuclear advocacy a promising perspective on nuclear studies. Following 
																																																						
8	George	 P.	 Shultz	 ,	William	 J.	 Perry,	Henry	A.	 Kissinger,	 and	 Sam	Nunn,	 ‘A	World	 Free	 of	Nuclear	
Weapons,’	Wall	Street	Journal,	January	4,	2007	4:	A15.	
9	For	an	interesting	perspective	see	Hugh	Gusterson,	‘The	New	Nuclear	Abolitionists,’	Bulletin	of	the	
Atomic	 Scientists,	May	 13,	 2008,	 http://thebulletin.org/new-nuclear-abolitionists	 (last	 accessed	 12	
October	2016).		
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Gusterson’s work on the pervasiveness of a nuclearist ideology in the US 
laboratories (the conviction that producing nuclear weapons is positive and 
that there is no risk of failure in nuclear deterrence)10 we should inquire into 
the pervasiveness and variety of ideologies in the nuclear civil society sector. 
While the great majority is in favour of disarmament, there appears to be a 
degree of internal variation. Nuclear-free world, global zero, nuclear weapons 
abolition, the model convention – all of these have become general terms to 
refer to the prospect of eliminating the bomb. But what is actually meant by 
these terms and do they all represent the same idea?  
Asking such questions can enlarge our understanding of nuclear governance 
because deconstructing the ideologies of civil society gives us a handle in 
understanding the most stable bases of nuclear thinking. Strategies of 
Disarmament examines the ideological apparatus of civil society involved in 
nuclear policy at the global level and the varieties of disarmament calls, in 
order to demonstrate how they contribute to constitute the thinking behind 
the value of nuclear weapons. Here we will historicise their struggle to change 
the terms of the debate while also subject them to critique as a way to 
understand their relation to the culture of nuclearism. Reading the current 
situation through Gramsci one is taken to conclude that the old is dying but 
the new is failing to be born: nuclearism is declining and a disarmed world 
cannot start yet. To better understand this nuclear interregnum it is crucial to 
assess the forces behind each camp.  
This introductory chapter will outline the conceptualisation of the thesis 
highlighting the motivations for the theoretical and empirical choices, in two 
																																																						
10	Hugh	Gusterson,	Nuclear	Rites:	A	Weapons	Laboratory	at	the	End	of	the	Cold	War.	
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steps. Firstly it is necessary to clarify the foundational question of the 
research by engaging with existing accounts of the reality studied here: civil 
society in the nuclear order. The research will thus be placed in relation to 
previous works on civil society in nuclear politics, providing the motivation 
for the prioritisation of the global level and for the theoretical reliance on 
Antonio Gramsci and related critical constructivist works. Secondly, this 
chapter will give a brief overview of the research design employed. To that 
end it will firstly contextualise the argument and contribution. It will also 
discuss the empirical object of attention by briefly defending the selection of 
the case study. Thirdly, a summary of the methodological approach will 
explain how the research was conducted. Finally, the last section will draw a 
summary of each chapter of the thesis. 
 
 
1.1 Civil society and nuclear struggles 
In the field of nuclear politics studying civil society is always subject to raise 
some eyebrows, given the state-centrism of this literature. This is not 
surprising as, for most of its life, nuclear scholarship has been the domain of 
rational choice theorists for whom states are the sole authority and whose 
interests are exogenously given. Precisely when dealing with the bomb, they 
argue, states need to be the unit of analysis. While long underestimated by a 
nuclear literature that has paid overwhelming attention to material factors 
and disregarded the role of actors that were not generally considered 
powerful, civil society has been one of the players in the nuclear policy game. 
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Researches on social movements, civil society, epistemic communities and 
the like have shown that agency also resides in other actors. A broader 
engagement with the nuclear literature will be carried out in Chapter Two to 
contrast this thesis approach to the mainstream. If that typically entails 
rationalist accounts, skewed towards the US context, and engaged in 
problem-solving theorising, this work is interpretivist, global in outlook, and 
critical.11 
This thesis wants to investigate what the role of civil society is in the 
governance of nuclear weapons by making the case for paying attention to its 
discursive contribution to transnational policy debates. This approach builds 
upon studies of nuclear weapons politics that depart from the conventional, 
positivist, strategic studies that so much have pervaded the literature on the 
topic. Some scholars have highlighted the efforts of civil society in pursuing 
policy changes. This literature, however, is still quite sparse and theoretical 
works have not been many. In this section some of the most important 
contributions will be reviewed highlighting the lack of a truly global outlook 
as well as the need to further their theoretical depth. Secondly, the critical 
research project will be examined as a way to show the contribution of a 
Gramscian-inspired approach. Thirdly, it will clarify the activities and 
inclinations of global nuclear civil society, which are the object of this study. 
 
																																																						
11	This	argument	will	be	deepened	in	greater	detail	 in	Chapter	Two.	The	problem-solving	vs.	critical	
theory	 divide	 comes	 from	 Robert	 W.	 Cox,	 ‘Social	 Forces,	 States	 and	 World	 Orders:	 Beyond	
International	Relations	Theory,’	Millennium	-	Journal	of	International	Studies	10	n°	2	(1981):	134.	
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1.1.1 Methodological nationalism in nuclear civil society 
research 
A first division can be established between researchers who have looked at 
the domestic level and those who focused on the international one. The 
former, however, is much more developed than the latter, in a reflection of 
the methodological nationalism of nuclear scholarship in general, where 
attention to single countries has overshadowed the study of transnational 
dynamics. Anti-nuclear activism in the US context is an interdisciplinary 
subject of inquiry, which has been tackled by perspectives ranging from 
history to communication studies as well as anthropology. It is relatively well 
studied and various locations have been brought into the framework, from 
the localised movements around the nuclear weapons complex to the political 
circles of Washington’s decision making.12  
The most encompassing work is Lawrence Wittner’s monumental oeuvre 
published in three volumes under the title of The Struggle Against the 
Bomb.13 His writings trace the origins and various developments in the 
community of activists against nuclear weapons, from the origins with the 
calls by prominent scientists, to the emergence of an organised movement in 
																																																						
12 	An	 example	 of	 the	 former	 is	 the	 already	 cited	 Hugh	 Gusterson,	 Nuclear	 Rites:	 A	 Weapons	
Laboratory	at	the	End	of	the	Cold	War.	An	example	of	the	latter	is	David	S.	Meyer,	‘Institutionalizing	
Dissent:	 The	 United	 States	 Structure	 of	 Political	 Opportunity	 and	 the	 End	 of	 the	 Nuclear	 Freeze	
Movement,’	Sociological	Forum	8	n°2	(1993).	
13	Lawrence	Wittner,	 The	 Struggle	 Against	 the	 Bomb:	One	World	 or	 None:	 A	 History	 of	 the	World	
Nuclear	Disarmament	Movement	Through	1953	(Vol.	1	of	The	Struggle	Against	the	Bomb)	(Stanford,	
CA:	Stanford	University	Press,	1993);	Lawrence	Wittner,	Resisting	the	Bomb:	A	History	of	the	World	
Nuclear	Disarmament	Movement,	 1954-1970	 (Vol.	 2	 of	 The	 Struggle	Against	 the	Bomb)	 (Stanford,	
CA:	Stanford	University	Press,	1997);	Lawrence	Wittner,	Toward	Nuclear	Abolition:	A	History	of	the	
World	 Nuclear	 Disarmament	 Movement,	 1971	 to	 the	 Present	 (Vol.	 3	 of	 The	 Struggle	 Against	 the	
Bomb)	 (Stanford,	 CA:	 Stanford	 University	 Press,	 2003).	 His	 work	 is	 also	 summarised	 in	 Lawrence	
Wittner,	 Confronting	 the	 Bomb:	 A	 Short	 History	 of	 the	 World	 Nuclear	 Disarmament	 Movement	
(Stanford,	CA:	Stanford	University	Press,	2009).	
	 21	
the 1950s, its decline and rebirth during the 1980s at the peak of the arms 
race. The importance of Wittner’s historical recollection is complemented 
with a powerful argument for the agency of these non-governmental actors, 
for instance showing the impact of figures such as Linus Pauling. The Nobel 
Prize winner had gathered about 10,000 signatures of scientists concerned 
about atmospheric testing in a petition submitted to the United Nations in 
1958. The initiative is credited for the pressure it put especially on President 
Kennedy, leading the way to the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. 
The world movement against nuclear weapons, according to Wittner, is to be 
credited for the fact that arms control and disarmament measures were 
agreed upon. This claim is extremely powerful and, reading his extensive 
material, often convincing. However, in his analysis the US movement 
remains the main focus and what happens elsewhere seems to be confined in 
a ‘rest of the world’ category. Even beyond him, almost no work has been 
conducted on activism in states other than the US or European countries 
while democratic societies have been prioritised.14  
Which mechanisms make one movement more successful than another is 
also matter of debate among scholars of nuclear civil society: the political 
opportunity structure is the prevailing explanation, but other ideas have been 
put forward. Matthew Evangelista in his Unarmed Forces focused on Cold 
War-era exchanges between individuals and groups from the US and the 
Soviet Union by relating their political structures to the opportunities and 
																																																						
14	David	 S.	Meyer,	 ‘Social	Movements	 and	 Public	 Policy:	 Eggs,	 Chicken,	 and	 Theory,’	CSD	Working	
Paper	 (UC	 Irvine:	 Center	 for	 the	 Study	 of	 Democracy,	 2003);	 Herbert	 P.	 Kitschelt,	 ‘Political	
Opportunity	Structures	and	Political	Protest:	Anti-Nuclear	Movements	in	Four	Democracies,’	British	
Journal	 of	 Political	 Science	 16	 n°	 1	 (1986);	 Lyndon	 Burford,	 ‘Principled	 Pragmatism:	 Non-
Governmental	 Influence	 on	 New	 Zealand	 Nuclear	 Disarmament	 Advocacy	 1995–2000,’	 Global	
Change,	Peace	&	Security	23	n°1	(2011).	
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constraints presented to civil society initiatives. 15  His work certainly 
demonstrates an attention to the international dimension of nuclear civil 
society; however, he concentrated on the conditions of domestic political 
systems that impinge on the movements’ effectiveness globally. In most cases 
of transnational activism, though, drawing a line between the two levels can 
be hard, as they actively influence each other.  
Important sociological work has been conducted, especially in the US, to 
demonstrate the importance of representation practices in the success of a 
certain campaign. Benford applied logics of framing to the nuclear 
disarmament movement, inquiring into what makes actors join movements.16 
He identified the vocabularies of motive, or discourses which provide 
movement actors with compelling rationales to take action on behalf of the 
movement and/or its organizations. The internal divisions within the 
movement were also object of his attention, with a review of inter-
organisational frame disputes.17 Though focusing on organisations opposed 
to nuclear energy rather than weapons, Gamson and Modigliani made a 
significant contribution to this literature. 18  They have studied media 
representations of nuclear power since its invention, historicising the 
interpretive packages that contribute to constructing the meaning of that 
technology. The crucial importance of the media in framing a certain issue 
was demonstrated both in the case of the UK’s Campaign for Nuclear 
																																																						
15	Matthew	Evangelista,	Unarmed	Forces:	The	Transnational	Movement	to	End	the	Cold	War	(Ithaca,	
NY:	Cornell	University	Press,	2002).	
16 	Robert	 D.	 Benford,	 ‘“You	 Could	 Be	 the	 Hundredth	 Monkey”:	 Collective	 Action	 Frames	 and	
Vocabularies	of	Motive	Within	the	Nuclear	Disarmament	Movement,’	The	Sociological	Quarterly	34	
n°	2	(1993).	
17	Robert	D.	Benford,	‘Frame	Disputes	within	the	Nuclear	Disarmament	Movement,’	Social	Forces	71	
n°	3	(1993).		
18	William	A.	Gamson	and	Andre	Modigliani,	‘Media	Discourse	and	Public	Opinion	on	Nuclear	Power:	
A	Constructionist	Approach,’	American	Journal	of	Sociology	95	n°	1	(1989).	
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Disarmament (CND)19 as well as in Germany for a series of security issues.20 
As Chapter Three will clarify in more detail, a discursive approach similar to 
the one proposed by these constructionist sociologists will guide this analysis. 
These contributions are all highly valuable, but they fail to consider the issue 
of nuclear weapons technology in their global character. Certainly the same 
level of detail could not have been achieved in other cases, and this thesis 
does not aim to chronicle the various national civil society movements in 
non-Western contexts. Instead, it wants to pinpoint the commonality in the 
transnational reactions to nuclear weapons. The study of transnational 
nuclear activism, in fact, remains sparse. This is problematic because, 
although domestic decision-making is crucial in understanding nuclear 
politics, these are never just national.21 It was agued in fact that, even with its 
limits, ‘an international society is in the process of being created with its own 
transnational culture – a shared set of norms and meanings that facilitate 
and constrain interactions across national boundaries’.22 The international 
institutions that have produced and sustained multilateral agreements and 
practices are, as for others,23 a central focus for this thesis. It is indeed 
important to purposefully engage with the global level to have an exhaustive 
outlook on nuclear order and the different types of actors it involves. To be 
																																																						
19	Bob	Hodge,	‘Getting	the	Message	Across:	A	Systemic	Analysis	of	Media	Coverage	of	a	CND	March,’	
in	 Language	 and	 the	 Nuclear	 Arms	 Debate:	 Nukespeak	 Today,	 ed.	 Paul	 Chilton	 (London:	 Frances	
Pinter,	1985).	
20	Alice	Holmes	Cooper,	 ‘Media	Framing	and	Social	Movement	Mobilization:	German	Peace	Protest	
against	 INF	Missiles,	 the	 Gulf	War,	 and	NATO	 Peace	 Enforcement	 in	 Bosnia,’	 European	 Journal	 of	
Political	Research	41	n°1	(2002).		
21	Itty	Abraham,	‘The	Ambivalence	of	Nuclear	Histories,’	Osiris	21	n°1	(2006).	
22	Hugh	Gusterson,	Nuclear	Rites:	A	Weapons	Laboratory	at	the	End	of	the	Cold	War,	6.	
23	Andrew	M.	Johnston,	Hegemony	and	Culture	in	the	Origins	of	NATO	Nuclear	First	Use,	1945-1955	
(New	 York:	 Palgrave	 Macmillan,	 2005);	 Keith	 Krause	 and	 Andrew	 Latham,	 ‘Constructing	 Non-
Proliferation	and	Arms	Control:	The	Norms	of	Western	Practice,’	Contemporary	Security	Policy	19	n°	
1	(1998);	Harald	Müller,	‘Justice	in	International	Diplomacy,’	PRIF	Working	Paper	8	(2011).	
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sure civil society is not the only transnational non-governmental actor that 
deserves attention; however, for the purpose of this thesis, multinational 
corporations and the like will be excluded from the analysis.  
 
1.1.2 A transnational phenomenon: global nuclear civil society 
The transnational per se has not received much exploration with regard to 
civil society despite being a central point of reference for most analyses of the 
nuclear order. Jackie Smith and her colleagues, however, did devote some 
attention to the topic. 24  Transnational mobilisation and networking of 
nuclear-concerned civil society were catalysed by the First UN General 
Assembly Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. 25  Since then, 
transnational civil society has increased tremendously, especially during the 
1990s when, following a broader trend, the number of Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) skyrocketed, but it also deepened its involvement in 
formal institutions of nuclear politics with the review and extension of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). While participation in global fora 
has continued and often strengthened since the 1980s, not all nuclear 
campaigns have acquired a transnational dimension: the Nuclear Freeze 
movement, for instance, remained a parallel but distinct struggle on the two 
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sides of the Atlantic.26 Yet, periodic reunions of the NPT have been key in 
bringing together the various national movements and allowing for common 
campaigns. 
As it has been argued, ‘certain institutional settings allow for the 
participation of non-state actors, reflecting an organised part of civil society 
and establishing a transnational public.’ 27  From the NPT to the First 
Committee of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), from the 
General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)28 to 
the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS), 29  most fora of nuclear diplomacy 
include civil society. This is usually done either through the UN Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC) consultative status30 or on an ad hoc basis. 
Global conferences see the participation of NGOs and social movements, but 
also of think tanks and research centres, all of whom absolve some 
information and advocacy functions, conjugated in varying degrees, as will be 
seen later. In their effort to influence the negotiation process at these global 
events, civil society broadly defined engages diplomats from the various 
national delegations to convince them to take on board their views, which 
generally translates in a specific wording in some official text. The linguistic 
																																																						
26	David	 Cortright	 and	 Ron	 Pagnucco,	 ‘Limits	 to	 Transnationalism:	 The	 1980s	 Freeze	 Campaign,’	 in	
Transnational	 Social	 Movements	 and	 Global	 Politics:	 Solidarity	 Beyond	 the	 State,	 eds.	 Smith,	
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element of this specific type of activism should be kept in mind in this study, 
as it is one of the drivers behind its attention to discourse. 
Beyond being involved as independent entities, civil society has a particularly 
interesting relation with the state. Indeed, on the one hand, transnational 
activists have often partnered up with like-minded states producing positive 
results for both: ‘while NGOs gained access to negotiations, states could point 
to the legitimacy of their efforts by relying on the support of civil society.’31 
Civil society sometimes acquires even greater access to multilateral 
negotiations by participating in national delegations.32 These experts are 
generally researchers working in academia or think tanks who serve as 
consultants, in cases for several review cycles, gaining higher levels of 
expertise than their colleagues in the delegation. Such a practice not only 
allows big states to have an extra set of hands and an external opinion, but 
also feeds the thin ranks of delegations that do not have national experts in 
the field.  
The literature has been rather concerned with the effectiveness of 
transnational civil society. According to Atwood, anti-nuclear activism 
success depends not only upon its ability to provide an innovative 
contribution, but also on its professionalism, credibility, and basic 
understanding of the system.33 This project is not interested in assessing the 
effectiveness of civil society, firstly because it believes it cannot be inferred 
from a set of variables and secondly for it simply wants to raise different 
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33	David	C.	Atwood,	‘Mobilizing	around	the	United	Nations	Special	Sessions	on	Disarmament.’	
	 27	
issues. A campaign, group, or call should be placed within its historical 
context in order to assess the conditions of possibility to which they are 
subject. Instead of focusing on their activities or constituencies, an avenue 
that promises to shed more light on the politics of civil society is analysing 
their ideological orientations if we are to assess the construction of a 
movement that could help transform the meaning of nuclear weapons.  
In the nuclear civil society research programme much more should be done 
in terms of empirical investigation at the transnational level. The 
methodological nationalism of nuclear studies has long been recognised as a 
problem, which will be addressed here. While there has been work on 
transnational movements – both at the sub- and supra-state level – as well as 
on discursive practices, the two approaches have thus far not been adequately 
integrated. The present project aims to rectify this through a dialogue 
between the literature on nuclear weapons and transnational civil society that 
finds its theoretical scaffolding in the thought of Antonio Gramsci34 and the 
critical constructivist approach. Though the specifics of the analysis of 
discourse, frames, and ideological representations will be further detailed in 
Chapter Three, the next section starts diving into the relevance of Gramsci to 
this theoretical approach by contrasting it with competing accounts of a 
rather similar reality. 
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1.1.3 Locating a critical approach to global nuclear civil society 
A vision of the discursive dimension of civil society working on nuclear 
politics at the global level is far from being well explored. However, this has 
been done to a certain extent in a few works that draw upon different critical 
theorists raising a number of valid points but also, each in their own way, 
lacking in some respect. By examining them in turn, it will be argued that the 
insights of another philosopher, Antonio Gramsci, hold the potential for a 
reappraisal of some of their arguments.  
Among global nuclear civil society, this thesis is concerned with the groups 
involved in the NPT, an approach taken by only one book so far. In Civil 
Society and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Claudia Kissling assesses the 2005 
NPT Review Conference based upon the potential for these groups to 
contribute to deliberative democracy by applying concepts drawn from 
Jürgen Habermas’ theory of communicative action.35  Kissling tested the 
prospects for regime building and democratization of civil society 
participation in multilateral decision-making by looking at collaboration 
mechanisms involving international organizations and civil society groups. 
She expected to find that, by being part of the process and having a say, civil 
society could potentially succeed in advancing its agenda if it made sure that 
its priorities get included in the policy process.  
Following Habermasian social theory, the ability to produce an acceptable 
frame becomes front and centre of the analysis. More theoretically rich work 
on this was conducted by other German constructivists, including prominent 
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nuclear scholar Harald Müller, arguing that rationalist analyses of bargaining 
had to be complemented with a focus on the process of arguing.36 Surely 
rationalists’ avoidance of communication did leave a logical gap that had to 
be filled, given that not all situations could be ascribed to a rational bargain 
among actors. However, the discourse ethics approach based on Habermas 
does not represent the best option because it misleadingly leads to look for an 
‘ideal speech situation’ that constitutes precisely an ideal, rather than a 
reality. It is indeed important, like these scholars recommend, to inquire into 
the content of the discourse, but much more should be done to understand 
the context in which it is produced.  
To go back to Kissling’s argument, of her four criteria – access, transparency, 
responsiveness, and inclusion – she found that none was truly in place, thus 
hampering civil society’s ability to affect the 2005 NPT Review Conferences 
(NPT RevCon) negotiation. ‘There is no guarantee that an equal exchange of 
arguments took place by which at the end the best argument carries the 
day,’ 37  she argues, demonstrating something that hardly needed any 
empirical proof: the NPT (among other diplomatic fora) is not an equal 
playing field and the best argument often fails. On the one hand, access is not 
always granted because of the mainly intergovernmental nature of the NPT 
and because of the secrecy surrounding nuclear and security decision-
making. On the other hand, Kissling’s assumption that deliberation could 
prevail over bargaining, and thus actors would attempt to seek the truth 
instead of advantages, demonstrates all its problems. Establishing such a 
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division in the modalities of diplomatic interaction simply brings her to deny 
her starting assumption when finding that ‘several States were reluctant to 
open up to true deliberation’.38  
Deliberative democracy is not a good basis to start observing the NPT, 
because it is very far from being a democratic practice. The Habermasian 
framework she employs is in fact ill-suited for such a situation where 
positions of power are not checked at the door, as the Frankfurt scholar 
posited. What is lacking in Kissling's account is precisely the attention to the 
power dimension of civil society, whose communicative actions are not linked 
to the materiality of their position within the system of other actors at the 
NPT RevCon. Beyond realising that a certain public sphere does not conform 
to the ideal standard of deliberative democracy dictated by the theory, this 
gives little indication of the politics that happen within it. Both accounts 
based on Habermas and on Gramsci would agree that the public sphere is a 
site of interaction, whether primarily consensual or conflictual.39  Yet, a 
Gramscian reading is better suited to reveal the power at play in such 
rhetorical encounters because it combines the study of representational 
practices with the analysis of institutional bases of power. Both are needed if 
we want to assess the political role of a certain player, in this case nuclear 
civil society.  
A different perspective has been advanced by Senn and Elhardt, who 
employed yet a different discursive perspective, drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s 
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social theory.40 They have shown ‘how powerful actors can shape our thinking 
and policies in the realm of nuclear weapons’41 by looking at the so-called 
four horsemen initiative. Since their first call for nuclear disarmament in 
2007, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, with 
their high-ranking past in the national administration, have been uniquely 
able to spread their message. Accordingly, not all disarmament calls are the 
same, as much depends on the Bourdieusian concept of ‘symbolic capital’. 
Moreover, they argue, a ‘doxic battle’ is in action, between alternative 
conceptions of the value of nuclear weapons in which certain ideas are taken 
for granted. Dominant discursive patterns, in fact, are not a fixed field, rather 
animated by struggles over conceptions. While their symbolic capital makes 
George Shultz and his colleagues heard in the doxic battle over the value of 
nuclear weapons, what makes them understood is the provision of an 
appealing narrative that combines established and new discourses.  
It is precisely this combination that is of interest for the present study, in that 
it follows the assumption that the ideological apparatus plays a significant 
role in the endurance of a certain system. The taken-for-granted ‘doxa’ tends 
to replicate itself, while the spontaneous inclinations rooted in a certain 
habitus feeds those practices that strengthen and sustain it. The superior 
status of certain actors and their narratives is thus recognised here, in 
contrast to Kissling’s work. Bourdieu, however, does not provide conceptual 
tools to understand transformation, lacking a theory of change. In fact, his 
assessment of cultural domination led to a pessimistic outlook on collective 
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action. 42  Whereas for Bourdieu all working class consciousness is false 
consciousness, Gramsci sees potential for emancipation in the production of 
counterhegemonic narratives. 43  Importantly, Gramsci shows that 
counterhegemonic struggles hold the potential to challenge the dominant 
common sense with alternative conceptions and institutions, which can only 
develop in civil society.44 According to him, the ideological construction that 
replicates the structure of forces with its mechanisms of domination can be 
overcome through critical thinking. 45  Gramscian common sense is the 
channel of cultural domination, yet actors can realise it and overcome it, 
which allows for agency and transformation. 
Through a conceptualisation of cultural domination drawn from Gramsci, we 
can come to a better understanding of civil society as the site of discursive 
perpetuation, but also of metamorphosis. If in this site hegemony finds its 
discursive fuel, it is also where counter-hegemonic movements emerge. 
Going back to the issue of nuclear discourse that means that the 
pronouncements of public figures like the four horsemen should be examined 
to see not only whether their discourses are relevant to a certain 
constituency, as done by Senn and Elhardt, but also and most importantly 
whether they are for or against hegemony. A discourse analysis that is 
centred on the domination of a certain frame of mind makes way for criticism 
of those positions that are most aligned with the prevailing order. At the 
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same time, it is necessary to identify the emerging alternatives and assess 
their strength.  
To be sure, critical works have generally noted nuclear civil society’s lack of 
autonomy and radical potential, thus denying the possibility of 
transformation. In fact, it was argued that the discursive system would be 
closed to challenges. Those who are more critical will lack access and 
resources, while organisations advocating marginal improvements should be 
the majority – what Deudney calls ‘the legions of state-supported and state-
supporting experts.’46 To shed light on this issue it is interesting to turn to the 
insights by Craig and Ruzicka on what they call the ‘non-proliferation 
complex’.47 They argue that the array of non-governmental groups backing 
non-proliferation are a source of support for misguided global nuclear 
politics, having accepted the dominant concept of nuclear regulation with a 
strong emphasis on non-proliferation and nuclear arsenals’ reductions.  
According to Craig and Ruzicka this results from a practice started during the 
Cold War when the non-proliferation complex did not feel able to discuss 
nuclear disarmament, given the status of tensions between the Soviet Union 
and the United States. In the post-Cold War period there was an attempt to 
bring the discussion back to the need for the NPT-recognised Nuclear 
Weapon States (NWS) to eliminate nuclear weapons, but in order to maintain 
the treaty this was swiftly dropped. Shy of supporting atomic abolition these 
groups focus on more proximate aims such as ‘ensuring nonproliferation 
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among the smaller states that appeared interested in acquiring the bomb, and 
stabilising and even reducing superpower arsenals by means of treaties.’48 In 
doing so they have refrained from criticising nuclear weapons modernisation 
projects and applauded initiatives that were far from revolutionary, while at 
the same time managing consistent sums of money often granted by NWS or 
powerful mainstream foundations. The result of this, they maintain, 
contributes to making the problem unsolvable: 
by refusing to challenge the interests of the nuclear haves, and hence 
advocating policies that cannot succeed, it is helping to entrench the 
permanent nuclearization of international politics—precisely the outcome 
that the original founders of the NPT were so determined to prevent.49 
Their approach is extremely valuable for a set of reasons. Firstly it is very 
relevant to put the issue of nongovernmental support for dominant mind-sets 
regarding the natural and desirable route of nuclear governance, something 
that this thesis also does. Moreover, the types of nuclear regulation that they 
identify are broadly consistent with the ones that guide the present analysis 
of the structures of nuclear order. In particular, tracing the distinction 
between reduction and abolition of nuclear weapons, as will be seen later, is a 
critical cleavage that deserves more attention, notably as it is an issue that 
still seems to be confused by practitioners and academics alike. Finally, one 
can certainly agree with the need to criticise even those actors that would at a 
first analysis seem the most worthy of appreciation, with a view to 
understand the real character of their activism.  
What is troubling in their analysis, however, is the unproblematic lumping 
together of all ‘academic programmes, think tanks, NGOs, charitable 
																																																						
48	Craig	and	Ruzicka,	‘Who's	In,	Who's	Out?,’	37.	
49	Craig	and	Ruzicka,	‘The	Nonproliferation	Complex,’	337.	
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foundations and government departments’ 50  committed to reducing the 
nuclear danger. While the points Craig and Ruzicka make surely apply to a 
certain subset of these organisations, it is surprising that they do not 
acknowledge the internal variety of the non-proliferation complex. There are 
several issues to be taken with this community and this thesis aims to 
contribute to this emerging discussion, but there is a need to look more 
closely at the different groups to understand whether what they do supports 
or challenges the prevailing order. It is with this intent that this thesis will 
attempt to map what Ruzicka and Craig have called the non-proliferation 
complex, or what could be termed global nuclear civil society. What Gramsci 
would add to their perspective is a differentiated analysis of its hegemonic 
character. 
In sum, a critical Gramscian-inspired approach can provide a view of nuclear 
civil society attentive to the politics of its discursive struggle, mindful of 
inequalities in power relations, but also open to the possibility of 
transformation. In order to unravel the struggles of global nuclear civil 
society it is important to explore not only its historical roots but also the main 
divisions cutting across the community more broadly.  
This long section has embedded the current approach in some of the most 
important contributions on the theme of global nuclear civil society. Despite 
being actively present in nuclear politics both in the domestic field and in 
diplomatic negotiations, civil society’s role is relatively unexplored.51 This 
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51	There	are	a	number	of	exceptions	but	their	number	and	comprehensiveness	pales	in	comparison	
to	 works	 that	 looked	 at	 governmental	 actors.	 Some	 of	 them	 are	 the	 already	 cited	 Evangelista,	
Unarmed	Forces:	The	Transnational	Movement	to	End	the	Cold	War;	Wittner,	Confronting	the	Bomb:	
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section has first made the case for a transnational approach. Secondly, it has 
identified the contribution of approaching the issue from a Gramscian 
perspective. Analyses of civil society in nuclear politics would benefit from an 
increase in their theoretical depth, and particularly from a more thorough 
engagement with constructivist and critical scholars who have provided 
insights into the normative, identity, and discursive elements of nuclear 
politics. Such is the approach taken by this project. Furthermore, although 
certain works have touched upon civil society’s ideological dimension, this 
remained a superficial endeavour and authors have not detailed its internal 
differentiation.52  
 
 
1.2 Research design 
This thesis aims to locate the agency of civil society within the global 
governance of nuclear weapons. It does so by taking an enlarged outlook 
towards the regulation of nuclear weapons, one that exceeds the prevalent 
notion of the non-proliferation regime, and through a critical constructivist 
approach influenced by Antonio Gramsci’s thought. On the one hand, 
conceiving of nuclear order as a complex system differentiated according to 
the reliance on nuclear weapons allows focusing on the varying attitudes of 
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52	Craig	and	Ruzicka,	 ‘The	Nonproliferation	Complex,’	and	Claudia	Kissling,	Civil	Society	and	Nuclear	
Non-proliferation.	This	point	will	be	taken	up	again	in	Chapter	Six	with	reference	to	the	useful	work	
by	Jeffrey	W.	Knopf,	‘NGOs,	Social	Movements,	and	Arms	Control,’	in	Arms	Control:	History,	Theory,	
and	 Policy,	Vol.	 1,	 	eds.	 Robert	 E.	Williams	 Junior	 and	 Paul	 R.	 Viotti	 (Santa	 Barbara,	 CA:	 Praeger,	
2012).	
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actors as well as understanding the sources of potential shifts. On the other, 
the theoretical approach employed builds upon existing debates in nuclear 
studies, security studies, and civil society research that focused analysis on 
representation practices. As such, this thesis primarily contributes to studies 
of nuclear civil society, but its contribution also rests on the dialogue it 
engages among different literatures.  
The innovative reading of nuclear civil society provided here builds upon an 
understanding of the nuclear condition influenced by critical nuclear 
scholarship and critical constructivist approaches to international security. 
Both have employed to a certain extent insights borrowed from Antonio 
Gramsci to make the case for the cultural nature of domination and a need to 
be attentive to discourses, narratives, and ideologies. The analytical 
framework of Chapter Five will further detail how those approaches are 
consistent with one another, but for now it is important to state that such a 
conjunction allows us to make a double move that: (a) escapes the economic 
centrality of Gramsci through the recourse to critical constructivist work on 
security and (b) overcomes the latter’s prioritisation of elite discourse thanks 
to a view of civil society inspired by Gramsci. Taking up Stuart Hall’s 
invitation to think in a Gramscian way,53 this thesis argues that researching 
civil society is crucial to understand the bases for the maintenance of nuclear 
weapons.  
This thesis will thus ask what role global nuclear civil society plays in the 
maintenance and contestation of the nuclear common sense. Such a 
perspective promises to give a deeper understanding of the multiple ways in 
																																																						
53	Stuart	Hall,	‘Postscript:	Gramsci	and	Us,’	in	Gramsci’s	Political	Thought:	An	Introduction,	eds.	
Roger	Simon	(London:	Lawrence	and	Wishart,	1991),	129.	
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which civil society intrudes in global nuclear governance as well as to escape 
some of the limitations with similar works on the subject. Through a 
prioritisation of the global level, it will inquire into a nuclear reality that is 
broader than a sum of national policies. Moreover, a Gramscian reading of 
civil society with a solid critical constructivist theoretical framework will 
bring attention to the issue of public acceptance of subordination. Critically 
inquiring into nuclear disarmament calls by global civil society groups can 
shed light on the complicity of some non-governmental actors to the 
prevailing system. 
The next sections will show how that question has been answered by this 
thesis so as to guide the reader in navigating this text. The first section 
clarifies the argument and contribution, the second explains the case study 
selection, and the third outlines the methodology employed. Finally, a 
chapter outline delineates the various phases through which the argument is 
built. 
 
1.2.1 Argument and contribution 
The thesis seeks to empirically demonstrate that behind global nuclear civil 
society lies a deep division in the assessments of the value of nuclear 
weapons. Indeed, civil society’s struggle for nuclear disarmament hides an 
internal struggle over the same meaning of nuclear disarmament, which for 
some refers to reducing stockpiles, while for others to abolishing them 
altogether. The varying construction of disarmament adopted by civil society 
is illustrative of the overall global domination of a culture that sees nuclear 
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weapons as a security enhancer, what Booth would call nuclearism.54 By 
analysing those portrayals of disarmament we can find how far they are from 
representing its logical opposite, deterrence.  
An ideological analysis of civil society along the deterrence-disarmament 
continuum is an important perspective on nuclear order more broadly, 
because it encapsulates the same central cleavage of global nuclear 
diplomacy. That is to say that, like states that occupy a place in the nuclear 
order according to the value they see in nuclear weapons, this same division 
occurs at the level of civil society, in which certain counter-hegemonic groups 
challenge the nuclear common sense while others contribute to reinforcing it. 
What will be argued here is that the support basis for nuclear deterrence goes 
well beyond the usual suspects – so much so that it includes many 
representatives of civil society, even some of those who advocate 
disarmament. That promises to show that, beyond the immediate coercive 
nature of nuclear deterrence, there is an important consensual component 
that lies in the common belief in its necessity for the maintenance of nuclear 
order. 
The argument of this thesis is that civil society is not, as one might expect, a 
dominated actor within the governance of nuclear weapons, but rather it is 
enmeshed in an unequal relation of forces, which it contributes to 
symbolically reproducing. Civil society comes here to be seen as an integral 
part of the state, crucial for its material but also ideological configuration. 
This project contests the notion of civil society as an inconsequential actor of 
nuclear politics. Instead, here it is conceived of as that part of the state which 
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legitimates and replicates the dominant social relations, while also holding 
the potential for radical change.  
 
1.2.2 Case study selection 
This thesis seeks to find the place that civil society and its intellectual 
apparatus have in the governance of nuclear weapons in constructing, 
challenging, and debunking its ideological architecture. The struggle that 
interests this project is the one happening at the transnational level involving 
civil society’s effort to shift the discourse around what nuclear weapons mean 
for security. A way of looking at the interplay between governance, ideas, and 
civil society is to analyse the diplomatic process and the extent of 
contestation present therein. Whilst analysing a national reality allows for a 
deeper understanding of the nuclear ideology in its various faces, one that 
includes the direct voices of the nuclear industry, military ranks, etc., the 
preference for a transnational approach rests on the intent to highlight a 
global dynamic.55 Therefore, the object of this study is not on the various 
types of private actors active on nuclear politics, but rather those organised 
groups that work on those issues transnationally. 
In an effort to debunk the prevailing conceptualisation of nuclear order as 
centred on the non-proliferation regime, the empirical focus of this thesis is 
on its very heart, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in which we aim to 
locate global nuclear civil society. The NPT is in fact one of the oldest and 
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interests	 of	 the	 military	 and	 of	 influential	 private	 actors	 can	 weight,	 though	 often	 that	 inpus	 is	
unacknowledged.	
	 41	
most subscribed institutions of global nuclear regulation, which established 
the norm of non-proliferation since its entry into force in 1970.56 Since the 
nuclear order’s central cleavage is between the haves and have-nots (or those 
with or without the bomb), the NPT is the best location to study it given its 
role in establishing that divide. Setting a clear distinction between states that 
were permitted to have nuclear weapons and all the others that were 
expected to abstain, the NPT established the main roles of the struggle for 
nuclear order. It mandated the former NWS to keep the bomb technology for 
themselves, while all the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) commit not to 
seek it. In exchange the NWS promised to encourage cooperation on the 
peaceful applications of nuclear technology and to eventually disarm. Such an 
unequal commitment has held through more than four decades, and its 
subscribers grew ever more numerous. At the time of writing only five states 
are not parties to the NPT: four whose nuclear capability is not recognised by 
the treaty and one of recent independence. 57 
The NPT’s centrality as a legal instrument, despite those significant outliers, 
is compounded by its crucial role as a deliberative forum. The NPT holds 
Review Conferences every five years and yearly Preparatory Committees, 
where there is an established tradition of scholars engaged in participatory 
observation researches.58 These periodic conferences provide an opportunity 
																																																						
56	For	the	text	of	the	treaty,	see	United	Nations	Office	for	Disarmament	Affairs,	‘Text	of	the	Treaty,’	
Treaty	 on	 the	 Non-Proliferation	 of	 Nuclear	 Weapons,	
https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text		(last	accessed	9	October	2016).	
57	These	are	India,	Israel,	North	Korea,	and	Pakistan	for	the	former	and	South	Sudan	for	the	latter.	As	
of	 October	 2016,	 191	 states	 are	 parties	 to	 the	 NPT,	 see	 United	 Nations	 Office	 for	 Disarmament	
Affairs,	 ‘Status	 of	 the	 Treaty,’	 Treaty	 on	 the	 Non-Proliferation	 of	 Nuclear	 Weapons,	
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt	(last	accessed	9	October	2016).	
58	Some	 examples	 are	 the	many	works	 by	 participants	 in	multiple	 RevCons	 and	 PrepComs,	 Harald	
Müller	 (one	 of	 the	 latest	 being	 Harald	 Müller,	 ‘The	 NPT	 Review	 Process	 and	 Strengthening	 the	
Treaty:	Disarmament,’	EU	Non-Proliferation	Consortium,	Non-Proliferation	Papers	10	(2012))	and	Bill	
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for the NWS and NNWS to discuss and deliberate the future of the treaty, 
potentially deciding on ways to favour its implementation. It seems useful, in 
fact, to conceptualise the meetings of the NPT as the reunions of a 
community of practice that contributes to the permanence of the treaty and 
its associated norms. Those negotiations are taken here to be a key analytical 
opening into the establishment, permanence, and transformation of those 
armed and disarmed subject positions. Through their rhetorical encounters 
state representatives contribute to crystallise the meaning the bomb has for 
their security as well as its intersubjective global meaning. The NPT meetings 
can indeed be seen as a ritualised stage where agents act off their identities 
gaining a sense of ontologic security, as conceptualised by Jasper.59 
The world community of professionals of nuclear policy brought together at 
the NPT is crucial in the definition and constitution of the NPT and of what is 
meant by it. This community is composed of national diplomats, UN officials, 
and, importantly, non-governmental representatives, all of whom tend to 
travel from one to the other venue of global nuclear diplomacy. To be sure the 
NPT is not the only space in which the same interaction can be observed, 
with other options including the afore-mentioned fora where nuclear 
diplomacy is made. However, the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament 
(CD) and the Vienna-based IAEA summits suffer from limited 
representation, which makes them worse options. The UNGA First 
Committee and other UN bodies, moreover, do not mandate anything that is 
legally binding, thus reducing to an extent the heat of the debate. Further 
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alternatives like the Nuclear Security Summits and the Humanitarian 
Initiative conferences were also considered, but ultimately discarded for the 
excessive specificity of their focus. 
The NPT is an optimal place to look, in a Gramscian way, at hegemony in 
action, or the ability to command consensus without the exercise of coercion. 
The study of consensus is particularly appropriate to the analysis of 
multilateral diplomacy given the importance that finding solutions that are 
acceptable to everyone has there. The creation of consensus within the 
nuclear governance structures can be taken as a measure of the minimum 
shared understandings of that mechanism’s states parties. In the case of the 
NPT reunions, as with most negotiations, this means reaching a solution that 
no state would block, because everyone can live with it. In the NPT, 
justificatory discourse is put forward and the deliberation process is aimed at 
producing consensus documents which can be seen as mutually accepted 
sources of authority.  
At a deeper level, however, common sense cannot be established exclusively 
within diplomatic practice and discourse. If we are to look at the established 
policy of a state, it would make sense to look at the discourse of its key 
decision makers. Indeed, it has been remarked that ‘[n]uclear weapons 
politics and discourse provides an excellent subject for study.’ 60  Policy 
discourse by elites has always been taken to be relevant for nuclear studies, 
but recently scholars have also investigated popular culture representations, 
as in Mutimer’s comparison of cinematographic depictions of the bomb with 
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the more traditional discourse uttered by policy makers,61 or Taylor’s analysis 
of post-Cold War nuclear iconography. 62 As Ulla Jaspers maintains, ‘non-
official societal sources such as newspapers articles or statements by 
influential pressure groups and even pop-cultural representations also 
contribute to and shape the larger discourse by making particular modes of 
thinking and acting intelligible’.63 
In effect, to reveal common sense one cannot keep within bounds of official 
pronouncements, but should enlarge the gaze to the wider, popular 
interpretation instead. This does not mean looking for cultural products that 
reference the NPT, as hardly anything would make the cut; rather, it requires 
looking at all those actors that are not decision makers, all the rest of the 
state that is not its bureaucracy. Civil society representatives attending the 
NPT are definitely ‘actors that possess expertise central to the act of 
governing’.64 In that spirit this project privileges the analysis of civil society 
discourses and practices. The groups examined here are many and highly 
diversified, including, among others, international campaigns, social 
movements, NGOs, religious movements, professional associations, think 
tanks, foundations, 65  and prominent individuals. This is taken to be a 
significant sample of the transnational movement lobbying for some changes 
to nuclear governance, thus the most relevant actors for the kinds of 
diplomatic-cultural shifts discussed here. 
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The NPT does include a strong civil society participation, making it possible 
to pinpoint their narratives and practices, so as to assess the extent of their 
norm-building potential but also, crucially, of their counter-hegemonic 
nature. Although the involvement of civil society there has its limits, it is 
interesting to study the ways in which it intrudes into the formal negotiation 
process. For our analysis the limitation will be to those groups and 
individuals that are active at the transnational level, and in particular within 
the NPT process. Due to the detachment between a disengaged public 
opinion and an organised civil society activism, applying to the nuclear 
sphere too broad a definition of civil society runs against the problem of 
including groups of actors that are incomparable. While clearly this very 
limiting view of nuclear civil society is problematic, it is also an optimal test 
for the efficacy of the analytical framework.  
This project is concerned with those non-governmental groups and 
individuals that have an active role in the NPT by closely studying their 
behaviour at the 2015 NPT RevCon with an ethnographic approach. On a 
mild New York spring day of 2015 the Ninth Review Conference of the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty opened its doors, starting four weeks of 
diplomatic wrangling concerning the ways to regulate the nuclear order. 
From the early morning of April 27, the halls and corridors of the United 
Nations building were crowded with the world leaders who delivered their 
countries’ opening speeches, but also with those diplomats, activists, and 
experts who in various corners of the world work on nuclear weapons 
politics. If John Kerry, Federica Mogherini, Javad Zarif and the like would 
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soon leave the stage, governmental and non-governmental representatives 
would stay on.  
Those attending, indeed, included not only diplomats in charge of 
disarmament issues, but also hundreds of civil society representatives that, 
with varying perspectives, have a stake in global nuclear politics. Such a 
community is not entirely populated by the anti-nuclear activists one would 
generally expect. To be sure, there were marches for nuclear disarmament 
and a few demonstrations outside the UN gates, but most of the civil society 
involvement is in the room, shoulder to shoulder with diplomats and 
international public servants. Presided over by Ambassador Taous Feroukhi 
of Algeria, the four weeks of Review Conference saw the two attempting, each 
in their own way, to leave a mark on the negotiation and the ensuing Final 
Document. This transnational diplomatic process constitutes the central 
empirical preoccupation of the present work because, through that, it aims to 
say something broader about the place of civil society in the global nuclear 
order. 
Building upon its author’s direct participation in the 2015 conference, this 
work provides original empirical material on civil society at the NPT. This is 
expected to contribute to the understanding, on the one hand, of the 
actorness of civil society in global nuclear politics and, on the other, of the 
NPT and its review process as an expression of the broader governance of 
nuclear weapons. After having identified what this thesis analyses, the next 
section is devoted to explain how the research was conducted. 
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1.2.3 Methodology 
This work is inscribed in the tradition of studies of determined communities 
of practice within the nuclear reality. If Carol Cohn’s emphasis is on defence 
intellectuals 66  and Hugh Gusterson’s research has concerned national 
laboratories’ employees, 67  still more needs to be understood about the 
involvement of certain professional communities with a particularly 
prominent position in constructing the meaning of nuclear weapons and their 
associated policy options. Similarly to their approaches this thesis studies the 
discourses put forward by nuclear communities in order to understand the 
culture of the groups under examination. If culture is ‘a shared system of 
embedded meanings that shape and is shaped through interaction’68 it is 
necessary to get to the roots of those ‘meanings,’ but also to explore the 
‘interaction’ from nearby. For this project that has meant an attempt to get 
close to civil society active on nuclear issues and to join it in participating in 
the NPT reunions. 
The methodological choices of this project, in line with the interpretivist 
scholarship in which it is ingrained, are entirely qualitative, relying on in-
depth research into the various organisations active at the margins of the 
NPT gatherings. This involved analysing campaign materials, websites, 
YouTube channels, and other kinds of publications, but most importantly 
getting to see them in action and speaking to them face to face. The main data 
gathering techniques employed are participant observation and focused 
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interviews. A quantitative toolbox would have been unfit to the task given the 
interest in the cultural environment of the NPT negotiations that civil society 
attempts to influence.  
For the same reasons, it was deemed necessary to attend the deliberations 
and speak to as many representatives as possible adopting an approach that 
is heavily indebted to ethnographic research.69 The main fieldwork lasted 
over four months divided in two stays in New York to attend the entire 
proceedings first of the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) and 
then of the 2015 Review Conference. Through this sustained presence the 
author managed to listen to the voices of a majority of NPT-registered 
organisations and interview representatives of over twenty organisations, or a 
total of forty people.70 Further interviews were also conducted in other parts 
of the North East of the United States in the same period. Moreover, the 
author participated in a host of other meetings, both sponsored and attended 
by global nuclear civil society throughout the course of the doctoral project. 
Owing to the methodology employed, this research poses some challenges, 
which should be unpacked.  
This thesis relies on data acquired through participant observation and 
focused interviews because of the advantage they present in terms of 
understanding the issue at hand. In particular, as opposed to an archival 
work that would tell us something about the history of civil society activism, 
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participant observation and interviews document the struggles of today – for 
which there is not yet an archive – by recording live voices and practices. 
Though other methods could have been employed to gather the necessary 
data, for example oral history interviews71, building an archive of the voices 
of nuclear civil society would have been a task too extensive for the time and 
resources available. 
Participant observation holds multiple advantages in comparison to other 
methods of data collection. As Neumann has shown with his work, 
understanding the ‘microphysics of power’ that underlie the process of 
speech writing by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway could not be 
done at the same level of complexity from an isolated academic position.72 
There are processes in which a researcher needs to be immersed in order to 
ask insightful questions on identity, power struggles, and practices of 
collective action. The author observed global nuclear civil society in action by 
participating in dozens of meetings organised at the margins of the NPT 2014 
PrepCom and 2015 RevCon, in which civil society had a voice, as well as 
witnessing first-hand their roles in the official process – as speakers, 
advisors, advocates, and more. 
Furthermore, a direct and tailored contact with the agents under examination 
was revealed necessary to understand the reasons for certain strategic and 
rhetorical choices, through semi-structured in-depth interviews. Talking to 
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production	 of	 such	 texts	 a	 collective	 project	 which	 values	 continuity	 and	 special	 interest	 at	 the	
expense	 of	 content	 and	 audience	 reaction.	 Iver	 B.	 Neumann,	 ‘“A	 Speech	 That	 the	 Entire	Ministry	
May	Stand	For,”	or:	Why	Diplomats	Never	Produce	Anything	New,’	International	Political	Sociology	1	
n°	2	(2007).	
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representatives from civil society, national delegations, and UN officials was 
crucial to triangulate the answers provided and make sure that facts were not 
being misrepresented. While their semi-structured character makes 
comparison across interviews or cases somewhat challenging and the 
cacophony of the field at times overwhelming, it also allowed conducting 
different kinds of conversations with people who had disparate positions. As 
opposed to what could be learned by passing around surveys to selected 
leaders of civil society, in-depth interviews, accompanied by a sustained 
presence in the room where engagement happens, give a more accurate 
account of the very cultural processes that this thesis investigates. 
The almost ethnographic methodology of this thesis appears to be the best 
way to gain an understanding of the cultural milieu in which civil society 
tackles nuclear issues. It is referred to as almost ethnographic because the 
personal experience makes the author an unlikely anthropologist of the 
community at hand.73 Having studied nuclear issues since 2005 and worked 
in this sector since 2010, the author cannot claim the level of ‘alien-ness’ that 
seems to be the golden rule of anthropological investigation.74 This would be 
																																																						
73	It	 is	 important	 at	 this	 stage	 to	 note	 that	 there	 is	 an	 ethical	 dimension	 in	 the	 present	 research,	
which	 deserves	 some	 breaking	 down.	 This	 thesis	 has	 been	 written	 over	 the	 course	 of	 four	 years	
between	2012	and	2016,	however	many	of	the	sources	and	interviewees	were	already	known	to	the	
author	before.	In	2010	the	author	had	served	as	a	diplomatic	assistant	at	the	Permanent	Mission	of	
Italy	 to	 the	United	Nations	 in	New	 York,	working	with	 several	 disarmament	 and	 non-proliferation	
dossiers,	 including	participating	in	the	2010	NPT	Review	Conference.	Moreover,	the	author	worked	
during	the	period	of	the	PhD	with	other	organisations	that	are	involved	with	nuclear	politics,	notably	
the	Peace	Research	Institute	Frankfurt	and	the	Pugwash	Conferences	on	Science	and	World	Affairs	
and	 had	 assiduous	 contacts	 with	 several	 more.	 If	 that	 allowed	 for	 an	 unprecedented	 access	 to	
diplomats,	UN	officials,	 and	NGO	 representatives	during	 the	main	 fieldwork	phase	 in	2015,	 it	 also	
created	 some	 unease	 as	 to	 the	 role	 that	was	 played	 at	 that	 specific	moment.	 To	 offset	 that,	 the	
author	has	strived	to	maintain	critical	distance	from	all	the	initiatives	under	examination,	refraining	
from	 joining	 either	 of	 the	main	 organisations	 discussed	 and	 only	 offering	 her	work	 after	 her	 PhD	
scholarship	had	expired	and	most	of	her	fieldwork	had	been	concluded.	
74	For	a	discussion	on	the	themes	of	proximity	and	distance,	see	Chapters	5	and	6	in	Claudia	Aradau,	
Jef	Huysmans,	Andrew	Neal,	 and	Nadine	Voelkner,	Critical	 Security	Methods:	New	Frameworks	 for	
Analysis	(London:	Routledge,	2014).	
	 51	
seen by some as a risky strategy that might make her blind to digging deeper 
in the meaning of things and deaf to the taken-for-granted assumptions that 
resonate in the community researched.  
However, there are several counter-points that can be raised in terms of 
access, power relations, experience, and reflexivity. First of all, any 
investigation, but particularly those on secretive fields such as diplomatic 
communities, suffers from problems of access that can be solved if one is to 
focus on familiar spaces. In the case of this research it would have been 
nearly impossible to sit in meetings, interview people, and generally be 
present to observe civil society in its everyday diplomatic engagement 
without the network established through the years. Being known to the 
community allowed the author to ‘disappear’ in the crowd in a way that 
would not have been available to a ‘stranger’.  
Secondly, when researching the behaviour of elites, it is easy to fall into 
power relations adverse to the researcher, given the advantage they tend to 
have in terms of economic, political, and social capital. One way to contrast 
this tendency is compensating in terms of intellectual capital by showing a 
deep knowledge of the issues at hand and an ability to speak the jargon 
required, as Carol Cohn’s path-breaking research demonstrated.75 As she has 
acknowledged, ‘the comfort of studying an external objectified “them”’	76 is 
something that even an external researcher cannot cling to for more than a 
limited time. 
Lastly, but most importantly, what makes any researcher distant from its 
object of study stems more from a reflexive attitude than from any provable 
																																																						
75	Cohn,	‘Sex	and	Death	in	the	Rational	World	of	Defense	Intellectuals.’	
76	Ibid.,	688.	
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unawareness of the dynamics that are characteristic to the group under 
examination. The commitment to reflexivity is one that can very well be 
respected even when one is more familiar with a certain field – or that can 
equally well be defied even when alien-ness is ensured. There are many 
devices to maintain a reflexive gaze that have been consistently employed to 
avoid this pitfall, chiefly among them a continuous effort at acknowledging 
and questioning one’s own position with regard to the object of research. 
Indeed, undergoing this project made apparent the need to engage in 
continuous self-reflection in order to be considered by the interviewees as a 
reliable interlocutor and someone who would treat their words with care, 
even when not shared. 
In sum, through a qualitative approach based upon participant observation of 
the NPT review process and in-depth interviews with key civil society 
representatives, this project produced empirical material to support its 
theoretical claims. 
 
1.2.4 Chapter outline 
After having laid out the research topic in this Introduction, Chapter Two 
focuses on the main concepts that have informed the study of nuclear 
weapons politics on a global level, with a view to identify the space covered by 
disarmament in nuclear governance. Through a review of the major insights 
on deterrence, non-proliferation, and arms control, the chapter makes the 
case that disarmament has been treated as a residual category whose 
implications and requirements have not received enough theoretical 
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attention. In criticising the rationalist paradigm for its belief in the existence 
of immutable laws regulating nuclear politics, the superiority of an 
interpretive theoretical toolbox will also be established. 
As a way to escape the disciplinary black boxes described above, Chapter 
Three follows others in conceptualising the nuclear order as nuclear 
governance, but wants to go beyond them in theoretical depth. To that end a 
review of the literature on security governance allows for explaining this 
heuristic tool’s ability to capture agency well beyond the state while at the 
same time remaining open to the concomitant existence of cooperative and 
competitive forms of interaction. To construct this thesis’ vision of global 
nuclear governance, Chapter Three argues for an integrated view of nuclear 
politics that focuses on matters of order as a way to encompass the four 
dimensions of deterrence, non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament. 
That allows establishing the ideological space along which nuclear 
governance operates and over which civil society struggles. 
If Chapters Two and Three introduce the exploration of the nuclear order, 
Chapter Four and Five will establish this thesis’ position in relation to nuclear 
civil society. At first, Chapter Four is dedicated to locate the study on the 
agency of civil society through its main currents and methodological choices. 
After demonstrating the limitations of the political opportunity structure 
model and of framing analyses, the chapter highlights the need for a critical 
approach and the relevance of applying ideas taken from Antonio Gramsci. 
His approach to civil society in fact stands in contrast from rationalist 
accounts that privilege institutional constraints and mainstream 
constructivist views that maintain ideas’ effectiveness in that both suffer from 
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mechanicism. Instead, Gramsci’s attention to the cultural domination and 
political movement formation not only integrates material and discursive 
elements but also recognises transformative potential, making it better 
poised for the subject at hand. 
Chapter Five will further elaborate on that by establishing this thesis’ 
analytical framework through a combination of critical constructivism and 
Gramsci’s concepts. As such, firstly, it identifies the theoretical inspirations 
for this project, both in nuclear and in security studies. As for the former, 
critical nuclear studies have provided rich proof of the relevance of discourse 
for this intersubjective practice. The latter developed a fruitful methodology 
to analyse discourse in conditions of power inequality, which sees 
representation as key for understanding the conditions of possibility. 
Building on that and on the reflections on Gramsci, the analytical framework 
will be elaborated. Nuclear civil society is thus conceptualised in relation to 
the parallel processes of discourse and movement formation. The ideological 
continuum along disarmament and deterrence regimes of nuclear governance 
guides the analysis of common sense within a particular forum of nuclear 
activism. This closes the theoretical part of the thesis, which makes the case 
for an interpretive analysis of civil society as a way to understand the global 
nuclear order. 
The way in which this will be developed empirically is twofold. On the one 
hand, Chapter Six sets the stage by describing the historical and institutional 
contours of the actor examined. On the other, Chapter Seven and Eight enter 
into the case of the 2015 NPT RevCon and provide the original material and 
analysis of the thesis. Chapter Six, firstly traces the historical development of 
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the anti-nuclear movement through its main waves and currents. Describing 
the present context of mobilisation the relevance of the transnational level, 
key for this project, is addressed. Secondly, the chapter unpacks the types of 
transnational groups that are active in the NPT context and the varying 
nature of their calls. The final part introduces the examination of the NPT 
and its review process as the critical arena to assess the agency of global 
nuclear civil society.  
The analysis conducted in Chapter Seven builds upon the distinction, 
outlined above, between reductionist and abolitionist strands of civil society, 
and traces the varieties of each discourse. Through the critical constructivist 
methodology of discourse analysis it pinpoints traits in the articulation of 
their disarmament narratives that attach a particular meaning to the nuclear 
risk. An examination of the communities under threat and of the response 
required allows characterising these varieties of disarmament discourse. 
Moreover, an exploration of the rhetorical materials upon which each 
discourse is built grounds the ensuing discussion of the strength of the 
nuclear common sense. The aim of this chapter is to show that ideological 
divisions dominate the global nuclear civil society community and that this 
corresponds to the same cleavage among supporters and opponents of 
nuclear weapons reliance. 
Chapter Eight looks through Gramscian lenses at common sense and historic 
bloc in turn. On the one hand it critically assesses the different discourses to 
reveal their relation to the prevailing common sense. That allows 
distinguishing between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic movements. On 
the other hand, it examines the configuration of forces for each position. 
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Some reflections on the construction of the alternative historic bloc can thus 
be advanced. 
Finally, the Conclusion summarises the main arguments as well as weighing 
over the utility of the analytical framework. As a result, it considers what the 
limitations of the present project are, but also the contribution it has made 
and the potential to apply to other cases its insights. 
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Chapter 2  
 
Nuclear Ordering Ideas:  
Deterrence, Non-Proliferation, Arms 
Control, Disarmament 
 
This chapter provides a critical review of the main debates in nuclear 
weapons studies with an eye to identify, on the one hand, the theoretical 
approach that is best suited for this project and, on the other, the complexity 
of nuclear governance. As stated in Chapter One, this thesis is concerned with 
the role of civil society in global nuclear governance, a notion that needs to be 
unpacked. Recently, in fact, there has been a rising awareness of the 
usefulness to think of global nuclear politics in its entirety, with a few 
scholars employing the word ‘governance’ in relation to nuclear issues.1 
However, this was done mostly in passing, or with reference to either a 
																																																						
1	Hans	 Born,	 Bates	 Gill	 and	 Heiner	 Hänggi,	Governing	 the	 Bomb:	 Civilian	 Control	 and	 Democratic	
Accountability	of	Nuclear	Weapons	 (Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2010);	Trevor	Findlay,	Nuclear	
Energy	and	Global	Governance:	Ensuring	Safety,	Security	and	Non-Proliferation	(London:	Routledge,	
2010);	 Ramesh	 Thakur,	 ‘Nuclear	 Weapons:	 Global	 Governance	 Failing	 to	 Meet	 the	 Challenge,’	
ACPL/CNND	 Policy	 Brief,	 June	 3,	 2013;	 Ramesh	 Thakur,	 ‘The	 Global	 Governance	 Architecture	 of	
Nuclear	Security,’	The	Stanley	Foundation	Policy	Analysis	Brief,	March	2013;	Justin	Alger,	‘A	Guide	to	
Global	 Nuclear	 Governance:	 Safety,	 Security	 and	 Nonproliferation,’	 Centre	 for	 International	
Governance	 Innovation	 (CIGI)	 1	 2008;	 Nick	 Ritchie,	 ‘Valuing	 and	 Devaluing	 Nuclear	 Weapons,’	
Contemporary	Security	Policy,	34	n°	1;	Nicholas	Wheeler,	‘Beyond	Waltz’s	Nuclear	World:	More	Trust	
May	be	Better,’	International	Relations,	23	n°	3,	2009;	Harald	Müller	and	Carmen	Wunderlich,	Norm	
Dynamics	 in	 Multilateral	 Arms	 Control;	 Bruce	 Larkin,	 Designing	 Denuclearization:	 An	 Interpretive	
Encyclopedia,	Vol.	1	(New	Brunswick:	Transaction	Publishers,	2011).	
	 58	
domestic process2 or a very specific side of the broader picture.3 Moreover, it 
remains still quite undetermined what the scope of nuclear governance is, 
something that this chapter seeks to address through a review of the 
literature on nuclear weapons. 
The literature on nuclear weapons is extremely rich and, since the invention 
of the bomb, has attracted contributions that benefited from debates ranging 
from the theoretical to the policy-oriented and including technical military 
analyses as well as legal works. Scholars have approached the matter from 
different theoretical perspectives: much rationalist work has been done, 
especially during the 1960s, but later contributions have also come from both 
constructivist 4  and critical 5  fronts. Methodological difference has also 
dominated the field: on the one hand, game theory6 constituted the basis of 
early deterrence theory, while psychological and case-study approaches7 
grounded later contributions. On the other hand, process-tracing 8  and 
discourse analysis9 have been preferred by interpretivist researches. The 
literature has also seen participation in the debate of a variety of 
																																																						
2	Born,	Gill	and	Hänggi,	Governing	the	Bomb.	
3	Findlay,	Nuclear	Energy	and	Global	Governance.	
4	For	 example,	 Emanuel	 Adler,	 ‘Complex	 Deterrence	 in	 the	 Asymmetric-Warfare	 Era,’	 in	 Complex	
Deterrence:	 Strategy	 in	 the	Global	Age,	 eds.	 T.V.	Paul,	Patrick	Morgan,	and	 James	Wirtz,	 (Chicago:	
The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2009),	and	Nina	Tannenwald,	The	Nuclear	Taboo.		
5	A	great	example	is	Carol	Cohn,	‘Sex	and	Death	in	the	Rational	World	of	Defense	Intellectuals.’	
6	Some	examples	are	Thomas	Schelling,	The	Strategy	of	Conflict	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	
Press,	 1980),	 Robert	 Powell,	Nuclear	 Deterrence	 Theory:	 The	 Search	 for	 Credibility	 (Cambridge:	
Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 1990),	 and	 Glenn	 Snyder,	 ‘Deterrence	 and	 Power,’	 The	 Journal	 of	
Conflict	Resolution,	4	n°	2	(1960).	
7	Contributions	include	Alexander	George	and	Richard	Smoke,	Deterrence	in	American	Foreign	Policy:	
Theory	 and	 Practice	 (New	 York:	 Columbia	 University	 Press,	 1974),	 as	 well	 as	 various	 of	 the	 case	
studies	 in	 Robert	 Jervis,	 Richard	 Ned	 Lebow,	 and	 Janice	 Gross	 Stein,	Psychology	 and	 Deterrence	
(Baltimore,	MD:	Johns	Hopkins	University	Press,	1989).	
8	Nina	Tannenwald,	The	Nuclear	Taboo;	William	Potter	and	Gaukhar	Mukhatzhanova,	Nuclear	Politics	
and	the	Non-Aligned	Movement	 (London:	Routledge,	2011),	and	Harald	Müller,	 ‘The	Internalization	
of	Principles,	Norms,	and	Rules	by	Governments:	The	Case	of	Security	Regimes,’	 in	Regime	Theory	
and	International	Relations,	ed.	Volker	Rittberger	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1993).	
9 	Nick	 Ritchie,	 ‘Rethinking	 Security:	 A	 Critical	 Analysis	 of	 the	 Strategic	 Defence	 and	 Security	
Review,’	International	Affairs	87	n°	2	(2011).	
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professionals.10 Extensive interchange has taken place with policy as well, 
with many diplomats and officials – former or current – contributing to 
publications and discussions.11 
Studies on nuclear weapons in International Relations, IR from now on, have 
asked various sets of questions regarding the politics surrounding this 
technology. The foremost question that has been asked is what do nuclear 
weapons do – and the answer given was for the most part a series of rational-
based modelling on the ways in which deterrence would work to prevent 
nuclear catastrophe. Moreover, scholars have tried to understand what is that 
makes states want to have nuclear weapons and under which conditions they 
would be more likely to comply with the non-proliferation rule. Much work 
has also been devoted to the likelihood and chance of success of arms control 
agreements, paying most attention to the Moscow-Washington binary. 
Finally, the issue of how to disarm has always attracted those interested in 
ways to get out of the nuclear dilemma. These four thematic concerns will be 
reviewed in turn, not only because of their importance in the nuclear debate, 
but also as they are all crucial for the regulation and management of the 
nuclear risk on a global level. 
These four main ways in which nuclear weapons have been conceptualised 
largely remain disconnected and, as has been observed, the different 
epistemic communities ‘often ignore or talk past one another.’12 If discussion 
																																																						
10	Various	examples	exist	of	renowned	and	insightful	experts	who	are	nuclear	physicists	by	training	
(Pierre	Goldschmidt,	Patricia	Lewis,	 James	Acton)	or	who	used	to	work	as	 journalists	(Mark	Hibbs).	
Even	more	numerous	are	those	with	a	background	in	diplomacy	or	international	public	service	(Mark	
Fitzpatrick,	Trevor	Findlay,	Laura	Rockwood).	
11	Some	examples	are	Nabil	Fahmy,	Mark	Fitzpatrick,	Greg	Thielmann.	
12	William	Walker,	 ‘International	Nuclear	Order:	 A	 Rejoinder,’	International	 Affairs,	83	 n°	 4	 (2007),	
footnote	12,	752.	
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on the causes of nuclear proliferation engaged a certain community, that 
would often not include those searching for the requirements of deterrence. 
Disciplinary divides have indeed reduced the wide literature on nuclear 
issues into many isolated silos of academic disagreement. A governance 
approach allows for an integrated view of nuclear issues in order to surpass 
the problems created by looking at its different components separately. 
This chapter provides an argument for the conceiving of four elements as the 
central axes of nuclear governance: deterrence, non-proliferation, arms 
control, and disarmament. Moreover, Mutimer made the case that analysing 
the knowledge bases of nuclear weapons is crucial because, according to how 
the security problem posed by the bomb is constructed, different practices 
become possible. 13  Accordingly, non-proliferation, deterrence, and arms 
control are not only entirely different lenses through which to examine 
nuclear weapons and their security implications, but also the foundation of 
policies that are all bomb-related but highly diversified.  
Mutimer’s contribution is highly significant to this study, which starts off 
from his distinction and builds upon it. He defines the three images as 
follows: 
1. Deterrence: relies on nuclear weapons with the potential for 
extreme destruction. 
2. Non-proliferation: addresses the problem of the spread of nuclear 
weapons technology to more and more states. 
																																																						
13	David	Mutimer,	The	Weapons	State:	Proliferation	and	the	Framing	of	Security.	
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3. Arms control: addresses the problem of the numbers and 
sophistication of existing arsenals.14 
These three images have indeed been critical in producing a different 
assessment of the nuclear danger and providing the framework for 
alternative policy responses. Mutimer also makes reference to the image of 
disarmament, but does not give the concept the same thorough examination 
of the other three.15 This thesis attempts to do just that, placing disarmament 
together with deterrence, non-proliferation, and arms control and 
investigating their conceptual relation.  
This literature review wants not only to inscribe the project into the wider 
framework of nuclear studies, but also to reflect upon the political 
consequences of knowledge divides. Through a review of the major insights 
on deterrence, non-proliferation, and arms control, the chapter clarifies the 
differences in the meaning that this inert object, the bomb, has acquired 
depending on the lenses through which it has been looked at. For each of the 
four, it examines the theoretical insights developed to explain that particular 
nuclear reality as well as giving a condensed overview of the history of the 
nuclear age. With that, the chapter makes the case that disarmament has 
been treated as a residual category whose implications and requirements 
have not received enough theoretical attention.  
These four images of nuclear weapons will be the guiding elements of the 
present chapter, helping to structure the contributions that throughout the 
past seventy years have fed the thought process on nuclear arms. The chapter 
																																																						
14	Ibid.,	43.	
15	Ibid.,	40-41.	
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will thus be divided in four main sections: deterrence, non-proliferation, 
arms control, and disarmament. Moreover, a few concluding remarks will 
support the argument for an integrated vision of the military dimension of 
nuclear weapons that focuses on matters of order as a way to encompass all 
four categories in an overarching global nuclear governance. Finally, in 
criticising the rationalist paradigm for its belief in the existence of immutable 
laws regulating nuclear politics, the superiority of an interpretive theoretical 
toolbox will also be established.  
 
 
2.1 Deterrence: a dominant concept 
The first nuclear attack on August 6, 1945 was a watershed moment for 
international security thought. Academics and the public alike were suddenly 
confronted with this new technology, and the challenge of making sense of it 
and devising its strategic utility. The unprecedented degree and immediacy of 
destruction achievable through managed atomic explosions had profound 
repercussions for the thinking on security and strategy, setting them apart 
from all other armaments. Possessing nuclear weapons held the promise of 
changing military strategy forever – the bomb ‘greatly raised the relative 
importance of threats to use force, while at the same time increasing the 
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restraint on the actual use of force in combat.’16 This novel weapon that could 
be powerful even when not used needed interpretive keys.  
The present section will look at this connection between threat and use of 
force by giving an overview of the main contributions on deterrence theory.  
It will also note how deterrence has been practiced, particularly in the largely 
more studied US context. Thereafter, it will expose the main criticisms levied 
at both the theory and the policy from different perspectives, assessing 
rationalist and interpretivist accounts in turn.  
2.1.1 The theory of deterrence 
The theory of deterrence, even though it is now treated as universal, was born 
in a specific time and place. The United States was the only state to possess 
nuclear weapons in the aftermath of World War II and was faced with not 
only building an extensive infrastructure to sustain the production of these 
new armaments, but also devising the ways to employ them. While the 
concept of deterrence is an old one (think of a parent threatening punishment 
on a child to avoid their misbehaving), deterrence theory was born after the 
explosion of the bomb and it involved mostly American strategists, 
particularly at RAND Corporation. 
The first wave of deterrence theory17 saw contributions by a few analysts who 
had quickly grasped the underpinnings of the new technology and how 
different the practice of deterrence would have been with nuclear instead of 
conventional weapons. Nuclear arms, in fact, were considered deeply 
																																																						
16	Barry	 Buzan	 and	 Eric	 Herring,	 The	 Arms	 Dynamic	 in	World	 Politics	 (Boulder,	 CO:	 Lynne	 Rienner	
Publisher,	1998),	2.	
17	Robert	Jervis	 introduced	this	division	 into	three	waves	 in	his	 ‘Deterrence	Theory	Revised,’	World	
Politics,	31	n°	2	(1979).	
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revolutionary. As early as 1946, Brodie’s book, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic 
Power and World Order, pioneered the study of deterrence.18 Being capable 
of inflicting incalculable devastation, nuclear use consequences can never be 
expected to be low. As a result, avoiding wars must be the central goal of 
national strategy, ensuring at the same time an ability to retaliate. ‘Thus far 
the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From 
now on its chief purpose must be to avert them.’19  
Yet, these works had little impact on policy and amounted to only a handful 
compared to the so-called second wave, the golden age of deterrence studies. 
Between the late 1950s and the 1960s, in fact, numerous works helped clarify 
the notion and implications of deterrence. While a thorough examination of 
this literature is beyond the scope of this chapter, and since several excellent 
literature reviews exist, 20  some of the basic concepts, paradoxes, and 
distinctions of the theory will be briefly sketched. 
One of the most prominent thinkers on these matters, Thomas Schelling, 
defined nuclear deterrence as ‘a threat […] intended to keep an adversary 
from doing something.’21 This is part of the broader category of coercive 
diplomacy, which encompasses both deterrence and compellence. Whereas 
the former aims at stopping another actor from undertaking an action, the 
latter’s objective is obtaining something. A decade later, George and Smoke 
																																																						
18	Bernard	Brodie	et	al.,	The	Absolute	Weapon:	Atomic	Power	and	World	Order,	(New	York:	Harcourt,	
1946).	
19	Bernard	Brodie,	‘The	Atomic	Bomb	and	American	Security,’	Yale	Institute	of	International	Studies,	
Occasional	 Paper	 n°	 18,	 (1945)	 cited	 in	 Bernard	 Brodie,	 ‘The	 Development	 of	 Nuclear	 Strategy,’	
International	Security,	2	n°	4	(1978).		
20	Robert	 Jervis,	 ‘Deterrence	 Theory	 Revised,’	 Patrick	 Morgan,	 Deterrence:	 A	 Conceptual	 Analysis	
(London:	 Sage	 Publications,	 1983),	 and	 Jeffrey	 Knopf,	 ‘The	 Fourth	 Wave	 in	 Deterrence	
Research,’	Contemporary	Security	Policy,	31	n°	1	(2010),	Amir	Lupovici,	 ‘The	Emerging	Fourth	Wave	
of	 Deterrence	 Theory:	 Toward	 a	 New	 Research	 Agenda,’	International	 Studies	 Quarterly,	54	 n°	 3	
(2010).	
21	Thomas	Schelling,	Arms	and	Inﬂuence	(New	Haven,	CT:	Yale	University	Press,	1966),	69.	
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specified that deterrence is ‘simply the persuasion of one’s opponent that the 
costs and/or risks of a given course of action […] outweigh its benefits.’22  
War in the nuclear age would thus be irrational, as victory and defence lose 
meaning. The doctrine of deterrence holds that nuclear war would never be 
fought between two adversaries armed with nuclear weapons, because the 
consequences of attack would be just as devastating for the attacker as for the 
victim. Atomic weapons are therefore a great equaliser that reduces both 
parties’ eventual desire to take advantage of power inequalities. Mutual 
assured destruction (MAD) would create self-restraint, making sure that both 
parties would never dare using these arms out of a rational self-interested 
calculation. ‘The probability of nuclear war among states having nuclear 
weapons approaches zero,’ Kenneth Waltz argued.23 If each state chooses the 
option that yields greater benefits, war can never be the preferred alternative, 
and there will be little incentive to start conventional wars for fear of 
escalation.  
What keeps states from attacking each other is the fear of a destructive 
counterattack. In practice, only ‘if there are first-strike advantages, then there 
is some chance of an unlimited exchange.’24  Thus, states should endow 
themselves with the forces needed to launch a retaliatory strike – a second-
strike capability – making sure that, even after having suffered a nuclear 
attack, they would still be able to threaten the adversary with the same 
destruction. ‘To deter an attack means being able to strike back in spite of it’25 
																																																						
22	Alexander	George	and	Richard	Smoke,	Deterrence	in	American	Foreign	Policy,	11.		
23	Kenneth	Waltz,	‘Nuclear	Myth	and	Political	Realities,’	The	American	Political	Science	Review,	84:3	
(1990),	738.	
24	Robert	Powell,	Nuclear	Deterrence	Theory,		130.	
25	Albert	Wohlstetter,	The	Delicate	Balance	of	Terror	(Santa	Monica,	CA:	RAND	Corporation,	1958).	
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argues Wholstetter, and Waltz adds that ‘[f]or deterrence one asks how much 
is enough, and enough is defined as having a second-strike capability.’26   
Two main corollaries to the doctrine of deterrence were added, stability and 
credibility, both giving way to paradoxes. First, the ability to inflict significant 
damage to the adversary must be preserved for the deterrent relationship to 
remain stable. Stability is grounded in parity, and it disappears if the balance 
of power tilts towards one party. What’s more, vulnerability lies at the core of 
stability. Both opponents have an interest in the other being able to launch a 
second strike because, absent that, the aggressor could be tempted to attack 
under the logic of ‘use them or lose them’. Finally, for stability to be in place, 
deterrent threats must not provoke the other side, but need to presuppose 
high costs of war. However, that risks breeding instability in that it might 
encourage minor ventures.  
Second, credibility is defined as ‘the perception by the threatened party of the 
degree of probability that the power-wielder will actually carry out the threat 
if its terms are not complied with or will keep a promise if its conditions are 
met.’27 Credibility is a function of one’s ability to carry out the threat and its 
commitment to do so. That makes the ability to communicate the 
commitments effectively crucial. However, how can massive retaliation be 
credible if an assailment is going to be met with a counterattack? How can 
mutual suicide be rational? This problem was solved by Schelling with the 
development of the ‘threat that leaves something to chance.’28 Even when the 
ultimate option of general war can be discarded as unrealistic, a response 
																																																						
26	Kenneth	Waltz,	‘Nuclear	Myth	and	Political	Realities,’		740.	
27	Glenn	Snyder,	‘Deterrence	and	Power’,	164.	
28	Thomas	Schelling,	Arms	and	Inﬂuence.	
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that implies the risk of war is conceivable. It was also suggested that one 
could ‘create an array of limited options each of which could serve to raise the 
risk of an explosive escalation to general nuclear war’ – a threat that would 
appear ‘much more credible than the threat to launch a massive retaliation 
intentionally.’29 
Realist scholars involved in this research, moreover, did recognise that not all 
deterrence relationships are alike. 30  For instance, Snyder introduced a 
distinction between deterrence by denial (intended to prevent the opponent 
from taking advantage of a strategic option) and deterrence by punishment 
(the coercive threat that aims to terrorise the opponent to deter action).31	
Morgan added a further distinction between immediate and general 
deterrence, where the former entails a relationship in which ‘at least one side 
is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of 
retaliation in order to prevent it’; the latter, on the other, ‘relates to 
opponents who maintain armed forces to regulate their relationship even 
though neither is anywhere near mounting an attack.32	Finally, deterrence 
can be aimed to protect different interests: not only the defence of one’s own 
territory (immediate or Type I deterrence) but also the protection of allies 
(extended or Type II deterrence).33 The latter is problematic for credibility: 
would a state really risk its own destruction to defend an ally? The debate 
continues to this day as extended deterrence has been practiced throughout 
the Cold War and even afterwards by the United States.  
																																																						
29	Robert	 Powell,	 ‘The	 Theoretical	 Foundations	 of	 Strategic	 Nuclear	 Deterrence’,	 Political	 Science	
Quarterly	100	n°1	(1985),	78.	
30	Some	key	examples	are	Glenn	Snyder,	Patrick	Morgan,	and	Herman	Kahn,	whose	works	are	
subsequently	quoted.	
31	Glenn	Snyder,	Deterrence	by	Denial	and	Punishment	(Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University,	1959).	
32	Patrick	Morgan,	Deterrence,		30.	
33	Herman	Kahn,	On	Thermonuclear	War	(Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	1960),	126.	
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In sum, there are a series of problems with the theory of deterrence and the 
use that has been made thereof. 
 
2.1.1.1 A note on the practice of deterrence 
Especially in the US, the theory and policy of deterrence came to be 
progressively intertwined. However, there has often been a deep distinction 
between the theory and the practice of deterrence.34 ‘Deterrence became 
prominent in part because of its importance in avoiding nuclear war, but it 
also received a boost because it fit well with the larger U.S. grand strategy of 
containment.’ 35  Therefore, a momentous debate focused on the policy 
application of the concept of deterrence. Is it better to threaten a massive 
retaliation to any kind of provocation or rather employ a flexible response 
according to the interests at stake? And how to translate Schelling’s 
suggestion to rely on the ‘threat that leaves something to chance’? Finally, 
what are the quantitative and qualitative requirements to maintain 
deterrence (i.e. the value of superiority)?  
Washington’s initial monopoly allowed it to remain rather vague on the 
strategic prevision of atomic use. However, the Soviet Union rapidly caught 
up and, faced with a nuclear-armed opponent, MAD became the frame of 
reference for strategic and operational developments. A deterrence 
relationship developed between the US and the Soviet Union after the latter’s 
first nuclear test in 1949, after which the two got involved in an arms race 
																																																						
34	Keith	 Krause,	 ‘Rationality	 and	 deterrence	 in	 theory	 and	 practice,’	 in	Contemporary	 Security	 and	
Strategy,	ed.	Craig	Snyder	(London:	Macmillan	Press,	1997).		
35	Jeffrey	Knopf,	‘Three	Items	in	One:	Deterrence	as	Concept,	Research	Program,	and	Political	Issue,’	
in	Complex	Deterrence:	Strategy	 in	the	Global	Age,	eds.	T.V.	Paul,	Patrick	M.	Morgan,	and	James	J.	
Wirtz	(Chicago:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2009),	46.	
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that brought them to fill their arsenals with ever more and increasingly 
sophisticated atomic weapons. The logic of second-strike capability, in fact, 
says little as to the quantitative requirements of deterrence. Being able to 
survive and retaliate was the push behind the arms race, with the US arsenal 
steadily increasing throughout the 1950s and reaching a peak in 1967 with 
over 31,000 warheads.36 In practice, both the US and the Soviet Union 
quickly acquired overkill, meaning enough capability to destroy each other 
several times over. It also spread across the so-called Triad of land-based 
missiles, submarines, and aircraft. With the rise of the arms race came the 
need to manage the nuclear relationship through a variety of arms control 
initiatives that will be discussed later. 
The strategic posture to be adopted was also left an open question by 
deterrence theorising. The concept of massive retaliation was made policy by 
the Eisenhower Administration after the Korean War. Accordingly, any attack 
– even a minor conventional offensive – would be met with all-out nuclear 
retaliation, especially counter-city attacks.37  That, however, created huge 
problems for stability and credibility. Given the irrationality of nuclear war 
and significant escalation, states could end up being self-deterred from using 
their atomic arms, risking to pave the way for lesser confrontations. As  
Snyder put it: ‘The Soviets probably feel, considering the massive retaliation 
threat alone, that there is a range of minor ventures which they can 
																																																						
36	The	US	all-time	high	arrived	in	1987	with	over	23,000	warheads,	while	the	world-wide	peak	would	
be	reached	in	1986	with	over	64,000	nuclear	warheads	globally.	See	Hans	M.	Kristensen	and	Robert	
S.	Norris,	‘Nuclear	Notebook:	Nuclear	Arsenals	of	the	World,’	Bulletin	of	the	Atomic	Scientists,	
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37	For	a	criticism	of	massive	 retaliation,	 see	William	Kaufman,	Military	Policy	and	National	Security	
(Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	1956).	
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undertake with impunity, despite the objective existence of some probability 
of retaliation.’38  
Massive retaliation was substituted by flexible response by the Kennedy 
Administration, right after the Cuban missile crisis had put deterrence under 
pressure and evidenced the folly of risking a nuclear war.39 It relies on 
tailored counter-threats commensurate to the incoming menace, maintaining 
the ability to respond at different levels of violence with both conventional 
and unconventional means.40 However, problems of credibility came from the 
application of extended deterrence. That theory, in fact, gave no indication on 
how to operate a nuclear alliance, something that became evident in the case 
of the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO): how to ensure the 
credibility of collective defence under a nuclear shadow and how to extend a 
nuclear umbrella to Europe? Practical examples of answering those questions 
were Kennedy stating ‘Ich bin ein Berliner,’41 but also the deployment of 
troops to West Germany and the rest of Europe, as well as the basing of 
tactical nuclear weapons in several NATO states.  
Both massive retaliation and flexible response were harshly criticised by 
Colin Gray and others, who insisted that a nuclear war might indeed have to 
be fought. Accordingly, any war would risk going nuclear, thus resting on the 
																																																						
38 	As	 this	 quote	 shows,	 most	 works	 of	 deterrence	 theory	 have	 a	 US	 focus	 and	 offer	 policy	
prescriptions,	 even	 when	 they	 purport	 to	 offer	 universal	 theories	 devoid	 of	 normativity.	 Glenn	
Snyder,	Deterrence	and	Defense	(Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	1961),		226.	
39	This	shift	was	more	rhetorical	than	practical,	as	evidenced	by	Francis	Gavin’s	chapter	on	‘The	Myth	
of	Flexible	Response’;	Francis	J.	Gavin,	Nuclear	Statecraft:	History	and	Strategy	in	America’s	Atomic	
Age	(Ithaca,	NY:	Cornell	University	Press,	2012).	
40 	On	 these	 and	 other	 strategies,	 see	 Paul	 Nitze,	 ‘Assuring	 Strategic	 Stability	 in	 an	 Era	 of	
Détente,’	Foreign	Affairs,	54	n°	2	(1976).	For	reasons	of	space,	we	cannot	get	 into	too	much	detail	
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arsenals	as	retaliation	to	a	nuclear	first	strike.	
41	Declaring	to	come	from	Berlin,	Kennedy	was	stating	his	commitment	to	the	defence	of	West	
Germany.	
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assumption that atomic attack is impossible makes for a dangerous strategy. 
On this basis, Gray recommended the development of war-fighting 
capabilities to make sure that denial, and not just punishment, were 
components of deterrence.42 A similar view has been put forward by Lieber 
and Press: ‘The most logical conclusions to make are that a nuclear-war-
fighting capability remains a key component of the United States’ military 
doctrine and that nuclear primacy remains a goal of the United States.’	43 
The position in favour of war-fighting, however, has been remarkably 
marginal, with academic discussion agreeing that nuclear weapons are 
primarily useful for war-avoidance and nuclear doctrine of President after 
President confirming that. Ronald Reagan would come to take only half of 
their advice: nuclear wars cannot be won, he maintained but primacy could 
be achieved by escaping the nuclear riddle. On that basis, he initiated the 
Strategic Defense Initiative, designed to protect from ballistic missiles and 
thus eliminating the mutual vulnerability that is so crucial for deterrence.44 
The connection between nuclear and other weapon systems, indeed, created 
further issues for the operationalization of deterrence. A nuclear retaliatory 
attack, for instance, has been sometimes proposed against attacks using other 
weapons of mass destruction – a proposal that was turned into policy under 
President Clinton.45 With that came the concern that deterrence has been 
asked to do progressively more.46 
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43	Keir	Lieber	and	Daryl	Press,	‘The	Rise	of	U.S.	Nuclear	Primacy,’	Foreign	Affairs	(March	/April	2006),	
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As this section has outlined with some selected examples, the theory of 
nuclear deterrence created immense problems and disagreements when it 
came to putting it into practice. The examples have been drawn from the US 
case because of ease, but similar issues are conceivably present in other 
nuclear-armed countries. 
 
2.1.2 Critics of deterrence theory: third wave and beyond 
A fundamental problem with the literature on deterrence examined so far is 
that it rests on assumptions of rationality that hardly work in practice. 
Furthermore, it ignores the fact that deterrent relationships are different 
from each other – and have been shaped by social interaction, with a 
normative expansion that has led to the prohibition of possession and of 
many other nuclear-related activities (e.g. testing) for most states, which left 
deterrence all but alone in producing the nuclear order. Finally, the level of 
conflict assumed by this view is always very high, which clearly makes 
deterrence more attractive. All of this has been eloquently expressed in the 
so-called third wave of deterrence theory.47 
Several works have contested the results of the earlier studies taking issue 
particularly with the shortcomings of the rationality assumption. The third 
wave of deterrence theory was set in motion by the 1974 book of Alexander 
George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory 
																																																																																																																																																										
Consensus:	Nuclear	Weapons	and	American	Security	after	the	Cold	War	(Washington,	DC:	Brookings	
Institution	Press,	1999).	Although	the	notion	of	weapons	of	mass	destruction	 (WMD)	 is	contested,	
they	are	generally	thought	to	include	chemical	and	biological	weapons	as	well	as	nuclear.	
46	Lawrence	Freedman,	Deterrence,	(Cambridge:	Polity,	2004).	
47	For	a	 review	of	 the	 literature	of	 this	 ‘fourth	wave’	of	deterrence	 theory,	 see	 Jeffrey	Knopf,	 ‘The	
Fourth	Wave	in	Deterrence	Research.’	See	also	Robert	Jervis,	‘Deterrence	Theory	Revised.’	
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and Practice.48 This strand’s main claim, summarised by Zagare, is that 
nuclear deterrence theory is ‘logically inconsistent, empirically inaccurate 
and prescriptively deficient.’49 Though it stopped short of producing a new 
theory, the basic shared contribution of the third wave lies in having unveiled 
that empirical testing often does not grant legitimacy to rational deterrence 
theory explanations. It did so through methodological innovation, 
challenging game theory models that assert an ability to identify the 
outcomes of certain relations and focusing instead on the painstaking 
historical reconstructions of case studies.  
The empirical test showed that deterrence theory is indeterminate and 
irrational. First of all, it is hard to understand which actions fall under 
deterrence, as they can be confused with compellence, and threats are 
generally not made in such an overt way as to be uncontroversial.50 Moreover, 
the theory is silent on the practical difficulties of signalling. 51  Finally, 
empirical testing often evidences much more risk-taking and less foreclosing 
options for credibility than expected, it highlights the importance of rewards 
as a complement to threats, and sheds light on the possibility that deterrence 
might fail.52  
Deterrence did not work in many instances, they emphasise, partly because 
of failures of rationality.53 Morgan contested the rationality assumption of 
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previous works, pointing to the fact that state actions are not necessarily the 
result of cold-blooded calculation. He argued that if both states in question 
were absolutely rational, deterrence would not work because no stakes can be 
high enough to risk the decimation of one’s own population. The deterrent 
threat, in fact, ultimately implies an irrational rationality.54 A further blow to 
the rationality assumption resulted from Scott Sagan’s investigation of 
domestic bureaucracy and military establishment.55 His argument is that the 
organisational behaviour of professional military organisations can lead to 
deterrence failures and deliberate or accidental war. In particular, these 
institutions display ‘bounded rationality’ and a multitude of conflicting 
goals.56 
Other works shared their same concern with the irrational, the psychological, 
and the country-specific dimensions of deterrence and criticised rational 
deterrence theory for failing to account for them. Opening the way to 
analyses in strategic cultures, Colin Gray maintained that each state is 
characterised by a specific ‘way of war’ that effectively changes the 
requirements of deterrence.57 Since cultural factors – shaped by historical 
experiences and perceptions thereof, geopolitics, political culture, and 
ideology – are affecting rational behaviour, the deterree could be more 
willing to fight than the theory would predict.58 Despite the problems with the 
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also	be	found	in	Keith	Payne,	‘Maintaining	Flexible	and	Resilient	Capabilities	for	Nuclear	Deterrence,’	
Strategic	Studies	Quarterly	5	n°	2	(2011),	17.	
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ethnocentric character of Gray’s work,59 it does point out an important side of 
the problem of deterrence. 
Both Sagan’s and Gray’s points build directly upon what argued by Jervis and 
others on opening up the ‘black box’ of the state. They have pointed out that 
the state exercising deterrence does not enact a behaviour superimposed by 
the international structure, as hard-core realists would have it. Instead, 
variation happens because decision makers are subject to a whole set of 
psychological and cultural constraints that lead to choices sometimes 
inconsistent with rational deterrence theory.  
The notion that since 1945 war was averted by nuclear deterrence has been 
challenged by revisionist historians. John Mueller, contrasting depictions of 
the bomb as the guarantor of the ‘long peace,’60 maintained instead that they 
were ‘irrelevant’ – influencing discourse and budget more than the history of 
world affairs.61 Nuclear weapons, accordingly, had a much smaller role in 
preserving stability during the Cold War, as the threat of a repetition of 
World War II was enough to deter the US and the Soviet Union away from 
direct confrontation. Ward Wilson complemented that by convincingly 
showing that it was the Soviet entry into the Eastern war front and not the 
use of atomic bombs that caused Japanese surrender in August 1945.62  
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Moreover, scholars pointed out cases in which the possession of the bomb did 
not give the expected advantages. Wilson showed that nuclear possession did 
not prevent challenges to the US while it enjoyed a monopoly over the bomb 
(Berlin, 1948), it did not give an advantage to nuclear-armed states in case of 
war (US in Korea ended in draw, lost in Vietnam, USSR lost in Afghanistan) 
nor did it deter non-nuclear opponents (Israel in Yom Kippur, UK in 
Falklands). ‘The mutual caution of the Cold War is evidence that nuclear 
weapons are dangerous, not that they are effective weapons of war or useful 
for threatening.’ 63  Similarly, Nina Tannenwald questioned why these 
armaments have not been used when retaliation was impossible and why they 
did not deter conventional attacks from non-nuclear to nuclear weapon 
states, making a powerful case that deterrence does not tell the whole story.64  
Tannenwald also raised the issue of proliferators’ motives asking why small 
countries have not felt that their security situation needed a deterrent and 
why so many states have not pursued them.65 Her study, which makes the 
case that the norm of nuclear taboo has contributed to the restraint on 
nuclear use, is one of the most notable contributions to nuclear thinking from 
the constructivist tradition. Her view that deterrence practices are embedded 
in a set of norms that stabilise and restrain self-help behaviour provides a 
great basis to understand many other riddles of nuclear policy. Tannenwald’s 
widely referred contribution is highly interesting for several reasons, but the 
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most important one for the purpose of this study lies in the demonstration 
that deterrence is a norm, a social prescription for a certain behaviour.  
Constructivists have pointed out the socially constructed character of nuclear 
deterrence and highlighted the historical and social contingency of 
deterrence practices. Accordingly, deterrence like all other practices is shaped 
by the context in which it is embedded and has been constrained by a 
normative structure. Alexander Wendt emphasised how deterrence is 
intersubjectively constructed and not a mere reflection of objective 
capabilities. For Washington, for example the British weapons did not 
represent a threat, whereas the Soviet ones did.66 Farrell, moreover, argued 
that military practices are influenced by culturally specific notions of 
appropriateness,67 further stating that a non-legal norm of deterrence can be 
‘as powerful, if not more powerful, as international law in shaping the social 
reality of state behaviour’. 68  Emanuel Adler, moreover, emphasised the 
importance of a community of experts for the development of the nuclear 
doctrines as well as the ‘invention’ of arms control during the Cold War.69  
If constructivism understands deterrence as a norm, critical literature thinks 
of it more in terms of ideology and of the role of representation. Critical 
scholars, indeed, have not only examined what nuclear deterrence does but 
also what it does not do, taking issue with its limited usefulness and 
explicatory power but also with its normative implications. More will be said 
on their account in Chapter Four, but it is useful to remember for now that 
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this project stands with these critical voices in being sceptical about the 
usefulness of rational models and of a scholarship that is set on producing 
solutions to policy problems. All these works have shown that deterrence 
theory’s empirical record is far from perfect by using historical material that 
shows that rationality does not always prevail and that not all deterrence 
relationships are alike. The next section will delve into the second image: 
nuclear non-proliferation. 
 
 
2.2 Non-proliferation and its regime 
The issue of proliferation, or the potential for spread of atomic technology, 
led to the development of a cooperative management of the nuclear risks. 
While US and USSR developed their deterrence doctrines and created ever 
larger arsenals of nuclear weapons, these arms started to gain the interest of 
other states. After all, getting the most cutting-edge military tool had been 
consolidated practice, with tanks, bombers, and submarines as only the most 
recent of many examples. Which would be the next state to get the bomb and 
what to do about it? Although the beginning of the atomic age was 
characterised by efforts at regulating the nuclear risk through disarmament 
proposals, such as the 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal Report and Baruch Plan, 
these attempts soon faltered and the idea of managing nuclear relationships 
took hold.  
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One of the highest priorities for the United States, and later for the other 
states that joined the nuclear club, was to limit the spread of these arms to 
other countries. In the 1950s, at a time when the bombs were becoming more 
common and numerous, the fear was that states such as Sweden, Italy, or 
Australia would bring their scientific advances in nuclear physics to the 
extreme consequences, acquiring the bomb. The idea of proliferation, in fact, 
significantly diminished the value of any existing arsenal and threatened the 
armed states with more potential MAD situations. In the meantime, three 
more states had developed and tested bombs – the United Kingdom in 1952, 
France in 1960, and China in 1964 – making the management of nuclear 
weapons a multi-lateral issue. 
Global nuclear governance emerged in the 1960s. The 1962 Cuban missile 
crisis, which brought US and USSR, and perhaps the whole world,70 to the 
brink of nuclear confrontation, provided the momentum to go forward with 
regulatory efforts. The first treaty to be signed was the Limited Test Ban 
Treaty (LTBT) in 1963, which prohibited atmospheric nuclear explosions. 
Moreover, a turning point appeared with the conclusion of the NPT in 1968.71 
Almost all of its parties committed to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons 
technology while maintaining the right to its peaceful uses. In contrast, five of 
them were allowed to retain their arms, but had to negotiate in good faith on 
how to get rid of them. A great number of analyses have concerned 
themselves with the diplomatic history and politics of the treaty, many of 
them emphasising its discriminatory character.  
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The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is taken to be central in 
constraining worldwide acquisition of nuclear arms.72 While in the 1960s 
many states were interested in the bomb, and NATO was toying with the idea 
of a multilateral nuclear force, the conclusion of the NPT, made possible by 
cooperation between Moscow and Washington, significantly changed the 
structure of the nuclear order.73 The NPT is a particularly important site of 
nuclear politics, not simply because it is recognised as the main treaty 
establishing obligations for the majority of states, but also because it is the 
main locus of contestation of such politics.  
Contestation is rooted in the normative ambiguity of the NPT, where several 
obligations for different categories of signatories exist concurrently, 
producing a variety of subject positions. In fact, the fundamental division 
between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ is legally enshrined in the NPT, which 
grants the five earliest members of the nuclear club (US, Russia, UK, France, 
and China) a right to possess nuclear arms, which, on the other side, is 
denied to the rest of its 191 states parties. Only five states are not parties to 
the NPT – India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, South Sudan – and all but the 
latter have nuclear arsenals. The NWS, or nuclear weapon states, are 
required by the Treaty not to facilitate other members in obtaining nuclear 
arms, which the NNWS, the non-nuclear weapon states, promise to forego 
indefinitely in exchange for the undertaking to receive cooperation on the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  
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The NPT’s well-recognised discriminatory character, whereby the right to 
possess nuclear weapons is granted to a handful of states, but denied to all 
the rest, constitutes its crucial cleavage.74  The possession of nuclear arms is 
only to be a temporary condition, as the NWS also commit to ‘pursue 
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the 
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.’ 75 
Accordingly, the NPT is based upon a grand bargain between the haves and 
the have-nots comprising three pillars: disarmament, non-proliferation, and 
peaceful uses. However, ‘the NPT nuclear weapon states have never fully 
delivered on the disarmament part of this bargain.’76 Most NNWS, instead, 
consider their adherence to the treaty fundamental to their credentials as 
responsible members of the international community.77 As a result, the treaty 
is in a state of crisis that has been getting worse since the end of the Cold 
War. 
This foundational problematic of the Treaty and the wider non-proliferation 
regime appears in all its force in the NPT discussions and pulls the normative 
structure of the nuclear age in different directions. Agreement is made 
particularly hard by the consensus rule that gives each member state a virtual 
veto power. Disarmament has always been a concern in the NPT framework, 
making states unable to agree in three Review Conferences and causing 
considerable division and eventually becoming the object of compromise 
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language.78 This is even truer after the 1995 indefinite extension: an NPT 
without ‘expiry date’ meant that its inequality could become perpetual, a 
prospect that troubles many.79  
 
2.2.1 Theories of proliferation 
A whole research programme concerned itself with the determinants of 
nuclear proliferation and has typically asked under what circumstances states 
would pursue military atomic capabilities. The lines of this debate trace those 
of classical IR disagreements with different contributions from realist, liberal, 
and constructivist perspectives as well as a few critical works. 
If the most extended view opposes proliferation as a global danger, there are 
also contrasting ideas, famously heralded by Kenneth Waltz. Bringing the 
axioms of deterrence to their furthest extent, he claimed that the spread of 
nuclear weapons is a force for peace. He famously wrote that ‘more may be 
better’ since countries will be deterred from attacking each other if they know 
that their opponent possesses nuclear arms.80 Stability would thus result 
from proliferation. It is this promise of eliminating war from conflict 
situations that served as the most widespread explanation of nuclear 
acquisition practices. Waltz’s positive view of proliferation is not shared by 
most other realists, who have a general appreciation for the restraint 
introduced by the non-proliferation regime, though they agree on the 
security-enhancing character of these weapons.  
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Realist proliferation theories have questioned the reasons behind nuclear 
acquisition, both through quantitative81 and qualitative research, reaching 
the conclusion that security seeking is the prime motivation. ‘A state’s 
decision to build nuclear weapons is a result of its perception of the security 
equation it faces.’82 The level of conflict – especially at the regional level – 
and the extent of security interconnection have often been viewed as the 
major determinants of proliferation.83 Coming from a realist perspective, 
Benjamin Frenkel maintained that extended deterrence has been at the heart 
of why states protected by a nuclear umbrella, such as Japan, South Korea, or 
Taiwan, have not sought the bomb.84 Accordingly, a lack of this commitment, 
instead, led Israel, Pakistan and India to proliferate. Multipolar structures, 
moreover, would be more conducive to proliferation than bipolar ones: in the 
former scenario, in fact, alliances are more unsure and security guarantees 
would not be given by world powers, while middle powers would remain 
unable to take a commitment to defend allies with nuclear arms.85  
Aside from being contradicted by the reality of a world where proliferation 
has not taken place at an alarming rate, the realist concept is also excessively 
reliant on the structural conditions that would lead to nuclear acquisition, 
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ignoring other levels of interpretation. Their proliferation dynamic ought to 
work regardless of which state is under examination, irrespective of the 
individual decision-makers and types of regimes: all states are supposed to be 
monolithical rational entities. While being deployed often as a way to offer 
policy prescriptions to the United States – for example with the huge 
literature on the nuclear program of Iran –, much of this literature has not 
been able to generate insights that apply to all states, despite realism’s claims 
to universality. In addition, it is methodologically questionable to apply large-
N statistical analysis, given that nuclear proliferation has happened in less 
than a dozen cases. 
Neo-liberal institutionalism, on the other hand, tried to compensate for such 
shortcomings, highlighting the role of international institutions in mitigating 
security dilemmas. In this view, participating in institutions such as the non-
proliferation regime can be a powerful incentive to refrain from going 
nuclear, given the benefits that accrue to the well-behaved states. On the 
contrary, states that do not value these kinds of offsets will be more likely to 
seek the bomb. An insightful contribution by Glenn Chafez proposed a new 
theory of nuclear proliferation rooted in social psychology.86 His argument is 
that the US is the principal guardian of the non-proliferation regime also 
because it is seen as the defender of what he calls a ‘liberal security 
community.’ Chafez looked at compliance disputes through ingroup-
outgroup dynamics pointing to the biases deriving from self-identification 
practices. However, this is a limiting view that gives the impression that only 
those defenders of the liberal order would support the non-proliferation 
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regime, forgetting that some of its staunchest backers are states that would 
not fall in his ‘liberal security community’ category.87   
Possibly the best example of liberal proliferation theorising is Etel Solingen, 
who complemented this thinking by adding a domestic layer. States governed 
by a liberal, outward-looking coalition would better appreciate the benefits of 
collaborating in the international system, whereas those ruled by 
nationalistic, inward-looking coalitions would be more attracted by the 
bomb.88  The economic benefits accruing from participation in the non-
proliferation regime are, in her view, what was sought by those governments 
that exercised nuclear restraint. A convincing rebuttal of Solingen’s thesis 
came from Maria Rost Rublee’s constructivist work on non-proliferation 
norms.89  While she does agree that a move from authoritarian rule to 
democracy was associated with an increased acceptance of the non-
proliferation regime, Rost Rublee argues that ‘these newly democratizing 
regimes wanted something larger than just access to foreign capital and 
markets, something that can be described as membership in the Western 
‘club’.’ 90  Using insights from social psychology, she claimed that elite 
decision-making is influenced by the international social environment 
through mechanisms of persuasion, conformity, and identification. 
Indeed, as with the theory of deterrence, constructivists appear most 
convincing in non-proliferation research than both realist and liberal 
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scholars. The power of norms has been also outlined by Müller and Schmidt, 
who examined both the domestic and international pressures on decision-
makers faced with the option to proliferate. 91  They maintained that 
acquisition patterns have changed remarkably before and after the 
introduction of the NPT: states considering the bomb have been far more 
likely to stop weapons programmes after the treaty came about than before, 
and only a few started them since. The NPT, in fact, changed expectations as 
to what is an acceptable state behaviour, thereby altering the international 
normative constraints. These, however, are felt differently by different 
political systems, as pariah states are more likely to proliferate according to 
Müller and Schmidt, thereby tracing a causal link between the degree of 
democracy and the likelihood of proliferation. 
Others shared the same turn towards domestic analysis of nuclear choices 
exemplified by Solingen. With his typology of national identity conceptions, 
Jacques Hymans tried to explain the decision to get the bomb.92 This, he 
contended, is not something anyone seeks: states that are likely to value 
nuclear proliferation are those that have an ‘us vs. them’ approach coupled 
with nationalist conception. Although Hymans thinks security is the main 
reason why states choose to proliferate, he argues that such a decision is 
essentially taken on the basis of emotions that depend on identities. Another 
scholar to focus on domestic dynamics is Peter Lavoy, who looked at nuclear 
‘mythmaking’ as an antidote to the division between realist and ideational 
																																																						
91	Harald	Müller	 and	 Andreas	 Schmidt,	 ‘The	 Little	 Known	 Story	 of	 De-Proliferation’	 in	 Forecasting	
Nuclear	 Proliferation	 in	 the	 21st	 Century,	 Volume	 1:	 The	 Role	 of	 Theory,	 eds.	William	 Potter	 and	
Mukhatzanova	Gaukhar	(Palo	Alto,	CA:	Stanford	University	Press,	2010),	152-153.	
92	Jacques	Hymans,	The	 Psychology	 of	Nuclear	 Proliferation:	 Identity,	 Emotions,	 and	 Foreign	 Policy	
(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006).	
	 87	
accounts.93 Proliferation is therefore explained by the domestic success at 
convincing elites by certain constituencies – they draw on the country’s 
insecurities and isolation to portray proliferation as the best corrective and a 
feasible one. The success of nuclear mythmakers depends on their ability to 
associate their arguments with the existing cultural and political realities, 
thereby convincing senior officials to accept their views.94   
Whilst for some nuclear weapons remain a boon, making proliferation an 
appealing way to improve the country’s strategic position, others have noted 
that these arms would not help in protecting everyone. For most, the global 
non-proliferation norm is an effective barrier and it is by this mutual 
renunciation that states have felt more secure. Moreover, it is not only the 
specific strategic situation of a state, but also country-specific cultural factors, 
that make the value of the bomb change. Far from believing in the existence 
of immutable laws dictating the choice to proliferate or not, many of these 
contributions highlighted the agency of different actors as well as the 
normative importance of international institutions. 
 
2.2.2 Second nuclear age 
If during the Cold War thinking of nuclear weapons was dominated by the 
paradigm of deterrence and East-West balance, after its end, proliferation 
became central. For the United States, the fall of the Soviet Union led to the 
reconsideration of nuclear policy in the post-bipolar world, where, some 
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maintained, conflict would be higher. That even led to advice that nuclear 
proliferation be encouraged in the case of allies, 95  though such 
recommendation was not applied. Instead, the 1990s were a mixed period: 
the NPT was strengthened by the accessions of two NWS (France and China) 
and many NNWS and other agreements were signed, like the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). However, the 1990s, with the discovery of a nuclear 
programme in Iraq and the atomic tests of India and Pakistan, also 
challenged the non-proliferation regime.  
The fear that lesser countries would get nuclear weapons and try to challenge 
the nuclear status quo became a central concern, with a heightened 
apprehension for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction under the 
Clinton Administration.96 All of this reached new levels with the turning point 
of 9/11 and the rise of neo-conservative thought. After 2001 mainstream 
consensus emerged on the new rising danger: terrorist organisations and so-
called ‘rogue states’ acquiring nuclear arms.97 This category was paramount 
for the Presidency of George W. Bush, who used it to refer to the security 
threats posed by the developments in the so-called ‘axis of evil’ of Iraq, North 
Korea, and Iran, states not only intent on breaching the non-proliferation 
regime but also supporting terrorism.98 As the global war on terror unfolded, 
fears that Al Qaeda might pursue a nuclear capability also grew. The Bush 
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recipe held that preventive action was legitimate against rogue states and that 
counter-proliferation measures – to be undertaken unilaterally or in 
coalitions – were a positive way to escape the need for multilateralism. 
Against those threats, many feared, the NPT did not have an answer.99  
The focus of both literature and practice, at the turn of the century, shifted 
from deterrence to proliferation. 100  Deterrence thinking, in fact, had 
concerned itself with just one part of the strategic interaction panorama, 
focusing mostly on mutual deterrence between two nuclear-armed states. 
Can those tenets developed to make sense of the US-Soviet confrontation also 
give insights into unequal deterrence relationships such as the US-North 
Korea one? What does it say about deterrence against non-nuclear opponents 
or, as with respect to Iran, how can a state be deterred from proliferating? 
And how to deter a terrorist group?  
The idea is that the second nuclear age presents new global challenges, where 
the bipolar nuclear confrontation is of little guidance. Because lesser states, 
and even non-state groups, possibly interested in getting the bomb are many 
and because they would allegedly be more willing to use it, the priority should 
be avoiding all further proliferation.101 Although scepticism with this view has 
been extensive,102 the issue has also been taken seriously by much of the 
academic community. Thomas Schelling’s position is that nuclear deterrence 
will probably play a much lesser role in maintaining security in the post-Cold 
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War environment.103 Some have expressed even more concern about the 
second nuclear age. Thérèse Delpech defined the new era as one of piracy 
characterised by lawlessness and deception.	 104  She claimed that major 
threats would be small autocratic and reckless states as well as China 
because, accordingly, deterrence works better when practiced by risk-averse 
democracies that do not want to go to war. 
However, authors from the critical camp took issue with the intentionality in 
the rise of this new narrative. As Krause and Latham put it:  
Faced with a threat vacuum and the anxiety it induced, Western (and 
especially American) policy-makers soon began to search for a new threat – 
one that would provide a clear guide to military affairs and at the same time 
furnish a powerful justification for the large, high-technology military forces 
that had been developed to fight the Soviets.105  
The risk of the second nuclear age, in fact, was not an objective fact, instead it 
was constructed as a threat. David Mutimer investigated the production of 
the ‘weapon state’ image and how this made possible the emergence of 
cyclical crises, such as Iraq 1991–1998. He pointed out that weapons 
proliferation was framed as a problem and that image has shaped and been 
shaped by the measures taken in response to it.106 This effectively moves the 
pole to a new research agenda: no longer what proliferation is but what 
proliferation does. Problematising non-proliferation practices has 
characterised academics from the critical tradition, an approach that is 
crucial for the current project, as will be seen in Chapter Four. 
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As amply stated, nuclear proliferation is a sporadic event and, while it has 
been declining, it also failed to provide the security that some analyses would 
imply. 107  With the NPT being the most widely subscribed treaty on 
armaments, the non-proliferation norm appears in good health. Whether 
convinced or not about the treaty’s effectiveness, it is still noteworthy that 191 
are state parties108 and that only one has withdrawn since its entry into force, 
over four decades ago. The diminished proclivity to get a military nuclear 
capability has been accompanied by a strengthening of the non-proliferation 
regime. 
This notion of ‘non-proliferation regime’ is often used to refer to the legal-
institutional framework of nuclear weapons restraint in its totality. This is 
meant to comprise not just the NPT, but also a wide range of other 
agreements and practices intended to limit the horizontal spread of 
technologies useable in nuclear weapons. Indeed, a whole regime devoted to 
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, both to state and non-state actors, 
developed throughout the years, coming to include a host of actors both in 
nuclear-armed states and not. This grew to include, among others, five 
regional treaties establishing nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZ) in the whole 
of the Southern Hemisphere and beyond, a CTBT, and IAEA verification 
safeguards, among other instruments.  Moreover, initiatives have been 
launched to tackle the spread of nuclear weapons and materials to non-state 
groups, both in the UN (with Security Council Resolution 1540) and beyond, 
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chief among them the Nuclear Security Summits. Some have argued that 
nuclear security is an entirely different regime to prevent proliferation to 
non-state actors,109 but the view taken here is that it is one specific part of 
non-proliferation.  
The existence of the non-proliferation regime is hardly in question, but as the 
preceding discussion has shown, there are issues with it. That is why many 
authors have questioned how the regime works as well as claimed it is 
undergoing a crisis.110 The non-proliferation regime as the encompassing 
system of global nuclear rule, however, suffers from two limitations. It is a 
regime and regards non-proliferation. Regime theory, while broadly 
consistent with the study of normative structures in the global order, is 
insufficient for understanding the current governance of nuclear weapons 
because of its overwhelming focus on states.111 Moreover, non-proliferation is 
only part of that regulation in that it is a norm that counts for most but not all 
states. As seen in the previous section, instead, deterrence is the norm for 
those nine that have the bomb. 
In sum, non-proliferation is a paramount part of nuclear regulation globally 
that seeks to limit the spread of the bomb to further actors, be they states or 
non-state groups. The development of this norm can be traced to the NPT but 
since the 1970s it has expanded in obligations. While being broadly complied 
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with, there have been several proliferation concerns, which now can be seen 
as diminishing, given that the treaty is almost universal and that difficult 
cases such as that of Iran have been solved.112 The rationalist literature on 
proliferation fails to foresee this situation, but constructivists have correctly 
previewed the strengthening of the global norm against nuclear proliferation. 
 
 
2.3 The contested field of arms control 
If a fixation for the non-proliferation regime institutes a discriminatory 
system and a focus on deterrence overestimates the relevance of such 
paradigm for the totality of states and other actors, it is now important to 
turn to the broader question of how the nuclear order is created and 
maintained. Arms control has often been used as the general term to define 
the whole spectrum of activities in the area of cooperation on nuclear (and 
other) weapons. This comes from the broad definition of arms control that 
Schelling and Halperin gave, which became of common use:  
We use the term ‘arms control’ rather than ‘disarmament.’ Our intention is 
simply to broaden the term. We mean to include all the forms of military 
cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the 
likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and 
economic costs of being prepared for it.113 
Bilaterally the US and the Soviet Union started cooperating to stop the arms 
race, reaching their first accomplishment in 1972, with the conclusion of the 
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Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence (ABM) Treaty. Throughout the détente period, 
strategic arms limitation talks continued, resulting in the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaty (SALT) I of 1972 and SALT II of 1979. Arms control had 
thus become a component of American and Soviet nuclear policy. The goal 
was offsetting the risk of an unintended nuclear war by avoiding escalation 
and making the deterrent relation more stable. 114   Arms control was 
reactivated with limitations on arms of shorter ranges through the 1987 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the 1991 Presidential 
Nuclear Initiative, and extending during those years to the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaties START I and II. After a setback during the Bush 
Administration, these practices were revived under President Obama with 
the New START of 2010. The issues of verification and how to ensure 
compliance were important throughout all those negotiation and 
implementation processes.115 
Using cooperative mans to control nuclear weapons – what would generally 
be termed arms control – has been praised by most of the academic and 
policy oriented literatures. A contrasting perspective can be found in Colin 
Gray’s view that arms control is ultimately bound to fail because of what he 
calls the ‘arms control paradox.’ Such efforts are going to succeed only when 
they are least needed, thereby revealing themselves to be a mere reflection of 
the ‘temperature’ of international relations.116  
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116	Colin	 Gray,	House	 of	 Cards:	Why	 Arms	 Control	 Must	 Fail	 (Ithaca,	 NY:	 Cornell	 University	 Press,	
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However, as Stuart Croft indicated, arms control has been interpreted in 
much too narrow terms focusing on superpower relations.117 Thus, the label 
has been tightly linked to the process undertaken from the late 1960s by the 
US and the USSR (and later Russia) of de-escalation of the arms race and 
numeric reduction of their strategic forces. This however is a very time-
specific development that can hardly be applied to other occurrences. Arms 
control, in fact, implies a level of conflict that makes it inapplicable to a 
variety of situations where weapons have been regulated. For Henry 
Kissinger, ‘the objective [of arms control] should be to increase the 
uncertainty about the possibility of success in the mind of the aggressor and 
to diminish the vulnerability of the defender.’118 Indeed, neither this nor 
‘military cooperation between potential enemies’ accurately describes the 
kind of rapport between say Mexico and Costa Rica when signing the Treaty 
of Tlatelolco that established a NWFZ in Latin America.119 
From the definition above and others, disarmament would appear to be a 
specific type of arms control.120 This view takes disarmament to be a more 
radical form of arms control, something that has been contested. It was the 
very Thomas Schelling who objected to arms control being included under 
the rubric of disarmament because it would be against the former’s 
endorsement of deterrence and belief in the stabilising effect of nuclear 
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weapons. 121  Indeed, he saw the application of deterrence as just one 
alternative way to ensure an orderly nuclear world. He argued that the focus 
on disarmament did not allow thinking of the various ways in which 
Washington and Moscow could exercise restraint, cooperating on measures 
to safeguard against war.122 Through unilateral and cooperatives moves, in 
fact, arms control aimed at making deterrence more stable.  
As a result, critics have argued that arms control and deterrence are to be 
considered twinned inseparably.123  
The transformation of inter-state relations via either nuclear disarmament or 
nuclear holocaust was to be avoided at all costs, and the management of the 
superpower arms race was a sort of via media between those two Manichean 
visions.124  
Glaser agreed that arms control and disarmament are two entirely different 
matters – the former concerned with controlling ‘numbers and types of 
nuclear forces, and their operations [to] reduce the probability of nuclear 
war,’ the latter requiring a ‘radical and lasting political change’ before 
becoming desirable.125 While the amount of political change required for 
nuclear disarmament can well be greater than that needed for arms control, 
the first efforts at discussing limits to nuclear possession were also not easy. 
As such, arms control is fundamentally different from disarmament and 
completely congruent with a deterrence posture. Building on Foucault, 
Mutimer considers arms control as an expression of governmentality, or the 
political knowledge focused on the mechanisms of ensuring regulation of the 
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population. He sees a deep difference between arms control and 
disarmament, and suggests that pursuing the former might bring us further 
away from the latter.126 This sustains his criticism of President Obama’s 
nuclear policy, whose stated aim (a world without nuclear weapons) stands in 
contradiction with the assigned instruments (more of the same bilateral 
warhead reductions).127  
In sum, arms control is a product of its time that lost memory of the past, 
rather than resting, as some claim, on immutable laws. 128  It is thus 
misleading to describe the whole field of nuclear regulation as arms control.  
 
 
2.4 Disarmament as the logical opposite of deterrence 
A fourth way to conceptualise the bomb has been through the image of 
disarmament. The idea that eliminating the weapons would be the way to 
ensure security in the nuclear age emerged early on. Terrorised by the sheer 
destruction brought by nuclear arms, individuals started to develop 
arguments for their elimination. The disarmament literature, as a result, is 
mostly normative and tends to focus on the moral, legal, and strategic 
benefits of living without nuclear weapons.  Although the term disarmament 
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is generally juxtaposed to non-proliferation, its logical opposite is instead 
deterrence.  
The whole non-proliferation theory developed from these early stages to 
account for the variance in states’ decisions with regard to getting the bomb, 
asking mainly under what circumstances states seek nuclear weapons. A 
similar theory on the causes of disarmament, however, never fully developed. 
Researchers have investigated nuclear reversal but the paucity of cases of 
disarmament made all discussion highly speculative. Only South Africa 
eliminated at the beginning of the 1990s the nuclear arsenal they had 
previously built and never declared.129  
The NPT acquired an important space in the discussion of disarmament, as it 
is the only treaty legally requiring the NWS to disarm. This is exemplified in 
the debates about the nature of the NPT. While some interpret it as being 
solely about non-proliferation, 130  others argue that its focus is also on 
disarmament.131 With the NPT grand bargain being a deal between states that 
wanted to ensure non-proliferation and states that sought disarmament, the 
two are often understood as opposing priorities.	Indeed, one can be a great 
supporter of non-proliferation even while being one of the proliferators, a 
situation that does receive much attention in diplomatic circles but not as 
much in academia.  
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The NPT, however, is about both non-proliferation and disarmament. Its goal 
was to regulate the possible uses of nuclear technology as well as the nuclear 
relationship between armed and disarmed states. The latter is key for the 
endurance of the treaty and for the configuration of the nuclear order as a 
whole. If reduced compliance on the non-proliferation front could well 
inspire a retreat from disarmament, at the same time it cannot be expected 
that non-proliferation would continue in the absence of disarmament. As 
pointed out by Sagan, the ‘future progress by the [nuclear weapon state] to 
disarm will strongly influence the future willingness of the non-nuclear 
weapon states to stay within the NPT.’132 An interesting view on this was 
proposed by Anne Harrington de Santana, who argued that non-proliferation 
does not lead to disarmament, and is actually going to make it impossible 
because of its reliance on deterrence.133  
Disarmament is also conceptually related to deterrence. Critics have pointed 
to the impossibility of ‘uninventing’ the bomb, as well as the essential 
tendency to resolve controversies through violence.134 Although it is certainly 
true that mankind might always resort to force, one cannot deny that 
normative constraints, even concerning the use of force, have been an 
increasing feature of international politics. As Patricia Lewis argued, 
deterrence unhinges the claims of the disarmament camp by reminding them 
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that nuclear weapons exist in order for them not to be used.	135 However, even 
with deterrence, the possibility of their use remains an option, and actually 
needs to if the strategy is to be effective. As even supporters of deterrence 
concede, ‘[s]o long as nuclear weapons exist there will always be some chance 
of their use.’136  
Although nuclear deterrence theoretically promises to make war irrational, 
states have often preferred to refrain from acquiring it. Nick Wheeler has 
convincingly shown that security based upon fear (i.e. deterrence) is not the 
only, nor the best, way to regulate interstate relations.137 He argues with 
Waltz’s point that mutual security can be provided by deterrence and 
presents instead the model of security communities grounded in trust. By 
looking at the experience of Brazil and Argentina and their nuclear reversal, 
Wheeler makes the case for the establishment of a global nuclear governance 
‘that will reassure states that others have disarmed and are not about to 
reveal a hidden arsenal to the world.’138 This attention to those states that 
made disarmament a reality is a refreshing expansion of a research 
programme that has often limited itself to the weapons holders.139  
Disarmament is not only the opposite of proliferation but also, crucially, the 
renunciation of deterrence. What drives apart the two is the reliance (or not) 
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on nuclear weapons. That means that the important concepts of reversal, 
restraint, and others should instead be conceived as part of disarmament, in 
that they all reach the end-state of being bomb-free. Indeed, Kazakhstan, 
Ukraine, and Belarus did not disarm in the same sense that South Africa did: 
the former never autonomously sought the bomb, but all have in common 
having taken a decision to renounce it. Indeed, the three republics did 
renounce the potential benefits of deterrence when they returned the parts of 
the Soviet nuclear arsenal that were left on their territories after the 
dismemberment of the USSR. It could be even argued that a similar dynamic 
was in place with the decision by Argentina and Brazil to roll back the nuclear 
programs they were involved in.140 
The idea of disarmament pushed for by this thesis, however, is even broader. 
One further example is Mack’s usage of the ‘nuclear allergy’ metaphor to refer 
to ‘the idea that reliance on nuclear weapons to promote national security in 
the post-Cold War is neither wise nor morally appropriate.’141 Building on 
that, Dalby dubbed New Zealand’s anti-nuclear choice the ‘Kiwi disease’ to 
explain the renunciation to the ANZUS treaty because of the reliance on a 
nuclear threat.142 Indeed, if countries renounced proliferation because of a 
deep conviction in the inferiority of security based upon deterrence, that 
would be the ideal situation Wheeler referred to.  
Pending that, it is useful to notice that disarmament at its core implies a 
renunciation to nuclear deterrence, which is the most decisive element in 
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understanding what it is about. This conception will be better clarified in 
Chapter Three. 
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
The literature review conducted in this chapter has outlined the contours of 
some of the debates surrounding the security underpinnings of nuclear 
armaments. With a view to providing a more integrated approach to the field, 
this chapter has focused on the debates surrounding the four images of 
nuclear weapons. The discussion was thus divided among deterrence, non-
proliferation, arms control, and disarmament, trying to devise patterns and 
conceptions that characterise each. Studies on the history of deterrence were 
dominant throughout the Cold War and a focus on non-proliferation and 
arms control also emerged early on. Serious contemplation of disarmament, 
on the other hand, waned after a prolific early start and is now back in the 
debate. However, disarmament has been treated as residual category, a 
deviant phenomenon, while actually most states have adopted a ‘disarmed’ 
identity, a question that was left widely unattended.  
On the theoretical level, rationalist explanations fared poorly, leaving much 
unexplained in both deterrence and non-proliferation theories. Realism’s 
indeterminate character and lack of explanatory power was a problem for 
both literatures as such theories were little guide when facing crises and 
overestimated the appeal of proliferation. As much of the literature 
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demonstrates, intersubjective practices are crucial to unravel nuclear 
weapons issues. Realist or liberal institutionalist approaches, in fact, have 
failed to recognise the ideational and normative factors that have worked to 
diminish the risk posed by nuclear arms both in terms of contributing to 
nuclear non-proliferation and a safer management of nuclear deterrence. 
Challenging these assumptions, interpretive work is breaking new ground in 
explaining nuclear restraint – both concerning the practice of deterrence and 
regarding further proliferation.  
Going back to the introductory remarks, we can agree with Mutimer that 
much changes according to the lenses through which the nuclear order is 
assessed. What is striking, despite the different language used in the various 
traditions, is the commonality of themes and preoccupations. The chapter 
argued that the divisions within these literatures have prevented an analysis 
of the nuclear problem as a whole, something this thesis aims to do evocating 
the notion of global nuclear governance. This is established on the 
prohibitions enshrined in non-proliferation and arms control, but also on the 
crucial distinction between those states that rely on the bomb and those that 
do not. This will be referred to here as the deterrence-disarmament 
continuum, which will be further explained in Chapter Three. Conceiving of 
global nuclear governance as based upon the competing regimes of 
deterrence and disarmament, as well as on the regulations of non-
proliferation and arms control, allows us to view them as a whole.  
To better understand the advantages of a governance framework, the next 
chapter will highlight its relevant insights and apply them to the nuclear 
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reality in a way to contribute to the emerging notion of global nuclear 
governance.  
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Chapter 3  
 
Towards a Definition of Global 
Nuclear Governance 
 
In an effort to make sense of the current nuclear condition and of the reliance 
on the threat of mass destruction even in the face of global opposition, this 
thesis asks what the role of civil society is in the global governance of nuclear 
weapons. In Chapter Two we have identified the defining characters of 
nuclear order and started discussing what are the practices attached to each 
of those images – deterrence, non-proliferation, arms control, and 
disarmament. We have also highlighted how some, dissatisfied by the 
traditional emphasis on the regime of non-proliferation and the field of arms 
control, have started developing the notion of global nuclear governance. 
This will be better grounded in this chapter, as well as throughout this thesis, 
by engaging a discussion between the literatures on governance and on 
nuclear politics. 
At this point it is important to turn to the scholarship on global governance, 
and distinctly security governance, to assess whether this interpretive lens 
has something to offer to the study of the politics of the bomb. That allows 
building upon the specialist insights of nuclear scholarship by engaging a 
different research tradition, generally deployed to analyse somewhat 
	 106	
different global problems. It will be argued that, with its emphasis on diverse 
sources of authority and ample definition of power, governance is of high 
value as a heuristic tool to conceptualise the global dimension of the current 
struggle over the bomb. 
In the second part of the chapter, we will proceed to defend the usefulness of 
the concept in the nuclear field, by proceeding in steps: (1) give a definition of 
global nuclear governance, (2) overview the variety of governance actors, and 
(3) identify and typify its associated practices. On the basis of the nuclear 
images from Chapter Two, a matrix of nuclear governance will visualise the 
distinction between regimes of deterrence and disarmament, on the one 
hand, and regulatory practices of arms control and non-proliferation, on the 
other. Through that exercise we will be better able not only to see the variety 
of nuclear relations, much beyond the usual attention to power-wielding 
nuclear-armed states or aspirants, but also realise the underlying tension 
within this global order. As such, we can start developing a conceptual map of 
the governance of the nuclear risk and of the various attitudes and practices 
that actors can enact. 
 
 
3.1 Security governance 
Throughout the last couple of decades, the term governance has become 
something of a buzzword, used often by both academics and policy makers to 
refer to different things: to the quality of domestic rule or to the structures 
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and processes of the global order, and deployed analytically by some and 
normatively by others. Fundamentally, governance is concerned with the idea 
that the act of governing has changed and should be considered as a process 
rather than an institution. The basic assumption is that the Westphalian state 
has lost its centrality as the world becomes more transnationally connected 
because of globalisation, new communication, and the spread of global 
threats. ‘Direct-dial telephones, nuclear fallout, global corporations and the 
like have brought the 'outsider' to the 'inside' as never before.’1 Even the most 
powerful states are unable to tackle challenges alone; instead a system of 
heterarchy prevails whereby a multiplicity of authority sources shape 
outcomes through complex interactions in most areas of social life, from the 
economy to the environment and from health to security.  
Governance study has not been part and parcel of one specific theoretical 
perspective, but rather pluralism has dominated as often realist, liberal, 
institutionalist, cosmopolitan, and Marxist perspectives are to be found 
together. 2  While several contributions over the past fifteen years have 
concentrated on security governance, the field is still quite limited and draws 
heavily on more general theoretical claims made by the global governance 
approach. The latter, however, has mostly focused on ‘softer’ issues such as 
trade and the environment giving only sparse attention to the troubling 
questions of order and cooperation under loaded conflict situations. 
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Financial governance, labour governance, development governance and the 
like have received much more attention than security governance.  
To any extent, it was found that the same structures, actors, and processes 
evidenced in economic and environmental matters, are at play also in the 
field of security, making governance approaches better poised for assessing 
the way security policy is organised in the 21st century. As this project is 
interested in exploring a security issue, and a hard one at that, the present 
section will review the most crucial works on security governance while 
drawing on the wider global governance literature throughout. The two 
research programmes, in fact, cannot be properly distinct and cross-
pollination across issues has been successfully undertaken.  
One of the most popular definitions of security governance states that it 
involves the coordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple 
and separate authorities, the interventions of both public and private actors 
(depending upon the issue), formal and informal arrangements, in turn 
structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully directed toward 
particular policy outcomes.3  
This is basically a system of rule that structures multiple levels of human 
activity, as one of the most prolific scholars on the subject, James Rosenau, 
has put it.4 Whereas other approaches have focused on certain spaces – be 
they national or transnational – the benefit of governance lays in its accent 
on the global level of interaction in its complexity. Heterarchy is a crucial 
concept here, highlighting the absence of one predominant source of 
authority – in fact, whilst in certain cases it is still the state to be the keystone 
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of the system, this does not apply to all circumstances.5 Instead of the 
traditional framework based on nation states and their interactions, the very 
conception of space in governance is distinctive: it works on a global scale 
and tries to trace back the disparate forces that animate it. The definition will 
now be unpacked so as to outline its complexity in terms of, first, the actors 
involved and, second, the processes subsumed under this framework. 
 
3.1.1 The rise of transnational and non-governmental actors 
Most crucial among the contributions of security governance are the insights 
into the diffusion of agency to different kinds of actors throughout multiple 
levels of the social world, thereby breaking open the dominance of the state. 
Governance is built on the distinction of this political system from that of 
government, as highlighted by the very title of Rosenau and Czempiel’s 
seminal work, Governance without Government.	6  Indeed, as some have 
noted, ‘security governance is performed by multiple actors and is intended 
to create a global environment of security for states, social groups, and 
individuals’.7   
While one could argue that governance has always been a tendency, its 
emergence dates to two decades ago and is generally associated with 
globalisation. The transnational reach of the market had in fact 
disempowered states to a certain extent and actors were trying to rein in or 
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liberate the forces of globalisation through governance. The emergence of 
globalisation made it clear that single states or alliances were no longer able 
alone to address certain problems, such as terrorism, environmental 
degradation, and the proliferation of arms. Subsequently, this reinforced the 
need for interactions between communities of states and non-state actors, 
NGOs, international organisations, and transnational corporations. Positing 
a distinctive conception of political space that does not coincide with the 
nation state, governance is thus the system to rule globalisation, as noted 
particularly by those concerned with global economic or financial 
governance.8  
For this thesis what is problematic in some, though not all, of this literature is 
that governance is addressed as a by-product of globalisation rather than a 
parallel process.9 While globalisation is a process that goes much beyond 
mere economic forces, the emphasis on the market is problematic for 
exploring the field of security. Aside from its material component, 
globalisation also produced a ‘borderless space of social life’, with a move 
towards localism and transborder identities accompanied by an opposite one 
to renewed nationalism. 10   Furthermore, globalisation is not the only 
structural change that should be credited for the emergence of governance: 
privatisation and deregulation, new technologies, and the end of the Cold 
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War also contributed to make the world more complex through an increase in 
the number of its relevant units and of their interconnectedness.11 
Multi-level is in fact the condition of political action in the 21st century, 
characterised by both significant autonomy and high interactions between 
different levels.12 Governing activity, in fact, has undergone a double process 
of integration and fragmentation, or the so-called ‘fragmegration’, whereby 
authority has moved not only beyond but also below the state.	13  In fact, 
while the world was becoming increasingly integrated with institutionalised 
cooperation spanning several continents, it was also displaying a higher 
fragmentation as evidenced in the oft-mentioned ‘hollowing out of the state’. 
As suggested by Anne-Marie Slaughter, we should think about the state in the 
same way we think about domestic governments, which we naturally regard 
as a set of separate institutions with different roles and capacities.14 The 
decentralisation of authority is evident in the multiplication of agents 
engaged in creating issues, setting agendas, producing norms, and 
monitoring their enforcement.15 New institutions, more fluid and flexible 
arrangements, changing coalitions, and private actors have characterised the 
transatlantic security architecture after the end of the Cold War.16 Actors can 
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thus be divided across the supra-national, national, and sub-national levels 
but they can also be classified as private, governmental, and third sector.	17 
The national governmental actor par excellence, the state, is still central, 
virtually everyone agrees, though it is increasingly intertwined with other 
depositaries of authority. The 1990s had seen more and more competencies 
being transferred to regional and international bodies like the EU and UN 
agencies, international courts, WTO, and MERCOSUR. Not only did NATO 
survive the end of the Cold War, but regional security fora have emerged 
elsewhere, as shown by ASEAN and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. 
The creation and interpretation of norms is increasingly transnational, most 
evidently when enshrined in international law or the creation of institutions. 
Initial studies of governance can be considered as an extension of the 
literature on international organisations and regimes. This approach was 
epitomised in the work of the Commission on Global Governance, which 
considered it to be mainly about intergovernmental relations, but also in 
other contributions stressing mostly the role of the UN or other institutional 
frameworks.18  
Regional governance has also received much attention as actors like the EU 
provided the most similar analogy to a national government with some roles 
being fulfilled beyond the states and others below it.19 Decisions over fields as 
diverse as finance and fishing must be reached in Brussels and national 
																																																						
17	Joseph	S.	Nye	Jr	and	John	D.	Donahue,	Governance	in	a	Globalizing	World.	
18	Thomas	G.	Weiss	and	Ramesh	Thakur,	‘Framing	Global	Governance,	Five	Gaps,’	in	Thinking	about	
Global	Governance:	Why	People	and	Ideas	Matter,	ed.	Thomas	G.	Weiss	(London:	Routledge,	2011).	
19	Emil	 J.	 Kirchner,	 ‘The	 Challenge	 of	 European	 Union	 Security	 Governance,’	 Journal	 of	 Common	
Market	Studies,	44	n°	5	(2006);	Mark	Webber,	Stuart	Croft,	 Jolyon	Howorth,	Terry	Terriff,	and	Elke	
Krahmann,	‘The	Governance	of	European	Security.’Although	not	directly	related,	the	work	by	Buzan	
and	Waever	on	regional	security	complex	theory	bears	many	similarities	to	governance	approaches:	
Barry	 Buzan	 and	 Ole	 Waever,	 Regions	 and	 Powers:	 The	 Structure	 of	 International	 Security	
(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2003).	
	 113	
governments need to cooperate to establish and enforce rules. Also, the EU 
expanded its involvement in security with peace-keeping and peace-building 
operations as well as conflict prevention. Christou and others went so far as 
to define it an ‘ideal-type of governance structures for several concerns, 
security included.’20  As with the broader global governance literature, in fact, 
the EU provides a good example of how politics are moving to a multi-level 
system where different actors have not only a stake but also a say in the 
process. While this certainly rests on the sheer array of tasks performed by 
EU institutions and non-governmental actors within Europe, it also detracts 
somehow from the wider applicability of governance theory – as maintained 
by Keohane and Nye, in fact, the domestic analogy holds quite well for the EU 
but not for other regions or fora.21 
Moreover, supra-national cooperation is only one side of the picture. It is 
definitely true that states remain central actors and that ‘intergovernmental 
governance’ or ‘governance with the state’ is crucial: states discuss and sign 
treaties, produce international law, and activate regulation. However, they 
are often not alone in that: ‘transnational governance’ or ‘governance without 
the state’ also bears importance.22 Authority has in fact spread below and 
beyond the state but also beside it: multinational corporations, the 
information industry, NGOs as well as domestic agencies are all in some ways 
governors.23 In the post-conflict reconstruction in the Balkans, for instance, 
we can see not only NATO cooperate with the EU, the Organization for 
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Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the UN, but also with a 
range of non-governmental actors, from private contractors to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross.24  
Among those that looked at private governance some focused on all the 
governance practices happening inside states’ boundaries, while others 
emphasised the transnational dimension of political action undertaken by 
actors other than the state.  Of the former, Hanggi examined security sector 
governance, or the management at the domestic level of all those involved 
with the provision of security.	25 In a field highly bound to sociology, many 
contributions addressed the politics of policing, paying also attention to 
transnational actors’ choice of response to insecurity.26 As for the latter, 
Slaughter has emphasised the pervasive nature of interactions between 
government agencies across borders and how transnational networks are no 
longer the prerogative of diplomats but also involve national officials in 
dialogue with their foreign counterparts.27 Similar networks are to be found 
for most business and advocacy activities as well. Thinkers influenced by 
Marxism have pointed to the emergence of a transnational capitalist class, 
responsible for the spread of neoliberal frames of mind and recipes, and of 
marginalized groups for whom globalisation offers no benefit.28 While this is 
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true of economic relations, a similar process of cultural subordination can be 
found in security as well.  
Scholarship on NGOs and social movements is quite extensive and will be 
analysed in more depth subsequently. It has mostly asked how groups of 
advocates and activists can affect change in normative and social orders and 
developed models such as the boomerang and the spiral, explaining the 
agency of non-governmental groups in the acceptance of norms by states.29 
Empirically it has been convincingly demonstrated that civil society activism 
had a role in the success of at least two disarmament regulations: the 
prohibition of chemical weapons and of landmines.30 Others, however, have 
problematized these occurrences criticising what is often taken to be 
resistance as another manifestation of governmentality.31 
While these debates on civil society and the role and value of their contention 
will be analysed in the next section, it is worth mentioning now that the 
emergence of private governance has opened the way to discussions of 
democracy when sovereignty loses its traditional meaning. Can these new 
actors be legitimated even in the absence of electoral political representation? 
A variety of scholars have asked what it is that makes governance legitimate 
and distinguishing between input- and output-legitimacy and linking it to 
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internal and external accountability.	32 The idea of broadening the pool of 
stakeholders taking part in policy-making and implementation promises to 
bring more inclusion, legitimacy, and ultimately democracy. Some even 
argued that only a legitimate system of governance can prove effective.33 As 
Wolf pointed out, however, the picture is not always so rosy, in that states 
often cooperate with one another to protect themselves against social 
pressures. 34  After having given this broad overview of the actors of 
governance, we will now turn to the processes that structure their 
interactions. 
 
3.1.2 Coordinated management and regulation 
The management and regulation of a certain issue area through a wide array 
of instruments, actors, and sources of authority are thus at the heart of 
governance, as illustrated by the definition given above. After having looked 
at governance’s comprehensive take on actors and authority, this section will 
outline the ways in which coordination in the management and regulation of 
a problematic issue in world politics is structured. There can be said to be two 
main strands of research on this, which for simplicity will be termed 
conventional and critical. These two approaches differ on the place that the 
concept of cooperation holds in a system of governance. Whereas the former 
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approach has been more widespread, the latter has also received increasing 
attention.  
Together with the initial focus on transnational institutions, conventional 
governance studies have had a tendency to consider governance as almost 
akin to cooperation. As hinted above, security governance is generally seen as 
a non-coercive system involving coordination, management, and regulation.35 
This is based on the recognition that coercion is becoming less relevant in a 
number of social interactions, as demonstrated by the less frequent recourse 
to the use of force and threats in inter-state relations. It has been argued that 
‘governance in the global system is about creating social and political order in 
the absence of modern statehood’ 36  and thus governance has been 
conceptualised by many as the set of rules, institutions, and arrangements 
that structure the world in an orderly way. Some have gone even further 
saying that ‘There can be no governance without order and there can be no 
order without governance’.37 This functionalist view tends to see governance 
problems as a matter of efficiency and effectiveness in fulfilling collective 
demands.38 
However, this understanding is quite limiting and only focuses on the most 
benign face of governance. An example of this view can be found in Kirchner 
and Sperling’s work on security governance.39 Not only do they take a mostly 
statist approach, dividing their edited volume along national lines, but they 
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also see institutions as the unique expression of security governance and a 
better integration of the regional and the international levels as the solution 
to pressing problems. As noted by Finkelstein, ‘although adopting rules may 
be a primary objective of governance, as of government, and may even be the 
most important service performed, it is not the only function of governance 
precisely because it is not the only thing governments do’.40  
More fundamentally, the problem of this view lies in its more or less implicit 
liberal claim that solutions to shared problems of world politics are to be 
found in inter-state and trans-level cooperation. Conversely, critical 
contributions have doubted the feasibility of a normative consensus binding 
the international community: the process of creating order, far from equating 
cooperation, is indeed prone to crate more subtle forms of domination and 
exploitation even in the absence of formally legitimated coercive power.	41 
That is the case of postcolonial analyses of security governance, which have 
looked, for example, into transnational companies active in the mining sector 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and the everyday security practices they generate.42 A 
similar line of thought has been particularly developed by authors from a 
Foucauldian and Gramscian perspective. In the rise of tasks fulfilled by civil 
society, Neumann and Sending do not see a movement of power from the 
state to the non-state, but rather a change in the governing rationality which 
might lead to co-optation.43 The notion of governance as provision of order 
can thus be maintained but in the sense of steering capacity and (informal) 
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rule.44 For Bob Jessop, governance is the coordination of social relations 
characterized by different kinds of reciprocal interdependence, which are 
placed along a continuum from the ‘anarchy of exchange’, through the 
‘hierarchy of command’ and the ‘heterarchy of reflexive self-organization’, 
and to the ‘solidarity of unconditional loyalty and trust’.45  
In the field of security, a similar but more parsimonious distinction of 
modalities has been presented by Adler and Greve who see governance as 
composed of two mechanisms of interaction: balance of power and security 
communities.46 They maintain that, despite being the remits of two opposed 
schools of thought, both modalities exist in reality, even overlapping in 
certain regional settings. Accordingly, these mechanisms should therefore be 
studied, together with their associated repertoires of practices, through a 
more comprehensive approach that overcomes the rationalist-constructivist 
theoretical divide.	As such, governance does not entail the elimination of 
conflict or the emergence of a cosmopolitan federalism, rather it includes 
different modalities of interaction among actors. This means being open to 
recognise the effect of varieties of power: not only the material one but also 
the power of identities and narration.  
Bringing this even further, Barnett and Duvall have looked for instances of 
four different forms of power, whether the compulsory kind favoured by 
realists or the power of institutions highlighted by liberals and 
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constructivists, the structural power of the Marxist tradition, or the 
performative type preferred by interpretivist approaches. Their approach, 
looking for evidence of the enactment of a certain type of power rather than 
the other, appears well-placed to recognise the dialectic and sometimes 
contradictory character of governance even in matters of security. Applying 
this framework, Johnstone has looked at the debate in the UN Security 
Council regarding NATO’s intervention in Kosovo to find the effects of 
interpretive communities, or those groups of experts, governmental and not, 
that define rules and norms.	47 He finds instances of productive, institutional, 
and compulsory power as legal discourse shapes the terms of interaction 
among the players, indirectly steers action in a certain direction, and can 
directly affect states’ positions if used effectively. 
Like him, much interpretive literature has drawn from Habermas to develop 
propositions over communicative action and its role in producing and 
reproducing global governance. Risse in particular has looked at 
argumentative action within international negotiations noting its centrality in 
setting and implementing rules. 48  It is through social interaction that 
preferences and identities get challenged and changed paving the way for 
social learning and the internalisation of norms. In a similar vein, but coming 
from a media background, Castells used the notion of ‘global public sphere’ 
																																																						
47	Ian	 Johnstone,	 ‘The	 Power	 of	 Interpretive	 Communities,’	 in	 Power	 in	 Global	 Governance,	 eds.		
Michael	Barnett	and	Raymond	Duvall	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2004).	
48	Thomas	Risse,	‘Global	Governance	and	Communicative	Action,’	Government	and	Opposition,	39	n°	
2	 (2004).	 On	 the	 discursive	 construction	 of	 legitimacy,	 see	 Jens	 Steffek,	 ‘The	 Legitimation	 of	
International	Governance:	A	Discourse	Approach,’	European	Journal	of	International	Relations,	9	n°	2	
(2003).	
	 121	
as the site where the opinions of society are shaped.	49 Together they help us 
think of governance as the space where regulation is decided upon through a 
discursively constructed consensus. 
This approach is consistent with critical constructivist commitment to 
prioritise identity, narratives, and representation that has been sketched in 
the Introduction. However, it needs to be complemented with a reflexive 
attention to the politics of power inequalities. Murphy stated that ‘Global 
governance is more a site, one of many sites, in which struggles over wealth, 
power and knowledge are taking place.’50 This notion of governance as the 
space of struggle also resonates with calls by postcolonial authors to engage 
with ‘subaltern agency and the politics of translation, appropriation and 
resistance.’51 The contestation of global governance has indeed been a central 
preoccupation of critical contributions.52 The same sensitivity can be found in 
this work, which takes an interpretive approach to examine the struggle over 
nuclear disarmament, as it is being brought forward by a governance actor 
that, at least in principle, is a subordinate voice of contestation. 
About twenty years after the introduction of the concept, global governance 
remains a relatively undefined and indeterminate notion. The term has been 
used by a variety of authors who have given it connotations ranging from 
analytical to normative and from broad to narrow. In many works, moreover, 
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the usage of governance is instrumental to saying something else: a variety of 
authors do not even attempt to define what they mean by governance. In 
1995 Finkelstein argued that ‘”[g]lobal governance” appears to be virtually 
anything.’ 53  Indeed, he has not been alone in criticising this research 
programme for being too undetermined and theoretically shallow.  
However, it is more useful to think of governance as a heuristic tool or a 
conceptual framework – essentially as a perspective that leads to asking 
questions that would otherwise remain unanswered.54 It could be said that 
governance argues that less political actors and less political actions are 
integral to understanding the world.  The emergence of governance is thus 
rooted in a reconfiguration of sources, sites, and practices of authority. On 
the structural level, it is interested in understanding or advancing the 
creation of global order from complexity generated by parallel processes such 
as globalisation, communication, and networking which made the world 
more interconnected and interdependent. While the concentration on market 
forces of much of the literature can help in analysing the nuclear order only 
to a certain extent, the increase of nodal structures and their interaction is 
quite important. Mapping the space of global governance and locating its 
regulatory structures is indeed a promising perspective to understand 
governing activity in the absence of legitimated coercion. 
After having gone through the different types of power and actors involved in 
global security governance, the chapter will address the use that of this 
framework can be made in the nuclear field. 
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3.2 Nuclear governance 
Attempts at conceiving of the nuclear order as a complex system of 
government have thus far been scarce, as foregrounded by the discussion of 
nuclear governance introducing Chapter Two. Harald Müller and his 
colleagues, for instance, refer to ‘common security governance,’ an attempt to 
unravel the spirals of security dilemmas through the norms ingrained in arms 
control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.55 Similarly, Bruce Larkin refers 
to global governance as opposed to ‘sovereign unilateralism’.56 Also, Nicholas 
Wheeler mentions governance while criticizing the implications of a world 
shaped upon Kenneth Waltz’s presumption that nuclear weapons are a 
boon.57  
All of these contributions only touch upon governance but they seem to 
employ a notion of it that is akin to cooperation, thus unnecessarily 
restricting their analysis to one modality of governance. The bomb has been 
governed not only through the rules imposed by agreements for non-
proliferation or arms control purposes, but also by the decisions to disarm or 
exercise deterrence. As argued by Lebow and Stein, a full view of the nuclear 
situation must take into account the restraint induced by nuclear 
deterrence.58 Nuclear governance is not only a set of ‘international treaties, 
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56	Bruce	 Larkin,	 Designing	 Denuclearization:	 An	 Interpretive	 Encyclopedia,	 Vol.	 1	 (New	 Brunswick:	
Transaction	Publishers,	2011).	
57	Nicholas	 Wheeler,	 ‘Beyond	 Waltz’s	 Nuclear	 World:	 More	 Trust	 May	 be	 Better,’	International	
Relations,	23	n°	3	(2009).		
58	Richard	 Ned,	 Lebow	 and	 Janice	 Gross	 Stein,	 ‘Deterrence	 and	 the	 Cold	 War,’	 Political	 Science	
Quarterly	110	n°	2	(1995):	166.	
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organizations, initiatives and networks’59 but also coercive practices. Such 
sensitivity can be found in Ritchie’s category of ‘institutional/governance 
value’60 as one of the domains of nuclear value, with the UN Security Council 
permanent membership coinciding with the NPT-sanctioned nuclear weapon 
state status. All this work has been helpful in clarifying the contours of 
nuclear governance, but more systematic analyses are needed in order to 
understand the structures, actors, and practices involved.61 
On the basis of what said in the previous section, nuclear governance does 
not need to be synonymous with cooperative behaviour. Wheeler thinks of 
global nuclear governance as what will be necessary for disarmament to take 
place, here it is argued that governance is already in place – though its 
effectiveness and legitimacy have limits.	Building on the definition of security 
governance presented in earlier, we can say that nuclear governance 
comprises all those formal and informal arrangements, institutions, norms, 
and discourses, situated at multiple levels and involving different kinds of 
actors in the coordinated management and regulation of nuclear arms and 
their sensitive technologies. This thesis will try to conceptualise it instead as 
the whole of the practices as well as regulations on nuclear weapons and 
related activities, thus considering not only a potential disarmament end-
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for	International	Governance	Innovation	(CIGI)	(2008):	1.	
60	Nick	Ritchie,	‘Valuing	and	Devaluing	Nuclear	Weapons.’	
61	Other	 projects	 are	 increasingly	 interested	 in	 exploring	 such	 issues	 so	 hopefully	 this	 research	
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state, but also all the other analytical categories that were the backbone of 
Chapter Two: deterrence, non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament. 
In the following sections we will start mapping nuclear governance in terms 
of actors and practices. That grounds the case for the relevance of this 
approach in that it allows us to have a deeper understanding of agency in the 
nuclear world with its focus on what is non-state and multi-level as well as a 
broader analysis of the structure of nuclear order, more inclusive than the 
non-proliferation regime. 
 
3.2.1 Actors of nuclear governance: more than just states 
As there is not one single body dedicated to its various dimensions, nuclear 
governance works at multiple levels and includes both public and private 
authority. States are visibly important and often preponderant in decisions 
concerning nuclear arms and materials and their management, but by no 
means are they the only ones with agency in these decisions. The parallel 
processes of integration and fragmentation have been in place with 
competences migrating to higher and lower levels of government through 
formal and informal arrangements. International organisations and regimes 
have put limits on states’ nuclear practices and, although it remains a 
national decision whether to join them or not, there has been extensive 
support and compliance with their norms.62 Non-proliferation, for example, 
is now an almost universal norm and the related agreement, the NPT, is one 
of the most universal treaties. Of course the same cannot be said about all 
																																																						
62	For	 an	 analysis	 of	 compliance	 see	 Harald	 Müller,	 ‘Compliance	 Politics:	 A	 Critical	 Analysis	 of	
Multilateral	Arms	Control	Treaty	Enforcement,’	The	Nonproliferation	Review,	7	n°	2	(2000).	
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nuclear governance norms, and contestation is pervasive even for non-
proliferation and its associated commitments.  
In terms of ‘governance with government’, institutionalised multilateral 
cooperation among states is well developed in a variety of fora under the 
aegis of the UN: General Assembly, Security Council, UN Disarmament 
Commission, Conference on Disarmament. Formally separated but 
connected to the UN, several multilateral treaties and agreements have 
constrained nuclear activities: the NPT, LTBT and the CTBT, the 
International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 
and the different forms of safeguards and nuclear cooperation administered 
by the IAEA. Less inclusive arrangements have characterised the export 
control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Zangger 
Committee, and the Wassenaar Arrangement.63 Interdiction activities have 
also been coordinated through the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI). All these multilateral institutions and agreements absolve a function in 
nuclear governance even with their varying degree of resources, effectiveness, 
and consensus. Interestingly, networks of states with similar views have acted 
within some of these institutions to promote their common agenda, as 
highlighted by work on the NAM.64 
Moreover, it is not just globally but also regionally that governance acts, in 
fact treaties and institutions have dealt with non-proliferation and 
disarmament at that level. Treaties on the regional prohibition of nuclear 
arms (and certain uses of the materials) were concluded in all of the Southern 
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Hemisphere and parts of the Northern, reaching a total of 115 states covered 
by the so-called nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs). These bind their parties 
to non-possession, non-stationing, and non-use of nuclear weapons and 
therefore go further than the NPT in important respects.65 Some of the 
NWFZs have established their institutions – The Organization for the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Arms in Latin America (OPANAL) and the African 
Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) – while Argentina and Brazil 
bilaterally created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and 
Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) to administer verification. 
Another example of nuclear policy coordination at the regional level can be 
found in the NATO. As part of its commitments, nuclear deterrence has been 
from its origins central to the defence of the alliance and US nuclear arms 
have been stationed in Europe through the Treaty. Moreover, NATO conducts 
activities to limit nuclear proliferation and to secure materials in partner 
countries. As works on European security governance have demonstrated, 
the EU provides a good example of how politics is moving to a multi-level 
system where different actors have not only a stake but also a say in the 
process.66 In the nuclear field too the EU is an important component of 
regional coordination and regulation as shared agendas and practices 
emerge. Brussels’ non-proliferation policy suffers from many shortcomings, 
first of all its inclusion of both nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states as well 
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as countries hosting atomic weapons.67 Yet, it has a strong basis in the 
cooperative management of nuclear materials through EURATOM and 
started to increase the coordination of its external actions as part of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, from sanctions to common positions.68 
This is a complex process that involves the cooperation of a host of 
institutions, from heads of states to local port authorities. 
Other military alliances that involve deterrence sharing are the ANZUS or 
Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (though without 
Wellington after its denuclearisation), the Japan-US Security Treaty, and the 
Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and South Korea. However, 
informality has often been preponderant, as demonstrated by the unclear 
status of the nuclear protection awarded by the US to its Middle Eastern 
allies. Much policy is also made at the bilateral level, especially, but not only, 
concerning Washington and Moscow. Since the 1970s, an array of treaties has 
bounded the two to cap their atomic warheads deployments and holdings, 
and to refrain from certain practices and accept mutual verification. More 
recently they also cooperated on securing Russia’s radioactive material via 
the U.S.-Russian Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.69 
Aside from the international, the regional, and the bilateral levels, domestic 
dynamics and bodies have also come to shape nuclear politics as authority 
gets fragmented across sub-state entities. The US Congress, in particular, has 
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proved several times to be a crucial player in nuclear decision-making and 
implementation as the following examples highlight: in 1999 it rejected 
ratification of the CTBT, it has actively pushed for more sanctions against 
Iran over the past ten years, and controlling the budget gives it leverage on 
the continuing layout of the US deterrent and its implementation of arms 
control treaties. The discussion around the repercussions of a potential 
Scottish independence for the British nuclear deterrent is another case in 
point, demonstrating how agency might matter at the local level. Threatening 
to leave London without a base for its nuclear-armed submarines, Scotland’s 
independence and nuclear renunciation would have involved far-reaching 
consequences in terms of disarmament. In a similar fashion, albeit at a 
smaller level, cities have sometimes rejected nuclear possession under the 
banner of nuclear-free cities. Particularly in the 1980s, as disarmament 
campaigners were strong in Europe, local municipalities ruled not to allow 
any nuclear materials under their jurisdiction. Although this opposition is 
possibly rooted more in a rejection of nuclear energy rather than weapons 
per se, its implications hinge on military matters as well. An example is to be 
found in Sir Michael Quinlan’s account of the UK Ministry of Defence’s 
inability to conduct exercises involving nuclear weapons in 1982 because of 
the local councils’ decision to declare themselves ‘nuclear-free zones’ refusing 
to cooperate with the central government.70 
Even though nuclear politics remains dominated by states, there are grounds 
to argue that ‘governance without government’ is also present as non-state 
actors are involved in a variety of respects: contributing to agenda-setting in 
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multilateral institutions, monitoring states’ practices, building networks to 
advance their claims. Non-state actors are thus involved in nuclear 
governance both with the provision of services and knowledge but also 
making their own politics. Not only do private and third sector actors have 
increasing access to resources, but they are often also given some voice in 
international deliberations. Moreover, they have been sometimes a source of 
strain: it is probably sufficient to recall the A.Q. Khan incident, the scientist 
who stole and sold nuclear secrets, to convincingly make the case that states 
are no longer the only actors that can affect nuclear governance. Nuclear 
terrorism has quickly risen to a major concern since 9/11, as demonstrated by 
the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Also, the standoff 
surrounding Iran’s nuclear programme started with the revelation of 
undeclared facilities by the National Council of Resistance of Iran, a political 
opposition group. Another example of governance without government is 
found in the nuclear energy industry, although a large part of it is state-
owned. Nuclear corporations actively lobby for their priorities and have 
started establishing policy guidelines on nuclear proliferation and security.71  
Since the invention of the bomb civil society has been active campaigning for 
disarmament in different countries at the national and local level as well as 
transnationally, as will be further explored in the following section. Examples 
range from the historic Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) to the 
more recent Global Zero and from the Greenham Common movement to 
anti-testing Greenpeace activism  
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In sum, actors involved in the discussion, negotiation, and implementation of 
nuclear policy span from international organisations to civil society and from 
cities to continents. This complexity risks being lost in approaches that 
privilege the state or a certain level of analysis – it is the interaction among 
levels and between states and other sources of authority that often 
determines outcomes.   
 
3.2.2 Regimes of nuclear governance 
What nuclear weapons do to order is not an unproblematic unit, but a 
complex system of practices and social relations. Mapping the space of global 
governance and locating its regulatory structures is indeed a promising 
perspective to understand governing activity in the absence of legitimated 
coercion. On the structural level, the politics of the bomb can be divided into 
four relatively independent images, which have associated policy options and 
priorities as well as discourses. Contrary to other accounts this thesis 
maintains that nuclear governance is structured around the politics of 
deterrence, arms control, non-proliferation, and disarmament, whose 
definitions have been put forward in Chapter Two. Table 1 summarises that 
discussion and seeks to highlight the differences across categories. 
Table	1:	Images	of	Nuclear	Governance	
	 Aim	 Actor	 Modalities	
Disarmament	 Eliminate	the	threat	of	
nuclear	weapons	as	a	
means	of	security	
States	that	do	
not	have	nuclear	
weapons		
-	Cannot	afford		
-	Do	not	want	to	
possess	nuclear	
weapon		
-	Reversal	
Deterrence	 Threaten	nuclear	
weapons	use	to	protect	
Nuclear-armed	
states	or	that	rely	
-	High-salience	
nuclear	postures	
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the	national	interest	 on	them	in	their	
security	
doctrines	
-	Low-salience		
-	Umbrella		
Arms	control	 Limit	the	number	of	
and	activities	allowed	
for	nuclear	weapons	
Nuclear-armed	
states	
-	Treaties		
-	Ad-hoc	initiatives	
Non-proliferation	 Limit	the	spread	of	
nuclear	weapons	to	
other	actors	
States	and	non-
state	
-	Treaties		
-	Ad-hoc	initiatives	
 
Arms control is an important way through which order has been brought to 
the nuclear age and often it is considered as the name of the field revolving 
around nuclear cooperation.72 However, the term has often been used to refer 
more to the bilateral process of nuclear arms limitation between Washington 
and Moscow than to an overall strategy. For this arms control has recently 
come under attack,73 however, it proved so powerful a frame that even when 
authors recognise that it is only one side of the issue, they have adopted it as 
an encompassing term.74 As such, nuclear governance encompasses the other 
dimensions of the provision of orderly solutions to the nuclear risk. 
The regulation of nuclear weapons is also often associated to the idea of an 
expanding non-proliferation regime with treaties and agreements to limit the 
geographical spread of the bomb, to new countries or other actors. 
Significantly, non-proliferation is but one dimension of nuclear weapons 
regulation, as Chapter Two showed. Of course it is a very important 
component of agreements and institutions in this field including the NPT, 
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NWFZs, export control arrangements, legally binding negative security 
assurances, and various activities by the IAEA.75  
This project uses the term nuclear governance, rather than the more widely 
used non-proliferation regime, because of its wider structural regard and of 
its recognition of agency different from that of the state. Nuclear governance, 
indeed, is composed of different regimes, as the creation of order has 
concerned much more than the geographical spread of the bomb. Treaties 
have been signed for the renunciation of certain activities (the LTBT and 
CTBT treaties on nuclear testing, India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement), to 
set quantitative limits of deployed weapons (SALT I, II, START I, II, New 
START), to eliminate altogether a category of arms (INF), but also to grant 
nuclear protection as in the NATO framework, or for cooperation such as 
between the UK and France.  
All the four images discussed, in fact, have their limitations. Talking about 
deterrence, for instance, does not say much as to why states seek nuclear 
arsenals and disarmament is mostly a normative project with little theoretical 
development. Arms control, on the other hand, is generally a subject of 
historical discussion, and non-proliferation is dominated by policy-oriented 
accounts and an alarmist feel. This thesis proposes a more integrated view of 
the field, which goes beyond its fixation with the bilateral arms reduction 
process on the one hand, and the proliferation problem raised by special 
countries of concern on the other, and the avoidance of the problematic 
repercussions of deterrence. All of these elements speak to the security 
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underpinnings of nuclear weapons and much could be gained from greater 
interaction.  
Contesting the notion of the non-proliferation regime, the regimes of 
deterrence and disarmament give a better view of the normative variance of 
nuclear order. They coexist at the same time proscribing different roles to 
different categories of states. The relations between social order and nuclear 
weapons are essentially divided between a logic of disarmament and a logic of 
deterrence. Deterrence and disarmament could be seen of the remits of the 
opposing factions of strategic studies and peace research, and indeed from 
the very language used, they are highly different. Even more, they are one the 
opposite of the other. Disarmament, as conceptualised here, promises to 
weaken both deterrence and proliferation while being essentially not in 
contradiction with arms control.  
This view of the nuclear order heavily builds on the division advanced by 
William Walker around two managed systems – deterrence and abstinence – 
with two complementary regulatory institutions – arms control and non-
proliferation.76 In the system of deterrence ‘a recognized set of states would 
continue using nuclear weapons to prevent war and maintain stability, but in 
a manner that was increasingly controlled and rule-bound’, while the other 
states in the system of abstinence ‘would give up their sovereign rights to 
develop, hold and use such weapons in return for economic, security and 
other benefits’.77 The distinction between those states relying on nuclear arms 
and those states that don’t, indeed, goes to the crux of the matter because 
that is what creates differential obligations and status for states in nuclear 
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politics. It is not a matter of being pro or against proliferation but pro or 
against the possession of nuclear weapons. Rather than being the expression 
of one single non-proliferation regime, the nuclear order is regulated by 
different regimes for nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. 
If for Walker what matters is the material possession of the bomb, however, 
this thesis takes an interest in the cultural relevance of nuclear weapons 
themselves. In fact, Walker’s category of abstinence, including among the 
states that do not have nuclear weapons those protected by nuclear 
umbrellas, creates problems. While formally correct, it leads to consider that 
states being protected by a deterrent they do not themselves possess are not 
actually acting in a system of deterrence. As such, it is reliance on deterrence, 
not material possession, that constitutes the opposite of abstinence for the 
purpose of this project. 
On the other side, this project sees a regime of disarmament in which states 
would move away from deterrence conceptions. Disarmament here comes to 
represent something more than the elimination of a weapon system: it is the 
elimination of nuclear deterrence from a certain relationship. Nick Ritchie 
focused his attention on the process of devaluing nuclear weapons that he 
sees as crucial to make getting to zero politically, strategically, and socially 
possible.78 He made the argument that ‘disarmament occurs when the value 
assigned to nuclear weapons falls below a context-specific threshold such that 
nuclear weapons have insufficient intersubjective value to warrant continued 
possession for a polity’.79 In line with him, disarmament is taken here to be 
not what happens when numbers of weapons decrease, but rather when 
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deterrence is rejected. Social relations can be disarmed, in the sense that 
nuclear weapons are eliminated (materially or not) from the realm of possible 
use. 
Accordingly there is a chasm between a regime of deterrence and a regime of 
disarmament, both existing in the present environment with differential roles 
and rules and in continuous conflict with one another. Recognising that the 
two systems of deterrence and disarmament coexist is crucial because 
nuclear scholarship has mostly focused on the armed and paid little attention 
to the disarmed. The assumption that deterrence is the interesting side of 
nuclear scholarship deserves re-examination. Also, it should be recognised 
that deterrence and disarmament are not discreet categories, but rather two 
poles of a continuum along which the ideas, discourses, and, more to the 
point for this thesis, advocacy material can gravitate.  
Figure	1:	Scheme	of	Nuclear	Governance	Arrangements	
 
	
Deterrence	
Arms	Control	
Non-Proliferation	
Disarmament	
New	START	 INF	
extended	
deterrence	 NWFZs	
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To briefly summarise, as Figure 1 shows, the governance of nuclear weapons 
is taken here to constructed along a continuum between disarmament and 
deterrence regimes which ascribe higher or lower value to nuclear arms. 
Arms control and non-proliferation, instead, constitute its regulatory 
systems. Treaties and arrangements can thus be categorised according to 
whether the aim is restricting activities on an already existing nuclear 
arsenal, arms control, or preventing its formation, non-proliferation.  
As the two by two matrix shows, the arrangements making up nuclear 
governance can either belong to the regime of deterrence or that of 
disarmament and its regulatory institutions can be shaped on arms control or 
on non-proliferation. Arms control comprises instruments aimed to cap 
existing weapons, materials, or activities while non-proliferation, instead, to 
prevent their spread to new actors. As such, this creates four modalities that 
help us categorise the various arrangements included under nuclear 
governance. Four brief examples will be offered: within the arms control 
agreements (1) New START is the one that tilts towards deterrence, whereas 
(2) the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty promotes disarmament; (3) 
extended deterrence arrangements are aimed at non-proliferation but 
maintaining deterrence, while (4) NWFZs do away with it while sharing the 
same purpose.  
1. Most of the arms control treaties between the US and Russia (earlier 
the Soviet Union), of which New START is one example, have put 
quantitative limits to the arsenals of the two, reducing numbers 
without actually impinging on their mutually assured destruction 
relationship.  
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2. On the contrary, some agreements previewed the total elimination of 
a certain category of weapons, thus eliminating the deterrent power 
assigned to that arm system – this was the case for the Intermediate 
Nuclear Forces treaty of 1987, which banned both from having 
missiles with a range of 500-5,500 km. The crucial difference between 
New START and INF is that in the case of the latter the value of the 
controlled arms sunk and could thus be physically removed, whereas 
the same did not happen for the former.  
3. As for arrangements that prevent the spread of arms, extended 
deterrence is indeed a non-proliferation measure in that the 
guarantee by a nuclear-armed state reduces the protected states’ 
perceived need for nuclear arms. However, it does so while upholding 
the protector’s deterrent effect and is actually rooted in it.  
4. Nuclear weapon free zones, instead, belong to the disarmament 
modality because they reinforce non-proliferation while eliminating 
deterrent relationships among the zones’ parties, but also vis-à-vis the 
nuclear weapon states. The extension of legally binding negative 
security assurances to states under an NWFZ, in fact, is an act of 
disarmament even if no warhead is dismantled because the option of 
a nuclear attack is removed from (legal) possibility. 
Nuclear governance is thus much more than the non-proliferation regime: it 
is not only a matter of who is allowed to acquire the bomb but also how many 
can states possess and what they can do with them. Even more, nuclear 
governance is composed of two competing regimes, deterrence and 
disarmament, which classify actors according to their valuing of the 
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threatening effect of nuclear arms. As these four examples have shown, there 
are many ways in which nuclear relations can unfold and nuclear deterrence 
can either be utilised or rejected. In fact, not all states rely on the bomb or 
want to. Recognising that these two systems coexist is crucial because nuclear 
scholarship has mostly focused on the armed and paid little attention to the 
disarmed.  
 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has put the theoretical foundations of the project through the 
discussion of literatures on security governance and the development of the 
notion of global nuclear governance. As we have seen, multiple and separate 
authorities, including both public and private actors, are the agents of 
governance. That means that the sovereign authority of the state is dislodged 
from its central position and opens the way for other forms of authority. 
Governance exists both with and without government as more competences 
flow to the private sector and to non-profit organisations. They interact in a 
multi-level system where spaces both local and transnational complement the 
national. The site of governance is fragmented in multinational (both 
universal and exclusive), bilateral, national, subnational, and transnational 
fora. Functional differentiation, moreover, leads the various actors to 
perform different tasks.  
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Governance does not only emphasise complexity through heterarchy but also 
because of the multiple modalities of purposeful coordinated management 
and regulation which involves both formal and informal arrangements but 
also discourses and norms structuring them. In the creation of order patterns 
of enmity, domination, cooperation, and identification can be found to steer 
relations among the various units. Having rejected a benign view of 
governance as cooperation, this project employs governance recognising the 
complex nature of power and accepting the existence of different 
simultaneous structuring mechanisms. Power is not only intended as power 
over others, but also in terms of normative structures and discourses that 
give meaning to social interaction 
Building on the definition of security governance presented in this chapter, 
we can say that nuclear governance comprises all those formal and informal 
arrangements, institutions, norms, and discourses, situated at multiple levels 
and involving different kinds of actors in the coordinated management and 
regulation of nuclear arms and their sensitive technologies. In order to break 
away from the dominant conceptualisations of the nuclear order outlined in 
Chapter Two, this project makes a case for the relevance of a governance 
approach in that it allows, firstly, a broader analysis of the structure of 
nuclear order, more inclusive than the non-proliferation regime. Secondly, 
because it grants a deeper understanding of agency in the nuclear world with 
its focus on what is non-state and multi-level. In terms of actors, in fact, the 
governance literature provides ample justification for studying civil society 
groups as sources of authority alternative to the state.  
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Such a view of nuclear order allows to comprehensively regard the various 
ways in which the bomb is being governed. What is crucial for this discussion, 
however, is that the continuum along regimes of deterrence and 
disarmament, beyond the normative structure of nuclear governance, is also 
a baseline parameter for the discourses that take place there. The competing 
regimes indeed have less to do with the legal and institutional arrangements 
and more with the strategic culture and operational plans of the various 
states. Even more, states (and other actors) can either rely on deterrence or 
disarmament as the two main modalities to structure their relation to nuclear 
weapons and materials. Indeed, the idea that wants to be probed in this 
thesis is that so long as the discourse of deterrence, with its corollaries of 
non-proliferation and arms control, remain prevalent, nuclear disarmament 
will remain a far-off objective. 
The move along that continuum has crucial analytical importance for this 
project, which aims to identify the characteristics of the disarmament 
strategies of civil society. As mentioned in Chapter One, this thesis looks at 
global nuclear governance by focusing on a particular actor, whose relevance 
has been amply supported by this chapter’s discussion of governance actors. 
A discussion of the main debates in civil society research is thus crucial now 
to lay down the foundations to understand that agency, within the structure 
defined here. That will allow a further grounding in the constructivist and 
critical research agendas, already started in these pages, as well as the crucial 
link to Gramsci’s theory of civil society. If this and the previous chapter have 
introduced the literature concerned with one side of this thesis’ project, 
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global nuclear governance, the next two will do the same for the other side, 
global civil society.  
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Chapter 4  
 
Global Civil Society: Anatomy of a 
Research Programme 
 
As made clear in Chapter Three, the governance literature provides ample 
justification for studying civil society groups as one of the sources of 
authority alternative to the state. The extent of participation and visibility of 
coalitions and organisations such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International, 
Occupy, and the peace movement have drawn much scholarly attention. This 
produced a wide literature that followed the waves and peaks of activism with 
works much reflective of their times – from the 1960s with the civil rights, 
students, and women liberation movements, through the 1990s rise of NGOs, 
and contemporary activism exemplified by the Indignados and Arab 
uprisings. On the basis of what said above, this section will highlight the 
contributions of the literature on civil society in order to find a definition that 
could be applied to the study of the nuclear world. Reviewing them will allow 
the reader to identify the analytical focus of the whole project and to put 
nuclear civil society in the context of similar movements and their 
scholarship.  
The study of civil society broadly intended has included both analytical and 
normative studies while being highly interdisciplinary: sociologists, 
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anthropologists, communication studies experts as well as political scientists 
have come together around this theme. Moreover, the theoretical and 
methodological tools employed by various researchers markedly vary 
spanning from rationalistic to sociological approaches. Despite the 
overwhelming focus on domestic movements, increasing attention has been 
paid to what was alternatively defined as the international, or transnational, 
or global level of activism. What brings all approaches together is the idea of 
social change as the aim of mobilised communities engaged in collective 
action, be it for the rights of indigenous people, for the protection of the 
environment, or for the abolition of nuclear weapons. In fact, the desire to 
change the status quo and a more or less clear agenda to go about are 
essential to constitute a civil society actor. In essence, a variety of approaches 
have looked at global civil society whether they use the label or not. 
The designations of processes of collective action involving non-state agents 
have multiplied: social movements, NGOs, transnational advocacy networks, 
civil society, and transnational coalitions among others. Tarrow argued there 
are significant differences among the various categories of actors that have 
been lumped together. 80  Accordingly, works on transnational social 
movements look at social mobilization involved in contention across at least 
two states, thus paying attention to the movement’s interactions with states, 
institutions, and the economy. International NGOs, with a higher degree of 
professionalism as compared to movements, are not only committed to social 
change but also involved in service provision and in routine transactions that 
have a less contentious character. The notion of transnational advocacy 
																																																						
80	Sidney	Tarrow,	‘Transnational	Politics:	Contention	and	Institutions	in	International	Politics,’	Annual	
Review	of	Political	Science,	4	n°	1	(2001).	
	 145	
network, finally, covers both social movements and international non-
governmental organisations (INGOs) but also governmental agents. Although 
each term has been employed to refer to a partially different reality, they all 
speak to the agency of organised individuals who propose modifications to 
the system of governance.  
While collective action, even at the transnational level, is not an entirely new 
phenomenon, it is widely understood that contemporary movements have a 
different character from earlier ones. Nineteenth century labour and peasant 
movements, in fact, were not only much more localised despite the 
commonality of their cause, but also confronted a very different state 
apparatus. It is precisely the relation to the state that constitutes one of the 
main features of civil society and its scholarship. While thinkers such as 
Tocqueville and Marx had already investigated this relation, they 
conceptualised civil society as the private sphere, where market interests are 
at play.81 This project, instead, looks at civil society in a Gramscian way, as 
established in the Introduction, the implications of which will be seen at the 
end of this chapter.82 Therefore, it sees civil society as a public sphere, 
distinguished from political society, and located in the space between the 
state and the market.  
Gramsci regarded civil society as an integral part of the state; in his view, 
civil society, far from being inimical to the state, is, in fact, its most resilient 
constitutive element, even though the most immediately visible aspect of the 
state is political society, with which it is all too often mistakenly identified.83 
Again to go back to the Introduction, this project’s concern is the global 
reality of collective action in the nuclear field. The term used in this study, 
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global civil society, is employed in the same sense as Lipschutz: to refer to the 
fact that ‘civil society is becoming global and therefore a political force to be 
reckoned with’.84 Such terminology is preferred in that it encompasses a 
reality wider than social movements and because of the emphasis on its 
global reach: indeed, it is not only the transnational stretch of its connections 
that make a group global but also its consciousness, or the ability to imagine 
itself as a community.85 
Looking at specific elements of the phenomenon of collective action at the 
transnational level, scholars have often made the case for more limited 
applications that take into consideration a specific aspect of such activism. As 
a result, the focus of study changes significantly, with some looking mostly at 
media depictions, others at micro-processes of mobilisation, and still others 
at the integration of claims in governance structures. This has been chiefly a 
difference in emphasis, though, rather than a fundamental distinction.86 The 
next sections will discuss the main approaches in turn – mainstream and 
critical – and clarify the author’s position with respect to them.  
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4.1 Mainstream perspectives 
Researchers have asked under what conditions civil society mobilises and 
what factors aid its success. It was quickly noted that mobilisation alone is 
not sufficient to understand these processes and theories have thus been 
developed to explain under what conditions civil society is effective in 
accomplishing its ends. A major division can be seen between paradigms 
focused on resources-mobilisation and those that are identities-oriented, the 
former more popular in the United States, the latter in Europe.87 A lively 
debate flourished on these themes, with some arguing that the ability to 
gather resources is what makes social movements effective, while others 
concentrated on the features of the political opportunity structure to signal 
the relevance of openings and constraints. In opposition to these mostly 
rationalistic views, the framing perspective, emerged in the 1980s, has 
emphasised the capacity of non-governmental actors to construct messages 
that would be convincing for their counterparts, be they decision-makers, 
public opinions, or other movements. Still others, especially concentrating on 
the new movements of the 1990s, have put a greater emphasis on the cultural 
identity of groupings in both their internal and external dynamics.  
Early analyses have been heavily influenced by the most popular theoretical 
currents of the time, both in sociology and international relations. Rationalist 
accounts thus dominated civil society scholarship between the 1960s and 
1970s though their strength remains to this day. A first perspective is the so-
called resource-mobilisation theory developed particularly by McCarthy and 
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Zald, who argue that a social movement’s success is dependent upon its 
capacity to mobilise resources and people. 88  Employing an economistic 
model, this tradition sees civil society groups and participants as rational 
actors with claims on the political process, which they decide not to channel 
through traditional institutions such as political parties. The availability of 
financial resources is the determining criterion behind participation in a 
struggle, but also key to success. Accordingly, these scholars do not 
concentrate on the grievance itself, but on how, on its basis, an organised 
body strategically challenges institutional authority attempting to change 
norms and practices in their favour.89  
In this view social movements working much resemble interest groups. 
Tarrow has provided an institutional approach to transnational contention 
specifying four mechanisms through which movements’ action is performed: 
brokerage, certification, modelling, and institutional appropriation. 90 
Moreover, the involvement of specific actors is critical: adherents, or simple 
sympathisers, must be turned into constituents, i.e. those actively involved 
who provide the movement with resources.91 Rational choice theories have 
encountered serious difficulties in accounting for collective action however. 
Why should mobilisation occur if there are no prospects of material 
incentives? And how would the free riding problem be avoided? 
Furthermore, what is to be made of the relational and contingent character of 
contention? 
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In a partially similar fashion, some scholars have emphasized the importance 
of domestic structures, which comprise ‘the organizational apparatus of 
political and societal institutions, their routines, the decision-making rules 
and procedures as incorporated in law and custom, as well as the values of 
norms prescribing appropriate behaviour embedded in the political culture.’92 
According to the domestic structures paradigm, decentralized political 
systems and pluralistic societies tend to be more inclined to transnational 
activism. In fact, ‘it is mainly the social and institutional context rather than 
actors’ individual motivations which determine whether they can exert 
influence on negotiation systems.’93  
Given that civil society is seen not as a synonym of public opinion, rather of 
organised instances of social action, such organisation should be also located 
in the transnational or global space. According to Tarrow, the 
transnationalisation of a contention occurs via a scale shift, be it direct or 
indirect, through which a contention departs from its localised origins to 
become a transnational force.94 Transnational collective action is thus defined 
as coordinated international campaigns organised by networks of activists 
against international actors, other states, or international organisations.95 
Transnational diffusion, the mechanism identified to explain the spreading of 
movements from a country to the other, however, is too simplistic. It is 
always through a negotiation of local and global instances that movements 
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coalesce around themes, which also come from different traditions. As rule 
becomes more and more globalised, transnational civil society exerts on 
global governance structures roughly the same effect domestic movements 
have on the state.96  
If the literature described until now has mostly taken a positivistic approach, 
what follows comes from the post-positivist tradition and has, to varying 
degrees, tried to shift the focus of the question being asked from the why to 
the how. In opposition to an economistic and individualistic idea of policy-
making as determined by rational cost-benefit analysis, constructivism has 
compellingly argued for the relevance of socialisation and of the logic of 
appropriateness. Policy options are assessed against a set of historically 
contextual cultural conceptions that render only certain choices politically 
viable.97 Interests should not be taken as given, but rather problematized as 
to see why certain issues induced mobilisation while others did not. 
Moreover, the strategies and tactics employed by movements are not always 
the result of a rational calculation. Strategic behaviour is in fact always 
embedded in a context that shapes what possibilities an actor can choose 
from, with both norms and identities playing a significant role.  
From this perspective, Keck and Sikkink introduced the popular notion of 
transnational advocacy networks (TANs) and traced their emergence, 
workings, and effectiveness as norms entrepreneurs. 98  These groups of 
individuals connected across borders for the pursuit of principled ideas 
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emerge when denied political access at home and, through ‘boomerang 
effect’, they enlist transnational activity to bring about international pressure. 
The emergence of TANs is more likely if networking is perceived to advance 
their campaigns, and if conferences allow personal networks to develop. 
TANs strategies may be divided in information, symbolic, leverage, and 
accountability politics: thanks to their networks, they acquire and spread 
information in a quick, credible, and dramatic way, they construct symbolic 
analogies, link to more powerful actors to weight on decisions, and monitor 
policies implemented by states.  
Whether TANs will succeed or not, the authors have found, depends on both 
issues and actors – for example, success is easier for campaigns related to 
bodily harm and legal equality than other issues.99 The attractiveness of the 
model is testified by the range of followers it gathered and by the empirical 
validation it received, though there are cases for which this mechanism 
appears less convincing. In fact, domestic restrictions are not the only reason 
behind mobilisation and process of policy adoption results from pressures 
that appear more variegated than the model would imply, coming 
simultaneously from within and without. 
Studies of civil society are not the only ones to have concerned themselves 
with the agency of sub-state collectives involved in collective action, as 
demonstrated by the literature on epistemic communities. This investigated 
the origins of certain ideas with a bearing on the practice of politics.100 
Epistemic communities works have found that groups of experts with 
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significant access to decision-makers, and under conditions of uncertainty 
and complexity, can often successfully push for certain policies. ‘Through 
their authoritative knowledge in highly technical and complex issue areas, 
members of an epistemic community influence and persuade decision 
makers to subscribe to particular policy recommendations.’101 This is not 
limited to the phase of policy selection but also attains to policy innovation, 
policy diffusion, and policy persistence.102  
In this strand, Risse-Kappen pointed out the similarities among these 
different strand of research developing domestic model based on institutional 
access and political culture to understand the differing acceptance of certain 
ideas transnationally. 103  Bureaucratic politics are certainly needed to 
complement the structural theories of international relations, but so is 
cognitive psychology. Ideas, even in this context, have an impact because they 
are the factors accountable for the ways in which actors define their interests 
under given structural conditions. The ideas that were consequential for the 
end of the Cold War, Risse-Kappen indicates, have sometimes been 
introduced by local communities, other times by transnational ones. Looking 
at ideas as intervening variable, however, reduces the thrust of the argument 
making culture a neatly explainable phenomenon.104 
What some approaches miss, in fact, is the employment of less material 
means in the struggles of civil society, which are not only carriers of certain 
ideologies, but rather signifying agents involved in the production and 
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maintenance of meaning.105 Instead, the existence of shared identities, into 
which actors are socialised, is taken to be crucial for collective action.106 This 
is particularly true for the literature on the so-called ‘new social movements’ 
that emerged out of cleavages other than the traditional class struggle, like 
the peace or the environmental movements. Logics of action explored by 
continental philosophers such as Melucci, Habermas, and Castells have in 
fact been based on ideology and culture.107 Collective identities result from 
the so-called ‘boundary work’, the reciprocal identification between group 
members, which includes emotional factors and develops at multiple 
levels.108 Della Porta has taken subjective ideological orientations as the unit 
of analysis to assess the cultural and symbolic forms in making and 
unmaking of political violence.109 Park, instead, looked at the influence of 
TANs on the formation of international organisations’ identities through 
micro-processes of socialisation.110 Transnational civil society actors seek to 
change not just the interests and identities (and thus practices) of actors but 
also the environment within which those actors operate – that is, the 
structures of power and meaning.’111 Far from seeing civil society as mere 
organised collective action, these perspectives focus on its agency in terms of 
mobilisation of signs and symbols, thus looking at the social construction of 
collective action. 
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4.1.1 Frames 
A significant innovation to the constructivist literature was brought by the 
application of the concept of frame drawing on the sociological tradition 
originating with Erving Goffman’s work on these ‘schemata of 
interpretation’.112 It is through frames that facts become meaningful, thus it 
is interesting to understand the development of patterns and evolution of 
shared meaning. Frames are employed to mobilise consensus around the 
diagnosis and prognosis of a certain issue but also to foster mobilisation. In 
their working, frames can (a) identify different problems and directions of 
attribution, (b) be more or less flexible and inclusive, (c) have a larger or 
smaller interpretive scope, as well as (d) more or less resonance.113 This last 
notion is crucial because it is what makes the theory truly dynamic. In order 
to be internalised, a message must be seen as both believable and important, 
thus resonance is a function of credibility and salience. As for the former, the 
frame should be consistent and have empirical support, but its articulators 
must also be credible. Concerning the latter, instead, the frame must be 
deemed central, be commensurable to experience, and have narrative 
fidelity.114  
Applying similar ideas to transnational mobilisation on a security issue, 
Richard Price considered the function of discourse in norms construction in 
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the process of the Ottawa Convention banning landmines. 115  For him 
transnational civil society can induce normative change through three 
techniques: generating issues with their information diffusion, establishing 
networks of supporters inside and outside governments, and grafting the new 
norm onto the ones that are already accepted. Similarly to the idea of 
resonance, the concept he employs, ‘grafting’, is a notion in which both 
structural and strategic elements are at play. Insisting on the indiscriminate 
nature of their effects, landmines were increasingly associated with weapons 
of mass destruction, which were already recognised as illegitimate, making 
the proposal of a ban more feasible. In order for a new norm to be grafted 
onto the existing normative framework one must be conscious of both 
context and strategic action. 'Discourses produce and legitimate certain 
behaviours and conditions of life as "normal" and, conversely, construct 
categories that themselves make a cluster of practices and understandings 
seem inconceivable or illegitimate.'116 This is not only a purposeful behaviour, 
but also influenced by the cultural context that defines the perimeter of 
possibility. 
The most important problem with constructivism is that it did not ‘develop 
an analysis of how culture and strategic action might be related.’117 While 
they have investigated strategic action including cultural elements, they have 
stopped short of asking how culture acts through civil society. A major 
concern with part of the literature lies in its treatment of civil society as a 
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transmission belt of norms between local societies and global institutions.118 
It is certainly crucial for many policy issues to see the effects of closures and 
openings at the domestic level and to correlate them with the global decision-
making process, but it is not all that is happening. In particular, for certain 
issue areas it is not political repression in a local environment which leads to 
transnational coordination, rather the same character of the issue itself.  Such 
is the case for nuclear politics, as it will be argued in the next chapter, a field 
characterised by an ingrained transnationalism. 
 
 
4.2 Critical civil society research 
The benefit of critical civil society research is that it seeks to turn the 
mainstream concept upside down by taking issue with its normative 
implications. A whole debate has raged on the democratic potential of non-
state actors, whose inclusion in the political process promises to increase the 
legitimacy of governance structures and practices, as briefly hinted at in 
Chapter Three. It has been argued that ‘[t]he main problem of transnational 
governance concerns the lack of congruence between those who are being 
governed and those to whom the governing bodies are accountable.’ 119 
Legitimacy thus becomes crucial and appears to be advanced by the 
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involvement of civil society.120 The participation of organised civil society is 
seen as necessary for the democratic quality of international institutions in 
that it allows free, informed, and inclusive deliberation.121 According to this 
liberal conception, by representing a wider set of normative preferences, the 
participation of NGOs, social movements, TANs, and other groups could 
strengthen the foundations of social order bringing it more in line with the 
actual desires of populations.  
However, it is not only in deliberate norm-making that civil society is 
involved and it would be limiting to see its effects only in that. While the 
insights of the conventional constructivist research programme are certainly 
ground-breaking and much remains to be explored on that side, there are 
also global dynamics that it fails short of recognising. In particular, it offers 
an unproblematic take on the nature of these movements, which are 
supposed to bear an innately progressive agenda. Conversely, much can be 
said as to the hegemonic and discriminatory character of much transnational 
collective action. ‘NGOs and liberal scholars tend to ignore the dual meaning 
of civil society. They fail to understand adequately the sources of domination 
in play and are therefore ill-equipped to challenge them.’122  
Interesting points of criticism to the literature on global civil society have 
been resumed by Anna Stavrianakis, and are worth restating here – with the 
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understanding that she is not alone in making them.123 Two points concern 
the agendas and means of these organisations: traditional analyses of civil 
society have unproblematically regarded agendas as progressive and 
emancipatory, while limiting means to non-violent action. A rare exception, 
Clifford Bob has recently recognised the problem, finding fault with the 
limitation of the transnational advocacy literature to civil, Western, bourgeois 
civil society organisations characterised by liberal democratic or radical 
leftist principles.124 David Chandler made a similar point in his vocal critique 
of cosmopolitan readings of global civil society, taking issue with their 
normative super-imposition.125 By its same existence, civil society at the 
global level seems to be taken as a sign of progress, despite the fact that this 
is clearly not always the case (think of the National Rifle Association or the 
pro-life movement in the domestic US context). Moreover, the insistence on 
solely non-violent activism, tends to gloss over more subtle forms of violence 
that involve NGOs.126 In sum, the definition of civil society should be open-
ended as regard to aims and means of collective action. 
Furthermore, Stavrianakis takes issue with the unbalanced level of 
representation and funding of organisations from the South of the World, 
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resulting in power differentials which are lost when talking of global civil 
society. As Cox argued: 
The same kinds of hierarchy that are observable in the internationalizing 
process among states also appear in civil society-NGOs from the North have 
advantages in organization and finance over those from the South; their 
leadership can sometimes be turned by states and capital into an extension 
of established power. Effective democratization is much more than a simple 
inversion of the powers of states and civil societies.127  
Moreover, the widely used distinction of civil society from both state and 
market obscures the multiple ways in which the three categories are 
interrelated. This theoretical division, in fact, is functional rather than 
substantive, and tends to skirt away the structural constraints on NGOs. To 
analyse them, Stavrianakis proposes instead to consider agents as revolving 
around two networks: one made of state agencies and the arms capital, the 
other of less powerful elements of the state and NGOs. As for the former, the 
mechanisms of reciprocal influence are professional revolving doors and 
military advisory bodies, whereas for the latter it is state funding for NGOs as 
well as partnership on policy development.  
Mainstream civil society research, in fact, has looked at the matter of 
resources mostly from the point of view of civil society, asking how obtaining 
them helps its agenda. They have however not been as effective in 
investigating the state’s direct funding and active encouragement of civil 
society’s participation in governance.128 It is indeed relevant to ask what the 
funding does in terms of changing the very priorities and practices of civil 
society actors. The risk of being co-opted is a central concern of critical 
scholarship, which has problematized the relation between political and civil 
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society contesting rationalistic understandings of the 'power' of civil society – 
or the idea that power is transiting from the state to the non-state – to 
maintain that it is instead a shift in the practice of government.129 As noted by 
Sending and Neumann, the often-repeated claim that the state is losing 
power to civil society hides an important aspect of civil society politics, 
namely that it is often acted through by the state. ‘The expertise and 
knowledge embedded in NGOs must be analysed in terms that also consider 
how different types of actors and organizations fit into and correspond to a 
more general rationality of government.’130 Seeing civil society this way runs 
counter the mostly liberal theorising on global governance. The complexity of 
these relations, in fact, is lost in approaches that firmly distinguish between 
public and private institutions, which risk giving us an overly optimistic 
assessment of civil society activism. Instead, it is highly important to look at 
the power relations unfolding among the various agents, including when they 
are least visible.  
More than seeing what a claim leads to, it is interesting to examine what is 
the meaning of the claim being made. Lipschutz concentrates on the 
productive power involved in the generation of global civil society and on the 
institutional power of its actions – which are often a manifestation of 
governmentality rather than an effective form of resistance.131 Knowledge is 
indeed another form of resource that groups may have and exchange. 
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Stavrianakis’ two networks, in fact, resemble the distinction between an inner 
and an outer circle in interpretive communities theorised by Johnstone.132 
The former, including both governmental and intergovernmental officials, 
shares assumptions and expectation as well as developing consensual 
knowledge, while the latter is more amorphous and participates in 
deliberation in virtue of its claim to specialised knowledge.  
 
4.2.1 Gramscian civil society 
In order to better understand the points raised by critical scholars of civil 
society it is useful to turn to the thinking of Antonio Gramsci, the Italian 
Marxist philosopher who founded the Italian Communist Party and was 
imprisoned by the Fascist state for 11 years until his release in 1937, shortly 
before his death. The prosecutor’s peroration to the judge leading to 
Gramsci’s time in jail famously closed with ‘We must stop this brain from 
working for twenty years!’133  That was perhaps a prophetic attestation of his 
significance for revolutionary change, both in theory and in practice. In his 
pre-jail activism and, most importantly, in his Prison Notebooks,134 The 
Sardinian author, indeed, was an activist at heart, who was puzzled about the 
situation surrounding him, in which the Marxist expectation that a 
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revolutionary force could rise in the Italian context had failed to materialise. 
Instead, society was falling increasingly prey to fascism. 
Gramsci laid out a vision of politics highly critical of the mechanicism that 
prevailed in Marxist circles and of the passivity it induced. Distancing himself 
from structuralism, he proposed instead a ‘philosophy of praxis’ that ‘does 
not recognise transcendent or immanent (in the metaphysical sense) 
elements, but bases itself entirely on the concrete actions of man, who, 
impelled by historical necessity, works and transforms reality.’135 Instead of 
waiting for the objective conditions for revolution to realise themselves, he 
believed that collective action could alter the structure of social forces. 
Therefore, Gramsci’s famous motto ‘pessimism of the intellect, optimism of 
the will’ posits that, while never ignoring the hard reality on the ground, one 
always remain open to the change that derives from crisis and action. Indeed, 
there was no mechanicism in Gramsci, rather a strong belief in the agency of 
the subordinate and the potential of revolution, what at other times would be 
called emancipation. While this is a significant departure from Marxism, it 
should not be forgotten that Grasmci’s theory is part of historical materialism 
and still recognises the decisiveness of the nucleus of economic activity.136 
Though the concept Gramsci is best known for is hegemony, it is important to 
note the treatment he gave to the issue of civil society and how the two relate 
to one another. As seen in this chapter’s introduction, Gramsci had identified 
civil society as all those spaces that are not a direct emanation of the political 
authority of the state drawing the equation ‘State = political society + civil 
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society’.137 Whereas the former coincides with the state apparatus, the latter 
covers a wide range of actors: associations, churches, schools, movements, 
trade unions, intellectuals, publishers, and the entertainment industry 
among others. Accordingly, there are 
two major superstructural “levels”: the one that can be called “civil society”, 
that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called “private”, and that of 
“political society” or “the State”. These two levels correspond on the one 
hand to the function of “hegemony” which the dominant group exercises 
throughout society and on the other hand to that of “direct domination” or 
command exercised through the State and “juridical” government.138 
As noticed by Buttigieg ‘hegemony and civil society are interdependent 
concepts.’139 Civil society is the arena where the ruling class seeks consent by 
extending its ideology, it is the site of hegemony.  
With the term hegemony Gramsci meant to draw the attention to the cultural 
and intellectual basis for the creation and permanence of a certain social 
order. It is not only through direct domination, or coercion, that one could 
rule but also, more subtly, by inducing consent. Coercion and consent 
‘balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating excessively 
over consent.’140  The dominant class, he argued, cannot simply rule by 
coercion but instead needs to manufacture the consent of the subaltern.  
The ability to obtain consent depends on a group’s capacity of portraying its 
own interests as universal, or to transition from the economico-corporatist 
phase to that of ethico-political hegemony.141 Given the inability of a group to 
dominate by simply pushing for their particularist interests, all attempts at 
bolstering or challenging hegemony must include a general ideology that 
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accommodates various group preferences. It is only when particular 
corporatist interests stop being perceived as specific to a certain group and 
instead come to be ‘conceived of, and presented, as being the motor force of a 
universal expansion’142 that hegemony can be said to exist. As a consequence, 
the strength of hegemony can be gauged with reference to the presence or 
absence of struggle and the degree of legitimation enjoyed by social order.143 
This capacity to lead by creating consensual ideas is at heart an ideological 
matter, further problematized by Gramsci through the concept of common 
sense.  
Common sense is defined as the ‘philosophy of the non-philosophers’144 or 
the ‘traditional popular conception of the world’145 providing the necessary 
logical step from hegemony to civil society. While deriving from the 
dominant few and administered by political society, it is in civil society that 
hegemony is fashioned and reinforced as certain ideas become common 
sense. What is crucial here is that common sense is a world-view that is 
accepted uncritically, it is the system of taken-for-granted assumptions, the 
spontaneous beliefs that appear as natural while being intrinsically cultural. 
‘Common sense is not a single unique conception, identical in time and space 
[…], even in the brain of one individual, [it] is fragmentary, incoherent and 
inconsequential’.146 Political change happens when new ideas spread in these 
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institutions until they become common sense, thus acquiring Gramsci’s 
version of hegemony, or the ability to be obeyed without having to use force.  
Ideas do not become common sense naturally or by chance, rather they can 
only spread if there is a sufficient backing within civil society. For Gramsci 
‘the dominant group is coordinated concretely with the general interests of 
the subordinate groups, and the life of the State is conceived of as a 
continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria’.147 
Hegemony, indeed, is never fixed, ‘hegemony is always a process. It is not, 
except analytically, a system or a structure. [It] has continually to be 
renewed, recreated, defended, and modified. It is also continually 
resisted, limited, altered, challenged by pressures not at all its own.’148 
Revolutionary activity, indeed, can only be rooted in civil society through the 
development of counter-hegemonic ideas. In essence, society is ‘the 
product of struggles – at once material and ideological – among 
concretely situated social agents.’149 
The potential of transformation is seen by Gramsci in the emergence of a 
coalition of forces that unite around an alternative hegemony, what he calls 
historic bloc. An historic bloc refers to the alliance of social groups that are 
not simplistically defined by class hierarchies; instead it is an unison of 
economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity.150  
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A social group can, and indeed must, exercise “leadership” before winning 
governmental power […] it subsequently becomes dominant when it 
exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to 
“lead” as well.151 
Civil society is thus a terrain of contestation, it is through its trenches that a 
war for the control of the state is fought, predominantly on an ethico-political 
plane. If a new ideology is to seize state power sustainably it cannot limit 
itself to launch a war of movement. That is only the very last phase of a 
longer, deeper process aimed to induce consent in the society creating a solid 
historic bloc, the war of position.152 Gramsci, in fact, argues for the study of 
the formation of subaltern social groups, their attempts to exert influence on 
dominant formations, and the consequences of such claims. He reminds us, 
however, that one must also be attentive to the birth of countervailing 
formations by the dominant groups and the various degrees of autonomy that 
subaltern actors may manifest.153  
Because the contest over hegemony is essentially an ideological one, Gramsci 
sees intellectuals as crucial for the mobilisation of an historic bloc. 
‘[Intellectuals] perform the function of developing and sustaining the mental 
images, technologies and organisations which bind together the members of 
a class and of an historic bloc into a common identity.’154 Not only did he 
admit their importance analytically, but Gramsci also believed that 
revolutionary change could only happen through the mutual education of 
intellectuals and masses through the figure of the organic intellectual.155 
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Being embedded among the group whose interests they sought to advance, 
organic intellectuals do not just preach from a removed position, instead they 
are key in sustaining hegemonic orders but also in constructing new historic 
blocs with a counter-hegemonic project.  
Gramsci’s attention to the ideological component of social order is an 
important contribution for social theory and specifically for civil society 
research. In keeping with the Gramscian tradition, researchers have pointed 
to the pervasiveness of dominant forma mentis in the mutual influence of 
political society and civil society.156 Though Gramsci’s analysis was a Marxist 
study of class and economic power, his sociological insights and 
hermeneutical approach have found resonance beyond the study of the world 
economy. Gramsci was concerned with the political ramifications of different 
systems of meaning finding application in studies of linguistics 157  and 
pedagogy158 as well as cultural studies.159 Furthermore, employing Gramscian 
concepts to advance a discourse analysis has been the staple of the work of 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe.160 An examination of their framework 
would burden excessively this discussion, but it should be noted here that the 
present approach is less post-structuralist than theirs.161 
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The ontological positioning of Gramsci, in fact, makes him interested in 
linguistics and narratives, but only insofar as they reflect material social 
forces.  
So Gramsci agrees with some of the major themes around language that 
many scholars (both detractors and advocates) attribute to postmodernism; 
although we should make clear that for him this does not lead to some free-
floating world in which meaning is somehow ephemeral or infinitely sliding. 
Rather, his emphasis is on the historical production of meaning and the 
interconnectedness of human history and ‘objective’ knowledge.162  
Indeed, it is possible to combine this attention to what was said in the 
previous section about framing and its working in the attempts to influence 
the practices of states. As will be further elaborated in Chapter Five, 
understanding the cultural and discursive dimensions of nuclear civil society 
is a productive research avenue. However, the approach taken by this thesis, 
following Gramsci, relies upon an analysis of both discursive and material 
elements.  
Assuming that language is the medium through which facts and objects are 
rendered meaningful does not imply a precedence of discourse over 
materiality, rather the crucial role of analysing it. What is meant here is not 
that there is nothing outside of discourse, as some superficial readings of 
Foucault would have it, rather that only discourse can produce meaningful 
objects – or that all meaningful objects are discursively constituted. 163 
Accordingly, there are substantial limitations to what can be achieved 
through discourse alone. Gameson and Ryan caution from reducing political 
change to the adoption of a different frame alone, pointing out that both the 
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framing strategies and the broader movement-building strategies should be 
taken into account.164  
To counter the assumption that the frame will set us free, framing strategies 
must not just address the content of the message or the style of debate but 
attend to base building and challenge the contours of the non-level playing 
field in which the contest is carried on.165  
Because competing claims are articulated in the midst of uneven and 
hierarchical social relations, it is not enough to pitch the right frame. The 
reason for employing a Gramscian framework is indeed his attention to social 
positioning of the groups that can initiate political change. As pointed out by 
Peter Ives, ‘Gramsci provides a Marxist framework that does not impose an 
unworkable separation of the ‘material’ versus the ‘non-material’.’166  
The reason for employing his ideas with reference to the calls to change the 
nuclear order lays on the fact that ‘Gramsci’s political theory was essentially 
founded upon the democratic empowerment of subaltern groups’167 Although 
the subaltern was described by him as the proletariat, this does not need to 
be the case. Gramsci ‘is not arguing that there is such a place as the economy, 
which is ‘prior’ to politics and culture and in which identities are defined or 
articulated.’ 168  In international political economy (IPE) it has become 
relatively common to link Gramsci's thought with feminist or post-colonial 
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critiques of the exclusionary power of the market. However, the purchase of 
the Sardinian scholar goes beyond that, as this thesis will clarify. While civil 
society in Gramsci is hardly comparable to the one active in nuclear politics, 
thinking in a Gramscian way entails attempting to demystify cultural 
oppression by understanding how a subordinate group would consent to its 
subjugation. Gramsci’s contribution in highlighting the role of ideology, 
hegemony, and common sense allows for an understanding of civil society, 
the site separate from but interconnected to the state where struggles among 
alternative conceptions take place.169  
Reflecting upon the ambivalent position that civil society can have in relation 
to dominant conceptions and power is key here. In security studies, 
Neocleous quotes Gramsci in saying that to understand history we must 
study the intellectual apparatus. 
What we are talking about, then, is the centrality of the security intellectual 
to the regimes of knowledge produced by and for the national security state 
and thus, given the importance of security knowledge to the ideology of 
security as a whole, the ways in which the security intellectual has provided 
a key role in establishing certain forms of discourse as the ‘common sense’ of 
politics.170  
The next chapter will further elaborate on the employment of Gramsci’s ideas 
in the field of security. What should be retained from now are two main 
ideas. Firstly, a scholar of nuclear civil society who thinks in a Gramscian way 
should inquire into what is common sense to reveal the cultural 
entrenchment of dominant conceptions and social forces. Secondly, the 
potential of counter-hegemonic projects can be gauged with reference to the 
formation of an alternative historic bloc. As a final note, it could be added 
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that for Gramsci there was not to be a distinction between theory and praxis, 
rather the intellectuals had to be involved in political processes, as his very 
life demonstrated. 
 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
This project, in sum, is interested in civil society, intended as the sphere 
connected but separate from political society, or the state, but also from the 
economic structure, or the market. In addition, it is not the national 
component of civil society that will be investigated, but the transnational or 
global one because, even with its differences, anti-nuclear activism is a global 
phenomenon.  It is particularly with reference to the normative and 
discursive potential of civil society that this thesis is concerned. As we have 
seen, civil society can become a powerful actor with leverage on the decision-
making process. It was pointed out that, unlike national governments that 
can resort to military coercion or multinational corporations that command 
considerable financial resources, civil society can make use of more subtle 
forms of power. Understanding the foundations of consent should pass 
through an analysis of the discursive contestation of governance. Discussing 
the various theoretical positions it was made clear that framing and common 
sense are crucial concepts to examine the agency of civil society. Framing, or 
the capacity to spread a message that resonates with existing attitudes has 
allowed such actors to promote alternative agendas in multilateral fora. 
Moreover, critical perspectives that question the nature and context of civil 
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society and its power have pointed to the production of common sense, or the 
cultural-specific assumptions about the ‘natural’ functioning of societies. 
Integrating framing and common sense brings us to analyse the nuclear order 
as one in which civil society absolves the fundamental function of 
constituting the cultural foundations of governance.   
To complete the theoretical framework of this thesis, the next chapter will 
provide an application to the nuclear realm of the ideas outlined in Chapter 
Two and Three. In light of the emerging notion of global nuclear governance, 
Chapter Five will advance a view of civil society as one of the actors involved 
in the nuclear order structured around the four images of nuclear weapons 
(deterrence, non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament). By 
inscribing itself in the emerging critical nuclear studies literature, it will put 
forth an analytical framework inspired by critical constructivist approaches 
to representation. That allows for a coherent integration of the framing 
perspective of mainstream civil society research with the critical attention to 
hegemonic conceptions. The agency of civil society in nuclear governance 
needs to be better explored taking into account its politics of consensus-
building and contestation that this reading of governance referred to.  
Together with an attention to nuclear governance, the study of civil society’s 
meaning making practices will provide the further parameters of the project.
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Chapter 5  
 
Analytical Framework: Civil Society’s 
Discursive Contribution to Nuclear 
Governance 
 
Building upon the concepts of frames and common sense described above, we 
will now turn to examine how discourse is treated in this thesis. The present 
chapter will outline the thinking behind the analytical framework by 
summarising the main choices undertaken. The previous chapters have 
placed this project in the context of debates on nuclear weapons politics, 
security governance and civil society research, positioning itself somewhere 
between the constructivist and the critical traditions. To further develop this 
theoretical point this chapter will highlight the relevance of critical 
constructivist scholarship and of borrowing concepts from their approach to 
security as well as of Antonio Gramsci’s theory of civil society.  
The aim is to show that a Gramscian-inspired critical constructivist approach 
has a lot to say about the question at hand, namely what is behind the 
numerous and highly varying calls for nuclear disarmament by global civil 
society. It will do so by explaining, firstly, its theoretical commitments and, 
secondly, the methodological route. At first, the project will be positioned in 
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the tradition of critical nuclear studies, an emerging trend in the mostly 
positivist and predominantly materialist nuclear literature, by highlighting 
this trend’s connection with debates in security studies that have occupied 
the ground between mainstream constructivism and post-structuralism. That 
allows for identifying critical constructivism as the overarching theoretical 
position and grounding the thesis in the critical nuclear studies literature to 
which it wishes to contribute, by providing an innovative Gramscian-inspired 
methodology. If these scholars have applied concepts such as common sense 
and hegemony, they have discarded significant portions of the Sardinian 
political theorist’s thought such as, crucially, the centrality of civil society and 
importance of constructing a historic bloc. 
Through the help of the emerging critical constructivist insights in that field, 
the second section of this chapter will present the analytical assumptions of 
the thesis. On the basis of the Gramscian conception of civil society and 
discursive approach centred on common sense, one can acquire a view of the 
subordinate that takes its ideological positioning into account. The section 
moves from a general introduction in which the relevance of applying 
Gramsci’s insights is established to focus on this thesis’ analytical target, 
global nuclear civil society. This grounds the discursive and material study of 
nuclear disarmament expert communities undertaken in the second part of 
this thesis.  
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5.1 Theoretical approach: navigating critical approaches 
to nuclear discourse 
The concepts of frames and common sense overviewed have a much larger 
importance in the wider field of IR, and their deployment has not been 
restricted to the study of civil society or other kinds of activism. The 
‘discursive turn’ brought them to the forefront of academic research and, as 
of lately, the same is true for the studies of nuclear politics. This section 
clarifies the theoretical outlook in which this project is embedded by 
establishing a dialogue between the critical nuclear studies literature and the 
critical constructivist theoretical perspective. Based upon the former’s 
demonstration of the crucial role of discourse for nuclear politics, an 
argument will be made to complement that research program with an 
explicitly critical constructivist analysis inspired by the latter. 
 
5.1.1 The emerging field of critical nuclear studies 
The nuclear question and its consequences for international politics are 
tackled in this thesis in a way that can be broadly described as critical, an 
approach can be differentiated from both post-modernist and mainstream 
constructivist ones. Similarly to the approaches described in Chapter Four, 
which have made discourse the centre of analytical attention, a discursive 
turn seems to be overtaking the field of nuclear studies as well. To be sure, 
such sensitivity had started already in the 1980s with critical works 
challenging mainstream assumptions about the inevitability of nuclear 
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deterrence and proliferation. A few important works started early on to 
bridge disciplinary divides between security studies and communication 
studies, inquiring into the influence of the nuclear language in the 
permanence of the nuclear situation.  
Post-structuralists, feminist, critical, constructivist and other scholars in IR 
have investigated the discursive elements of nuclear politics with a markedly 
sociological approach, whereas sociologists and communication studies 
experts have done much the same at the domestic level. All of them depart 
from the assumption – contrary to realist and liberal theories – that 
communication is of extreme importance in the contemporary nuclear era. 
Nuclear communication is a group of symbolic practices that ‘make the world 
meaningful and capable of being acted toward’.1 Discursive practices, in 
fact, establish identities and prescribe strategies. 
What post-structuralist contributions attempt to do is unpacking taken for 
granted assumptions in order to demonstrate that they rest on shaky 
grounds. ‘Nuclear weaponry depends, more than any weaponry in the past, it 
seems, upon structures of information and communication, structures of 
language, including non-vocalisable language, structures of codes and 
graphic decoding.’ 2  Armament practices, according to Derrida, are the 
product of a paradox by which we simultaneously believe and reject the idea 
of a nuclear referent. Further, in her analysis of the French involvement in 
the sinking of the Greenpeace vessel Rainbow Warrior, Diane Rubinstein 
																																																						
1	Bryan	C.	Taylor	and	William	J.	Kinsella,	‘Introduction:	Linking	Nuclear	Legacies	and	Communication	
Studies,’	 in	Nuclear	Legacies:	Communication,	Controversy,	and	 the	US	Nuclear	Weapons	Complex,	
eds.	Brian	C.	Taylor	et	al.	(Plymouth:	Lexington	Books,	2007),	11,	emphasis	in	original.	
2	Jacques	 Derrida,	 ‘No	 Apocalypse,	 Not	 Now	 (full	 speed	 ahead,	 seven	 missiles,	 seven	 missives),’	
diacritics	14	n°	2	(1984):	23.	
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states that ‘deterrence is a textual as well as a rhetorical construct’.3 Her 
approach is more extreme than Derrida’s, in that she seeks lost meaning 
within words that do not seem to hold a special importance, especially 
because they were not uttered on purpose.4  
While it seems a worthy exercise to build alternative narratives that 
illuminate the inherently political character of nuclear developments, the 
post-structuralist approach is wanting. Firstly, because it remains unclear, 
beyond the deconstructive effort, why these authors’ specific reconstructions 
should be more worthy than any other. This problem, however, directly 
depends on the epistemological foundation of post-structuralism that rejects 
not only any form of positivist explanation but also of generalization and 
empirical claim.5 Secondly, what is lacking in several post-structuralist works 
is a firm grounding in the social reality that underlines the texts. Giving an 
object a name is not enough for a frame to be created, instead it is necessary 
that others share that naming. Resonance seems to be almost ignored by this 
outlook. 
Without going so far as embracing poststructuralist accounts of nuclear 
policy, one can still see the merit of their contributions. The importance of 
the discursive nature of deterrence was indeed recognized by other scholars 
as well. Other post-positivist approaches to nuclear governance have been 
more successful at presenting a credible framework to study discourse that 
																																																						
3 	Diane	 Rubenstein,	 ‘Hate	 Boat:	 Greenpeace,	 National	 Identity	 and	 Nuclear	 Crisiticism,’	 in	
International/Intertextual	 Relations	 Relations:	 Postmodern	 Readings	 of	 World	 Politics,	 eds.	 James	
Der	Derian	and	Michael	J.	Shapiro	(Lexington,	MA:	Lexington	Books,	1989),	249.	
4 	The	 name	 of	 one	 of	 the	 persons	 involved	 (Tricot),	 for	 example,	 is	 regarded	 as	 a	 key	 to	
understanding	the	mysterious	events.	
5 	Richard	 Price	 and	 Christian	 Reus-Smit,	 ‘Dangerous	 liaisons?	 Critical	 international	 theory	 and	
constructivism,’	European	Journal	of	International	Relations	4	n°	3	(1998).		
	 178	
takes into account not only the ‘fabulously textual’6 but also the inherently 
social nature of deterrence and other nuclear norms. 
Attention to discourse has been displayed by a range of critical contributors 
as well, from feminist to Marxist and postcolonial perspectives.7 Language is 
crucial for nuclear politics because nuclear weapons ‘are not a clearly known 
‘thing’, but a complex object discursively imagined and produced’.8 The ways 
in which certain political events are portrayed contributes to establishing 
practices that would otherwise be untenable. Jones, for example, shows ‘how 
the connection between power relations and discursive practices produces 
conditions of acceptability for perceiving Iran as a nuclear threat without 
relying on material proof for support.’9  
By restricting what can be said or understood, a special nuclear tongue or 
‘nukespeak’,10 constructed and reproduced by those in power, functions as a 
disciplinary device that reproduces the current order. Ken Booth further 
chastised deterrence’s static, time bound, and ethnocentric character and 
argued that it ‘led to a somewhat closed world, protected from politics and 
																																																						
6	Jacques	Derrida,	‘No	Apocalypse,	Not	Now	(full	speed	ahead,	seven	missiles,	seven	missives)’,23.	
7	Itty	 Abraham,	 ‘The	Ambivalence	 of	Nuclear	Histories’,	Osiris	 21	 n°1	 (2006);	 Carol	 Cohn,	 ‘Sex	 and	
Death	 in	 the	 Rational	World	 of	 Defense	 Intellectuals;’	 Hugh	Gusterson,	Nuclear	 Rites:	 A	Weapons	
Laboratory	 at	 the	 End	 of	 the	 Cold	 War;	 Anne	 Harrington	 de	 Santana,	 ‘Nuclear	 Weapons	 As	 the	
Currency	 of	 Power’,	 The	 Nonproliferation	 Review	 16	 n°3	 (2009);	 Gabrielle	 Hecht,	 ‘Globalization	
Meets	 Frankenstein?	 Reflections	 on	 Terrorism,	 Nuclearity,	 and	 Global	 Technopolitical	 Discourse,’	
History	 and	 Technology	 19	 n°1	 (2003);	 Keith	 Krause	 and	 Andrew	 Latham,	 ‘Constructing	 Non-
Proliferation	and	Arms	Control’;	David	Mutimer,	The	Weapons	State:	Proliferation	and	the	Framing	
of	 Security;	 Bryan	 C.	 Taylor,	 ‘“The	 Means	 to	 Match	 Their	 Hatred”:	 Nuclear	 Weapons,	 Rhetorical	
Democracy,	 and	 Presidential	 Discourse,’	Presidential	 Studies	 Quarterly	 37	 n°4	 (2007)	 and	 Brian	 C.	
Taylor	et	al.,	Nuclear	Legacies:	Communication,	Controversy,	and	the	US	Nuclear	Weapons	Complex	
(Plymouth:	Lexington	Books,	2007).	
8	David	Mutimer,	 ‘Picturing	Armageddon:	 Imagining	Nuclear	Weapons	on	Screen,’	2014	 ISA	Annual	
Convention.	Toronto,	March	26–29,	2014.	
9 	Jason	 Jones,	 The	 American	 Rhetorical	 Construction	 of	 the	 Iranian	 Nuclear	 Threat	 (London:	
Continuum,	2011).	
10	Paul	 Chilton,	 Language	 and	 the	 Nuclear	 Arms	 Debate:	 Nukespeak	 Today	 (Dover:	 Frances	 Pinter	
1985).	
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morality by ‘mindguards’ and ‘nukespeak’, and a belief in timeless success’.11 
By the same token, Carol Cohn highlighted the exclusionary and masculine 
character of the ‘technostrategic’ language employed in nuclear weapons 
issues.12 Practices of power are indeed crucial in precluding the possibility of 
dialogue among officials, citizens, and ‘counter-publics’ such as organised 
civil society.13 Employing metaphors limits what is and can be said. Frames in 
fact are not neutral – as David Mutimer convincingly demonstrated, framing 
a situation in terms of proliferation ‘reinforces the link between status and 
nuclear possession’14 
Whereas the ‘proliferation’ discourse places the onus on recipients not to 
translate that technology into weaponry, a ‘disarmament’ image places the 
onus on armed states to reduce and ultimately eliminate the weaponry they 
possess.15  
In a similar vein is the critique by Hugh Gusterson,16 who investigated the 
‘Western’ nuclear discourse and the distinction it makes between civilised 
and uncivilised possessors of nuclear weapons, considering less developed 
nations dangerously unable to manage nuclear arms and ultimately of little 
rationality.	Western discourse has been disseminated with ‘gaps and silences 
in [the] representation of our own nuclear weapons and exaggerations in its 
representation of the Other's.’ As a result, he contended that the ‘discourse on 
proliferation is a piece of ideological machinery that transforms anxiety-
provoking ambiguities into secure dichotomies’.17 
																																																						
11	Ken	Booth,	‘Security	and	Emancipation’,	Review	of	International	Studies	17	n°4	(1991):	322.	
12	Carol	Cohn,	‘Sex	and	Death	in	the	Rational	World	of	Defense	Intellectuals.’	
13	Bryan	C.	Taylor	and	William	J.	Kinsella,	‘Introduction:	Linking	Nuclear	Legacies	and	Communication	
Studies,’	6.	
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Marxist interpretations have examined the symbolic economy of nuclear 
weapons and how it relates to their institutional infrastructure. On the basis 
of Baudrillard’s political economy of signs, Timothy Luke posited that it is 
not the objective form of the bomb that deters, rather the symbolic economy 
of thermonuclear power by which the superpowers circulate signs of threat 
and deterrence. 18  Anne Harrington de Santana has gone so far in her 
exploration of the symbolic dimension of nuclear arms that she takes them to 
be a form of fetish in Marxian terms, concluding that ‘[n]uclear weapons are 
powerful because we treat them as powerful’.19 This means that objects such 
as nuclear weapons assume a sort of autonomy as carriers of certain 
meanings. Deterrence, for example, is taken to be not just a strategy, as per 
realism, or a norm, following constructivism, but also, in critical terms, an 
ideology.20  
Bourdieu’s idea of habitus equally provided a useful base to conceptualise 
nuclear communication in situations where knowledge is hardly 
challengeable. Nick Ritchie theorised that it is by analysing discourse that we 
can gauge the value that nuclear weapons have in a determined strategic 
culture because it reflects the interpretation of certain practices.	21 Indeed, 
‘habituated constructions of nuclear weapons’ value are not universal, but 
rather may vary across states.’ 22  There are deep political consequences 
deriving from what frames are employed to conceptualise an object. 
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Mutimer23 sees efforts at devaluing nuclear weapons as sign of a counter-
frame that defines them not as weapons but as something else. Furthermore, 
Senn and Elhardt, as has been seen, have employed other Bourdieusian 
concepts such as ‘symbolic capital’ and ‘doxic battle’ to examine attempts to 
change dominant conceptions of nuclear weapons in the case of the four 
horsemen initiative.24 Those former decision-makers were uniquely able to 
spread its message because of the symbolic capital granted by their high-
ranking past in the national administration, which endowed their message 
with a high resonance. Dominant discursive patterns, in fact, are not a fixed 
field, rather animated by struggles over conceptions and evolution takes 
place by combining old and new discursive materials.  
The centrality of language was recognised also by less critically inclined 
scholars. Building upon constructivist research pointing to the socially 
constructed character of nuclear rule,25 various scholars have highlighted the 
role of discourse. At the very least this means that, as the employment of the 
bomb is mostly a virtual exercise, understanding its operation passes through 
an analysis of the declaratory policy of nuclear-armed states.26 Given that 
atomic bombs have never been launched since Nagasaki, the employment of 
nuclear arms is often a prevalently linguistic matter. ‘Strategic interactions of 
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the most conflictual kind—as in compellence and deterrence models—are all 
about communication’.27  
As Harrington highlighted, 28  what could roughly be defined as a 
constructivist approach to nuclear studies is actually composed of two 
strands: American constructivism on the one hand and discursive and 
sociological history on the other. What divides the two is a different take on 
norms: a Wendtian social object for the former, and a discursive practice for 
the latter. As a consequence, constructivists take norms as intervening 
variables used by specific actors with agency over the nuclear political 
process, while critical scholars view them as practices that constitute the 
environment in which such agents act. Conventional constructivist research, 
it was noted, has neglected the ‘existence of oppositional normative concepts 
of order’.29 If conventional constructivism misses a theory of politics, its 
critical strand fills this gap with its attention to domination and hierarchy.30 
That is precisely the reason why such an approach is particularly apt to the 
study of the highly hierarchical nuclear order.  
Conventional constructivism misses in fact the dimension of state-society 
struggle needed to understand not only the origins of the normative changes 
that the nuclear order witnessed, but also the prospects for further 
modifications, regardless of our normative evaluation of them. While 
acknowledging the importance of norms in regulating nuclear weapons and 
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their circulation (both material and non), this project takes ideas as the 
keystone of nuclear governance and thus necessary to interpret political 
processes of cooperation and competition. It is indeed in this realm that 
narratives about ‘good’ managements are articulated, negotiated, and, if 
accepted, translated into norms. Far from being a given, what nuclear 
weapons are and how they should be regulated is a site of intense 
contestation, where certain definitions become dominant while alternative 
ideas of what is normal and legitimate are put forward. 
The present work builds upon what has recently been dubbed ‘critical nuclear 
studies,’31an approach that has gained increased traction in the past few 
years. Critical nuclear scholarship, though its confines are somewhat blurry, 
could be seen as the body of work that uses interpretive tools to ask questions 
about nuclear politics with a more or less explicit normative positioning. 
Burke’s introductory essay32 in a recent special issue of Critical Studies on 
Security dedicated to the issue, presents a community of scholars that takes a 
critical approach to nuclear politics, a group to which this thesis wants to 
contribute. In the same line as others, this thesis investigates the ‘politics of 
knowledge around nuclear weapons.’ 33  Requisites to be part of critical 
nuclear scholarship are the commitments to question received knowledge, to 
unearth its political content, and to highlight less visible aspects of the 
nuclear reality through unconventional methodologies.34 
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The following section will better explain the theoretical positioning of the 
thesis through a brief description of the critical constructivist research 
agenda and its connection to Gramscian concepts explored at the end of 
Chapter Four. If studying discourse is a well-established area of enquiry for 
scholars of social movement, this section has shown that a similar discursive 
turn has taken place in nuclear studies. In order to contribute to that 
literature this thesis will advance a critical constructivist analysis of the 
discourses of nuclear civil society.  
 
5.1.2 Studying discourse: a critical constructivist approach  
This project is inscribed into what might be termed the critical constructivist 
approach to security, which has contributed to the understanding of cultural 
factors in military policy. Departing from the assumption that ‘insecurities, 
rather than being natural facts, are social and cultural productions’35 they are 
interested in the role of collective discourse in making dangers real. The 
analytical commitments of critical constructivism can be roughly summarised 
as follows: (1) reality is socially constructed, (2) social constructions reflect, 
enact, and reify relations of power, (3) dominant constructions should be 
denaturalised to reveal their constructed and contingent character.36 Or, to 
say it another way, 
security is socially constructed: it is understood by different communities in 
different ways in different contexts; it is given meaning through inter-
subjective processes of contestation and negotiation between actors, in which 
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communication is central; and it is intimately related to particular narratives 
of who those communities are and what they value.37 
Critical constructivism challenged mainstream approaches for their empirical 
indeterminateness and positioned themselves as a bridge across the 
constructivist–post-structuralist divide.38 Critical constructivists share with 
conventional ones the belief in the social construction of reality, thus 
favouring a move away from positivist ontologies proffered by both realists 
and liberals. Arguing that agents and structures are co-constituted, 
constructivists refuse to see actors’ behaviour as predetermined. What sets 
conventional and critical constructivists apart, as explained by Hopf, is that 
the former understand identity as ‘possible causes for action’ whereas the 
latter are rather interested in ‘how people come to believe in a single 
naturalized version of the truth.’39 Critical constructivists, in fact, refuse 
attempts to find causal links focusing instead on the process of constitution 
that leads to ask the ‘how possible’ rather than the ‘why necessarily’ 
questions. 
The causal question assumes X and Y exist in the empirical world, as 
constant features, which may impact on each other in predictable ways. X 
and Y are examples of a larger pattern, which can be drawn on to explain the 
particular case. The constitutive question assumes that human action is not 
determined, that actors do exercise choice, and they do so within a world 
shaped by widespread shared understandings.40 
Both strands of constructivism share an interest in the communication 
process, believing that rhetoric is not epiphenomenal, but instead produces 
very real political consequences, though their conceptualisation differs. The 
process of framing explored in Chapter Three is also tackled by critical 
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constructivists, who complement it with an attention to power dynamics. 
According to this perspective, discourse is less the tool of the weak with 
nothing but the persuasiveness of ideas in the face of state power (as an 
unforgiving reading of mainstream constructivism would have it) – instead 
discourse becomes another arena for struggle. In analysing rhetorical action 
the main preoccupation of conventional constructivist scholars is the process 
of persuasion, distinguishing arguing from bargaining41 and finding that both 
can be subsumed under an encompassing logic of appropriateness, which 
would guide deliberation. According to critical constructivists, who pay more 
attention to power relations, persuasion may sometimes be only mimicked42 
or a form of rhetorical coercion.43 
Looking at language patterns is an important feature of the emerging critical 
constructivist methodology. Fierke has argued that language ‘needs to be 
taken seriously because the “rules of the game” provide first and foremost a 
structure by which physical objects or acts are invested with meaning.’44 
Applying Wittgenstein’s concept on language games to the end of the Cold 
War, she further argued that language patterns ‘do not represent the 
interpretations of individuals but, rather, a public language that reappears 
again and again and, subsequently, constitutes the identities of NATO and 
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the Warsaw Pact as well as knowledge of what they do.’45 Instead, it is their 
socially shared nature and how culturally ingrained they are to make 
discourses relevant. ‘Outcomes reflect intersubjective interpretations, so 
attention should be directed at the communicative process by which mutual 
meanings are agreed.’ 46  These public images and intersubjective 
interpretations are at the very heat of this project. 
Critical constructivists have mobilised several philosophies, but the one who 
arguably contributed the most to their analyses is Antonio Gramsci, whose 
main concepts were previously reviewed in Chapter Three. Common sense in 
Antonio Gramsci’s work ‘refers to uncritically accepted conceptions of the 
world that are employed discursively, but which have practical and tangible 
implications for the distribution of power, resources and influence’.47 In her 
seminal work on the construction of the national interest in the Cuban 
missile crisis, Jutta Weldes juxtaposed the contrasting narratives and 
timelines associated with the same event in the US, USSR, and Cuba to show 
that the moment of representation is crucial for the adoption of policy 
responses, thus making a cultural analysis of discourse necessary for a deep 
understanding of political junctures. 48  ‘Social constructions [...] become 
common sense when particular representations of reality are treated as if 
they neutrally or transparently represent the real.’49 If a discourse becomes 
dominant, it is able to define the terms of the debate, it gets incorporated in 
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institutions, and it provides ideas and categories for actors that seek 
credibility.50  
When a certain reality is constructed as natural, in sum, common sense can 
be said to exist. Similarly to the Gramscian contention that this intrinsically 
produces silences of the subordinate, critical constructivists affirm that ‘an 
essential part of the power produced through discourse, and a cornerstone of 
hegemony, is the capacity to construct silences within common sense.’51 To 
transform politics it is necessary to intervene on the hegemonic ideologies 
that allow the prevailing system to be in place though this might be extremely 
difficult. As noted by Peoples with reference to the nuclear energy debate in 
the UK, alternative frames are constructed on the basis of the dominant one, 
hence they may be left without the rhetorical materials needed to craft a 
successful rebuttal.52  
In order to operationalize such commitments, critical constructivists have 
developed an emerging methodology, which will be employed for this project. 
‘Discourse analysis therefore is particularly well suited for studying situations 
where power is maintained by aid of culture and challenged only to a limited 
degree, that is, what Gramscians call ‘hegemony.’’53 It is this attention to 
shared meanings coupled with the sensitivity to relations of power that 
makes this perspective so useful if applied to nuclear politics. As pointed out 
by Laffey and Weldes, ‘overlapping and competing discourses seek 
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authoritatively to define what is real, true or possible.’54 An analysis of both 
discursive and material elements is what allows an understanding of the 
conditions of possibility. 
Too many interpretive analyses have concentrated all their energy on 
identifying discursive twists ignoring the fact that not all discourses bear the 
same weight because the actors doing the uttering are different. What is 
crucial is not just to understand the rhetorical and cultural bases of the 
narrative that a group proposes, but also how much resonance this has. This 
is the division between articulation and interpellation in the critical 
constructivist version of discourse analysis.55 This distinction, elaborated by 
Weldes among others, allows for concentrating in turn to the analysis of how 
a certain narrative is constructed and to the examination of how it is made 
meaningful to a community.56 Articulation is the process through which 
meaning is constructed on the basis of linguistic and cultural resources that 
already exist.57 Interpellation serves instead to distinguish the phase in which 
subject positions are created and individuals hailed into them.58 
[T]hrough processes of articulation and interpellation, a security imaginary 
enables the production of representations of the world. These 
representations, in turn, interpellate identities or subject positions that 
already entail particular interests. National interests are thus social 
constructions that emerge out of the representations enabled by and 
produced out of the security imaginary of the state. National interests, that 
is, are an ideological effect of the security imaginary and its 
representations.59 
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The process of construction of common sense should be studied through its 
two main phases of articulation and interpellation in that ‘[m]eaning is 
produced by neither the text nor the reader but by the interpretive 
community in which both are situated.’60 
Given that groups ascribe varying meanings to the same facts, critical 
constructivists are interested in unearthing dominant conceptions by 
showing that there are possible alternatives. Applying this theoretical 
approach, Matt McDonald inquired into the issue of climate change studying 
by analysing the various types of security discourse employed, or a 
‘framework of meaning that defines the composition and nature of a group’s 
core values; threats to those values; and the appropriate means for 
protecting/advancing them.’ 61  McDonald developed a taxonomy of the 
different narratives on the connection between climate change and security 
concluding that ‘these discourses serve to legitimize some practices and the 
actors engaged in them while marginalizing others.’62 He analysed discourses 
asking what particular policy responses each encourages, which actors are 
assigned legitimacy, and how the terms of the debate are defined.63 Chapter 
Seven uses a very similar set of questions because of the same nature of what 
is being searched for, the place of hegemonic forces in a certain contestation 
over the meaning of security 
It is this understanding that leads to research the struggle against the 
structures of nuclear governance as a way to problematize the normative 
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direction of the prevailing order. Investigating the different 
conceptualisations of a social object is a useful exercise because the frames 
employed inform strategies that get promoted and put in practice, not by 
causing a certain action but by constituting the social environment in which 
such action can be considered possible. This thesis follows McDonald’s, and 
more broadly the critical constructivist, approach in trying to delineate the 
contest over the production of nuclear common sense.  
 
 
5.2 A Gramscian contribution to critical nuclear studies 
In order to study that process of contestation, this thesis proposes to use the 
Gramscian lexicon for it allows us to think of the role of civil society in the 
ideological construction of the nuclear order. Surely an application of 
Antonio Gramsci’s analysis to the security field presents a number of 
problems, particularly the difficulty to ascribe the struggle over nuclear 
weapons to class relations. His understanding of society, although 
unconventional by Marxist standards, remains embedded in that theoretical 
tradition and identifies relations of production and class struggle as defining 
political moments. ‘The “non-class” issues – peace, ecology, and feminism – 
are not to be set aside but given a firm and conscious basis in the social 
realities shaped through the production process.’64 In an effort to understand 
the hegemonic nature of neoliberalism and the relevance of the transnational 
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capitalist class, neo-Gramscian scholars have not attempted to go beyond the 
confines of IPE.65 Such a move, criticised by some,66 has significantly limited 
the application and diffusion of Gramsci’s thinking to areas of security, 
making it all the more relevant to build a bridge between his theory and 
critical constructivist work on the construction of security.  
Synthesising the two theoretical driving forces for this project can rely upon 
previous efforts by critical constructivists to employ Gramscian concepts of 
common sense and counter-hegemonic struggles to the field of IR in their 
empirical work.67 This is something that Strategies of Disarmament also 
does, recognising that a clear link in fact exists between this Gramscian 
sensitivity and the research programme shared by many critical security 
scholars. It is recognised that Gramsci ‘contributed powerfully to critical 
theory; but he was not a critical theorist.’68 A systematic application of the 
Gramscian theoretical toolbox would be difficult for several reasons, not least 
the fragmentary nature of his writings, and well beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Rather than employing the whole of Gramscian theory,	69 this project 
will recur to some of his key concepts in order to investigate an area that is 
far removed from his object of analysis. According to Stuart Hall, rather than 
looking into Gramsci’s work for answers to our puzzles, we should think of 
																																																						
65	Karen	M.	Buckley,	Global	Civil	Society	and	Transversal	Hegemony:	The	Globalization-Contestation	
Nexus.	(London:	Routledge,	2013).	
66	Owen	Worth,	‘Recasting	Gramsci	in	International	Politics,’	Review	of	International	Studies	37	n°	1	
(2011).	
67	Jutta	Weldes,	Constructing	National	Interests	and	Columba	Peoples,	Technology,	Common	Sense	
and	Missile	Defense.	
68 	Christopher	 Farrands,	 ‘Being	 Critical	 about	 Being	 ‘Critical’	 in	 IPE:	 Negotiating	 Emancipatory	
Strategies,’	 in	Critical	Perspectives	on	International	Political	Economy,	eds.	Jason	Abbott,	and	Owen	
Worth	(Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2002),	21.	
69	The	English	translation	of	parts	of	his	Prison	Notebooks	can	be	found	in	Antonio	Gramsci,	Selection	
of	the	Prison	Notebooks.		
	 193	
them in a Gramscian way.70  This promises to raise important questions on 
the nature of state-society relations in a highly conflictual matter where 
consent is created and maintained through constant and often linguistic 
social negotiation.  
The three analytical commitments of critical constructivism unpacked in the 
previous section are consistent with the Gramscian approach outlined in 
Chapter Four. Firstly, the social construction of reality has been advanced by 
Gramsci as well in his recognition that structure and agent (or political and 
civil society) mutually influence each other. Indeed, the Marxism of the latter 
is not incompatible with the social constructionism of the former, in that 
‘Gramsci is one of the first modern Marxists to recognise that interests are 
not given but have to be politically and ideologically constructed.’71 Secondly, 
the relations of power are reflected, enacted, and reified in those social 
constructions, or, in Gramscian terms, common sense is a means of cultural 
hegemony. The importance of language in replicating the dominant forma 
mentis and practice was certainly not ignored by the Sardinian scholar, who 
saw both material and non-material factors at play, as amply argued by Peter 
Ives.72 Finally, the third commitment, to destabilise dominant construction 
resonates well with Gramsci’s prioritisation for the study of the subordinates. 
His study of civil society opens up interesting questions on the strength of the 
status quo and on how to devise a strategy of transformation.73  
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In sum, the two approaches are highly consistent, but also promise to 
complement each other’s sensitivities well in that, at heart, both are 
interested in unearthing patterns of domination. On the one hand, whereas 
the economy must have central stage for a Marxist, even one sensitive to non-
material elements, this is not the case for critical constructivists. Indeed, they 
have built upon feminist, post-colonial, and post-structural critiques that 
pointed to other forms of domination beyond the purely material one. 
Hierarchy, indeed, is well present in those security issues that critical 
constructivists have analysed and is propagated not just by material forces 
but also by those ideological ones outlined here. On the other hand, 
complementing the critical constructivist theoretical framework with a direct 
engagement with Gramsci allows to take on board his important insights on 
the centrality of civil society that has been obscured by those theorists’ focus 
on elite discourses.  
Such an innovative approach can significantly contribute to the 
understanding of the current nuclear reality, in line with the prioritisation of 
practices of representation so central to the critical nuclear studies project. In 
the same way as laissez-faire is not an automatic expression of economic 
facts, deterrence is not a predetermined consequence of security realities. 
‘Once a machine is built, we soon discover that it has ‘ideas’ of its own. 
Technology not only changes our habits, but also our habits of mind.’74As the 
preceding discussion has shown, the social order in which nuclear weapons 
are rooted does not simply depend on technological processes. Instead, it is 
involved in a process of mutual constitution with the actors subject to such 
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order, who try to shape it in their interest by constructing competing 
discourses.  
While acknowledging the importance of norms in regulating nuclear weapons 
and their circulation (both material and non), this project takes ideas as the 
keystone of nuclear governance and thus necessary to interpret political 
processes of cooperation and competition. Ideas ground the narratives about 
‘good’ managements that are articulated, negotiated, and, if accepted, 
translated into norms. Whereas ‘[n]uclear weapons and deterrence strategies 
have helped constitute the cultural identities of major (and minor) powers 
throughout the postwar world”,75  certain non-governmental actors have also 
constructed their identity in relation to them. 
Far from being a given, what nuclear weapons are and how they should be 
regulated is a site of intense contestation where certain definitions become 
common sense while alternatives to dominant ideas of what is normal and 
legitimate are put forward. A dialectic process of argumentation and 
confrontation is what bears the potential for alternative forms of 
organisation.76  Narratives, however, draw from a repertoire of accepted 
discourses that is often limited and constrained by the prevailing nuclear 
culture. It is thus not only a matter of searching for the most effective ways of 
limiting technology, but asking what the bomb does to politics, order, and 
contestation. 
What we have really to ask, about the full range of nuclear and related 
weapons, is what specific variations they have introduced into the shifting 
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but always crucial relations between a military technology and a social 
order.77  
This project departs from the assumption that those relations change across 
time and space and advocates the need for always historicising nuclear 
relationships rather than assuming never-changing rules. 
 
5.2.1 Civil society and nuclear common sense 
It is now useful to briefly go back to the vision of global nuclear governance 
delineated in Chapter Three and the continuum along deterrence and 
disarmament regimes on which it is established. According to this view, 
countries can either operate according to the rules of deterrence or those of 
disarmament, with the value of nuclear arms for security being the decisive 
variable for moving along the continuum. Investigating how deterrence can 
come to be perceived as superfluous should indeed receive much more than 
the sparse attention it has so far received. What this project seeks to argue is 
that in this ideological shift civil society has an important part to play. 
Indeed, in Gramscian terms change should take place at the popular before 
than at the political level and could be traced through a hermeneutical 
approach.  
The role of discursive moves on the part of non-governmental actors has been 
inquired in passing by Fierke in relation to the 1980s anti-nuclear movement. 
While the central actions of the two superpowers—restoring, maintaining, 
undermining—are acts undertaken with military tools, the dismantling 
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actions of independent movements are directed more at the ideological 
structures in which the military actions of the arms race are embedded.78  
Such ideological dismantlement is the same process lying at the heart of this 
thesis of nuclear weapons devaluation.79 Since the beginning of the nuclear 
age, its ideological milieu has undergone several turns and it is an analysis of 
ideological structures, both dominant and subordinate, that promises to give 
a more accurate view both of the status of nuclear relations and on the role of 
civil society therein. What Fierke calls ‘dismantlement’ roughly corresponds 
to what this project understands as disarmament, or any move away from a 
deterrence forma mentis. This is not to mean that global civil society is alone 
what makes the shift from one mentality to the other. However, to 
understand this shift we must look at civil society in order to see how change 
can be possible. 
Given the hegemony of deterrence explicated in Chapter Two, Gramsci would 
push us to look within civil society to assess the strength of the common 
sense, on the one hand, and whether counter-hegemonic forces are building a 
historic bloc. Civil society and its conceptions of disarmament are 
particularly interesting because they appear as the quintessential disarmed 
actor, those that would, more than any, ascribe no value to nuclear weapons. 
Bobbio suggests we need to recognise that those that do not have arms, and 
who even if they had them would not use them, are the majority.80 Marxists at 
other times pointed out that: 
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Only an alliance which takes in churches, Eurocommunists, Labourists, East 
Europeans dissidents (and not only ‘dissidents’), Soviet citizens unmediated 
by Party structures, trade unionists, ecologists – only this can possibly 
muster the force and the internationalist elan to throw the cruise missiles 
and the SS-20 back.81 
An analysis of the narratives of civil society based on the governance 
framework of this thesis, which recognises both deterrence and disarmament 
as competing regimes, helps demonstrate that these groups can either 
support disarmament or, more or less explicitly, undermine it. The analysis 
of this supposedly subjugated voice of nuclear politics, will show that civil 
society’s struggle with the global ordering structures is productive of 
emancipatory alternatives; but also that the extent to which this is true 
largely depends on the implication of civil society with the nuclear state and 
the ideology of deterrence.  
A further reason for concentrating on civil society comes from the critical 
nature of this research, which takes issue with the dominant makeup of 
nuclear politics and proposes to reverse towards a more emancipatory route 
by giving voice to subaltern knowledges. Contestation and resistance in 
nuclear politics is a fertile ground for research because most studies have 
fallen short of asking their significance or have done so mostly descriptively. 
The great majority of studies related to nuclear issues have focused on states 
that have, had, or wanted nuclear weapons. This approach, regardless of its 
value, fails to explain the emergence of ‘disarmed’ identities by states and 
non-state actors that have renounced nuclear weapons possession or that 
criticise it, thus providing a limited take on nuclear relations. Moreover, it 
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does not recognise their voice and agency in shaping the meaning attached to 
nuclear arms. 
Civil society is relevant not only for the extent and quality of its activities, but 
also because of the complex relation that links it to other actors, namely 
states, institutions, business, and media. Moreover, it is the ideological 
component of such activism that results particularly well positioned to 
produce new insights. What kind of ordering ideas have been put forward? 
And what do these ideas do? Asking such questions promises to enlarge our 
understanding of the diplomatic process surrounding nuclear governance. In 
line with Gramscian thought, taking the perspective of the subordinate 
promises to denaturalise prevailing frameworks so as to make visible 
interesting elements that might otherwise go unseen.  
In keeping with the discursive analytical tools outlined above, the empirical 
analysis will proceed in a first stage to examine the discursive opposition of 
civil society. In a second stage, to understand the pervasiveness of a certain 
discourse – or in a Gramscian way whether it constitutes common sense – an 
analysis of the material side of the struggle is necessary. To that end, the 
discursive interventions will be investigated first, with a look to understand 
the ways in which each articulates the concept of nuclear disarmament. Such 
articulations will be broken down to examine the source of threat and 
communities at risk but also the policy responses advocated. This allows to 
gauge the variance of positions and to inquire into the common-sense nature 
of those discourses. Indeed, the critical constructivist tools will allow to break 
down the components of those discourses, while a Gramscian approach will 
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allow to provide insights not only on the strength of those articulations, but 
also on its hegemonic character and on the configuration of social forces. 
Building upon a characterization of contemporary global nuclear civil society, 
highlighted in Chapter Six, the empirical analysis will the proceed in an effort 
to understand the construction of the nuclear threat: Chapter Seven will lay 
out the discourses with the help of critical constructivist tools, whereas 
Chapter Eight will mobilise Gramsci to examine civil society’s material and 
non-material practices. As to the latter, the discourses of disarmament will be 
checked for hegemonic ideologies (some of which were described in Chapter 
Two) in the first instance, and then the strength of social forces behind each 
discourse will be evaluated. Civil society groups must in fact be able not only 
to construct a successful narrative, but also a coherent historic bloc in order 
to build a counter-hegemonic alternative. This analysis will be able to give a 
view of civil society activism in the nuclear field that allows inferring on the 
revolutionary potential of different movements.  
If civil society is routinely accused of being an unimportant actor because of 
its lack of coercive power, this thesis hopes to show that, even among those 
limits, it is a relevant actor. What we expect to see, much like Craig and 
Ruzicka revealed talking of the non-proliferation context,82 is hierarchy, even 
among those that are materially less powerful. This hierarchy will be 
reflected, if a Gramscian framework is correct, both in the discursive and in 
the practice of civil society, which can either be hegemonic or counter-
hegemonic. Such view promises to help better evaluate the ideological 
positioning of the many actors that partake in the construction of nuclear 
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governance. Also, crucially, by connecting common sense and historic bloc as 
the two facets necessary to understand civil society’s struggles, this 
perspective distances itself from those interpretations of the nuclear world, 
which centre on discourses alone without a clear indication of the power 
relations underlying them. At best, it could inform the growing discussion in 
academia and diplomatic circles about what it takes to achieve nuclear 
disarmament. 
 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
This thesis, in sum, looks at the struggle involving civil society at the 
transnational level in efforts to shift the discourse around what nuclear 
weapons mean for security. The NPT and its review process are an optimal 
place to study just those kinds of relations in that it is a forum that permits 
that rhetorical exchange in which we are interested, all the while including a 
role for transnational civil society. Various actors participate in the 
production of myths, narratives, discourses related to what nuclear weapons 
are, what they do, and what to do about them. In this struggle, which takes 
place in various fora at different levels, there are different truths and roughly 
two juxtaposed sides.  
Regimes of deterrence and disarmament, as expressed in Chapter Three, 
structure nuclear governance as well as much discussion in its institutions. 
Like deterrence disarmament exists in the mind first of all. This project wants 
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to trace the attempts at making disarmament common sense, this counter-
hegemonic project entertained by non-nuclear armed states but also 
representatives of civil society. They put forward a new definition of nuclear 
weapons, a new frame that they hoped would replace deterrence. Nuclear-
free world, global zero, nuclear weapons abolition, the model convention – all 
of these have become general terms to refer to the prospect of eliminating the 
bomb. But what is actually meant by these terms and do they all represent the 
same idea? How resonant is this frame? And how counter-hegemonic is this 
project that civil society advances? 
To answer those questions, the following chapters will thus strive to clarify 
the tensions between the different souls of civil society involved in global 
nuclear policy by looking at their involvement with the NPT. Chapter Seven 
contains an analysis of the discourses adopted in the NPT context by the 
abolitionist and reductionist strands of civil society. These are then examined 
in Chapter Eight in light of the theoretical discussion to identify the 
discursive place occupied along the deterrence-disarmament continuum and 
to pinpoint he structural conditions of their activism. Such analysis is heavily 
indebted to critical constructivists who started inquiring into ideological 
domination in international relations and to the thought of Antonio Gramsci, 
as common sense conceptions will be sought after along with the formation of 
the historic bloc, a combination which allows assessing counter-hegemonic 
potential of the various projects. To put current civil society activities in 
context, Chapter Six will briefly review the history of the anti-nuclear 
movement, its activities in relation to the NPT, and the ways in which civil 
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society gains access to the treaty as well as establishing the contours of the 
communities examined empirically. 
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Chapter 6  
 
Introducing the Case:  
Nuclear Civil Society and the NPT 
 
On the basis of the theoretical scaffolding built in the previous chapters, the 
analysis should now turn to the selected empirical object: civil society 
involved with nuclear weapons issues in the NPT framework. We will thus 
give the contours of the community, highlighting the modalities of their 
interaction with the treaty, and providing the analytical categorisation that 
will be further pursued in the following chapters. This chapter seeks to 
ground the empirical analysis of civil society at the NPT review process, to be 
conducted in Chapters Seven and Eight, into its historical and institutional 
position. To that end we will proceed in three phases: (1) presenting the 
evolution of civil society’s response to nuclear weapons since the beginning of 
the nuclear age, pinpointing the innovative character of the current fourth 
wave of disarmament activism. (2) The chapter will argue that the ideological 
divide within this civil society community is the most relevant, although not 
the only one, of its divides. (3) Finally, because the forum chosen for this 
thesis is the NPT and its review process, the mechanisms of civil society’s 
interaction will be broken down. Through that, the following empirical 
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analysis will be able to specify the different discursive and material strategies 
observed at the 2015 Review Conference of the NPT. 
 
 
6.1 A brief history of nuclear civil society  
Since the inception of the atomic age, private individuals have interrogated 
themselves on the ethical and strategic implications of these armaments and 
in various cases have taken public stances, resulting also in the organisation 
of collective action for nuclear arms limitation and elimination. Nuclear civil 
society in fact is a surprisingly wide category. It is a community that rarely 
makes the news, at least presently, and that often acts deliberately behind the 
scenes. It is composed of NGOs, think tanks, academic institutions, 
associations, and other groups that provide expert analysis and political 
recommendations to policymakers. The scope of their activity spans from 
local mobilisation in areas where nuclear weapons have created risks for the 
population to national campaigns to change domestic laws and global 
movements that support multilateral negotiations of treaties. Nuclear civil 
society’s work is not only limited to protests and lobbying, but also includes 
groups that focus more on analysis and less on advocacy. In sum, attention 
and involvement in nuclear matters have taken many forms. 
Of this wide-ranging community the present work will only address a 
relatively small part, nuclear civil society involved with the NPT. The 
previous chapter has clarified the reasons for this choice and in the following 
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section its contours will be explained. However, in order to understand where 
the community under examination comes from we should take a step back to 
August 6, 1945. The use of nuclear weapons over Japan was the first shock 
that prompted the emergence of a worldwide opposition to the existence of 
those arms. ‘The nuclear age did not just produce weapons, it also produced 
the world’s largest grassroots transnational peace movement, fostered by 
nongovernmental organizations.’ 1  Though the size, prominence, and 
strategies of the disarmament movement have significantly changed over 
time, it never withered away. Lawrence Wittner, an authority on the history 
of anti-nuclear campaigns, divides it in three major phases: the mid- to late-
1940s, the late 1950s and early 1960s, and finally the 1980s.2 To this we could 
add a fourth wave, started in the 1990s and re-energised in the second half of 
the 2000s. The following sections will examine the older and more recent 
developments in turn. 
 
6.1.1 The three waves of anti-nuclear activism 
The scientists’ argument for the responsible use of nuclear technology is the 
first instance of resistance to have emerged in response to the explosion of 
the nuclear bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In effect this had started 
even before the bomb project was finalised, as attested by the experience of 
Joseph Rotblat. 3  A Polish-born physicist associated with Liverpool 
																																																						
1	Francis	J.	Gavin,	Nuclear	Statecraft,	128.		
2 	Lawrence	 Wittner,	 The	 Struggle	 Against	 the	 Bomb,	 Lawrence	 Wittner,	 Resisting	 the	 Bomb;	
Lawrence	Wittner,	Toward	Nuclear	Abolition.	
3 	A	 special	 thanks	 goes	 to	 Sandra	 Ionno	 Butcher,	 Executive	 Director	 of	 Pugwash,	 for	 having	
illuminated	many	details	about	Jo	Rotblat’s	life	and	his	history	with	Pugwash.	
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University, he was called to work on the Manhattan Project in early 1944. 
While doubts about the sensibility of making such destructive devices had 
been in his mind already then, he was committed to help the US succeed 
before Hitler’s Germany in inventing nuclear weapons. However, as soon as 
he learned that the German project had been shut down, he resigned from 
the Manhattan Project and left Los Alamos in December 1944.4 There his 
colleagues continued working on making the bomb and finally produced a 
working one, which was tested at the Trinity site on July 16, 1945.  
Scientists at the University of Chicago, led by Leo Szilard, attempted to 
convince the government that using the nuclear bomb on Japan could not be 
justified, would jeopardise global support for the US, ignite an arms race, and 
hamper prospective control agreements.5 It was the decision to use the bomb 
against a civilian populated area, despite these warnings, that led many of 
those scientists to distance themselves from the government. As recounted by 
Rotblat, ‘the final blow to this [ivory] tower came with the Hiroshima bomb.’6 
The idea that scientists have a responsibility in their discoveries is what 
brought this community to leave the ‘ivory tower’ and engage in anti-nuclear 
activism from early on. As the director of the Los Alamos Laboratory and 
‘father of the nuclear bomb,’Robert Oppenheimer, put it, ‘the physicists have 
known sin.’7 Or in the words of Albert Einstein, ‘[s]cience has brought forth 
																																																						
4 	Martin	 Clifford	 Underwood,	 ‘Joseph	 Rotblat	 and	 the	 Moral	 Responsibilities	 of	 the	
Scientist,’		Science	and	Engineering	Ethics	15	n°	2	(2009).	
5	Lawrence	Wittner,	The	Struggle	Against	the	Bomb	(Vol.	1	of	The	Struggle	Against	the	Bomb),	20-36.	
6	Interview	 with	 Joseph	 Rotblat,	 War	 and	 Peace	 in	 the	 Nuclear	 Age,	 WGBH	 Open	 Vault,	 1986,	
http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/wpna-db6dc9-interview-with-joseph-rotblat-1986		(last	accessed	
26	September	2016).	
7	David	K.	Hecht,	 ‘The	Atomic	Hero:	Robert	Oppenheimer	and	the	Making	of	Scientific	 Icons	 in	 the	
Early	Cold	War,’	Technology	and	Culture	49	n°	4	(2008).	
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this danger, but the real problem is in the minds and hearts of men.’8 He 
became the most prominent scientific figure to speak against the mass 
destruction potential of nuclear arms and in favour of their international 
control.9  With many of his colleagues Einstein rejected the notion that 
security could be achieved through armaments, arguing instead that it 
requires nuclear disarmament and world government.10 
In this first surge of activism, some of the scientists previously connected 
with the Manhattan Project mobilised against the further development of the 
US nuclear arsenal and put in place several initiatives to try and influence 
policy. These included the creation in 1945 of the Federation of American 
Scientists (FAS), gathering participants from the main laboratories, and the 
launch of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Einstein and Szilard were 
behind the short-lived Emergency Committee of Atomic Scientists as well as, 
a decade later, the release of the Einstein-Russell manifesto, which laid the 
foundation for the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. 
Scientists pushed successfully for ensuring civilian control of the US nuclear 
program, but their calls against the development of the more powerful 
hydrogen bomb were ultimately ineffective, along with demands for 
international control. 
In addition to scientists, the first surge of activism revolved mostly around 
small peace organisations and world government groups in the US, Europe, 
																																																						
8	Einstein	wrote	 these	words	 in	a	 June	1946’s	article	 in	 the	New	York	Times	Magazine.	Along	with	
some	 of	 the	 other	 texts	 he	 wrote	 on	 nuclear	 weapons,	 it	 is	 available	 in	 Einstein	 on	 Politics:	 His	
Private	Thoughts	and	Public	Stands	on	Nationalism,	Zionism,	War,	Peace,	and	the	Bomb,	eds.	David	
E.	Rowe	and	Robert	J.	Schulmann		(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2007),		387.	
9	David	E.	Rowe	and	Robert	J.	Schulmann,	Einstein	on	Politics:	His	Private	Thoughts	and	Public	Stands	
on	Nationalism,	Zionism,	War,	Peace,	and	the	Bomb	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2007).	
10	Gordon	Mercer,	‘Albert	Einstein,	Power,	The	State,	And	Peace:	The	Physicist	As	Philosopher-King	In	
A	World	State,’	International	Social	Science	Review	69	n°	3/4	(1994).	
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and in Commonwealth countries. Religious leaders also took stances against 
nuclear bomb use. In Japan, survivors of the atomic bombings – or 
hibakushas – begun holding anti-nuclear gatherings such as the ceremonies 
to commemorate Hiroshima Day. A further component was the birth of a 
movement in the Soviet Union, where the need for nuclear control was 
compounded with a characterization of the US as aggressive. The movement 
backed initiatives such as the Acheson-Lilienthal Report and the ensuing 
Baruch Plan aiming for the international control of nuclear energy. The rise 
of tensions between Washington and Moscow and the latter’s acquisition of 
the bomb in 1949 put an end to this early phase.11 
The second surge of anti-nuclear activism started in the US, between the late 
1950s and the early 1960s, in opposition to nuclear tests and their radioactive 
fallout. At a time when nuclear weapons explosions were still a matter of 
national pride, and beauty contests regularly crowned Miss Atomic Bomb, 
opposition to the bomb grew stronger, particularly after the Lucky Dragon 
incident, the 1954 H-bomb test that contaminated a fishing boat in Japan. 
Nuclear tests were also conducted on the Marshall Islands, in Australia, and 
(once France joined the club) in Algeria, leaving health and environmental 
damage behind. Based on the risk that radioactive fallout generated genetic 
modifications in children, it was another scientist, Linus Pauling, who 
campaigned against nuclear weapons tests.12 In 1958, Pauling addressed the 
United Nations with a petition signed by 11,000 scientists.  
That is when a women’s movement started forming to put the matter of 
atmospheric nuclear testing on the public agenda with the creation of the 
																																																						
11	Lawrence	Wittner,	The	Struggle	Against	the	Bomb	(Vol.	1	of	The	Struggle	Against	the	Bomb)	
12	Lawrence	Wittner,	Resisting	the	Bomb	(Vol.	2	of	The	Struggle	Against	the	Bomb).	
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Women Strike for Peace. One of their representatives recalled feeling 
frightened for the future of her own children, but also empowered by being 
able to do something about it.13 Under the leadership of Dagmar Wilson, the 
movement would mobilise public opinion via kitchen meetings, educating 
newspaper editors, and also taking the streets: in 1961 over 50,000 people 
marched in 60 towns across the United States.14 Moreover, the Committee 
for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) was formed by Lenore Marshall and 
Norman Cousins. The movement grew in popularity thanks to the 
endorsement of several celebrities and was able to organise grassroots work, 
including large demonstrations. After Britain joined the nuclear club in 1952, 
activism mounted there too, catalysed by the formation of the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament, or CND, which grew very popular. On Easter 1958, 
CND activists marched on Aldermaston, the base of the UK’s Atomic 
Weapons Establishment, in what would become a yearly event.15 A similar 
movement was also established in West Germany under the leadership of the 
Social Democratic Party and the trade unions.16 
In this phase not only did public protests become more common, but citizens 
started organising also track II diplomacy initiatives. One of the first 
unofficial ambassadors was the prominent journalist and peace advocate 
Norman Cousins, who launched the American-Soviet Dartmouth 
Conferences.17 Similar activities were carried out by Pugwash, which held its 
																																																						
13	Interview	n.	1,	April	25,	2014.	
14	Ibid.	
15	Andrew	Futter,	The	Politics	of	Nuclear	Weapons	(London:	SAGE,	2015),	175.	
16	Holger	Nehring,	‘The	British	and	West	German	Protests	against	Nuclear	Weapons	and	the	Cultures	
of	the	Cold	War,	1957–64,’	Contemporary	British	History	19	n°	2	(2005).	
17	Interview	with	 Norman	 Cousins,	War	 and	 Peace	 in	 the	 Nuclear	 Age,	WGBH	Open	 Vault	 (1986),	
http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/wpna-29cf83-interview-with-norman-cousins-1986-1	 	 	 (last	
accessed	26	September	2016).	
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first conference of scientists from the two sides of the Iron Curtain in 1957. 
Both initiatives aimed to stimulate diplomatic progress between the 
superpowers by hosting unofficial meetings of individuals close to 
government that could foster compromise through discussion away from 
formal channels. Advisors of both the US and Soviet leaderships attended 
Pugwash Conferences, making it possible to pass information on national 
negotiating requirements.18  
In the 1960s civil society saw the success of some of their demands with the 
negotiation of a treaty to ban nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, 
and under water. The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, however, was only a 
mixed victory for the anti-nuclear movement, as nuclear explosions were 
simply driven underground.19 In the following years, although concern for the 
arms race persisted, American pacifists focused their efforts on the Vietnam 
War while track II diplomacy continued behind the scenes. 
The third phase of anti-nuclear activism emerged in the 1980s. At this point 
the arms race had led Washington and Moscow to produce massive arsenals 
and, although arms control treaties had been signed during the 1970s, 
tension was again simmering between the two rivals. With the election of 
Ronald Reagan, US peace groups gathered behind the Nuclear Weapons 
Freeze Campaign after the 1979 call for a mutual halt to testing, production, 
and deployment of nuclear arms by military researcher Randall Forsberg. 
With a bottom-up approach, a relatively simple proposal, and an appeal to 
different sectors of society, the freeze proposal was supported by a majority 
																																																						
18 	Paul	 Rubinson,	 ‘“Crucified	 on	 a	 Cross	 of	 Atoms”:	 Scientists,	 Politics,	 and	 the	 Test	 Ban	
Treaty,’		Diplomatic	History	35	n°	2	(2011).	
19	Interview	n.	1,	April	25,	2014.	
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of Americans.	20 In a campaign designed to target the mainstream, the Freeze 
combined public education with an attempt to influence electoral politics 
both locally and nationally.21 A similar appeal was launched by the first of 
many professional groups that emerged in that period: Physicians for Social 
Responsibility (PSR).22 Under the charismatic leadership of Helen Caldicott, 
the group organised talking tours to inform the public of the nuclear 
danger.23 It was not until the 1980s, though, that massive international public 
presence was mobilised in response to another immediate threat, that of 
deploying a new generation of missiles in Europe, the NATO cruise and 
Pershing II missiles and the Soviet SS-20s.24  
The European Nuclear Disarmament (END), launched in Britain in 1980, 
attracted hundreds of thousands of people in demonstrations across Europe 
to apply coordinated pressure against the so-called Euromissiles. They 
argued that, despite East-West divisions, the destiny of the continent was 
indivisible in the nuclear age and called for a ‘nuclear-free Europe from 
Poland to Portugal’.25 As recalled by E.P. Thompson, one of the founders, 
‘[w]e were using the pamphlet, letters to the papers, the church-hall, the even 
the open-air meeting, the—sort of 19th century type methods to break 
																																																						
20	Benjamin	Redekop,	‘‘Physicians	to	a	Dying	Planet’:	Helen	Caldicott,	Randall	Forsberg,	and	the	Anti-
Nuclear	Weapons	Movement	of	the	Early	1980s.’	
21	Lawrence	Wittner,	 ‘The	Nuclear	 Freeze	and	 Its	 Impact,’	Arms	Control	 Today,	December	5,	 2010,	
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_12/LookingBack		(last	accessed	26	September	2016).	
22 	Physicians	 for	 Social	 Responsibility	 was	 created	 in	 1961	 and	 had	 been	 instrumental	 in	
documenting	the	presence	of	the	radioactive	Strontium-90	in	children	teeth.	However,	 it	remained	
dormant	for	most	of	the	1970s	until	it	was	revived	in	1978.	Interview	n.	2,	April	8,	2014.		
23	Benjamin	Redekop,	‘‘Physicians	to	a	Dying	Planet’:	Helen	Caldicott,	Randall	Forsberg,	and	the	Anti-
Nuclear	Weapons	Movement	of	the	Early	1980s.’		
24	Lawrence	Wittner,	‘How	Disarmament	Activists	Saved	the	World	from	Nuclear	War,’	Talk	delivered	
to	the	Canadian	Network	to	Abolish	Nuclear	Weapons,	Ottawa,	May	2013.	
25	David	 Featherstone,	Solidarity:	 Hidden	 Histories	 and	 Geographies	 of	 Internationalism,	 (London:	
Zed,	2012).		
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through into the modernized media.’26 A group of women protested in 1981 at 
a Royal Air Force (RAF) airbase that was due to host NATO missiles, setting 
up a camp in Greenham Common that would keep going for two decades.27 
END members were travelling widely to meet communities and work with 
local groups such as the revived CND in Britain and the Interchurch Peace 
Council (IKV) in the Netherlands.28 Large rallies were organised throughout 
Europe: 300,000 people in Rome in 1981, 400,000 in London in 1983 and 
almost a million in the Hague the same year.  
With the motto ‘Freeze the Arms Race—Fund Human Needs,’ the largest US 
political rally up to that point took place in June 1982, when one million 
people marched in New York City.29 Under pressure from all these public 
campaigns, President Reagan, who had talked of a winnable nuclear war 
before, reversed his anti-arms control and disarmament stance, telling 
Secretary of State Shultz. ‘If things get hotter and hotter and arms control 
remains an issue, maybe I should go see [Soviet leader Yuri] Andropov and 
propose eliminating all nuclear weapons.’ 30  That proposal was in fact 
advanced at the Reykjavik Summit of 1986, in which Reagan and Gorbachev 
exchanged proposals for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Although 
they never reached an agreement on disarmament, the next year the two 
																																																						
26	Interview	 with	 E.P.	 Thompson,	 War	 and	 Peace	 in	 the	 Nuclear	 Age,	 WGBH	 Open	 Vault	 (1987),	
http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/wpna-5d8952-interview-with-edward-palmer-thompson-1987	
(last	accessed	26	September	2016).	
27	The	author	is	grateful	to	Rebecca	Johnson	for	some	brief	conversations	about	that	experience.	
28	Lawrence	Wittner,	Toward	Nuclear	Abolition	(Vol.	3	of	The	Struggle	Against	the	Bomb).	
29 	Jonathan	 Schell,	 ‘The	 Spirit	 of	 June	 12,’	 The	 Nation,	 June	 14,	 2007,	
http://www.thenation.com/article/spirit-june-12	(last	accessed	25	September	2016).	
30	George	 P.	 Shultz,	 Turmoil	 and	 Triumph:	 My	 Years	 as	 Secretary	 of	 State	(New	 York:	 Charles	
Scribner’s	 Sons,	 1993),	 372	 cited	 in	 Lawrence	Wittner,	 ‘The	 Nuclear	 Freeze	 and	 Its	 Impact,’	Arms	
Control	 Today,	 December	 5,	 2010,	 http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_12/LookingBack	 	 (last	
accessed	26	September	2016).	
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leaders were able to sign the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty that, as 
previously mentioned, abolished a whole category of nuclear missiles.31 
In over four decades of bipolar confrontation in the shadow of the bomb, civil 
society mobilised a range of constituencies and strategies to influence nuclear 
policy. Due to the Cold War context, their efforts were often criticised in the 
West as a communist plot to score propaganda points. Nonetheless, some of 
their demands became policy and, although it is hard to ascribe these 
successes exclusively to civil society’s efforts, the history of nuclear 
governance would have been quite different if they had not existed.32 
	
6.1.2 Nuclear civil society after the Cold War: a fourth wave? 
After the end of the nuclear-armed bipolar confrontation the involvement of 
civil society with nuclear politics entered a new phase. Marked by different 
opportunities and challenges than during previous decades, the movement to 
limit and eliminate the bomb became more transnational and accepted in the 
mainstream. International regulation of nuclear weapons and activities had 
progressively developed throughout the Cold War, giving rise to what became 
known as the non-proliferation regime based on the NPT, detailed in Chapter 
Two. The nuclear situation seemed to improve in the 1990s: the end of the 
bipolar confrontation allowed Moscow and Washington to enter in more far-
reaching arms control agreements and even take unilateral steps to eliminate 
certain atomic weapons. This seemed to remove one of the main obstacles to 
																																																						
31	Lawrence	Wittner,	Toward	Nuclear	Abolition	(Vol.	3	of	The	Struggle	Against	the	Bomb),	369–404.	
32	Jeffrey	W.	Knopf,	‘NGOs,	Social	Movements,	and	Arms	Control.’	
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disarmament. At the same time that decade saw decreased public attention 
for nuclear weapons issues.  
When the Cold War ended, the profile of nuclear weapons in the public eye 
declined. Progress on nuclear disarmament was slow, and civil society 
struggled to be seen as a key stakeholder in an area increasingly dominated 
by security policy discussions.33 
Many of the organisations that sprung up during the 1980s are still in action 
today, and the same is true for a few of the older ones. However, their 
activities have changed significantly. For some, frustration over the lack of 
disarmament progress had opened up new routes to action; for others, it 
meant a continuation of an existing undertaking. Protests as such became 
only a very minor portion of the activities of nuclear civil society, which 
tended to become more professionalised, focusing instead on advocacy, 
lobbying, and the dissemination of information.34 As activities by concerned 
citizens diminished, a host of organisations kept attention to nuclear issues 
alive, as well as providing career opportunities for analysts and lobbyists with 
an interest in the bomb.  
At the same time, the community expanded beyond a unique focus on 
security relations. As noted by Randy Rydell, the ‘constituency of nuclear 
disarmament has significantly expanded in recent years to include the 
world's religions, women's groups, environmentalists, scientists, scholars, 
																																																						
33	Magnus	Løvold,	Beatrice	Fihn	and	Thomas	Nash,	‘Humanitarian	perspectives	and	the	campaign	for	
an	 international	 ban	 on	 nuclear	 weapons’,	 in	Viewing	 Nuclear	Weapons	 Through	 a	 Humanitarian	
Lens,		eds.	Borrie,	John,	and	Tim	Caughley	(Geneva:	UNIDIR,	2013),	146.	
34	For	sure	direct	action	has	not	ceased,	as	demonstrated	by	several	local	actions	including	the	most	
recent	protest	at	the	Faslane	naval	base	on	April	13,	2015	by	Scrap	Trident:	Aditya	Tejas,	‘Protesters	
Of	 Trident	Nuclear	Weapons	 System	Block	 Faslane	Naval	 Base	 In	 Scotland,’	 International	 Business	
Times,	 April	 13,	 2015,	 http://www.ibtimes.com/protesters-trident-nuclear-weapons-system-block-
faslane-naval-base-scotland-1879065		(last	accessed	26	September	2016).	
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lawyers, human rights advocates, mayors, and legislators.’35 Many groups 
responded to diminished interest in nuclear issues by enlarging their 
mission. This often depended on decisions by funding agencies, whose 
priorities changed, making it very difficult for civil society, especially 
grassroots organisations, to maintain their attention on nuclear matters.36 
The effect of ageing, moreover, became a widespread concern, as a ‘greying of 
the membership’ of nuclear disarmament groups happened across the 
board. 37  The survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the hibakusha, are 
growing older and less capable of spreading the memory of nuclear effects.38 
Generally the advent of younger generations that do not remember nuclear 
tests or the fear of the arms race is potentially leading to less activism.39  
In addition, geography keeps having a great impact on where nuclear civil 
society emerges. Mobilisation has spurred in those places where the risk of 
nuclear weapons was alive: at the Livermore National Laboratory, at 
Greenham Common, but also more generally throughout Europe at the time 
of the Euromissiles or in the South Pacific in response to atomic tests. 
However, activities have mostly been limited to the North of the world, with 
																																																						
35	Randy	Rydell,	 ‘The	Future	of	Nuclear	Arms:	A	World	United	and	Divided	by	 Zero,’	Arms	Control	
Today,	 March	 31,	 2009,	 http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_04/Rydell	 	 (last	 accessed	 26	
September	2016).	
36	The	 funding	of	nuclear	civil	 society	 is	a	crucial	 issue	 that	will	be	addressed	 in	more	detail	 in	 the	
following	chapters.	An	initial	division	can	be	drawn	between	public	and	private	sources	of	funding.	
The	 government	 of	 Austria,	 Switzerland,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 (MFA)	 of	 Norway,	 the	
Department	 of	 Energy	 in	 the	 US	 –	 all	 are	 important	 donors	 in	 this	 field,	 in	 the	 same	way	 as	 the	
Macarthur	Foundation,	Carnegie	Corporation,	Ford	Foundation,	etc.	
37	Lawrence	Wittner,	Toward	Nuclear	Abolition	(Vol.	3	of	The	Struggle	Against	the	Bomb),	474.	
38	A	group	of	500	Hiroshima	hibakushas	that	had	been	in	charge	of	memorial	ceremonies	and	other	
activities	recently	disbanded	after	having	tried	to	pass	it	on	to	the	second-generation	victims.	Kyodo,	
‘Ageing	 Hiroshima	 A-Bom	 Survivors’	 Group	 to	 Disband,’	 The	 Japan	 Times,	 February	 23,	 2015,	
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/02/23/national/aging-hiroshima-a-bomb-survivors-group-
to-disband/#.VQsL62SsV0L	(last	accessed	20	March	2015).	
39	Activists	 interviewed	 for	 this	 project	 often	 referred	 to	 the	 nuclear	 scare	 to	 explain	 their	 initial	
mobilisation.	
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many groups based in Europe and Japan. The United States, where nuclear 
weapons have been more than anywhere else, a central issue of political 
debate, the extent of anti-nuclear mobilisation remains the greatest – its 
major cities being home to the largest number of NGOs, think tanks, and 
funders. Washington, DC is the base to many nuclear experts and activists, 
working mostly on domestic decision-making. In New York, on the other 
hand, most organisations follow closely international deliberations at the UN 
and its disarmament bodies, from the General Assembly’s First Committee to 
the meetings of the NPT. 
In the 1990s engagement with multilateral fora, indeed, became a staple of 
civil society’s activism.40 This has its roots as far back as 1899, when civil 
society participated in the First Hague Peace Conference convened to discuss 
war prevention and arms limitation.41 With the creation of the UN and of fora 
to discuss disarmament issues, civil society found occasions to participate. 
The 1979 Special Session on Disarmament of the UN General Assembly is 
probably a turning point in this regard, because not only did it create the 
most far-reaching consensual document on multilateral disarmament, but it 
also established the so-called UN disarmament machinery. It established the 
Conference on Disarmament, 42  based in Geneva and devoted to the 
negotiation of disarmament treaties, as well as other bodies like the UN 
Disarmament Commission (UNDC), tasked with making recommendations, 
and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), a 
																																																						
40 	John	 Burroughs	 and	 Jackie	 Cabasso,	 ‘Confronting	 the	 Nuclear-armed	 States	 in	 International	
Negotiating	Forums:	Lessons	for	NGOs,’	International	Negotiation,	4	n°	3	(1999).	
41	Jeffrey	W.	Knopf,	‘NGOs,	Social	Movements,	and	Arms	Control.’	
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Conference	 of	 the	 Committee	 on	 Disarmament	 (1969–78).	 Membership	 and	 mandate	 changed	
through	time.	
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research centre affiliated with the UN. This created a host of diplomatic 
meetings where civil society could make its voice heard.43 
The transnationalism of civil society in nuclear matters has thus been on the 
rise: NGOs are increasingly participating in global events and knowledge 
exchange activities with states, but also joining forces to form coalitions. 
Revolving doors are common in the nuclear realm, where former government 
representatives often turn to research, consultancy, and/or track II 
diplomacy. This increases complexity, as it can be hard to know which hat a 
person is wearing and hybrid entities multiply.44 This process reached a new 
level at the time of the 1991 Amendment Conference for the LTBT, which saw 
unprecedented participation of civil society representatives such as 
Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA), which were the idea’s originators. 
In that context NGOs not only had a chance to compare experiences and 
establish international networks, but were also granted excellent access. ‘The 
Conference likely served as a wake-up call to the nuclear weapon states to 
limit NGO access at international forums more under their control.’45 In fact, 
at present civil society is often excluded from many working sessions of 
disarmament fora, it is physically separated from diplomats, and its events 
often gather only few governmental participants.  
																																																						
43	NGOs	had	been	involved	in	the	General	Assembly’s	Special	Sessions	on	Disarmament,	particularly	
SSOD-II	 in	1982,	when	 the	movement	advanced	 its	demands	 from	 inside	 the	 room,	with	53	NGOs	
and	 22	 research	 institutes	 making	 statements.	 Data	 from	 The	 United	 Nations	 and	 Disarmament:	
1945-1985	(New	York:	United	Nations,	1985).	
44	The	 International	Commission	on	Nuclear	Non-Proliferation	and	Disarmament,	 for	 instance,	was	
established	 by	 the	 governments	 of	 Japan	 and	 Australia	 but	 it	 is	 an	 independent	 forum	made	 of	
former	or	serving	officials.	Similarly,	the	EU	Non-Proliferation	Consortium	gathers	independent	think	
tanks	and	experts	at	the	same	time	as	having	a	mandate	from	the	European	Commission.	
45 	John	 Burroughs	 and	 Jackie	 Cabasso,	 ‘Confronting	 the	 Nuclear-armed	 States	 in	 International	
Negotiating	Forums:	Lessons	for	NGOs,’	461.	
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In 1995 hundreds of civil society representatives flocked to New York for the 
Review and Extension Conference of the NPT, which was to decide whether 
to maintain the treaty beyond its initial 25-years duration.46 Along with many 
member states, large parts of civil society expected the extension to come in 
exchange for progress on the nuclear disarmament commitment of the NWS, 
given that the treaty had proved relatively successful at keeping NNWS to 
their promise. The Abolition 2000 Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear 
Weapons was created in 1995 to unify civil society behind the call for 
disarmament. With the idea to gather 2000 organisations from across the 
world and to coordinate their activities, civil society representatives sat in the 
middle of the UN cafeteria and started drafting the Abolition 2000 
Statement.47 Their 11-point plan for nuclear abolition was a critique of the 
status quo, stating that a ‘world free of nuclear weapons is a shared aspiration 
of humanity. This goal cannot be achieved in a non-proliferation regime that 
authorizes the possession of nuclear weapons by a small group of states.’48 
They feared that committing to a permanent NPT the NNWS would have 
given up their only bargaining chip to obtain disarmament.49 
Another umbrella group was set up for the 1995 Conference with the goal of 
supporting the NPT’s indefinite extension, the Campaign for the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. It comprised 18 NGOs, predominantly Washington-
based, and was coordinated by the Stimson Center. In contrast to Abolition 
																																																						
46	As	said	before,	the	NPT,	entered	into	force	in	1970,	had	an	initial	duration	of	25	years,	after	which	
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47	Abolition	2000,	‘The	Abolition	2000	Founding	Statement,’	
http://www.abolition2000.org/?page_id=153	(last	accessed	26	September	2016).	
48	Abolition	2000,	‘The	Abolition	2000	Founding	Statement.’	
49	Interview	n.	3,	May	22,	2015.	As	the	interviewee	pointed	out,	in	some	cases	this	difference	of	view	
was	 also	 internal,	 as	 for	 the	 community	 of	 organised	 physicians:	 PSR	wanted	 indefinite	 extension	
because	the	NPT	is	the	only	treaty	with	a	disarmament	commitment,	whereas	the	German	branch	of	
IPPNW	opposed	an	indefinite	extension	without	guarantees	for	disarmament.			
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2000, the Campaign did not put much emphasis on nuclear disarmament, 
but rather on the benefits of the current nuclear restraint infrastructure and 
the need to develop it further. This led some to conclude that it resembled 
‘the non-governmental face of an approach that had been worked out with 
arms-control elements within the US government.’50 This opposition brought 
to light a fundamentally under-explored issue with global civil society active 
on nuclear weapons matters: although all ostensibly support the same goal of 
nuclear weapons elimination, they do so in very different ways. While this 
distinction has been present throughout the initial three waves as well, it 
reached new levels of starkness once disarmament could no longer be 
dismissed as impossible because of bipolar tensions and started being 
embraced by former and serving policy makers.  
The time around 1995, in fact, is a crucial one for nuclear governance. With 
new legal documents reinforcing the prohibitions on nuclear-related 
activities, the normative structure of nuclear weapons has significantly 
expanded, most importantly with the indefinite extension of the NPT, but 
also because of the signature of the CTBT and the 1996 ruling of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). Until then, the NPT had a limited time 
period of 25 years since its entry into force in 1970. And, though many wished 
for an indefinite extension, this outcome was all but taken for granted, and 
much negotiation was needed to secure it.51 Further limitations were also 
introduced with the CTBT ban on all kinds of nuclear tests after a 
cumbersome process of negotiation, which had started at experts level and 
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51	Tariq	Rauf	and	Rebecca	 Johnson,	 ‘After	 the	NPT’s	 Indefinite	Extension:	The	Future	of	 the	Global	
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took two decades to iron out the technical details.52 The ICJ, on the other 
hand, did not reach consensus on a comprehensive affirmation of illegality 
under all circumstances, but it did affirm that nuclear arms use and its threat 
violate international law in most cases.53  
Since then, developments have been highly variable, some pointing to a 
weakening of nuclear governance (e.g. India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 
1998, North Korea’s 2003 exit from the NPT and nuclear capability) and 
others to its strengthening (e.g. the US-Russia arms reduction treaties up to 
the 2010 New START, the 2015 agreement between the P5+1 and Iran54). In 
the new millennium we are surely not in a phase of renewed public 
engagement with nuclear weapons politics, but the movement persists, and 
there is enthusiasm for the issue. In the 1980s people wanted to learn about 
it, because they thought nuclear war could happen. In the 1990s mobilisation 
got harder, but then interest spurred again in 2006-08.55 The frustration over 
disarmament which exploded after the end of the Cold War was followed by 
increased global attention on nuclear non-proliferation because of the crises 
over Iraq, North Korea, and Iran, but also by renewed abolition calls. In the 
midst of all this, civil society has taken positions ranging from the advocacy 
of abolition grounded on humanitarian imperatives to support for an 
incremental process of progressive arms limitation.  
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53 	Gro	 Nystuen,	 Stuart	 Casey-Maslen,	 and	 Annie	 Golden	 Bersagel,	 Nuclear	 Weapons	 under	
International	Law	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2014).	
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Most importantly, public opinion has shown a problematic disengagement 
from the issue, ceasing to provide that public movement that in other decades 
had challenged the nuclear order and its supporters. In the 1980s E.P. 
Thompson wrote: ‘[a]s anxiety and dissatisfaction mount, there can be 
glimpsed, as an intolerable threat to exterminist ideology, the possibility of a 
truly internationalist movement against the armourers of both blocs.’56 
However, anxiety seems to have waned in the post-Cold War period: marches 
asking for the elimination or control of the bomb appear to be a thing of the 
past, and public opinion is widely disengaged from the nuclear topic. 
Baudrillard wrote that ‘the ‘masses’ silent indifference to nuclear pathos 
(whether it comes from the nuclear powers or from antinuclear campaigners) 
is […] a great sign of hope and a political fact of the utmost importance.’57 The 
supposed hopefulness arising from popular nuclear disengagement is 
debatable, but the matter of that indifference is definitely politically relevant 
and makes the study of organised civil society in such an historical context all 
the more cogent. 
The NPT had stabilised a nuclear order based upon the almost universal 
renunciation to the bomb, complemented by IAEA safeguards and Western-
led export control agreements. However, fears of a nuclear war between US 
and Soviet Union were soon replaced by alarm at the potential acquisition of 
the bomb by what came to be called ‘rogue states’ as well terrorist groups. 
Despite the remarkable success of the NPT, which in the 1990s was joined by 
most of the hold-outs (including prominent ones like China and France but 
																																																						
56	Edward	P.	 Thompson,	 ‘Notes	on	Exterminism,	 the	 Last	 Stage	of	Civilization,’	 in	Exterminism	and	
Cold	War,	ed.	New	Left	Review	(London:	Verso,	1982),	24.	
57	Jean	Baudrillard,	America	(London:	Verso,	1989),	44.	
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also problematic countries like South Africa, Ukraine, and Brazil), there were 
worries that it was not enough. With anti-nuclear activism growing ever more 
detached from popular perception and participation, decision-making bodies 
have become a central focus for their work. That is why, in order to study 
contemporary civil society, attention should be turned to the most important 
global nuclear forum, the NPT and its review process. 
This brief overview has sketched the contours of civil society’s involvement in 
nuclear policy since the end of the Cold War, although important initiatives 
have been left out for reasons of space. The community, while growing more 
transnational and extending to new constituencies, has had to face problems 
such as diminished public attention, funding, ageing, and geographical 
underrepresentation. The demand for nuclear disarmament, moreover, has 
become increasingly accepted by political elites, although its progress at the 
multilateral level remains limited. How are we to make sense of this complex 
reality and of the various ways in which civil society has engaged with the 
central empirical focus of this study, the 2015 NPT RevCon? The following 
sections will provide some guidance in that by, firstly, inquiring into the 
analytical differences according to scholars and practitioners as well as 
specifying the reductionist-abolitionist divide, sketched in the Introduction; 
and secondly by laying out the groundwork for a study of civil society at the 
NPT via an overview of the institutional constraints to their participation. 
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6.2 Distinctions in global nuclear civil society 
For understanding the differences among civil society actors it is necessary to 
establish analytical categories of some kind. Several issues have already been 
taken with Claudia Kissling’s Civil Society and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 
but what is interesting for this discussion is that she provides only a shallow 
view of civil society at the NPT.58 Regarding the scope of actors involved, in 
fact, she points to the variety of groups, which ‘ranged from strong activist 
associations and popular grass-roots movements to specialist scientific and 
academic policy-analysis institutes’.59 Kissling rightly recognises the lack of 
any group explicitly striving for armaments, but explicitly rejects any attempt 
at classification of the stances taken by those civil society groups that 
participate in the NPT. While dispensing with that exercise might be justified 
in light of the fact that boundaries between categories are porous, it 
significantly detracts from her depth of analysis, leaving the reader unaware 
of the different agendas and practices of the community.  
More effort at classifying is evident in Jeffrey Knopf’s article ‘NGOs, Social 
Movements, and Arms Control’ that reviews the types of organisations and 
their activities.60 While his focus is on all arms control rather than just 
nuclear, Knopf provides an interesting typology according to primary 
audience (‘elite’ or ‘general public’) and main activity (‘advocacy’ or 
‘information’). As a result, he finds four types of arms control NGOs:  
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1. advocacy group: targeting advocacy to elites, as exemplified by the 
Federation of American Scientists (FAS); 
2. social movement: mobilising the public to affect government officials, 
like the Freeze’s experience; 
3. think tank: disseminating information and analysis to policy makers, 
such as the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS); 
4. education group: tailoring information to the public, as in the case of 
the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). 
Knopf’s categorisation indeed highlights major distinctions that can be 
witnessed in the NPT context. The strategies of groups involved with nuclear 
weapon issues span different types of collective action and have been 
described by many of this project’s interviewees as falling in either the 
‘advocacy’ or ‘information’ category. There seems to be a tension, in fact, 
between the two main activities that these groups are engaged in, as 
gathering information for the benefit of decision-makers is often seen as 
incompatible with the advancement of a specific political agenda. This 
difference is especially stark in Washington, where, in the words of an NGO 
representative, ‘think tanks and advocacy each do their things and are not 
cooperating.’61 As noted by Paul Boyer: 
Extra-governmental think tanks remain influential in policy formation, just 
as RAND loomed large in Kubrick’s day. Armchair strategists embedded in 
a network of foundations and institutes, often with ideological agendas, 
defense industry ties, and a revolving-door relationship with the Pentagon, 
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continue to play a shadowy but important role in setting the nation’s nuclear 
policies.62 
A further broad distinction among the different souls of nuclear civil society 
stems from the expected drivers of political change, which has led some 
groups to work at the grassroots level while others have focused their 
attention on directly influencing the decision-makers. As one activist 
explained in great detail, much non-governmental strategizing depends on 
the elected theory of political change: whether a top-down approach can alter 
the political process or bottom-up pressures are going to modify the status 
quo.63 Yet another strand is what is sometimes referred to as the ‘grasstops’: 
influential former officials who advocate certain positions and are able to get 
an audience by virtue of their status and connections.64 However, the elites-
grassroots distinction made by Knopf only helps to a certain extent; it is 
almost a moot point in the current situation because, as he recognises 
himself, civil society has largely shifted away from trying to influence the 
public.65 
A better analytical distinction is one that discriminates between the stances, 
rather than the strategies, of civil society. In examining the US debate around 
nuclear weapons abolition, Lodgaard66 distinguished among three camps: 
one for total nuclear disarmament, one for arsenal reduction, and one 
opposed to all arms control efforts. Indeed, these are the three main positions 
that can, and have been, taken with regard to nuclear disarmament. Since the 
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position opposed to any kind of arms control is almost by definition absent in 
the sort of diplomatic processes analysed in this thesis, the focus should be 
on the division between total nuclear disarmament and arsenal reduction.  
Disarmament and reduction are indeed very different processes, each with 
supporting constituencies. The disarmament camp Lodgaard, however, 
identified with the four horsemen proposal, mentioned earlier, something 
that should makes us reflect on what is the character of the disarmament they 
advocated. As he later notes, their rationale rested on national security and 
international order considerations, namely the limitations of nuclear 
deterrence against terrorist threats and in a multi-polar situation with risks 
of accidental launches.67 This is very different from a morality rationale, 
which sees the elimination of nuclear weapons as a way to establish a more 
equal and democratic international order.68 A very similar distinction of 
approaches can also be identified in the NPT context. Articulating something 
that is well recognised within the nuclear civil society community, Rebecca 
Johnson identified it in describing the chasm between arms controllers and 
abolitionists at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.69 If both 
supported in principle the goal of nuclear disarmament, the ways prescribed 
to get there varied remarkably, along with the strategy for that conference.  
To keep in line with the jargon most employed in an NPT context, this will be 
referred to here as the reductionists-abolitionists divide, but the concept is 
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the same. At heart lies the realisation that not all civil society groups are 
alike, since some want to control the risk factors inherent in nuclear 
armaments, while others propose to make away with them in order to 
eliminate the risk. Regrettably the analytical attention has seldom focused on 
the role of this ideological division, which according to this project is 
necessary to understand the political work this community conducts. Such a 
distinction is not only crucial for the history of the NPT, but also for the 
broader issue of global nuclear governance, and the critical question of how 
to deal with the nuclear risk. 
This thesis wants to explicitly look into this cleavage as a way to demonstrate 
that the same basic tension dividing states is also present in civil society. 
Chapter Seven will present more practically the two sides of this community, 
and Chapter Eight will proceed to compare and contrast them. Before doing 
so, however, we should first examine how civil society participates in the NPT 
review process. Beyond the strategies and divides among NPT-attending 
groups, all have to play by an established set of rules. 
 
 
6.3 Negotiating civil society access to the NPT 
The importance of the NPT, as argued earlier, does not only rest on the 
obligations it establishes for state parties, but also on being the main current 
locus of contestation for nuclear governance through its review process. 
Every five years the NPT holds a Review Conference that takes place in New 
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York, lasts about a month, and aims to produce a consensual Final 
Document. Each one is preceded by three shorter Preparatory Committees 
(PrepCom), held alternately in Vienna, Geneva, and New York to set the 
agenda to be discussed. The RevCons and PrepComs of the NPT are intended 
to oversee the implementation of the treaty, but almost always follow the 
same path of long-winded government statements and discussions that 
appear to be of little use to actually push towards any of the goals of the 
treaty. For instance, while many states in 2010 favoured strengthening the 
commitment to the Additional Protocol as the universal safeguards standard, 
such language did not reach consensus because of the opposition of some 
member states and was not included in the Final Document. Such is the 
situation for most other norms that could result from a conference of this 
kind.  
Nonetheless, on occasion the NPT was able to agree on significant measures, 
even though the implementation phase has always proved difficult. As 
pointed out earlier, in 1995 the parties met to decide on the future of the 
treaty. Although it was by no means a foregone conclusion, the conference 
agreed to indefinitely extend the NPT and to advance on another dossier: 
endorsing the creation of a zone free of WMD in the Middle East. The 2000 
RevCon, moreover, reached an agreement on a set of steps that would further 
the goal of nuclear disarmament, the so-called 13 practical steps. While there 
was no consensus on a Final Document in 2005, the 2010 RevCon hammered 
out a forward-looking Action Plan on all three pillars of the Treaty, along 
with a decision to take forward the discussion for the Middle East zone. 
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Sometimes change in agreed language has been more marginal but highly 
contested, such as the upholding of the humanitarian preoccupations.  
Reaching compromise on agreed language is thus a cumbersome process that 
only occasionally meets success. Regardless, examining the discussions at the 
NPT is relevant, because it is the best forum where to gauge the preferences 
of the majority of states and other actors involved. Moreover, it is significant 
that this debate takes place in the first place and that the voices heard are not 
limited to dominant conceptions.  
The main requirement for civil society groups under examination in this 
thesis is to participate in the NPT and its periodic reunions. Therefore, it 
should be explained how participation happens. The NPT is in fact highly 
hierarchical, both among different types of states and among various actors. 
If the former depends upon the diverging commitments accepted by different 
categories of members, the latter has to do with the still faulty access and 
transparency provided to civil society. While allowed to attend the Review 
Conferences and Preparatory Committees, civil society is denied participation 
in some of the discussions and is allowed to take the floor only during a 
special session. International institutions like the IAEA and the CTBTO, 
instead, are more actively involved, with a seat and the chance to make 
opening statements and interventions from the floor. Furthermore, the UN 
Secretariat is also engaged through its Office for Disarmament Affairs (ODA), 
which assists the chair of the RevCon or PrepCom both in the logistical 
details and in the substantive undertaking of gathering national positions and 
trying to find areas of potential agreement.  
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State representatives almost always make reference to the importance they 
attach to the participation and contribution of civil society. However, they 
have also proved to be resistant to civil society interventions While states 
have been often only verbally supportive of civil society, the United Nations 
Secretariat has consistently encouraged and facilitated their involvement. As 
a UN brochure puts it: ‘The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs 
(UNODA) has worked in close partnership with civil society organizations to 
advance the cause of general and complete disarmament under effective 
international control.’70 Created in 1982, the UNODA – or shortly ODA – is 
tasked with promoting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, 
strengthening disarmament regimes for other weapons of mass destruction, 
and advancing conventional armaments limitations. With offices both in New 
York and in Geneva, it provides organizational support for the General 
Assembly, the Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament 
and other bodies.  
Among other things, ODA works to make it possible for NGOs to attend 
various discussions taking place at the New York headquarters of the UN and 
in Geneva at the Conference on Disarmament. There is a lot of work that goes 
into the access of civil society in big conferences.71 For the NPT it is a two-
stage process of NGO accreditation and individual registration. Initially the 
organisations are screened to make sure that their work touches upon 
disarmament and non-proliferation, but only very few are rejected, and it is 
not restricted to groups with ECOSOC consultant status. In the registration 
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phase there is not a screening of the individuals, but security might put some 
in a black list. It is not until the first day of the conference, however, that civil 
society’s representation ceases to be provisional, when the NGO list gets 
approved by the parties to the treaty.  
Moreover, the ODA collaborates with civil society to organise the half-day 
session that the NPT RevCons and PrepComs dedicate to NGO presentations. 
In terms of civil society participation in the conference, the NPT is considered 
‘pretty generous’ by comparison with other fora. 72  The UNGA First 
Committee, for instance, only allocates them three hours, while at each NPT 
reunion they have a whole half-day NGO cluster. The format of the cluster 
has changed over time, but generally always included statements by different 
NGOs. In a relative innovation the 2014 session has been more interactive, 
although participation by state representatives was abysmal and their 
engagement with the presentation rather limited. Things went back to 
normal in 2015 when, a presentation after the next by each organisation, left 
the session with only five minutes for question and answer. The choice of 
speakers and format is entirely handled by the NGOs that only give ODA the 
list on the day. In this favouring of civil society’s autonomy, ODA is quite 
different from other UN departments that have no NGO coordinator. 
The organisation tasked with panel discussions at the UN was for many years 
the NGO Committee on Disarmament Peace and Security, founded in 1972 by 
Homer Jack, a Unitarian minister who had been involved with the creation of 
SANE. The Committee brings together different organisations concerned 
with disarmament, peace, and security with the aim of facilitating civil 
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society’s participation in formal disarmament meetings at the UN.73 Although 
the Committee organised a number of panel discussions at the UN over the 
years, its fate rapidly changed when their main funder went out of business. 
An organisation which used to employ 20 people, now runs almost 
exclusively on a voluntary basis.	74 The US$100 per year that each member 
contributes, along with some private donations, are not enough to cover more 
than the work of the editor of Disarmament Times, the monthly publication 
of the group.  
At present, although the NGO Committee still exists, the coordination has 
been undertaken by Reaching Critical Will (RCW), one of the largest New 
York-based organisations in the field. RCW is a largely autonomous section 
of the historical peace group, Women’s International League for Peace and 
Freedom (WILPF). With its leader, Ray Acheson, RCW is extremely 
prominent in the organisation of all phases of civil society’s participation, 
from managing the half a day allocated by the Conference to NGO 
presentations to coordinating the events taking place in the room assigned 
for civil society’s uses. Moreover, RCW publishes its own reports and during 
NPT PrepComs and RevCons produces the daily NPT News in Review. That 
and its website are greatly appreciated by both diplomats and civil society 
representatives, providing a great repository for conference documents – 
even those that are initially distributed to states only often make their way 
quite quickly to RCW website.75  
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The day of civil society participants to the NPT PrepComs and RevCons starts 
early with an 8 o’clock daily Abolition Caucus, followed by a government 
briefing for NGOs. Whereas the former is for internal coordination, the latter 
in an event that aims to facilitate dialogue between diplomatic and civil 
society participants to the Conference. A further avenue for coordination is 
presented by the Abolition 2000 Annual General Meeting, a one-day 
consultation where a variety of groups meet to brief each other on their 
activities and develop joint proposals. While invitations are widely extended, 
it seems that only the most committed abolitionists take part. Furthermore, 
civil society groups organise side events to formally interact with the 
diplomats at the conference. These short meetings tend to take place on the 
premises of the UN or in nearby Permanent Missions, NGO offices, or rented 
spaces and involve presentations by both members of civil society and of 
national delegations or international organisations. With a compact agenda 
revolving on specific themes and a format including questions and answers, 
the side events are seen as important avenues of dialogue and political 
influence. Yet, having participated in dozens of them, the author can attest to 
the unequal participation in these events, with interns well represented and 
diplomatic ‘heavy-weights’ often absent.  
Even with these formal possibilities of interaction, civil society is kept at a 
distance from the diplomatic process. It is unable to present working papers 
to the conference, a right that is reserved to states and groups of states. 
Moreover, some of the sessions are closed to nongovernmental 
representatives – the ones where usually more substantive issues are 
discussed. Also, issues remain with the physical division between diplomats 
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and civil society. When the Conference meets in the General Assembly room, 
the lower floor, where state representatives and international organisation 
officers have their seats, is off-limits. A civil society pass only allows access to 
the top floor, where space is quite ample, but a sense of division is strongly 
felt. NGO members often use the stairs to visit the bottom floor in order to 
have conversations with the representatives, to check the speakers’ list, 
collect documents, and distribute their publications. Such a practice, 
although informally accepted, is formally prohibited, and states have 
complained about it at the 2014 NPT PrepCom. In one instance, publications 
were removed because found offensive.76 Also, the possibility to visit the 
bottom floor was limited to five people at the time by giving RCW five badges 
and asking them to put every organisation’s publications for display in the 
new location. 
The palpable division between diplomats and civil society means that upon 
exiting the conference room diplomats spill over into a lounge bar 
overlooking the garden and the East River where they entertain 
conversations with colleagues. Being interdicted from the area makes it 
difficult for civil society to approach members of the delegations that they 
would like to lobby or present with proposals. The area dedicated to civil 
society, on the other hand, opens on a part of the Secretariat Building used 
for educational purposes. Guided tours do not only roam the outside corridor 
to illustrate the history of multilateral disarmament, but are daily let inside 
the room in order to catch a glimpse of the UN at work. This treatment has 
been resented by civil society, as is the cumbersome registration process with 
																																																						
76	The	 satirical	weasels	 arrest	warrants	 by	 rebellious	 organisation	Wildfire	 spurred	 complaints	 and	
the	 publications	 table	was	moved	 outside	 of	 the	 room.	More	will	 be	 said	 about	 them	 in	 Chapter	
Seven.	
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the massive lines for collecting badges on the first day, preventing many from 
entering the room on time. Nonetheless, civil society and delegation 
members spend weeks working side by side and rather often know each other 
well. A long conference day sometimes even ends with both sharing a drink a 
few blocks from the UN. 
As it has been said, this project is based upon participant observation of the 
NPT carried out predominantly at the 2014 Preparatory Committee and at 
the 2015 Review Conference. The groups taken into consideration in this 
project are thus all that were present there. In terms of demographics, in 
2010 1,102 representatives from 110 NGOs participated in the RevCon.77 At 
the 2014 Preparatory Committee the organisations were 59, although, as 
often happens, not all of them actually sent representatives. The 2015 
RevCon was attended by a total of 902 individuals from 86 organisations, 
data further broken down in Appendix A.78 Civil society at the NPT is heavily 
North dominated, as most accredited participants come from North America 
and Europe, with a sizable Asian contingent which is mostly from Japan. 
African NGOs are increasingly participating. Given that the third PrepCom in 
each cycle and all RevCons take place in New York, there always is a great 
participation from US-based organisations, even the ones with the most 
localised concerns such as groups of downwinders.  
																																																						
77	United	Nations	Office	for	Disarmament	Affairs,	‘Fact	Sheet:	Disarmament	and	Civil	Society,’	(April	
2014).	
78	There	is	a	slight	discrepancy	between	the	numbers	of	NGOs	and	representatives	registered	for	the	
conference	(1,151	and	101	respectively)	and	those	that	actually	participated	(902	and	86	
respectively).	Broken-down	data	is	available	only	for	registration,	in	Appendix	A.	The	number	of	
participants,	instead,	can	be	found	here:	United	Nations	Office	for	Disarmament	Affairs,	‘Fact	Sheet:	
Disarmament	and	Civil	Society,’	(January	2016).	https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/Disarmament-and-Civil-Society-Fact-Sheet-Jan2016.pdf	(last	accessed	2	
November	2016).	
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In addition to the customary route of civil society access to the NPT, certain 
nuclear experts have also been embedded in national delegations. This 
sometimes responds to the need for qualified personnel of small delegations, 
but in other cases it seems to have more to do with a search for legitimacy by 
inclusivity. Some examples of this reality are CNS’s William Potter with 
Kazakhstan, Chatham House’s Patricia Lewis with the UK, and Harald Müller 
of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) for Germany. Furthermore, 
the 2014 PrepCom saw another development: a civil society representative 
was enlisted as assistant to the Chair, a role generally given to a fellow 
diplomat from the same country. Thereby, Tariq Rauf of the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has worked with Ambassador 
Enrique Roman-Morey of Peru to bring parties to a consensus. The extent of 
access that civil society members embedded in national delegations or even 
in the NPT team is clearly on a whole different level from what regular 
representatives enjoy. However, it remains to be seen how much of the most 
sensitive conversations extend beyond diplomats. 
In sum, participation of civil society groups at the NPT RevCons and 
PrepComs is an established practice that allows for several possibilities of 
interaction. However, limits exist in terms of access and the next chapters 
will delve deeper into patterns of exclusion that might emerge. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the historical setting of global nuclear civil society 
to ground the forthcoming empirical analysis of its involvement in nuclear 
governance at the NPT. As such, it has first focused on the involvement with 
nuclear policy by nongovernmental organised groups throughout history. 
Sparked by crises such as the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the 
1940s, nuclear testing in the 1960s, and the arms race in the 1980s, people 
have mobilised to call for limits and an end to nuclear weapons. During over 
four decades of bipolar confrontation in the shadow of the bomb, civil society 
mobilised a range of constituencies and strategies to influence nuclear policy. 
Social movements, NGOs, but even private individuals have on occasion 
achieved such results through a combination of public demonstrations and 
elite lobbying. 
With the end of the Cold War, civil society’s relation to the nuclear question 
significantly changed, in terms of both strategies and opportunity. The 
community, while growing more transnational and extending to new 
constituencies, has had to face problems such as diminished public attention, 
funding, ageing, and geographical underrepresentation. The demand for 
nuclear disarmament, moreover, has become increasingly accepted by 
political elites, although its progress at the multilateral level remains limited. 
Nowadays the community of nuclear civil society is composed of NGOs, think 
tanks, social movements, academic institutions, associations, and other 
groups that provide expert analysis and political recommendations to 
policymakers and the public. The scope of their activity spans from local 
mobilisation in areas where nuclear weapons have created risks for the 
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population to national campaigns to change domestic laws and global 
movements that support multilateral treaties negotiations. Nuclear civil 
society’s work is not limited to protests and lobbying, but also includes 
groups that focus more on analysis and less on advocacy. 
Civil society groups are involved in struggles in multiple ways. These 
struggles deserve further examination, but little attention has been paid so 
far to the inner workings of civil society in nuclear weapons politics, 
especially at the transnational level. In order to understand this 
problematique, the chapter went on to engage with some of the authors who 
have broadly looked at the same community. This led to recognise the 
importance of distinctions between research and advocacy and between top-
down and bottom-up approaches, as well as the most relevant: between 
abolitionists and reductionists. While ostensibly all committed to the goal of 
nuclear disarmament, civil society is in fact divided on what it means by it: 
disarmament refers to the abolition of nuclear weapons for some, and the 
reduction in stockpile for others. Exploring this distinction remains the 
empirical commitment of this thesis. 
If this division can be found across the board in most of the sites where civil 
society is present, the NPT is an especially interesting forum to monitor. The 
treaty’s periodic meetings, in fact, can be seen as the main forum of 
contestation, in which nuclear civil society is given voice, albeit unequally. 
This has led us to briefly review the NPT’s commitments, history, and 
problems to inscribe civil society’s activities in its wider context. Finally, the 
chapter has explored what it entails for civil society to participate in the NPT, 
in terms of access and ability to interact with and influence the process. 
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Similarly to other studies in the field, this thesis researches the discourses 
put forward by nuclear communities in order to understand the culture of the 
groups under examination and its politics. The following chapters will thus 
strive to clarify the tensions between the different currents of civil society 
involved in global nuclear policy by looking at their involvement with the 
NPT.  
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Chapter 7  
 
Civil Society at the NPT: A Search for 
Ideologies of Disarmament and 
Deterrence 
 
In 1959, long before the NPT was signed, Bertrand Russell wrote of the 
proceedings of disarmament conferences as ‘a morass of technicalities, with 
arguments this way and that and well-founded objections that are met by 
equally well-founded retorts.’1 While he thought this situation would only 
hold as long as the East-West confrontation continued, those same words 
could still describe the now many conferences on issues of disarmament, 
non-proliferation, and arms control. What is even more striking is that a few 
lines later Russell points out that it is the very logic of the nuclear age to 
prevent agreements, as states doubt others’ self-restraint and worry about 
how to ensure their national security. In 2016, over half a century after his 
writings, it is evident that Russell was far-sighted in saying that ‘such 
questions could be prolonged ad infinitum and that negotiations could 
																																																						
1	Bertrand	Russell,	Common	Sense	and	Nuclear	Warfare	(London:	Routledge	[1959],	2001),	38.	
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continue throughout many years to advocate disarmament without incurring 
the risk of bringing it about.’2  
This is precisely the situation at the time under examination: being in favour 
of disarmament is now almost inevitable in the nuclear community, and since 
the very first resolution of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), nuclear 
disarmament has been on the global agenda.3 Moreover, virtually all states 
pledge it is a national goal, and the so-called non-proliferation regime stands 
on this promise, while basically all international organisations and civil 
society groups but also all states proclaim themselves supporters of nuclear 
disarmament. ‘We have and we will continue to scale down our arsenal, and 
to continue to move, step by step, toward nuclear disarmament,’4 announced 
the United States, while China declared itself ‘a staunch champion for nuclear 
disarmament process.’5 At the NPT they come and air their vision for a world 
without nuclear weapons, regardless of how much their policies align with 
such aim. It is thus critical to inquire into what is meant by nuclear 
disarmament and to unveil the process through which disarmament gets 
preached but has not yet incurred the risk of being brought about.  
Between April 27 and May 22, 2015, New York hosted yet another round of 
the nuclear-age-long wrestling match between supporters and opponents of 
																																																						
2	Ibid.	
3	General	Assembly	resolution	I/1,	Establishment	of	a	Commission	to	Deal	with	the	Problem	raised	by	
the	 Discovery	 of	 Atomic	 Energy,	 A/RES/1/1	 (24	 January	 1946),	 https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/032/52/IMG/NR003252.pdf?OpenElement	 (last	 accessed	 7	
July	2016).	
4	United	States,	 ‘Statement	delivered	by	Secretary	of	State	 John	Kerry,’	General	Debate,	2015	NPT	
Review	 Conference,	 April	 27,	 2015,	
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-
fora/npt/revcon2015/statements/27April_US.pdf	(last	accessed	22	October	2016).	
5	China,	 ‘Statement:	 delivered	 by	 Vice	 Foreign	 Minister	 Li	 Baodong’,	 General	 Debate,	 2015	 NPT	
Review	 Conference,	 April	 27,	 2015,	
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-
fora/npt/revcon2015/statements/27April_China.pdf	(last	accessed	22	October	2016).	
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nuclear reliance. As the doors of the 9th Review Conference of the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty opened, the ammunitions for this battle were all 
(more or less) ready, in the rather unfrightening form of papers and prepared 
remarks delineating each delegation’s position. Within those hundreds of 
pages, thousands of lines of text, millions of words, lay the different 
interpretations of what the NPT is and how well it is doing its job. More than 
that, they contained, sometimes hidden behind convoluted expressions and 
vague definitions, the views of states on nuclear weapons and their ideas 
about how to achieve disarmament. Studying that ideological clash is 
important to assess the degree of ideological contestation within global 
nuclear governance. 
Analyses of the discourses and competing claims of states and groups at NPT 
conferences have been explored, but it was left unanswered what role civil 
society plays in such narrative struggles. The place of less materially endowed 
actors, however, deserves further attention, in that it can demonstrate the 
pervasiveness of a certain system of signification, as highlighted in the US 
context by Gusterson’s analysis of the nuclear laboratory6 and Cohn’s work 
on the defence professionals.7 What is most interesting for this research, 
indeed, is the role that civil society plays in the NPT struggle, because, as seen 
in Chapter Five, the foundations of governing activity are better understood 
in light of the attitudes and organisation of civil society. Only within civil 
society can hegemony be won, according to Gramsci, and similarly this thesis 
argues that it is there that we should look for the consent and contestation to 
the continued reliance on nuclear weapons. Civil society is involved in the 
																																																						
6	Hugh	Gusterson,	Nuclear	Rites:	A	Weapons	Laboratory	at	the	End	of	the	Cold	War.	
7	Carol	Cohn,	‘Sex	and	Death	in	the	Rational	World	of	Defense	Intellectuals.’		
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NPT process, though it differs greatly from Gramsci’s times – rather 
constituting the intellectual apparatus behind organised collective action. 
Such organisations (including NGOs, social movements, think tanks, 
concerned individuals) participate in great numbers in NPT RevCons, as seen 
in Chapter Six, and contribute their own assessment of the nuclear condition.  
Understanding these voices is not superfluous, because, following Gramsci, 
the subordinate bear the potential for transformation, if they are able to 
construct an alternative common sense and a solid historic bloc – in parallel, 
they can give more or less direct support to the dominant common sense thus 
reinforcing the operation of deterrence. While the great majority is in favour 
of disarmament, there appears to be a degree of internal variation. Nuclear-
free world, global zero, nuclear weapons abolition, the model convention – all 
of these have become general terms to refer to the prospect of eliminating the 
bomb. Scholars have quantitatively analysed the recurrence of such words,8 
but their qualitative examination remains lacking: what is actually meant by 
these terms and do they all represent the same idea? What ordering ideas 
underlie them? And what do these ideas do? Asking such questions can 
enlarge our understanding of nuclear governance because deconstructing the 
ideologies of civil society gives us a handle in understanding the most stable 
bases of nuclear thinking.  
Ideas are never neutral, and they do not exist away from intersubjective 
relations. Departing from the assumption that all theory ‘is always for 
																																																						
8	Moritz	 Kütt	 and	 Jens	 Steffek,	 ‘Comprehensive	 Prohibition	 of	 Nuclear	 Weapons:	 An	 Emerging	
International	Norm?,’	The	Nonproliferation	Review	22	no	3-4	(2015).	
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someone and for some purpose,’9 we are led to ask what is the aim of nuclear 
disarmament according to its supporters. The thesis has a critical core, as it 
takes issue with this unproblematic lumping together of different processes 
and political dynamics under the label of disarmament. At a minimum this 
thesis should show that terminological precision is important for this field 
and has not been consistently exercised. In addition, if the overarching 
argument of the thesis were accepted, one would think of nuclear identities as 
positioned on a continuum between regimes of disarmament and deterrence 
where the latter is hegemonic. The narratives of civil society at the NPT 
summits are useful in highlighting the existence of taken-for-granted 
deterrence theory reasoning even among this community of disarmament 
advocates. By demonstrating that a deterrence forma mentis is active even 
among civil society championing nuclear disarmament, we can indeed arrive 
to prove the common-sensical nature of deterrence, whose tropes are so 
widely accepted that they get incorporated in some of civil society’s 
articulations of the nuclear threat. 
 
 
7.1 Civil society frames at the 2015 NPT Review 
Conference 
This and the following chapter are set on demonstrating that there is a 
division within NPT-attending global civil society that derives from their 
																																																						
9	Robert	W.	 Cox,	 ‘Social	 Forces,	 States	 and	World	Orders:	 Beyond	 International	 Relations	 Theory,’	
128,	emphasis	in	original.	
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definitions of disarmament, considered a revolutionary project for some, and 
an incremental one for others. These two strategies, the abolitionist and the 
reductionist, which have been outlined at the end of Chapter Six, will be 
examined in turn as a way to understand the variation of approaches to 
disarmament. As highlighted in the previous chapters, this is a fundamental 
distinction among NPT state parties as well as within the civil society 
community that operates in that forum. Clearly every distinction illuminates 
some aspects while hiding others. However, the abolitionist-reductionist 
divide is particularly relevant, not just because of its historical operation, but 
also for its significance in the case of the 2015 NPT Review Conference, as 
this builds upon a wider cleavage in the governance of nuclear weapons that 
is hard to reconcile. 
The differences in narratives of disarmament will be examined with the aid of 
critical constructivist methods, developed for a very similar phenomenon. In 
his analysis of NGOs contesting environmental politics in Brazil, Matt 
McDonald looked in turn at four key elements that each construction of 
security defines: the security threat, the referent object of such threat, the 
agent of security, and the ways in which to realise security.	10 This is a useful 
guide to highlight the differences amongst the definitions, which will give us 
a crucial insight into the process of articulation of nuclear disarmament. Such 
a schemata, and the historical material analysis that will be necessary to trace 
the origins of the narratives of threat and of solution, will be crucial to 
account of the variance of approaches. Moreover, it will allow drawing 
conclusions on who is the subordinate party within that contest. 
																																																						
10	This	approach	is	broadly	similar	to	that	of	Matt	McDonald,	‘Discourses	of	Climate	Security,’	49.	
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The 2015 NPT RevCon discussion, in fact, has been dominated by a tension 
between two narratives that belong to the abolitionist and reductionist camp 
respectively: the ‘humanitarian’ and the ‘step-by-step’ proposals. Surely a 
series of other frames exist, either linked or unconnected to the two 
mentioned, but they have less relevance to the object of study than the two 
main ones. Step-by-step and humanitarian narratives, indeed, have been 
employed not only by various civil society actors, but also by the state parties 
to the NPT. In fact, they have been employed to such an extent that they had 
a pervasive effect on the conference itself, drawing a rift between the states 
and closing all options for consensual outcomes.11		The gulf between the two 
interpretations of the disarmament commitment could not be bridged, 
contributing to the unsuccessful outcome of the 2015 RevCon, which closed 
without a Final Document.12 This chapter will argue that those narratives are 
an expression of a wider fracture between abolitionist and reductionist 
approaches to nuclear disarmament, which can be evidenced among both 
attending states and civil society. 
This chapter focuses particularly on two paradigmatic examples to highlight 
the distinction between these two main orientations among civil society 
concerned with nuclear weapons: Global Zero and the International 
Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). The two are not to be seen as 
ideal-types of this division, rather as particularly indicative examples of a 
certain tendency which they help illustrate. In fact, they are expression of a 
wider division within that community, with groups such as the four 
																																																						
11	Oliver	Mayer,	‘The	2015	NPT	Review	Conference	Failure:	Implications	for	the	Nuclear	Order,’	SWP	
Working	Paper	4	(October	2015).	
12	Anthony	Burke,	‘Nuclear	Politics:	Beyond	Positivism,’	2.		
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horsemen and the European Leadership Network (ELN) falling in the former 
category and others like the coalition Abolition 2000 and groups like 
International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA) and 
Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) in the latter. Additional narratives 
that have been employed in the NPT context will be addressed and their 
relation with the step-by-step and the humanitarian discourses will be put in 
focus.  
 
 
7.2 The abolitionist camp and its disarmament frame 
This part will examine the discourse of the abolitionist camp of nuclear 
disarmament supporters by focusing on three of its main initiatives.  This 
community shares the view that eliminating nuclear weapons is an urgent 
necessity and that multilateral international law, in various forms, is the way 
to go about it. The three major groups in this category that have catalysed 
attention at the 2015 NPT RevCon are ICAN, Abolition 2000, and the 
Nuclear Zero lawsuit: 
1. The most important is certainly the campaign to abolish nuclear 
weapons launched by ICAN, which grouped more than 400 
organizations behind its call for a humanitarian ban on nuclear 
weapons.13  
																																																						
13	ICAN	website,	http://www.icanw.org/		(last	accessed	October	28,	2016).	
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2. Another interesting case is the Abolition 2000 network and its work 
for the negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention since the late 
1990s.14  
3. Finally, the Republic of the Marshall Islands’ lawsuits against nuclear 
possessor states was supported more or less directly by various parts 
of civil society.15  
 
All three initiatives have been rather present at the 2015 RevCon through the 
activities of various organisations. To briefly break them down, we can say 
that ICAN is a global campaign coalition of many civil society groups pushing 
for a treaty to outlaw and eliminate nuclear weapons. It was launched from a 
branch of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War 
(IPPNW) in 2007 and has progressively evolved into the main non-
governmental supporter of diplomatic process known as the Humanitarian 
Initiative. With an impressive number of delegates and a youthful 
communication, ICAN lobbies governments in capitals and at diplomatic 
meetings to gain their endorsement. ICAN also comprises prominent 
individuals and actively cooperates with like-minded states, but the basis of 
its campaign rationale has been the support for the Humanitarian Initiative.16 
It stressed that ‘[t]he catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons on our health, 
societies and the environment must be at the centre of all discussions about 
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.’17 
																																																						
14	Abolition	2000	website	http://www.abolition2000.org/		(last	accessed	October	25,	2016).	
15	Nuclear	Zero	website	http://www.nuclearzero.org/		(last	accessed	25	June	2016).	
16 	Magnus	 Løvold,	 Beatrice	 Fihn,	 and	 Thomas	 Nash,	 ‘Humanitarian	 Perspectives	 and	 the	
Campaign	for	 an	 International	 Ban	 on	 Nuclear	Weapons’	 in	Viewing	 Nuclear	Weapons	 Through	 a	
Humanitarian	Lens,	eds.	John	Borrie	and	Tim	Caughley	(New	York:	UN,	2013):	146.	
17	ICAN,	 ‘Catastrophic	 Humanitarian	 Harm,’	 booklet	 published	 in	 partnership	with	 Peace	 Boat	 and	
IPPNW,	 (August	 2012):	 1,	 http://www.icanw.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/CHH-Booklet-WEB-
2015.pdf		(last	accessed	23	October	2016).	
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Figure	2:	ICAN	sticker	and	card	
  
Certain civil society organisations had a prominent role in pushing this 
initiative in the NPT context, especially some of those that sit in ICAN’s 
International Steering Group. PAX launched Don’t Bank on the Bomb, a 
study on the financial institutions’ investments on nuclear weapons 
production. 18  Article 36 and Reaching Critical Will also had a few 
publications presented during the conference and the latter, despite being 
absent for the first week, published its daily summaries of the conference 
proceedings, the NPT News in Review.19 Reaching Critical Will is in charge of 
organising the room dedicated to civil society to make sure that all the groups 
that want to hold a side-event can do so, but they are also responsible for the 
special session dedicated to civil society. Unlike in previous years, in 2015 
this was a simple succession of organisation that had clearly not coordinated 
their speeches. 
																																																						
18	PAX,	Don’t	Bank	on	the	Bomb:	A	Global	Report	on	 the	Financing	of	Nuclear	Weapons	Producers,	
November	2015.	
19 	All	 the	 issues	 of	 the	 2015	 NPT	 News	 in	 Review	 are	 available	 online	 at	
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/npt/2015/nir	(last	accessed	7	July	2016).	
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Figure	3:	Hibakushas	at	the	Peace&Planet	march20	
 
As mentioned in Chapter Six, Abolition 2000 is a wide network of NGOs for 
nuclear disarmament from around the world that loosely coordinates around 
the NPT review process. The main activities conducted by Abolition 2000 
have been two big events: the International Peace and Planet Conference and 
Rally at the eve of the RevCon and the Abolition 2000 Annual General 
Meeting on the first Saturday. The former was a big event with hundreds of 
people marching through the streets of New York, with chants and paper 
cranes that the huge Japanese delegation handed out to bystanders. The 
latter, instead, always served for the abolitionist elements of civil society that 
attend the NPT to meet, network, and coordinate. Having attended both the 
Annual General Meeting in 2014 and the one in 2015, the author can attest 
there were many less participants in the latter. Moreover, the climate of 
																																																						
20	Photo	by	the	author,	New	York,	26	April	2016.	
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openness and mutual help seemed to recede somehow, as many participants 
appeared more interested in pushing their own proposal rather than 
engaging in a meaningful conversation. 
The third initiative is the so-called Nuclear Zero lawsuit, leadingly organised 
by Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (NAPF) and IALANA. The former has 
launched the initiative and the latter contributes to it thanks to its experience 
in the 1996 court case at the International Court of Justice. They organised 
four side events during the conference and have been only limitedly present. 
NAPF representatives flew home after attending the Abolition 2000 meeting, 
while IALANA’s John Burroughs remained longer, though less than in past 
times.  
These three initiatives are associated with three different recipes for nuclear 
disarmament: a ban, a convention, and a lawsuit. In order to understand 
what the abolitionist camp means by nuclear disarmament, attention will 
now be turned to the definition of the threat and of the response proposed by 
the afore-mentioned groups. As already noted, most of the analysis will focus 
on ICAN’s role within the humanitarian initiative given its importance in the 
review cycle under examination. 
 
7.2.1.1 Origins of the humanitarian discourse 
A brief look at the humanitarian discourse’s origin is now important to show 
what are the contours within which ICAN and other groups move. The 
humanitarian narrative was born in diplomatic circles already at the end of 
the 2000s, but it was in 2010 that it became a central NPT theme of debate, 
when it made its way into the Review Conference’s Final Document. In what 
	 253	
came to be regarded as a major turning point, the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) took a clear stance on nuclear disarmament just ahead 
of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. In the words of then-President of the 
ICRC, Jakob Kellenberger, the ‘currency of this debate must ultimately be 
about human beings, about the fundamental rules of international 
humanitarian law, and about the collective future of humanity.’21 It is the 
whole of humanity that should be the referent object of security and 
accordingly, so long as nuclear weapons exist human security cannot be 
guaranteed. Beyond explicitly introducing the theme of human suffering, the 
ICRC noted the lack of response capacity at the international level, in case of 
a nuclear weapons explosion.  
The following development was the 2010 NPT Review Conference, where a 
few states presented those same ideas in their statements. 
Two decades after the end of the Cold War, nuclear deterrence remains in 
the nuclear doctrines, with a considerable number of nuclear weapons ready 
for launch within minutes while thousands more remain stockpiled. The 
continued existence of defence policies based on nuclear weapons only 
serves to prolong this irresponsible gamble with the future of humanity.	22 
 Switzerland in particular opened its contribution to the conference calling 
disarmament the poor relative within the NPT and advocating a debate with 
humanitarian considerations at heart, beyond military and juridical 
considerations, questioning ‘at which point the right of States must yield to 
the interests of humanity.’	23 
																																																						
21	ICRC,	‘Bringing	the	era	of	nuclear	weapons	to	an	end,’	statement	by	Jakob	Kellenberger,	President	
of	the	ICRC	to	the	Geneva	Diplomatic	Corps,	Geneva,	April	20,	2010.	
22	Switzerland,	‘Opening	Statement	at	the	2010	NPT	Review	Conference,’”	delivered	by	the	Minister	
of	 Foreign	 Affairs,	 H.E.	 Mrs.	 Micheline	 Calmy-Rey,	 May	 3,	 2010,	
http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/statements/pdf/switzeland_fr.pdf	 (last	 accessed	 22	 October	
2016),	6.	
23	Ibid.,	7-8.	
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This preoccupation was reflected by many more delegations throughout the 
conference and language to that end was introduced in the Final Document.24 
Adopted by consensus and containing a series of measures to move forward 
on disarmament, non-proliferation, and peaceful uses, the text included an 
explicit humanitarian reference.  
The Conference, while welcoming achievements in bilateral and unilateral 
reductions by some nuclear-weapon States, notes with concern that the total 
estimated number of nuclear weapons deployed and stockpiled still 
amounts to several thousands. The Conference expresses its deep concern at 
the continued risk for humanity represented by the possibility that these 
weapons could be used and the catastrophic humanitarian consequences 
that would result from the use of nuclear weapons […] and reaffirms the 
need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, 
including international humanitarian law.25 
These few words catalysed a little revolution in NPT language as it was 
followed by the start of parallel diplomatic discussion process and the 
humanitarian discourse gaining wider international support between the 
2010 and 2015 RevCons. Indeed, three international Conferences on the 
Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons (HINW) were held – in Oslo in 
2013 and in 2014 first in Nayarit, Mexico and later in Vienna. At these events, 
convened by the host states, governmental and non-governmental 
representatives participated in fact-based discussion on the effects of nuclear 
arms. With the exception of India and Pakistan, the nuclear-armed (both the 
NWS legitimated by the NPT and not) decided not to attend the first or the 
second conference, which saw, however, an overwhelming participation of 
																																																						
24 	2010	 Review	 Conference	 of	 the	 Parties	 to	 the	 Treaty	 on	 the	 Non-Proliferation	 of	 Nuclear	
Weapons,	Final	Document	(New	York,	2010)	NPT/CONF.2010/50	(Vol.	I):	12	and	19.		
25	Support	for	the	humanitarian	initiative	went	from	the	35	states	that	signed	up	to	a	joint	statement	
to	the	First	Committee	of	the	UN	General	Assembly	in	2012	to	the	155	of	2014.		
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NNWS, the non-nuclear weapon states. The US and the UK have since 
participated in the one in Austria.26 
At the first HINW conference, organized by the Norwegian Government in 
March 2013, 128 states participated along with UN agencies, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent, experts, and civil 
society representatives. ICAN was invited by Norway to be its main civil 
society partner and since all the successive HINW conferences have been 
preceded by a civil society conference organised by ICAN.  
The conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons have 
provided stark and irrefutable evidence that nuclear weapons cause death 
and displacement on a catastrophic scale, with profound and potentially 
irreversible damage to health and the environment, to socioeconomic 
development, and to the social order. No state or international body could 
adequately address the immediate consequences by nuclear weapon 
detonations.27 
Both in Nayarit and Vienna, discussion has centred on scientific evidence of 
what nuclear explosions would do in today’s world. In Vienna participation 
grew to 158 states, but most importantly Austria took the lead in delivering 
the so-called ‘Austrian pledge’.28 It committed to bring the humanitarian 
discussion of the three HINW conferences to the NPT and other UN fora and 
called on all states parties ‘to identify and pursue effective measures to fill the 
legal gap for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons’.29 This 
document was presented at the 2015 RevCon, and it would gain the spotlight 
																																																						
26	Kennette	Benedict,	‘Should	governments	be	allowed	to	endanger	their	citizens	by	keeping	nuclear	
weapons?,’	Bulletin	of	the	Atomic	Scientists,	December	4,	2014.	
27 	ICAN,	 ‘Principles	 of	 	 Treaty	 Banning	 Nuclear	 Weapons,’	 ICAN	 flyer,	 2015,	
http://www.icanw.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/principles-2.pdf	 (last	 accessed	 23	 October	
2016).	
28	Austrian	Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs,	 ‘Austrian	 Pledge’,	 Vienna	 Conference	 on	 the	 Humanitarian	
Impact	 of	 Nuclear	 Weapons,	 December	 8-9,	 2014,	
http://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/HINW
14_Austrian_Pledge.pdf	(last	accessed	26	October	2016).	
29	Ibid.		
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when it was opened for other states’ endorsement – renamed humanitarian 
pledge, it would gain 159 supporters.30 The initiative has indeed come a long 
way since the 16 states that gave a joint statement on the catastrophic 
humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons at the 2012 PrepCom. 
 
7.2.2 The threat: all nukes 
The risk that the humanitarian initiative seeks to address derives from 
nuclear weapons existence as such, because of the catastrophic effects that 
their use would have for people everywhere. ‘Their destructive power is so 
vast that its effects won’t stop at national borders.’31 ‘The effects of nuclear 
weapons cannot be controlled in space or time. Their existence anywhere is a 
threat to people everywhere,’32 reads an ICAN publication. The specificity of 
the humanitarian discourse is to maintain that the consequences of a nuclear 
weapons explosion are ‘significantly graver than it was understood in the 
past.’33 In fact, its supporters have emphasised newly produced research 
showing that environmental and health consequences have not been 
thoroughly accounted for. Examples of this include Mary Olson’s work 
demonstrating that females are more affected than males by radiation 
exposure as well as the IPPNW data on the famine that would follow a 
																																																						
30	By	 the	 end	 of	 the	 conference,	 159	 NPT	 states	 parties	 had	 subscribed	 to	 it,	 over	 80%	 of	 its	
membership.	
31	ICAN,	 “It’s	 Time	 to	 have	 the	 Courage	 to	 Ban	 Nuclear	 Weapons,”	 YouTube,	 December	 8,	 2014,	
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q7-gE25dEbg	(last	accessed	27	October	2016).	
32	ICAN,	‘Catastrophic	Humanitarian	Harm,’	2.	
33	Austrian	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs,	‘Austrian	Pledge’.	
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nuclear exchange.34 What is more, supporters of the initiative have pointed 
out the lack of an adequate response capacity: a ‘nuclear attack anywhere in 
the world would overwhelm the health infrastructure, making an effective 
humanitarian response impossible.’35 
Accordingly, nuclear weapons explosions are the main threat, but the ‘danger 
of nuclear weapons arises from their very existence,’36 because, even when 
they are not used, bombs produce security, environmental, and economic 
harms. Deaths from cancer will continue being the ‘legacy of nuclear testing’ 
for decades to come, while the ‘production of the explosive materials used in 
all nuclear weapons – highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium – is 
harmful to human health and the environment.’37 A further reason why the 
threat of nuclear weapons is illegitimate, according to ICAN, is the diversion 
of public resources it generates, especially as modernisation programmes are 
carried out across the nuclear-armed states.38  
 The problem for this frame is not of acquisition by terrorists and rogue 
states, but possession as such – thus ICAN’s affirmation: ‘When it comes to 
nuclear weapons, there are no safe hands.’ 39  Such critique refuses the 
assumption that there are any security benefits deriving from the bomb, as 
much strategic studies literature has put forward, insisting instead that 
morality should ground a nuclear-free choice. As such, it has contested a 
																																																						
34	The	 former	 was	 discussed	 in	 a	 side	 event	 titled	 ‘Gender	 and	 nuclear	 weapons’	 organised	 by	
Ireland,	Austria,	Costa	Rica,	Denmark,	Sweden,	and	Trinidad	and	Tobago	on	5	May	2015,	the	latter	at	
the	IPPNW	side	event,	‘Nuclear	famine	and	the	ban	treaty:	how	prohibiting	and	eliminating	nuclear	
weapons	can	prevent	a	climate	disaster,’	April	28,	2015.	
35	ICAN,	‘Catastrophic	Humanitarian	Harm,’	15.	
36	Ibid.,	2.	
37	Ibid.,	17-8.	(last	accessed	26	October	2016).	
38	Ray	Acheson,	ed.	Assuring	Destruction	Forever:	2014	Edition	 (New	York:	Reaching	Critical	Will	of	
the	Women’s	International	League	for	Peace	and	Freedom,	2014)	
39 	ICAN,	 ‘Arguments	 for	 nuclear	 abolition,’	 ICAN	 website,	 http://www.icanw.org/why-a-
ban/arguments-for-a-ban/	(last	accessed	26	October	2016).	
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series of myths about nuclear weapons, among others: (1) being essential for 
security, (2) having kept peace since World War II, and (3) the legitimacy of 
possession by certain states.40 ‘The humanitarian discourse has placed the 
spotlight on the illegitimacy of possessing nuclear weapons and perpetuating 
the concept of nuclear deterrence.’41 
In reality the humanitarian frame is not new, as this Bertrand Russell quote 
shows: ‘The peril involved in nuclear war is one which affects all mankind 
and one, therefore, in which the interests of all mankind are at one.’42 
Caughley traces the origins of the same preoccupation for the safety of 
humanity in the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use in warfare of 
chemical and biological weapons, but even earlier in the 1868 St. Petersburg 
Declaration, which outlawed the use of weapons and projectiles capable of 
inflicting unnecessary suffering.43 Even more interesting is the fact that this 
preoccupation is stated in the preamble paragraph that opens the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty:44  
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a 
nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger 
of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples”.45  
																																																						
40	ICAN,	 ‘Nuclear	 Weapons	 Myth	 Buster,’	 ICAN	 flyer	 (2015),	 http://uk.icanw.org/action/nuclear-
weapons-myth-buster/	(last	accessed	23	October	2016).	
41	Ray	 Acheson,	 ‘Editorial:	 Humanitarian	 incantations,’	 First	 Committee	Monitor,	 no	 3,	 October	 26,	
2015,	 http://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/FCM15/FCM-
2015-No3.pdf	(last	accessed	23	October	2016).	
42	Bertrand	Russell,	Common	Sense	and	Nuclear	Warfare,	1.	
43	Tim	 Caughley,	 ‘Humanitarian	 Impacts	 of	 Nuclear	Weapons:	 Tracing	 Notions	 about	 Catastrophic	
Humanitarian	Consequences,’	in	Viewing	Nuclear	Weapons	Through	a	Humanitarian	Lens,	eds.	John	
Borrie	and	Tim	Caughley	(Geneva:	UNIDIR,	2013).	
44	Ibid.		
45	Treaty	on	the	Non-Proliferation	of	Nuclear	Weapons,	emphasis	added.	
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Surprisingly, this was lost on more than one delegation at the 2015 RevCon, 
given that some protested the inclusion of a similar sentence in the draft 
report from Main Committee 1 that was discussed on 10 May 2015. 
Rather than being a totally new idea, the humanitarian frame results from 
inserting new ideas within a more traditional pro-disarmament argument.46 
The 1996 Canberra Report is a good example of the shift from a national 
security to a human security perspective.47 Also, the research institute on 
disarmament under the UN umbrella, UNIDIR, has worked since 2000 on 
the relationship between human security and disarmament. They have 
concluded that ‘[t]hinking at the human scale—in terms of human security 
and humanitarian approaches—and not just at the scale of states was seen to 
be a promising new dynamic for multilateral approaches’.48 Humanitarian 
concerns have in fact been prominent, to a greater or lesser extent, in the 
negotiation of all the most recent multilateral agreements prohibiting 
weapons or activities connected to them, from the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mines 
Ban Convention to the 2008 Cluster Munitions Conventions, and even in the 
2013 Arms Trade Treaty. The same process of grafting identified by Price49 is 
being employed now by ICAN and other supporters of abolition to criticise 
the hypocrisy of having banned less dangerous weapons and disregarded 
atomic ones. Yet, the governance of nuclear weapons, for all its variety, has 
generally rested on national rather than human security so far, making such 
process of grafting a challenging one. 
																																																						
46	Markus	Kornprobst	and	Martin	Senn,	‘A	Rhetorical	Field	Theory:	Background,	Communication,	and	
Change,’	The	British	Journal	of	Politics	and	International	Relations	18	no	2	(2016).	
47	Canberra	Commission	on	the	Elimination	of	Nuclear	Weapons,	Report	of	the	Canberra	Commission	
on	the	Elimination	of	Nuclear	Weapons	(Australian	Department	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	Trade,	1996).	
48	Tim	 Caughley,	 ‘Humanitarian	 Impacts	 of	 Nuclear	Weapons:	 Tracing	 Notions	 about	 Catastrophic	
Humanitarian	Consequences,’	23.	
49	Price,	‘Reversing	the	Gun	Sight.’	
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Figure	4:	ICAN	and	the	Nuclear	Weapons	Ban	on	Twitter50	
 
 
As we have seen, the representation of the nuclear danger according to the 
abolitionists rests upon the possibility, intentionally or accidentally, to launch 
an atomic bomb. It follows that the agents of this threat are the states armed 
with nuclear weapons, the only ones with the capacity to unleash their 
destructive consequences. Furthermore, another category of states has been 
identified as central in the production of nuclear danger, as vividly illustrated 
by Wildfire>_, the satirical blog run by former diplomat Richard Lennane. As 
his title of Chief Inflammatory Officer lets on, the organisation is a very 
critical voice newly added to the abolitionist camp, which does not shy away 
																																																						
50	This	 is	 the	 ‘pinned	 tweet,’	 or	 the	 post	 given	 most	 visibility	 by	 @nuclearban,	 the	 official	 ICAN	
Twitter	account,	https://twitter.com/nuclearban	(last	accessed	26	October	2016).	
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from very radical proposals, as attested by his side event titled ‘Burn the NPT’ 
at the 2014 PrepCom. Supporting the ban and opposing any procrastination, 
Wildfire>_’s jokes and caricatures have spared almost nobody in the nuclear 
community, but have been particularly virulent against a category of states: 
the ‘weasels.’  
Figure	5:	The	Weasel,	Wildfire>_	flyer51	
 
																																																						
51	Wildfire>_,	 Weasel	 flyer,	 http://www.wildfire-v.org/Weasel_flyer.pdf	 (last	 accessed	 26	 October	
2016).	
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With its mock arrest warrants for weasels, Wildfire>_ contributed to raising 
attention around those states that benefit from extended deterrence even 
without having the weapons themselves. The weasel is further defined as a 
‘party to the NPT which is technically a non-nuclear weapon state but is in an 
alliance with one or more nuclear-weapon states and relies on nuclear 
weapons in its national security doctrine; a purveyor of double standards, a 
hypocrite.’52 While most in the civil society community would never use 
similar words, the term weasel has spread between 2014 and 2015, as has the 
blame received by nuclear umbrella states. 
The referent object of the threat, in turn, is ‘each and every citizen of our 
interconnected world,’53 according to the Humanitarian Pledge. It is the 
whole of humanity that would be hit by nuclear weapons destruction and is 
affected everyday by the dangerous practices relating to their existence. A 
case in point here is the Nuclear Zero lawsuit, which made of an entire nation 
a nuclear victim. ‘The Republic of the Marshall Islands acts for the seven 
billion of us who live on this planet to end the nuclear weapons threat 
hanging over all humanity.’54 The country suffered a total of 67 atmospheric 
nuclear tests between 1946 and 1958.55  
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Recounting personal experiences of nuclear suffering is symbolic in NPT 
circles, where the nuclear survivors stop being an imagined essence and 
acquire physical reality. We can see this in the massive applause at Foreign 
Minister Tony de Brum’s opening address, in which he told his own story of 
assisting to the Castle Bravo test from a fishing trip with his grandfather.56 
Further attestation of this is represented by the massive numbers of 
hibakushas who flock to the UN on the occasion of the RevCons (and more 
limitedly for PrepComs and other meetings) in order to voice their call for 
nuclear disarmament. Though they are not all survivors, Japanese have been 
the largest nationality for civil society delegates in 2015. 57  In addition, 
Mayors for Peace organised a photo exhibition in the UN lobby, with pictures 
of the effects of the bombings on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. All these have 
been attempts at catalysing the emotional reaction to human suffering.  
All in all, the humanitarian frame proposed by ICAN identifies all nuclear 
weapons explosions as the gravest threat motivating nuclear disarmament 
and all of humanity as the community at risk. Substantially equal is the 
position of other abolitionist groups like Abolition 2000. Nuclear weapons 
are thus represented as an inherent risk with no positive sides or potential 
exceptions, because the extent of their consequences for humanity makes 
them illegitimate. After having examined the abolitionist representation of 
the nuclear threat, we will now turn to its construction of the response. 
 
																																																						
56	Permanent	Mission	of	the	Republic	of	the	Marshall	Islands	to	the	United	Nations,	General	Debate	
address	by	Tony	de	Brum,	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs,	‘9th	Review	Conference	of	the	States	Parties	to	
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7.2.3 The response: To ban or not to ban? 
To describe the humanitarian response, we should take the words of 
Ambassador Alexander Kmentt, both because of Vienna’s leading role and for 
his own stature. The Austrian diplomat in charge of the disarmament dossier 
is what could be defined a rock star of the disarmament movement, having 
been even chosen by an online poll to be awarded the title of “Arms Control 
Person of the Year”.58 His speeches, often off-the-cuff ones, have been loudly 
applauded from the civil society seats at the NPT RevCon. If the risk inherent 
with the bomb is one of use, Kmentt affirmed that ‘elimination is the only 
responsible way to eliminate the risk.’59 ICAN’s position, however, is slightly 
different: ‘[e]liminating nuclear weapons – via a comprehensive treaty – is 
the only guarantee against their use.’60 If both agree that elimination is 
crucial, ICAN adds that this should be achieved via a treaty; using the 
brackets, however, makes the ban appear as simply a specification of the 
general policy recommendation, while betraying an attempt to make a 
specific suggestion pass as general.  
ICAN believes that the ‘most effective, expeditious and practical way to 
achieve and sustain the abolition of nuclear weapons’ would be a universal 
ban.61 ICAN's Asia-Pacific Director, Tim Wright, wrote that ‘[o]ver the past 
year, 122 nations have formally pledged to work together to prohibit nuclear 
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weapons through a new treaty.’62 However, 'a new treaty' is not the favoured 
route for all supporters of the humanitarian approach and this tends to fuel 
confusion within the abolitionist community. While ICAN has been trying to 
persuade others of the utility of a ban, it encountered resistance, as civil 
society itself appears divided on this issue. ICAN’s idea of the ban differs 
from the Nuclear Weapons Convention promoted by Abolition 2000, which 
previewed negotiations among NWS setting timelines and procedures for 
elimination.  
ICAN, to the contrary, proposes to negotiate a treaty to ban and eliminate 
atomic weapons ‘even if the nuclear-armed states refuse to participate.’63 This 
is seen by members of the coalition as an affirmation of power in the face of 
the NWS’ opposition, as stated by an ICAN representative, who made the 
point that the ban cannot be ‘dependent upon their participation or we give 
them power and nothing will happen.’ 64  Contrary to Abolition 2000 
experience with drafting the Nuclear Weapons Convention, ICAN did not get 
involved with drafting the text of their proposed legal instrument. As 
explained at an ICAN campaigners’ meeting by Ray Acheson, who sits on the 
organisations’ International Steering Group, this has both internal and 
external motivations: on the one side, the organisations supporting the ban 
																																																						
62	Tim	Wright,	 ‘In	Nuclear	Diplomacy,	Double	Standards	Abound,’	New	Matilda,	February	11,	2016,	
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do not want to be constrained by a set text, on the other they fear that states 
would not appreciate a treaty handed over by civil society.65  
Interestingly, for the main organisation behind the ban movement, ICAN 
initially maintained its foremost ‘goal has been to strengthen political 
support for the negotiation of a Nuclear Weapons Convention without further 
delay.’66 As a long-time activist candidly admits, she used to believe that NWS 
needed to be involved for a proposal to be meaningful, but she has since 
changed her mind.67 These converts, so to speak, even include some of the 
‘founding mothers’ of the Abolition 2000 statement, who turned into eager 
supporters of ICAN because of the potential seen in its distinctive approach 
and in the empowerment of the NNWS.68  
Side-lining the NWS is an expression of that frustration with the lack of 
disarmament progress that exploded particularly after the end of the Cold 
War. According to ICAN, non-nuclear weapon states can contribute to 
disarmament, because it aims to replicate the example of the convention to 
ban anti-personnel landmines. That was negotiated among and initially 
entered into force for the states for whom it was acceptable, but created 
pressure on the holdouts to agree to the new norm. The idea is that the 
nuclear predicament is similar to a situation in which a ban on smoking can 
be established: ‘if you leave it up to the smokers there is never going to be a 
smoking ban.’69 
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For all the Abolition 2000 insistence on the model nuclear weapons 
convention, on the one hand, and of ICAN on the ban treaty, on the other, it 
is crucial to note that the association of elimination and a single multilateral 
legal instrument is not a necessary one. In the 2015 RevCon this point was 
aired by the New Agenda Coalition, moreover, in a working paper seeking ‘to 
elucidate the legal approaches capable of advancing “effective measures” with 
a view to facilitating a meaningful exchange as well as decision-making’.70 
The group identified four main options: 
1. A comprehensive nuclear-weapon convention 
2. A nuclear-weapon-ban treaty 
3. A framework agreement comprising mutually supporting instruments 
4. A hybrid arrangement. 
Even other organisations that have been active in the humanitarian initiative 
do not share the programmatic focus on the ban. ILPI, the Norwegian 
international law think tank, for instance, is ‘agnostic on the ban.’71 They do 
co-organise events with ICAN and are on the same page ideologically if not 
practically. Other initiatives, moreover, have sought to mobilise multilateral 
UN fora on these matters, particularly under the leadership of Alyn Ware, 
thus undertaking a completely different route. 
Yet another legal avenue was the already-mentioned series of court cases 
opened by the Republic of the Marshall Islands at the ICJ against all states 
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holding nuclear arms, and in San Francisco against the United States.	72 At 
the 2014 NPT PrepCom, taking most by surprise,73  the delegate of the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands announced that his country had sued the 
nuclear powers for their failure to disarm.74 Building upon the disarmament 
commitment enshrined in the 1996 Advisory Opinion, NPT Article VI, and 
customary law, the tiny archipelagic state, which was used to conduct 
atmospheric nuclear tests, wants the nuclear-armed to fulfil their 
obligation. 75  It is asking for a declaratory judgment on the breach of 
obligation to negotiation of disarmament, cessation of the arms race, and 
performance of duty under the NPT in good faith.		
This is surely related to the initiative to ban the bomb, but the action and 
forum chosen to stimulate that change differ. As for other recent initiatives 
by this community, it is NNWS that are expected to hold the agency needed. 
In this case, more specifically, it is those who have been victims of nuclear 
weapons. Recalling his country and his own personal experience of 
witnessing the devastation of nuclear testing, Foreign Minister Tony de Brum 
spoke at the 2014 PrepCom of the legal claims that were publicly announced 
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shortly before.76 He also observed: ‘because we have experienced directly the 
effects of nuclear weapons we felt that we had the mandate to do what we 
have done.’77 According to this view, non-nuclear weapon states that have 
been victims of the armaments’ destructive effects have a special place in this 
conundrum, as the ones with a legitimate claim to make against their use and 
possession. The responsibility to take the measures to disarm is certainly of 
the NWS, but the NNWS can hold them accountable to what they committed 
as well as stigmatize their behaviour. 
 
7.2.4 Summary 
Here a few differences and similarities among the abolitionist community of 
global nuclear civil society will be outlined. 
Table	2:	Disarmament	discourses	by	abolitionists	
	 ICAN	 Abolition	2000	 Nuclear	Zero	
Risk	 Nuclear	weapons	
use	
Nuclear	weapons	
use	
Nuclear	weapons	
use	
Referent	object	 Humanity	 Humanity	 Victims		
Agent	of	threat	 Nuclear	possessors	 Nuclear	possessors	 Nuclear	possessors	
Collective	action	
requested	
Ban	treaty	 Nuclear	weapons	
convention	
ICJ	ruling	
Agent	of	response	 NNWS	 NWS	 NNWS	
Characterisation	of	
disarmament	
Necessary	 Necessary	 Lawful	
The table above shows how nuclear disarmament is conceptualised by the 
main campaigns or organisations in the abolitionist camp: ICAN, Abolition 
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2000, and Nuclear Zero. All three of them share the same assessment of the 
type of risk deriving from nuclear weapons, namely the eventuality of nuclear 
war, or any other use; this makes states in possession of nuclear arms the 
greatest agent of the nuclear threat according to abolitionist organisations. 
Crucially the referent object of security according to all three and more 
markedly for ICAN is humanity, in a radical cosmopolitan departure from the 
national security paradigm. All of them want to get to a disarmed end-state, 
where no country possessed nuclear weapons, however, they differ on the 
kind of collective action advocated. For ICAN it consists in a ban treaty and 
for Abiolition 2000 in a nuclear weapons convention, with the crucial 
difference here lying in the agent of such response: NNWS for the former and 
NWS according to the latter. The third option, provided by Nuclear Zero, is to 
make disarmament possible through a ruling of the ICJ.  
All three approaches can be firmly established within the disarmament 
regime of nuclear weapons governance, as has been laid out in Chapter 
Three. In the case of ICAN and others, nuclear abolition is ‘an urgent 
humanitarian necessity.’78 It is a total elimination of deterrence relationships 
that this camp advocates and does not foresee any security role for nuclear 
arms. According to this camp, all those who benefit from the bomb are to be 
opposed, though ICAN is not interested in engaging with them, contrary to 
Abolition 2000. This discussion, in fact, has shown how even closely related 
nuclear narratives bear important differences which have made it impossible 
for the abolitionist camp to speak with one single voice. The discursive 
material used for the humanitarian narrative is drawn from the classical 
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disarmament activism dictionary that, with many ups and downs, has been 
rearticulated since the late 1940s, but merges it with ideas about human 
security that had their golden age in the 1990s. 
In sum, there is a degree of internal variety among abolitionist proponents, 
though all share the view that the threat of nuclear weapons regards all 
possible explosions and the potential risk for all of humanity. Thus, the 
response advocated is a comprehensive legal prohibition of varying nature. In 
the next section we will look instead at the reductionist strategies. 
 
 
7.3 The reductionist camp and its disarmament frame 
The reductionists stand in contrast to the abolitionists, often considered 
idealists, heirs of the peace movement and hippy culture. Instead, these 
groups announce: ‘[w]e’re not tilting at windmills. We’ve got a plan.’79  If the 
abolitionist is a rather unsurprising community of nuclear disarmers, this 
section will make the case that the reductionist camp is much more puzzling, 
because of its merging of anti-nuclear and state-centric tropes. This is a 
community of civil society representatives wanting to appear more 
‘pragmatic’ than the abolitionists, and thus using images of realism like 
above. They tend to propose agreements that can be implemented in the 
short term. For more far-reaching undertakings, they believe, the time is not 
yet ripe, but could become if enough of those intermediate measures were in 
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place. A prominent think tank representative in Washington clarified to the 
author that he was not an idealist, one who wanted zero nuclear weapons, but 
rather a pragmatist, someone who just sees it as a goal and wants to work 
with what can be achieved at the moment.80  
The reductionist camp is somehow more undefined than the abolitionist one. 
Moreover, many such groups have an international outlook but are heavily 
US-based and centre their activities in Washington, DC, where they perceive 
political change is easier to instigate. Typically their priorities are reducing 
nuclear weapons, increasing non-proliferation efforts, optimizing national 
security spending, and halting the spread of biological and chemical 
weapons.81 Global Zero is one of the few organisations based in the US capital 
that are able or willing to operate transnationally, one major delimitation of 
this research. Yet, as for most of those American groups, the NPT is not the 
main focus of its activities.82 In effect, Global Zero is rather disengaged from 
the broader arms control community, as several of them reported that its 
members do not tend to participate in nuclear events held either in 
Washington or in New York.  
Given that there are significantly less groups and individuals from the 
reductionist camp that attend the NPT review process, most of the attention 
in the ensuing section will be devoted to Global Zero. In addition, a few more 
institutions will be mentioned here, like the Arms Control Association, 
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Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and the European Leadership Network, 
all of which can be generally traced to the reductionist approach. 
Global Zero was founded in 2008 by Bruce Blair and Matt Brown. There was 
a feeling, according to some organisers, that ‘it was time to generate a new 
movement to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons’.83 In its 2009 Action 
Plan proposal for nuclear disarmament,84 the movement made clear that 
Global Zero is an ‘effort formed in response to the growing threats of 
proliferation and nuclear terrorism and dedicated to achieving the phased, 
verified elimination of all nuclear weapons.’85 Two things emerge from this 
quote: firstly, that the reason behind Global Zero’s formation is the threat of 
nuclear acquisition by other countries or terrorist organisations; and 
secondly, that the way to get to the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons is 
through a series of phases, or steps, as will be discussed in the following 
sections. This concern with reductions and a general gradualist strategy are 
indeed what distinguishes Global Zero and many reductionists. 
The policy focus of Global Zero at the NPT in 2015 was on de-alerting, or 
measures to reduce the ability to launch nuclear weapons quickly. It did so 
with initiatives both élite-oriented and grassroots-focused to raise attention 
on the issue, reflecting the duality of its approach. Regarding the former, 
Global Zero has a strong focus on high-level support by so-called ‘movement 
leaders’ comprising Jimmy Carter and Mikhail Gorbachev as well as former 
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foreign ministers, ambassadors, military officers, etc.	86 Global Zero leaders 
met with Russian and American Presidents and one of them – Chuck Hagel – 
even became US Secretary of Defence.87 The presence of high-level figures 
has made the organisation famous and their side-events very well attended, 
as was the case for the launch of their latest report, which was chaired by 
retired General James Cartwright. As we will see, the participation of 
important establishment figures is crucial for reductionists. 
Concerning the grassroots, in 2015 Global Zero brought one of the largest 
NGO delegations to the RevCon. They participated in only few days of the 
conference, but were an impressive amount of young people, sporting Global 
Zero t-shirts and very organised. Over one day they came to speak in smaller 
groups with members of key delegations to brief them about the Global Zero 
recommendations. They also organised an act of ‘guerrilla visual action’: at 
night-time on May 3, they projected a huge rubber duck in crosshairs over 
the side of the UN Secretariat’s building, with the caption ‘We’re all sitting 
ducks #NPT2015’.88  
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Figure	6:	Global	Zero	visual	demonstration,	New	York,	3	May	201589	
 
With quite different means, Global Zero has thus brought yet a different 
perspective to the 2015 NPT RevCon. The organisation’s discourse on nuclear 
weapons’ threat and response will be put forward while analysing its 
rhetorical origins. To do that, the nuclear security narrative will firstly be 
fleshed out, as it shows that the diagnosis of the risk of Global Zero and 
others substantially coincides with second-nuclear-age preoccupation 
overviewed in Chapter Two. Moreover, the NPT step-by-step narrative will be 
evoked to highlight the nature of the response advocated. 
 
7.3.1.1 Origins of the nuclear security discourse 
The post-Cold War strategic situation brought former officials to join the 
crowd of anti-nuclear activists in arguing for disarmament. Previously a 
supporter of rational models of deterrence, Robert McNamara stated, with 
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the 1996 Canberra Commission, that ‘immediate and determined efforts need 
to be made to rid the world of nuclear arms and the threat they pose to it.’90 
Instances of former élites voicing opposition to the retention of nuclear 
weapons were not unprecedented, as the case of General Lee Butler 
demonstrates, but they were never heard as clearly as in 2007 with the 
previously mentioned four horsemen initiative. The emergence of a 
bipartisan group of men who had held very prominent decision-making 
positions was a significant development as were the names of those involved: 
George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. This widely 
cited op-ed argued for the elimination of all nuclear weapons on the grounds 
that their deterrent potential is no longer useful for dealing with terrorist 
organisations and new nuclear states that have not been socialised in nuclear 
relationships like the Soviet Union and the US were.  
It is far from certain that we can successfully replicate the old Soviet-
American ‘mutually assured destruction’ with an increasing number of 
potential nuclear enemies world-wide without dramatically increasing the 
risk that nuclear weapons will be used.91 
All the attention that has been given by civil society to the nuclear security 
project shows the pervasiveness of the new discourse, introduced mostly by 
US officials as early as the Clinton administration and consistently restated 
under the presidency of both George W. Bush and Barak Obama. Deterring 
proliferation of nuclear weapons to rogue states and terrorists was the whole 
rationale of the 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
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Destruction.92 This was the time of the ‘axis of evil’ speech, which singled out 
certain states as an international security threat in light of their involvement 
in WMD programs while being associated with terrorism at one level or 
another. Such was the justification for the Bush strategy of preventive 
military intervention put in practice in Iraq in 2003, which saw the addition 
of the new tool of counter-proliferation to the most traditional non-
proliferation approach.93 If counter-proliferation opened the way to the use of 
force, what mostly characterised it was the interdiction on transfers of 
weapons, equipment, or delivery vehicles and export control mechanisms 
have indeed come to the centre of the regulatory system.94 Examples of 
export controls include the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group. 
While the Bush years are generally considered to have been quite radical in 
their legitimation of military means for the maintenance of the nuclear order, 
the arrival of Barak Obama at the White House represented a return to 
multilateralism and international diplomacy. Like the four horsemen, Obama 
was also committed to a world free of nuclear weapons on the premise of a 
decreased utility for national security. Indeed, though in his 2009 Prague 
speech, he stated ‘clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek 
the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons,’95 though he 
added the caveat that it might not happen during his lifetime. Surely this 
more liberal approach has worked in the case of Iran, reaching a deal to curb 
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its nuclear capabilities in 2015, but it is still unclear how substantial was the 
change between the two Presidents. Beyond a more respectful attitude 
towards the NPT than George W. Bush had and further arms control progress 
with Russia, Obama’s policy remained based upon the reliance on the nuclear 
arsenal. 
Indeed, the same preoccupation with terrorists and potential proliferators 
remained the top national security priority in the Obama administration’s 
strategic documents. The National Security Strategy of 2010 affirms that 
‘there is no greater threat to the American people than weapons of mass 
destruction, particularly the danger posed by the pursuit of nuclear weapons 
by violent extremists and their proliferation to additional states.’96  
As said, Obama’s approach significantly differed from that of Bush in 
rejecting the latter’s reliance on unilateralism and the unforthcoming nature 
of his diplomacy. To revamp Washington’s image as a supporter of 
international cooperation Obama worked to take a leading role in the 
discussion of nuclear issues. It is in this context that we can read the launch 
of the Nuclear Security Summits. While his Prague speech is remembered for 
his aforementioned disarmament commitment, he then also announced an 
‘international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the 
world within four years.’	97 If on the former aim his record is certainly lagging 
if not lacking, the latter objective has seen practical movement, demonstrated 
by the fact that since then four Nuclear Security Summits, or NSS, have been 
held: in Washington in 2010, Seoul in 2012, The Hague in 2014, and again 
Washington in 2016. 
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Bush had succeeded in 2004 to get the UN Security Council to adopt 
Resolution 1540 for the imposition of measures against the transfer of WMD 
and their materials to non-state actors, which identifies the state as the only 
legitimate holder of WMDs. In the same year the Global Threat Reduction 
Initiative was established, with a mission ‘to reduce and protect vulnerable 
nuclear and radiological material located at civilian sites worldwide’98 – 
despite being a national structure. This only confirmed the Bush 
administration’s reliance on non-inclusive agreements backed on the 
international arena by the most powerful states. Instead, Obama’s framework 
wanted to represent a larger constituency in an effort to cover most of the 
nuclear-fuel possessing states. However, even this was an exclusionary effort, 
as demonstrated by the fact that Iran, despite its significant nuclear program, 
has not been invited to any of the four rounds of NSS meetings. ‘Well, I think 
we make the invitations,’99 the author was told by a Washington think tank 
representative when trying to understand why that was the case. 
Nuclear security, however, is not just a strategy of the United States; rather it 
has come to constitute a more general discourse spread and accepted by 
other countries. What the four rounds of NSS have accomplished is to make 
more states cognisant of the need to ensure protection of their nuclear 
materials, and in some cases also the conclusion of voluntary agreements for 
securing them. In addition, it has become increasingly common to refer to 
the nuclear security regime as a component or even an addition to the non-
proliferation regime. It is telling how it was included in some scholarly 
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definitions of the nuclear governance components. These, according to 
Thakur, are disarmament, non-proliferation, and security for peaceful 
uses.100 While in line with the three pillars of the NPT, the conflation of 
peaceful uses and security gives the term less a connotation of right and more 
of duty. For Trevor Findlay, instead, nuclear security is in a triad with nuclear 
safety and non-proliferation,101 which seems to remove from the analysis all 
reference to disarmament or the right to nuclear technology.  
In fact, nuclear security appears to be the frame of mind that some would like 
to attach to nuclear weapons governance.102 However, what can be criticised 
in this effort is the attempt to shift the preoccupation of an international 
treaty to domestic dynamics. The kind of governance that is involved with 
improving nuclear security is internal, not international, and is thus exposed 
to different complexities, as well as much of the same exclusionary character 
of the counter-proliferation case. 
 
7.3.2 The threat: nuclear proliferation to unreliable actors 
This long prologue was necessary to illuminate how in the last decade a 
mainstream advocacy of nuclear disarmament has indeed developed in the 
US. The attention to nuclear security has shifted the debate to the ‘demand’ 
side, directing attention to potential holders of nuclear weapons. The ‘offer’ 
side, instead, is only conceived of in terms of control, as existing nuclear 
arsenals are described as if they were a problem only in so far as vulnerable to 
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theft of nuclear material. In effect this discursive move that constructs only 
certain arsenals as a security threat de-politicises the nine holders of nuclear 
weapons. As others have noted, this is essentially an ethnocentric argument 
with deep roots in colonialism and wide repercussions on states’ security 
policies.103  
When talking about disarmament, reductionist groups tend to actually refer 
to the dual goals of stopping proliferation and reducing existing arsenals. The 
threat deriving from nuclear weapons accordingly resides in their potential 
acquisition by new actors, particularly non-state. If on the one hand nuclear 
weapons dispersion carries the risk of terrorists acquiring and (inevitably) 
using them, on the other the bombs of the nuclear armed are at risk of being 
launched by accident or miscalculation.104 Global Zero’s website states that 
the danger of nuclear weapons lies in the possession and modernisation of 
atomic arsenals, but also in the fact that ‘Terrorists are trying to buy, steal or 
build the bomb… North Korea, led by an erratic and aggressive regime, is 
poised to deploy nuclear forces for the first time’ and regional proliferation 
would follow a nuclear-armed Iran.105  
The commitment to disarmament and to undertaking steps in that direction 
is seen as necessary to 'enhance prospects for preventing the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons by new states and by terrorist groups.'106 The risk posed by 
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nuclear weapons is thus recognised only in the case of other actors’ reliance 
upon them, telling a story of US submission to nuclear blackmail, instead of 
being involved in it. According to reductionists, nuclear-armed terrorism is 
the reason why achieving zero is so urgent.107  This is made explicit in the 
Global Zero documentary Countdown to Zero, which draws on images of 
atomic terror to explain how easy it would be for a committed terrorist group 
to create nuclear havoc.108 As the movie director explains, the three main 
areas of concern raised by the movie are rogues states and terrorist making 
the bomb and human error setting off the bomb.109 The threat thus derives 
primarily from those unreliable actors and, only in third place, by 
vulnerability of the existing nuclear arsenals. 
If in private talks Global Zero leaders see nuclear risk even beyond that, they 
have deliberately decided to focus on those issues because ‘it helps people 
understand the urgency’110 given that longer-terms issues are harder to get 
people’s engagement. This choice is understandable, considering that it 
builds upon a frame which is by now well-established within the nuclear 
community, that we could call the nuclear security frame. Within civil society 
the main proponent of the nuclear security narrative is perhaps Graham 
Allison from Harvard’s Belfer Center, who in 2004 affirmed that nuclear 
terrorism was ‘more likely than not in the decade ahead.’111 He became a 
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champion of nuclear terrorism preoccupations, with his “doctrine of the 
Three No’s: No loose nukes, No new nascent nukes, and No new nuclear 
states.”112 His Belfer Center colleague, Matt Bunn, has been credited for 
having pushed the idea all the way to the ears of President Obama.113  
In sum, the reductionist discourse is heavily influenced by the narrative of 
nuclear security that prioritises fighting proliferation through attacks on its 
perpetrators. As such, in a world that has seen less and less countries trying 
to obtain the bomb, the spotlight has been turned on a few states of concern 
as well as non-state groups upon the assumption that they would almost 
inevitably use nuclear weapons if they had them. Seeing the threats of 
proliferation as growing is not just factually incorrect, as we have seen in 
Chapter Two, but it contributes to constructing a particular subject for the 
nuclear threat. It appears clear, in fact, that it is not the whole of the global 
population to be endangered by this threat – rather it is an unidentified ‘us’, 
which should more properly be capitalised in ‘US’. 
 
7.3.3 The response: a step-by-step recipe 
The main idea behind the reductionist camp’s prescription for collective 
action is that you cannot get from the current situation to a world without 
nuclear weapons without going through some stages.  
Others, including the American president, believe that only global zero, the 
verifiable elimination of all nuclear weapons called for by Article 6 of the 
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NPT and by so many world statesmen, will keep the world safe from the risk 
of a nuclear weapon someday destroying a major city.114  
The measures that should be taken in order to implement that commitment 
to disarm vary somewhat in the constructions of the reductionists. According 
to some in the community, the most important measure, the key step, is 
securing nuclear materials from terrorist theft. Such is the position of all 
those organisations that have made of nuclear security their paramount 
pitch. The unavailability of a verification mechanism has been used for years 
to justify the lacking commitment to a treaty to prohibit all types of nuclear 
weapons testing. The issue of verification is still an objection aired by those 
who are unconvinced about nuclear disarmament, and indeed reductionists 
have often tried to prove its feasibility and confidence-building merits.115 
Certain groups have focused their attention on the entry into force of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), like the Arms Control Association, 
while still others have pushed for reduced spending on nuclear weapons, like 
the Ploughshares Fund. More generally, reducing arsenals and some of their 
dangerous associated practices has been the paramount concern of this 
community. 
Reducing the arms has indeed been central among the policies Global Zero 
advocated, particularly in its Action Plan, which outlined the group’s 
‘practical, end-to-end strategy, including near-, medium- and long-term 
																																																						
114	Richard	Burt	and	Jan	Lodal,	‘The	Next	Step	for	Arms	Control:	A	Nuclear	Control	Regime,’	Survival	
53	no	6	(December,	2011):	69.	
115	In	their	Abolishing	Nuclear	Weapons,	Perkovich	and	Acton	dedicate	to	the	issue	one	of	their	five	
chapters.	George	Perkovich	 and	 James	M.	Acton,	Abolishing	Nuclear	Weapons,	 Adelphi	 Paper	 396	
(2008).	
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steps, for the phased, verified, multilateral and proportionate reduction of all 
nuclear weapons to zero’.116  
Figure	7:	Phases	of	Global	Zero	Action	Plan117	
 
As with the abolitionist community, the end point is supposed to be a 
multilateral legal instrument, but much more emphasis is placed upon the 
steps required to get there. Therefore, to reach zero Global Zero recommends 
starting with the nuclear weapon states first and particularly encourage 
reductions and posture shifts by the United States and Russia. Indeed, two of 
the four Global Zero major reports discuss precisely these issues.118  
While this seemed a useful route when relations between Moscow and 
Washington were thawing, their worsening state risked jeopardising the mise 
en oeuvre of the plan, so Global Zero shifted to the de-alerting agenda. 
Another important report was released under the guidance of Gen. 
Cartwright, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the United 
States.119 
The proposal, backed by more than 75 former senior political officials, 
national security experts and top military commanders, makes the case that 
a multinational de-alerting agreement could greatly mitigate the many risks 
of nuclear weapons use, including from computer error, cyber launch, 
																																																						
116	Global	Zero,	‘Global	Zero	Action	Plan,’	2.	
117	Ibid.		
118	Global	 Zero,	 ‘Global	 Zero	 U.S.	 Nuclear	 Policy	 Commission	 Report:	 Modernizing	 U.S.	 Nuclear	
Strategy,	 Force	 Structure	 and	 Posture’	 (May	 2012),	
http://www.globalzero.org/files/gz_us_nuclear_policy_commission_report.pdf	 (last	 accessed	 24	
October	2016)	and	Global	 Zero,	 ‘Global	 Zero	NATO-Russia	Commission	Report:	Removing	U.S.	 and	
Russian	 Tactical	 Nuclear	 Weapons	 from	 European	 Combat	 Bases’	 (February	 2012),	
http://www.globalzero.org/files/gz_nato-russia_commission_report_-_en.pdf	 (last	 accessed	 24	
October	2016).	
119	Global	Zero,	‘Global	Zero	Commission	on	Nuclear	Risk	Reduction’	(April	2015).	
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accidental detonations, unauthorized "insider" launch, false warning of 
enemy attack, and rushed nuclear decision-making.120 
De-alerting is important, according to Global Zero, as it involves a change in 
nuclear strategy in a way that reduces the weapons’ role because it makes 
nuclear retaliation possible in a time frame of only a couple of days, instead 
of immediately as is the case now. De-alerting in fact promises to eliminate 
the risk of unauthorised and accidental use.  
Many civil society groups working under the same assumptions explicitly 
evoke the step-by-step parlance. As Daryl Kimball said, citing the 2010 Final 
Document, ‘all of the nuclear-weapon states committed “to accelerate 
concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament,” including 
“all types of nuclear weapons.’121 Overall, the list compiled by Kimball and a 
few other mostly US-based experts recommended five actions, four of which 
included the language of ‘steps’ in their description.  
As a result, whether for bilateral reductions or through posture changes, the 
actors expected to make change happen are the nuclear weapon states. Global 
Zero’s ‘focus is getting countries with arms to get interested in 
disarmament.’ 122  This is partially different from the nuclear security 
narrative, which has also been ascribed to the reductionist camp, because in 
that case the agents of the response are all those states that possess enough 
civilian nuclear capabilities to be a palatable target for theft or illegal 
procurement on the part of eventual proliferators. In both cases a class of 
																																																						
120 	Global	 Zero,	 ‘Get	 the	 Facts:	 Global	 Risk	 Reduction,’	 http://www.globalzero.org/get-the-
facts/nuclear-risk-reduction	(last	accessed	24	October	2016).	
121	Daryl	 Kimball,	 ‘Greater	 U.S.	 &	 Russian	 Cooperation	 and	 Leadership	 Is	 Necessary	 to	 Fulfill	 NPT	
Article	VI	Obligations	to	Reduce	and	Eliminate	Nuclear	Dangers,’	Statement	to	the	2015	NPT	Review	
Conference,	May	1,	2015.	
122	Interview	n.	12,	June	1,	2015.	
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preferred nuclear citizens can be conceived of, the most technologically 
developed few that would solve the global risk posed by the same technology 
they hold. 
 
7.3.3.1 The step-by-step discourse at the NPT 
This need to go through stages is primarily a psychological matter according 
to some,123 though this section will show that it is also highly embedded in 
the institutional framework of the NPT. The step-by-step approach is based 
upon the assumption that certain moves would reduce mistrust among states, 
which in turn would create a better climate for nuclear disarmament. Such is 
the view held by the nuclear weapon states and by several other NPT parties, 
united by the claim that nuclear disarmament can only proceed 
incrementally. According to this vision there are a series of measures on 
which international consensus should be built before nuclear elimination can 
happen. Implementing Article VI would pass through intermediate legal 
arrangements that, to an extent, have been formalised in texts agreed upon at 
successive NPT Review Conferences.  
An early appearance of the step-by-step narrative is to be found in the 
McCloy-Zorin Accords of 1961, the important US-Soviet text that laid the 
principles for nuclear as well as general and complete disarmament. 
Accordingly, ‘[t]he disarmament programme should be implemented in an 
agreed sequence, by stages until it is completed, with each measure and stage 
																																																						
123Ibid	.	
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carried out within specified time-limits.’124 By now in the NPT context the 
introduction of time frames is highly contested, with the 2012 conference for 
the Middle East WMD Free Zone being just the most recent example. 
However, the idea that a set of stages must be subsequently completed so that 
disarmament can take place is a recurrent and very powerful frame, 
especially among the NAM. 
The origins of the language of steps in NPT parlance can be traced to the list 
of principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament 
adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, though it would 
be made explicit only in 2000.125 With regard to disarmament the conference 
demanded the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in a year 
and start of negotiations on a ban on the production of fissile material for 
nuclear weapons; more generally, it called for the 'determined pursuit… of 
systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with 
the ultimate goal of eliminating' them.126  Reiterating and specifying the 
Article VI commitment was indeed crucial for the NPT's indefinite extension.  
 The 13 practical steps, included in the Final Document of the 2000 RevCon 
were a further elaboration of that effort to summarise what should occur 
before the effective implementation of Article VI.127  The 13 practical step 
included those 1995 elements as well as a whole spectrum of other activities: 
																																																						
124 	McCloy-Zorin	 Accords,	 September	 20,	 1961,	 http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-
issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/arms-control-disarmament/mccloy-zorin-accords_1961-09-20.htm	
(last	accessed	4	July	2016).	
125	Decision	2:	List	of	principles	and	objectives	for	nuclear	non-proliferation	and	disarmament.	Final	
Document,	1995	Review	Conference	of	the	Parties	to	the	Treaty	on	the	Non-Proliferation	of	Nuclear	
Weapons	(New	York,	1995)	NPT/CONF.1995/32	(Part	I),	Annex.	
126	Ibid.	
127	Final	Document,	2000	Review	Conference	of	the	Parties	to	the	Treaty	on	the	Non-Proliferation	of	
Nuclear	Weapons	(New	York,	2000)	NPT/CONF.2000/28.	
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from the reduction in the role of nuclear arms in security postures to 
transparency and confidence-building measures. A list of the thirteen steps as 
summarised by Sharon Squassoni follows.128 
1. CTBT.129 
2. Testing moratorium.130 
3. Fissile-material cut-off treaty (FMCT).131  
4. CD role on disarmament.132  
5. Irreversibility in disarmament and arms control.133 
6. Unequivocal undertaking to totally eliminate NWS nuclear arsenals.134 
7. START II, III, ABM.135 
8. Trilateral Initiative.136  
9. Steps by all nuclear weapon states leading to nuclear disarmament: 
1. Further unilateral reductions. 
2. Increased transparency. 
3. Further reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons. 
4. Concrete agreed measures to reduce operational status of nuclear 
weapons. 
5. Diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies. 
6. Engagement by all NWS in process, as soon as appropriate. 
10. Excess fissile material under verification 
11. General and complete disarmament.137 
																																																						
128	Sharon	 Squassoni,	 ‘Grading	Progress	 on	13	 Steps	 Towards	Disarmament,’	 Carnegie	 Endowment	
for	 International	 Peace	 Policy	 Outlook,	 May	 8,	 2009,	
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/13_steps.pdf	(last	accessed	24	October	2016).	
129	Early	entry	force	of	a	Comprehensive	Test	Ban	Treaty,	without	delay	and	without	conditions.	
130	A	moratorium	on	nuclear	testing	pending	the	entry	into	force	of	a	CTBT.	
131	Necessity	of	negotiations	 in	 the	CD	of	 a	non-discriminatory	multilateral	 and	 internationally	 and	
effectively	verifiable	treaty	banning	the	production	of	fissile	material	for	use	in	nuclear	weapons.	
132	Necessity	 of	 creating	 an	 appropriate	 subsidiary	 body	 in	 the	 CD	 with	 a	 mandate	 to	 deal	 with	
nuclear	disarmament.	
133	The	principle	of	 irreversibility	to	apply	to	nuclear	disarmament,	nuclear,	and	other	related	arms	
control	and	reduction	measures.	
134	An	unequivocal	undertaking	by	NWS	to	totally	eliminate	their	nuclear	arsenals	leading	to	nuclear	
disarmament,	to	which	all	States	parties	are	committed	under	article	VI.	
135	The	 early	 EIF	 and	 full	 implementation	 of	 START	 II	 and	 the	 conclusion	 of	 START	 III	 as	 soon	 as	
possible	while	preserving	and	strengthening	 the	ABM	Treaty	as	a	cornerstone	of	 strategic	 stability	
and	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 further	 reductions	 of	 strategic	 offensive	 weapons,	 in	 accordance	 with	 its	
provisions.	
136	The	completion	and	implementation	of	the	Trilateral	Initiative	between	the	United	States,	Russia,	
and	the	IAEA.	
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12. Reporting.138 
13. Verification for disarmament.139 
As often is the case in diplomatic settings, texts tend to be reiterated at 
following conferences, thus the steps would become a central NPT RevCon 
debating theme. Civil society in turn has kept track of developments in those 
fields.140 
If in 2005 there was no political will to find a consensual outcome. Given the 
US reticence to reaffirm the commitment to the 2000 document, the steps 
emerged again at the following RevCon. A further specification is in fact to be 
found in the document approved by the 2010 RevCon, which included an 
Action Plan with a total of 64 measures relating to nuclear disarmament.141 
The steps have thus become a great number and of widely different orders of 
magnitude, from the negotiation of treaties that have been stuck for decades 
to minimum measures of transparency. The NWS see the 2010 Action Plan as 
a “long process” that in the short term is not expected to produce any 
outcome. One result, however, was reaped in 2015, as the NWS took pride in 
their increased transparency at the RevCon. This refers to the launch of the 
P5 Process, which held a series of reunions including all the five NWS 
recognised by the treaty. ‘These conferences are building the foundation on 
																																																																																																																																																										
137 	Reaffirmation	 that	 ultimate	 objective	 in	 nuclear	 disarmament	 is	 general	 and	 complete	
disarmament	under	effective	international	control.	
138	Regular	reports,	within	the	framework	of	strengthened	review	of	the	NPT	and	recalling	the	1996	
advisory	opinion	of	the	ICJ.	
139	Verification	development	for	the	achievement	and	maintenance	of	a	nuclear-weapon–free	world.	
140	Squassoni,	‘Grading	Progress	on	13	Steps	Towards	Disarmament.’	
141	2010	 Review	 Conference	 of	 the	 Parties	 to	 the	 Treaty	 on	 the	 Non-Proliferation	 of	 Nuclear	
Weapons.	New	York,	Final	Document.	
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which future P5 multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament could 
stand’, argued the United States.142 
The most tangible outcome of these meetings is the P5 Glossary of Key 
Nuclear Terms, which was released at the 2015 RevCon.143  Beyond the 
inability of the group to settle on a common definition of nuclear deterrence, 
for this study it is interesting to note the way in which the NWS have defined 
nuclear disarmament. ‘The process leading to the realization of the ultimate 
goal of a world without nuclear weapons and any measure contributing 
hereto. Nuclear disarmament may also refer to the end state after nuclear 
weapons are eliminated.’144  One problem with this view is that nuclear 
disarmament comes to mean two things: both the process and the end-state. 
Also, and more importantly, it encompasses any measure contributing to the 
disarmament process, thus, even eliminating a single warhead would 
constitute disarmament – or progress on any of the 13 or 64 measures 
mentioned before. 
The same contradiction appears embedded in the discourse put forward by 
the reductionist strand of civil society. According to a Global Zero organiser, 
‘nuclear disarmament is the process of elimination of all nuclear weapons 
with intrusive global inspection system to ensure that nobody is cheating and 
the legal framework prohibiting possession.’145 The process outlined in this 
movement’s position, and of the reductionist community more broadly, is 
																																																						
142	United	States,	‘Statement	to	Main	Committee	I,’	delivered	by	Ambassador	Robert	A.	Wood,	2015	
Review	Conference	of	the	Parties	to	the	Treaty	on	the	Non-Proliferation	of	Nuclear	Weapons,	May	1,	
2015,http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-
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143	P5	 Working	 Group	 on	 the	 Glossary	 of	 Key	 Nuclear	 Terms,	 P5	 Glossary	 of	 Key	 Nuclear	 Terms	
(Beijing:	China	Atomic	Energy	Press,	April	2015).		
144	Ibid.,	2.	
145	Interview	n.	12,	June	1,	2015,	emphasis	added.	
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certainly more defined than that agreed by the NWS, but it maintains the 
same confusion between outcome and process. Such distinction is important 
to understand whether the NWS are effectively complying with their Article 
VI commitment, while at the same time constituting a central cleavage in the 
civil society community. As stated by a senior Russian figure at the 61st 
Pugwash Conference, moderate analysts recognise that disarmament is under 
way, even though not fast enough, while radical ones say there is no progress 
at all.146  Clearly it is hard to assess the pace whether what constitutes 
disarmament remains unspecified.  
At a closed-door event attended by the author, a prominent Global Zero 
leader said of a nuclear-free world that ‘we’re all sceptical about it,’ but the 
concern should not be so much on eliminating all of the bombs, but on 
reducing all those unnecessary ones. To make sense of the seeming 
disconnect between advocating for an organisation called Global Zero and 
refusing the need to get to zero is that both reduction and elimination 
‘involve exactly the same steps’.  
 
7.3.4 Summary 
The reductionist approach thus constructs a markedly different threat than 
the abolitionists, one in which both the risk and the response have a less 
global character. 
	 	
																																																						
146	Senior	Russian	figure,	remarks	at	the	plenary	panel	‘Path	Towards	a	Nuclear-Weapon-Free	World:	
Prospects	 for	Nuclear	Disarmament,’	November	1,	2016,	61st	Pugwash	Conference	on	Science	and	
World	Affairs,	Nagasaki,	Japan.	
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Table	3:	Disarmament	frames	in	the	reductionist	camp	
	 Global	Zero	 Nuclear	security	
Risk	 Nuclear	proliferation	and	
terrorism	
Nuclear	terrorism	
Referent	object	 West	 West	
Agent	of	threat	 Rogue	states,	terrorists	 Terrorists,	rogue	states	
Collective	action	requested	 Non-proliferation,	counter-
proliferation,	arms	control	
Securing	nuclear	material	
Agent	of	response	 NWS	 Nuclear	capable	
Characterisation	of	
disarmament	
A	process,	utopian	 ?	
 
The table above shows two varieties of how nuclear disarmament is 
conceptualised by the reductionist camp. Given that most of the analysis has 
concerned the discursive position of Global Zero, the organisation is at the 
forefront, but accompanied here by a summary of the mainstream nuclear 
security narrative, which has been described in depth. This shows that 
nuclear terrorism and the proliferation of the bomb to untrustworthy actors 
is the major definition of the threat coming from nuclear weapons. If the 
agent of such threat resides in terrorists and rogue states, their target can 
only be the West, though it remains largely implicit.  
The response to the nuclear threat appears much less linked to the concept of 
disarmament than in the abolitionist frame. Here too there is a certain 
variety, from a prescription for the securing on nuclear materials and 
stopping proliferation to other measures that should reduce the nuclear 
threat. These are always to be undertaken by the most powerful actors in 
nuclear governance, the ‘haves’, either in the sense of possessing nuclear 
technology or the weapons themselves. Given these states’ reliance on the 
same danger that the reductionists insist on wanting to eliminate, nuclear 
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disarmament can only be seen as a process, or even a utopian aspiration, 
whereas the nuclear security narrative does not express itself on the matter. 
Global Zero’s narrative on nuclear disarmament thus appears to be in line 
with the dominant prioritisation of non-proliferation, nuclear security, and 
the step-by-step process for nuclear disarmament, much in line with 
mainstream thinking, as will be seen. 
 
 
7.4 Conclusion 
The first analytical move has aimed at showing how disarmament can be (and 
indeed is) constructed differently, a task aided by unpacking discursive 
construction of the threat and the solution. The study of the frames of 
disarmament employed by civil society from abolitionist and reductionist 
approaches has examined their respective articulations, placing these into the 
wider context of nuclear discourses. Chapter Eight will proceed to compare 
the frames so as to highlight their ideological positioning and function in the 
hegemonic apparatus. The focus on language and its strategic use draws from 
the assumption that language ‘constitutes the principal means through which 
meaning is given to security’147 in various contexts. What should be retained 
for now is the high variance of disarmament calls put forward at the NPT. 
The very way in which nuclear weapons constitute a threat differs for 
abolitionists and reductionists, as do policy prescriptions.  
																																																						
147	Matt	McDonald,	Security,	the	Environment	and	Emancipation,	25.	
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Following this, we should turn to research how these articulations have been 
received in the NPT context, that is, it will deal with the crucial issue of 
interpellation. Not only the construction of security is important, but also the 
resonance enjoyed by particular frames, especially when the community 
analysed is composed of NGOs and think tanks with no formal coercive or 
institutional power.148 This will allow building upon the critical constructivist 
analysis so far carried out and a more direct engagement with the Gramscian 
theory of civil society and its related concepts of common sense and historic 
bloc to illuminate the overall strategies of civil society at the NPT. As such, 
Chapter Eight will provide an examination of the common sense nature of the 
two frames by looking at the process of interpellation, and an exploration, 
preliminary as it may be, of the historic blocs supporting the competing 
ideologies.  
  
																																																						
148	The	 difference	 here	 is	 amongst	 the	 four	 types	 of	 power	 identified	 by	 Barnett	 and	 Duvall:	
compulsory,	 institutional,	 structural,	 and	 productive.	 For	more	 see	Michael	 Barnett	 and	 Raymond	
Duvall,	eds.	Power	in	Global	Governance	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2004).	
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Chapter 8  
 
Civil Society Common Sense and 
Historic Bloc at the NPT 
 
Analysing nuclear politics with a Gramscian outlook leads us to look at the 
complexities of the nuclear state and its rule. It requires paying attention not 
just to the nuclear state strictly defined, as most positivist accounts would 
have it, but in a broader framework that recognises the mutual constitution 
of the state by political and civil society. The importance of civil society rests 
on the fact that it is where the struggle for hegemony takes place, or the 
contest among competing ideologies to obtain consent. Indeed, the consent 
the state needs to maintain its rule is not only built through governmental 
functions and bureaucratic directives, rather it is also based upon popular 
understandings that are so widely shared to be taken as a given. Such social 
concepts are part and parcel of that common sense which has been outlined 
in Chapter Two. In order to understand the rule of the state we need, 
therefore, to take into account the meaning-making practices, the ideological 
inclinations, present in institutions and artefacts such as trade unions, 
parties, churches, schools, political texts, popular novels, and paintings. 
Traits and trends of the hegemonic ideas will be present both in high and in 
low political representations, as will alternative ideologies.  
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The analysis of the common sense nature of civil society’s understandings of 
nuclear disarmament introduced the question of the circulation of frames. If 
the articulation of a narrative is indubitably central for those interested in the 
cultural milieu of a certain policy area, even more significant is the way in 
which the narrative is received and spread. Therefore, the analytical gaze of 
this section drifts towards the theme, hereto only anticipated, of the 
organisation of social forces behind a common conception. For Gramsci such 
a conglomerate is the historic bloc, a union of intent among disparate actors 
that can alternatively support or challenge the hegemonic order. Both for the 
maintenance of a hegemonic project and for the establishment of a counter-
hegemonic alternatives, it is indeed necessary that various forces, with 
different social, economic, political and ethical concerns combine their 
efforts. A project becomes dominant only if it is able to present its particular 
corporative interests as general and natural. There is never a single dominant 
ideology and a subordinate one; hegemony, in fact, is never fully acquired, it 
is constantly in a state of tension among competing propositions. 
For the purpose of this research, the array of actors to be analysed is not the 
entirety of civil society groups that Gramsci referred to – trade unions, the 
Church, schools, media, etc. That would certainly be a valuable exercise in a 
national context where a certain cultural approach to nuclear disarmament 
could be assessed within those various communities, or with a cross-country 
comparison. In keeping with the analogy drawn in the research design, the 
focus here will be on the interaction between transnational civil society and 
other social forces of nuclear governance, particularly states, coalitions, UN, 
funders, and the general public. By looking into the politics of nuclear 
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disarmament and the competing approaches of reduction and abolition, the 
chapter aims at highlighting the difficulties of both frames to become 
common sense and of producing a historic bloc in the contemporary nuclear 
order.  
 
 
8.1 Civil society NPT frames and common sense 
meanings of nuclear disarmament 
As the two previous chapters have highlighted, both the problem and the 
solution to the current nuclear conundrum have received a varying treatment 
by civil society. Nuclear disarmament has indeed been constructed in widely 
differing terms by those groups that, in and beyond the NPT review process, 
belong to the abolitionist or the reductionist camp. Looking within the 
programmatic statements of different civil society groups, and zooming in on 
certain issues with interview material, allows us to see the nuances in their 
interpretation of the nuclear risk. As reported in the table below, this is 
differently characterised – proliferation or use – and so is the origin of the 
threat – terrorists and rogue states or all those involved in nuclear 
possession. Again, like in Chapter Seven, the cases of Global Zero and ICAN 
are taken as exemplary of this division. What crucially drives them apart is 
the referent object of the threat, which according to the abolitionist 
comprises the whole of humanity, whereas in the reductionist 
characterisation seems to imagine a specifically Western subject. As such 
both the collective action and the agent identified to respond differ, but most 
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importantly disarmament itself is for some a necessity, and a utopian 
aspiration for others. This underscores the fundamental ideological 
distinction between the two. 	
Table	4:	Visions	of	Disarmament	for	Global	Zero	and	ICAN1	
	 Reductionists	
Global	Zero	
Abolitionists	
ICAN	
Risk	 Nuclear	proliferation	 Nuclear	use	
Referent	object	 West	 Humanity	
Agent	of	threat	 Rogue	states,	terrorists	 Nuclear	possessors	
Collective	 action	
requested	
Non-proliferation,	 counter-
proliferation,	arms	control	
Ban	treaty,	disarmament	
Agent	of	response	 NWS	 NNWS,	NWS	
Characterisation	 of	
disarmament	
Utopian,	a	process	 Necessary	
 
The views of the two different communities are not to be seen as opposing 
processes of securitization and de-securitization, to borrow the Copenhagen 
school terms.2 In fact, it would be too limiting and even misguided to see the 
reductionist approach as an instance of framing nuclear weapons as a 
security threat, while the abolitionist one as an attempt to devoid them of 
that characteristic. Instead, both discourses in effect move toward portraying 
the bomb as a menace to global security. The issue is that they do so by 
employing two very different conceptions of the nuclear order: following 
Gramsci, the abolitionists and the reductionists can be seen as bearers of 
different versions of nuclear common sense. Varieties of common sense can 
in fact coexist and do keep transforming in time by building upon sedimented 
discourses. For the purposes of analysis the definition of categories and the 
simplification of arguments have been undertaken, even though clearly this 
																																																						
1	While	the	first	four	categories	are	taken	from	McDonald,	the	fifth	is	added	by	the	author.	
2 	The	 theory	 was	 laid	 out	 by	 Barry	 Buzan,	 Ole	 Wæver,	 and	 Jaap	 De	 Wilde,	Security:	 A	 New	
Framework	for	Analysis	(Boulder,	CO:	Lynne	Rienner	Publishers,	1998).	For	a	critical	evaluation	of	the	
securitization	 framework,	 see	 Matt	 McDonald,	 ‘Securitization	 and	 the	 Construction	 of	 Security,’	
European	Journal	of	International	Relations	14	n°	4	(2008).	
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has limits. After all, a ‘lived hegemony is always a process. It is not, except 
analytically, a system or a structure.’3 
 
8.1.1 Discourse contestation and the common sense of nuclear 
disarmament 
The struggle for common sense is indeed happening at various levels in the 
NPT context. The reductionist camp, and Global Zero particularly, is in effect 
supporting the dominant narrative of nuclear history, which sees it as a 
succession of natural pursuit of atomic capabilities and territorial spread as 
well as quantitative surge. According to this story, the threatening actors are 
acting against the norms set by the so-called international community, thus 
convincing them to give up their aggressive plans is one of Global Zero’s 
challenges. The move to reframe the nuclear threat in the post-Cold War age 
appears to confirm the need, even for hegemonic conceptions, to be 
constantly restated and rearticulated in order to maintain their prominence 
as a security conception. As highlighted by critical scholars, the new threat of 
nuclear terrorism had to emerge in order to give meaning to the existing 
arsenals previously justified by the Soviet threat.4  
Instead, the nuclear arsenals of the established nuclear-armed states receive 
little scrutiny, while no question is raised as to why they would need these 
devices to boost their security. These states are called to play a role, namely 
																																																						
3	Raymond	Williams,	Marxism	and	Literature	(Oxford:	Oxford	Paperbacks,	1977),	112.	
4	Keith	Krause	and	Andrew	Latham,	‘Constructing	Non-Proliferation	and	Arms	Control,’	36.	
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‘pursuing Global Zero by negotiating further reductions in their arsenals’,5 
but it is not made clear how reductions link to elimination. The paradigm of 
nuclear need is thus left unchallenged, at least for the most powerful states, 
with the implication that not all nuclear weapons are equally problematic. 
For ICAN, and crucially differently from Global Zero, the problem is not of 
acquisition by terrorists and rogue states, but possession as such. ‘When it 
comes to nuclear weapons, there are no safe hands,’6 is a central ICAN 
argument. According to one of its leaders, this frame ‘puts human needs first, 
not the ideology of deterrence.’7 ‘Whether deterrence works doesn’t matter, it 
is what nuclear weapons do that matters.’8  
The simplicity of the message has surely been one of the strengths of the 
humanitarian discourse.9 Nuclear weapons have horrific consequences on 
human beings, which are forbidden by international law, therefore they 
should be banned. It was because the idea of the nuclear weapons convention 
appeared too complicated and only few people understood it, that IPPNW 
introduced the idea of the ban.10 The greater inclusion of more partners and 
the international turn, which led to the creation of the International 
Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, led to this rebranding.11  If the 
humanitarian initiative is an effort at reframing the debate on nuclear 
disarmament globally, it has seen civil society take an increasing role. The 
process of reframing goes through the establishment of accepted text and its 
																																																						
5	Global	Zero,	‘Frequently	Asked	Questions.’	
6	ICAN,	‘Arguments	for	Nuclear	Abolition.’	
7	Civil	society	leader,	ICAN	campaigners’	meeting,	London,	July	6,	2015.	
8	Interview	n.	14,	June	19,	2014.	
9	Tim	Caughley,	‘Humanitarian	Impacts	of	Nuclear	Weapons,’	27.	
10	Interview	n.	3,	May	22,	2015.	
11	Ibid.		
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strength is proportional to the diffusion it enjoys. Therefore in the NPT 
context – but also in diplomatic practice more broadly – activism has focused 
on introducing a certain language in the statements of states, with the aim of 
seeing it reflected in the outcome documents. For the Abolition 2000 
movement, for instance, it was crucial to see as many states as possible use 
the expression ‘nuclear weapon convention’ in their statements.12 In some 
cases they were even able to have their own people write statements for 
certain states, together with the establishment of personal relations and even 
friendships between civil society representatives and members of 
delegations.13 
Similarly, for ICAN a prime aim has been to change the language used by 
NPT parties in their statements and working papers. They have mobilised 
huge human resources to make that happen. This was particularly evident at 
the 2014 PrepCom, when tens of ICAN members and affiliates were seen 
making contacts with each individual delegation to fill in a form.14 In 2015 
the focus was on making sure that as many states as possible would endorse 
the Austrian pledge, later known as humanitarian pledge. This was often 
guaranteed by the repeated ICAN calls to the permanent missions and long 
chats with the delegation members. Special attention was also given to those 
from low-income countries.15 
																																																						
12	Ibid.		
13	Ibid.	
14	In	these	forms	ICAN	members	would	note	relevant	data	for	country	positions.	
15	Article	 36,	 ‘Underrepresentation	 of	 Low-Income	 Countries	 in	 Nuclear	 Disarmament	 Forums,’	
Discussion	 Paper	 (May	 2015),	 http://www.article36.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/Underrepresentation-nuclear-forums.pdf	 (last	 accessed	 26	 October	
2016).	
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At the same time, the very debate at the 2015 RevCon has highlighted the 
political importance of shifting the global discourse. In one of its 
publications, ICAN points out that the term ‘catastrophic humanitarian 
consequences’ is now commonly used.16 Expressing one’s deep concern over 
the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons has become a sign of 
one’s affiliation with a certain narrative of nuclear disarmament. Indeed, 
there were abundant efforts, particularly on the part of the NWS, to refrain 
from using those terms. All of the P5 together countered the ‘catastrophic 
humanitarian consequences’ frame, limiting themselves to a reference to the 
‘severe consequences of nuclear weapons use’ in the Joint Statement of the 
P5 Conference on 2015.17 For instance, the US and the UK delegates reacted 
to the first draft of the Main Committee 1 report by asking that the references 
to the humanitarian consequences be moved to the chapeau section of the 
Final Document.  
Yet, the French statement has been much more vehement, proclaiming 
‘Unacceptable, unacceptable’ that a conference to which it did not partake 
was praised in the document. The overall French statements at the 2015 
RevCon are indeed the best example of the NWS’ attempt to distance 
themselves from the HINW. In the speech at the General Debate, 
Ambassador Jean-Hughes Simon-Michel pointed out that France is fully 
conscious of the ‘severe effects of nuclear weapons’ but that, because of their 
purely defensive role, nuclear arms and the deterrence they provide are 
wholly compliant with international law. He went further, in the Main 
																																																						
16	ICAN,	‘Catastrophic	Humanitarian	Harm.’	
17	Foreign	 and	 Commonwealth	 Office,	 ‘Joint	 statement	 from	 the	 nuclear-weapon	 states	 at	 the	
London	P5	conference,’	Gov.uk,	February	6,	2015.	
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Committee I speech on May 1st, arguing that ‘nuclear disarmament cannot be 
declared - it must be built’ and that it ‘can only be reached through a series of 
concrete measures, step by step.’18  
These statements reflect the fear of becoming entangled in a web of words 
contrary to France’s (and the NWS) position. It is clear that Paris is intent in 
countering the opposed disarmament argument, especially the humanitarian 
one while supporting the step-by-step approach. The effects of nuclear 
weapons are in fact defined here as ‘severe’ in clear opposition to attempts to 
introduce a debate on ‘catastrophic humanitarian consequences’. It is in the 
same vein that one can read the remark on the infeasibility of disarmament 
by declaration. According to the French position, the calls for negotiating a 
ban on nuclear weapons are misguided because they do not consider the 
‘strategic context’, which demands a series of step-by-step measures rather 
than a single comprehensive process. 
The materials used for the construction of the narrative of the step-by-step 
process are well established: sovereignty, stability, defence, and technical 
approach, among others. That is what makes this narrative so successful and, 
in Gramscian terms, common sense. Statements reinforcing the efficacy of 
nuclear weapons for keeping national security have been pervasive ever since 
the invention of these weapons. It is less important that rarely the question 
has been raised as to what is the actual evidence to support that claim, 
because what really matters is that most people are convinced that nuclear 
deterrence keeps peace. The reductionist discourse can thus build upon what 
																																																						
18	France,	 ‘Statement	by	Amb.	 Jean-Hugues	 Simon-Michel,	 Permanent	Representative	of	 France	 to	
the	Conference	on	Disarmament,’	 2015	NPT	Review	Conference,	Main	Committee	 I,	May	1,	 2015,		
http://www.francetnp.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/discours_1er_pilier_final_revcon2015.pdf	 (last	 accessed	 22	
October	2016).	
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is already believed to be true by many; thereby challenging it becomes all the 
more difficult. Conversely, this is the same reason why the humanitarian 
discourse is weak, despite the adherence of over a hundred national 
delegations. It is built upon cosmopolitan ideas about the indivisible nature 
of security and the equality of all world citizens that simply do not carry 
much weight in the current state-based nuclear governance. The conception 
is certainly counter-hegemonic, but it is not as clear how much of a chance to 
succeed it has in the contemporary security situation.  
In 2015 the climate was certainly more conducive to abolitionism than it has 
been at most points in nuclear history. Indeed, many opportunities have 
opened for this narrative with the proliferation of organisations and 
individuals, even with political responsibilities, that speak in favour of 
disarmament. Several analysts have asserted that nuclear weapons ‘are in the 
process of being recoded as unacceptable instruments of terror that are of no 
use in war.19 Some have even gone further to argue that ‘it is now the anti-
nuclear advocates who are at the cutting edge of the debate for the first time, 
and the pro-nuclear advocates who are the ones pushed into the corner.’20 
However, it will not be enough to preach to the converted, since the 
deterrence ideology does exist and remains at the basis of security strategies 
of several states and alliances. That is because of the disciplinary effect of 
nuclear discourse, which has colonised the entire polis, according to 
Kinsella. 21  In fact, despite its apparent inconsistencies, the deterrence 
																																																						
19	Hugh	Gusterson,	‘The	New	Nuclear	Abolitionists.’	
20	Ken	Booth,	‘Nuclearism,	Human	Rights	and	Constructions	of	Security	(Part	1),’	21.	
21	William	 J.	 Kinsella,	 ‘One	 Hundred	 Years	 of	 Nuclear	 Discourse:	 Four	 Master	 Themes	 and	 their	
Implications	 for	 Environmental	 Communication,’	 in	 Environmental	 communication	 yearbook	2,	 ed.	
Susan	Senecah	(London:	Routledge,	2005).	
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ideology and the notion of disarmament as a step-by-step process benefit 
from greater resonance than their abolitionist alternative. 
Reductionists therefore operate through recourse to common sense ideas 
about deterrence and proliferation, while what abolitionists do poses a 
counter-hegemonic challenge to the dominant order. 
 
8.1.2 Maintaining common sense: the deterrence-disarmament 
continuum 
This discussion can benefit from bringing in the perspective of the UN, for its 
particular position on disarmament. It ‘has become part of the identity of the 
United Nations as an organization; some have called it now part of the 
organization’s “DNA”’’.22 On the conceptual level the UN has consistently 
recognised a distinction between the goal of armaments regulation and 
disarmament. In a talk at the margins of the NPT PrepCom of 2014, Virginia 
Gamba expressly stated that the step-by-step process more clearly resembles 
regulation of armaments than their elimination, as demonstrated by the fact 
that not a single weapon has been destroyed to comply with an existing 
treaty.23 High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Angela Kane went 
even further saying that ‘some might question whether the step-by-step 
approach will result in zero nuclear weapons . . . or zero disarmament.’24 The 
																																																						
22	Randy	Rydell,	‘The	Hardy	Perennial:	Seven	Decades	of	Disarmament	Work	at	the	United	Narions,’	
in	United	Nations,	2015	Session	of	the	Nuclear	Discussion	Forum,	UNODA	Occasional	Papers,	no	27,	8.		
23	Virginia	Gamba,	‘Unfold	Zero	side	event,’	New	York,	May	7,	2014.	
24	Angela	Kane,	‘The	“step-by-step”	process	of	nuclear	disarmamen:	Quo	vadis?,’	remarks	of	the	UN	
High	 Representative	 for	 Disarmament	 Affairs	 at	 the	 panel	 ‘Next	 Steps	 in	 Nuclear	 Disarmament:	
Where	do	we	go	from	here?’	at	the	10th	 International	Security	Forum,	Geneva	Center	for	Security	
Policy,	April	24,	2013.	
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2008 UN Secretary General’s five-point plan for disarmament, for example, 
envisages either the agreement on a framework of separate, mutually 
reinforcing instruments or the conclusion of a comprehensive convention.25  
The policy prescriptions advanced by reductionist groups, whether for the 
reduction of numbers and practices of the nuclear weapons states or for 
securing sensitive material, are not a radical challenge to the current nuclear 
governance. The focus of these movements, as exemplified by Global Zero, is 
thus on risk reduction, not elimination, because the way in which they 
propose solving the threat of nuclear weapons does not immediately – and 
many would say necessarily – require the dismantlement of deterrence 
relations. What distinguishes practices and proposals built on a regime of 
disarmament, as opposed to one of deterrence, is the reduction in the value of 
nuclear weapons, similarly to what put forward by Nick Ritchie.26 As it has 
been put forward in Chapter Three, in fact, it is less important to dismantle a 
warhead than to disarm a relationship. If on the one hand a state stops 
employing the threat of nuclear use towards even just one other country, then 
disarmament is under way; if, on the other, it keeps relying on nuclear 
deterrence, this thesis’ position is that it matters little whether it has enough 
to inflict intolerable damage to the opponent once or more than once.  
To be fair, among the two actions that Global Zero has advocated most 
recently, the de-alerting campaign belongs somewhere in between the 
deterrence and the disarmament regime. It is true that a US-Russian 
																																																						
25	Secretary	 General	 Ban	 Ki-moon,	 ‘Address	 to	 the	 East-West	 Institute:	 "The	 United	 Nations	 and	
Security	 in	 a	 Nuclear-Weapon-Free	 world"’,	 New	 York,	 October	 24,	 2008,	
http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/search_full.asp?statID=351	 (last	 accessed	 22	
October	2016).	
26	Ritchie,	‘Valuing	and	Devaluing	Nuclear	Weapons.’		
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confrontation with high alert levels contains the same amount of black-
mailing of one within a de-alerted situation; still, renouncing the possibility 
of attacking the opponent with almost automaticity is a move towards de-
valuing nuclear weaponand thus in the direction of disarmament. 
 
The graph above summarises some of the policy proposals that have been 
seen until now, both from reductionist and abolitionist groups, to highlight 
the fact that all of them are on an ark that can tend more towards a regime of 
deterrence or to one of disarmament depending on the value that nuclear 
weapons play in the security of the states/global society. At one extreme we 
find arrangements that envisage no role for nuclear arms (so much so that 
they would be banned or comprehensively prohibited), whereas at the other 
extreme these weapons keep playing a security role, at least for some. 
Countering proliferation, reducing arsenals numbers, and limiting nuclear 
spending surely make accidental nuclear war less likely but do little to change 
existing deterrence relations. This should be seen as a way of identifying the 
place of an advocated policy option to the wider nuclear order.  
The abolitionist strategy could be seen in Gramscian terms as an attempt at 
war of movement given the importance attached to one single immediate 
objective that is set to revolutionise the status quo. However, the movement 
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to ban the bomb does not convincingly explain what would happen after the 
perspective entry into force of a similar treaty and how that would contribute 
to nuclear disarmament. The reductionist approach invoked by the NWS and 
others, instead, can be seen as an example of what Gramsci would call war of 
position. Their message is not opposed to the status quo, rather it falls 
perfectly within its confines by supporting in theory the goal of disarmament 
but subordinating it to a series of conditions. While this discourse does give 
support to nuclear disarmament, it does so in a way that makes it appear 
distant and even impractical. The whole security framework would need to be 
different, very different from today’s, in order for disarmament to become 
possible – in essence, the discourse discredits the same idea it purports to be 
espousing.  
Those groups that support a reductionist strategy depart from the 
assumption that the risks nuclear weapons create come mostly from their use 
by terrorists or rogue states that could acquire them and, the argument goes, 
almost inevitably use them. This logic assigns a higher rationality to those 
states that already possess nuclear weapons, making it seem that use by them 
is a foreclosed option, whereas new proliferators, both state and non-state, 
would not exhibit the same caution. In practice this discourse does not 
contest the security benefits that states currently derive from holding nuclear 
arsenals, nor does it address the morality of relying on the threat of using the 
weapon even if only virtually. This view, in sum, does not respond to the 
question: ‘is deterrence good?’ 
Parallel to this, the other side of the discourse is also partial and politically 
charged in that it does not acknowledge another query: ‘is disarmament 
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better than deterrence?’ Surely many abolitionist activists would say that they 
do because they give ample reasons why deterrence is bad, including the huge 
sums of money spent, the health and environmental effects of the nuclear-
weapons-building apparatus as well as the potential destruction of nuclear 
attacks brought on by a failure of deterrence. However, saying that 
deterrence is bad does not necessarily imply that it is worse than the 
alternative, disarmament. It is unfortunate that the abolitionist community of 
civil society involved with nuclear weapons questions does not engage with 
the security argument because as long as that is not done there can not be a 
conversation between the two sides of this struggle  
As seen so far, this struggle within civil society replicates the global division 
between regimes of deterrence and disarmament. The discourse of the 
reductionists operates within the hegemonic tropes of deterrence and non-
proliferation in their disarmament advocacy. The abolitionists, instead, 
premise theirs on a counter-hegemonic project that does not only contest the 
reliance on deterrence but also, implicitly, notions of sovereignty and the 
supremacy of national security. After having established the discursive 
strategies of civil society, we will now turn to their organisational and 
material strategies as a way to unravel the war of position of the reductionists 
and the war of movement of the abolitionists. 
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8.2 Nuclear civil society and the creation of the historic 
bloc 
Following from the previous analysis, it appears clear that the struggle over 
the meaning of disarmament is not a resolved quest with one side firmly 
dominating. Instead, both the reductionist and the abolitionist 
interpretations exist and manage to make a powerful case. It is evident, 
however, that one of these visions, deterrence, is more strongly embedded 
within the global psyche. Global Zero’s narrative thus appears as an 
expression of the common sense of nuclear order, deterrence, the hegemonic 
ideology at the basis of practices of non-proliferation and arms control. The 
position of ICAN, disarmament, instead is taken to be a counter-hegemonic 
narrative, which challenges deterrence both as an ideology and a strategy. 
After having established that there are different interpretations of the nuclear 
threat and of the necessary response, the analysis now turns from the 
ideational to the material by analysing how the Gramscian concept of historic 
bloc could help in assessing nuclear civil society’s struggles at the NPT.  In 
the same way as Gramsci distinguishes between civil society and political 
society in his analysis of the Italian fascist state, this thesis discusses global 
civil society and global political society to examine the global nuclear politics 
in the case of the NPT. The focus is not on the creation of domestic consent, 
but of consensus in international negotiations and, just like at the level of the 
nation-state, this thesis argues that global civil society is crucial in 
crystallising a certain ruling order.  In order to reflect upon this notion of 
historic bloc, it is thus useful to reflect upon which union of forces lie behind 
the configuration of narratives that we have examined so far.  
	 312	
The unity of the historic bloc proposing each version of the nuclear common 
sense will be examined, in the NPT context and more broadly. As has been 
repeated throughout, the NPT is but an arena of a broader struggle. Its 
periodic conferences allow to have a glimpse into the diplomatic and activist 
communities involved with nuclear policies, but the range of these groups’ 
activities is much wider. The conclusions that will de drawn concerning the 
historic bloc are very preliminary, but hope to illuminate some of the ways in 
which the global nuclear civil society addressed in this thesis has been 
interacting with the structural constraints of the nuclear order, here broken 
down as: states, populations, funders, and their geographical limitations. 
 
8.2.1.1 States 
It would be easy to imagine government-NGO relations in events like the 
NPT RevCon as distant and uncommunicative; instead the opposite is true. 
For sure many restrictions come with the UN badge marked with the ‘T’ of 
temporary or ‘N’ on NGO as opposed to the ‘D’ of delegate. The former are 
prohibited from taking the floor and attending certain sessions, and even 
barred from some areas of the building. At the 2015 RevCon, however, a lot 
took place where all classes of participants are allowed, demonstrating that 
states are willing to engage with civil society. Even more, a significant few 
states have included in their national delegations non-governmental 
representatives to receive assistance, but also a preferential point of access 
with other civil society constituencies.27 
																																																						
27	Some	examples	 of	 this	 phenomenon	 are	 Bill	 Potter	 for	 Kazakhstan,	Harald	Müller	 for	Germany,	
Patricia	Lewis	 for	the	UK,	but	also	Carlos	Umaña	for	Costa	Rica	and	Christian	Ciobanu	for	the	RMI.	
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Not only did most countries praise the role of civil society in their statements, 
but they also supported them in practice. The thirteen governmental 
briefings for NGOs organised throughout the four weeks of the conference 
are further proof of that. These are early sessions in which a national 
delegation or coalition sums up the status of negotiation allowing for 
questions from the floor, usually very crowded with civil society 
representatives. The countries or groups of countries involved in these 
briefings are all, in their own way, important reference points for NPT 
politics.28  
One indicator of state support for civil society’s activities at the NPT is their 
organisation of side events. These are open events, usually taking place 
during breaks of the RevCons and PrepComs in which panel presentations 
are followed by questions from the floor and tend to be well attended by the 
non-governmental community. Despite some exceptions, these also are some 
of the main actors in the NPT forum.	29 These events represent a chance for 
states to showcase their endorsement for certain proposals and to 
demonstrate their backing of a particular civil society organisation. Although 
convincing opposing sides to endorse their proposals remains the ultimate 
aim of most groups under examination, their events are often limited to like-
minded states or actors, with the result that most of the work is done 
																																																																																																																																																										
The	degree	of	involvement	and	consequently	satisfaction	for	this	kind	of	arrangements	has	greately	
varied,	 from	 what	 can	 be	 assessed	 by	 the	 author’s	 interviews	 with	 these	 individuals,	 such	 as	
Interview	n.	15,	May	13,	2015	and	Interview	n.	16,	April	30,	2015.	
28	These	 were	 Austria,	 France,	 Egypt,	 Ireland,	 Japan,	Mexico,	 South	 Africa,	 Sweden,	 UK,	 US,	 NAC,	
NPDI,	and	a	group	composed	of	Indonesia,	Thailand,	and	the	Philippines.	Governmental	briefings	for	
NGOs	occupied	a	slot	from	9	to	9:50	and	were	held	almost	each	morning	before	the	RevCon	starts	in	
a	little	room,	Conference	Room	C,	which	becomes	NGO-central	during	the	review	process.	
29	At	 the	 2015	 RevCon	 the	 states	 that	 organised	 or	 co-organised	 side	 events	 were	 the	 following:	
Argentina,	 Austria,	 Canada,	 China,	 Costa	 Rica,	 Denmark,	 Finland,	 France,	 Germany,	 Iraq,	 Ireland,	
Japan,	 Latvia,	Mexico,	 the	 Netherlands,	 New	 Zealand,	 Norway,	 Poland	 Russian	 Federation,	 Spain,	
Sweden,	Switzerland,	Trinidad	and	Tobago,	United	Kingdom,	United	States.	
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preaching to the converted. It often happened that events related to the ban 
campaign had only diplomats from friendly states present; similarly, NWS 
delegates were in many occasions in the audience of reductionist-inclined 
groups. 
As should be clear from the discussion of common sense, the states that 
support the reductionist approach, and its underlying deterrence regime, are 
the five nuclear-armed states recognised by the NPT, as the French 
statements illustrate. These, however, are also joined by a variety of states – 
mostly US allies – that still benefit from nuclear deterrence and speak in 
favour of step-by-step recipes. For instance, Australia, in response to the 159-
countries strong Austrian pledge, launched a competing working paper that 
obtained less than 30 endorsements. This created quite some confusion 
because of the similarity in the two countries’ names – so much so that the 
Dutch Foreign Minister himself fell victim of a major Freudian slip in his 
opening remarks, claiming support for the ‘Austrian pledge… hmmm, wait, 
the Australian one!’30  
Examples of coalitions that belong to the reductionist historic bloc include 
the de-alerting group, which focused on producing agreed language on 
reducing the operational ease of a nuclear strike, and the Non-Proliferation 
and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), a group of states close to the US that 
																																																						
30	Unfortunately,	the	text	only	contains	the	correct	language	in	support	of	the	Australian	statement,	
but	the	slip	of	tongue	was	personally	witnessed	by	the	author	and	confirmed	by	the	bemusement	it	
received	among	civil	society	at	the	conference.	Netherlands,	 ‘Speech	by	Bert	Koenders,	Minister	of	
Foreign	Affairs	of	the	Kingdom	of	the	Netherlands,’	2015	NPT	Review	Conference,	General	Debate,	
May	 27,	 2015,	 http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-
fora/npt/revcon2015/statements/27April_Netherlands.pdf	(last	accessed	30	June	2016).	
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attempted to build bridges between abolitionists and reductionists.31 The 
position of NPDI is particularly interesting here, because its statements 
include elements of both abolitionism and reductionism without explicitly 
recognising this tension. ‘We hope to contribute to a growing consensus that 
any perceived security or political advantages of nuclear weapons are 
outweighed by the grave threat they pose to humanity.’32 This unevenness 
and contradiction should not be seen as evidence of the limited explanatory 
power of the present framework. To the opposite, common sense is always in 
flux and never permanently acquired, with hybrid mutations produced by the 
tension among competing ideologies. Still, it is significant that NPDI 
supports nuclear sharing agreements, a clear indication that this group 
values positively the security benefits of nuclear deterrence.33 
Beyond the relatively high consistency of the reductionist camp, it is more 
interesting to inquire into the abolitionist historic bloc and the states and 
coalitions that support it. If most of the criticism in the previous section has 
regarded the complicit role of reductionist civil society in supporting the 
ideology of deterrence, the rest of this chapter will highlight the failure of the 
abolitionist camp to produce a coherent union of social forces. The creation 
of an abolitionist historic bloc has been in the making for several years. If 
during the Cold War many states felt that advancing nuclear disarmament 
could not proceed in the climate produced by the bipolar opposition, things 
changed in the 1990s. NAM states, to be fair, had promoted the goal since 
																																																						
31	The	Non-Proliferation	and	Disarmament	Initiative	is	a	coalition,	 launched	in	2010,	which	includes	
Australia,	 Canada,	 Chile,	 Germany,	 Japan,	 Mexico,	 Netherlands,	 Nigeria,	 the	 Philippines,	 Poland,	
Turkey,	and	the	United	Arab	Emirates.	
32	Non-Proliferation	 and	Disarmament	 Initiative,	 ‘Joint	 Statement	by	 Foreign	Ministers:	On	nuclear	
disarmament	and	non-proliferation,’	New	York,	September	22,	2010.		
33	NPDI	briefing,	May	11,	2015.	
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their very creation.34 However, many more states embraced their call, and 
more moderate ones at that. The creation of the New Agenda Coalition in 
1998 was a powerful signal: a group of medium powers from different regions 
of the world called for progress in nuclear disarmament in order to maintain 
alive the promise of the NPT grand bargain.35  
Ireland is a long-time champion of the cause, ever since in the 1960s it 
proposed at the General Assembly a text that would result in the negotiation 
of the NPT itself. Furthermore, in more recent times, several states have 
provided leadership and support for the humanitarian initiative, starting with 
Norway and Switzerland, and coming to include New Zealand, Mexico, 
Austria, South Africa and others. Both at the NPT and at the UN General 
Assembly, these states took the lead in sponsoring joint statements: from the 
statement strong of 16 states led by Switzerland at the 2012 PrepCom, to the 
one of 80 states coordinated by South Africa at the 2013 PrepCom, and the 
resolution introduced by New Zealand at the same year’s UNGA, which 
gained 155 endorsements. At the 2015 NPT RevCon, the joint statement 
presented by Austria reached 159 signatories. The states allied to the 
abolitionist community are a series of non-nuclear-weapon states that have 
made of nuclear disarmament a priority. Clearly not being part of a nuclear 
alliance is a crucial factor for being part of this bloc.  
																																																						
34	The	Non-Aligned	Movement	was	created	in	1961	to	 include	states	that	were	neutral	 in	the	East-
West	confrontation.	It	now	comprises	120	members	mostly	from	the	South.	For	an	investigation	of	
their	involvement	on	nuclear	issues	see	William	Potter	and	Gaukhar	Mukhatzhanova,	Nuclear	Politics	
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Norway has played a tremendously important role in the humanitarian 
initiative, providing funding and endorsement for its activities since early on. 
After Nayarit, however, Oslo has distanced itself from the abolitionist 
community and failed to give the humanitarian initiative continuing public 
support.36 South African delegates spoke vehemently at the 2015 RevCon 
about the need to fill the legal gap, including a powerful condemnation of the 
‘minority rule’ of nuclear politics, which won a long applause at the RevCon 
closing on May 23. However, Pretoria made clear it would not host in the 
near future any conference of the humanitarian initiative.37  The New Agenda 
Coalition (NAC) is a big abolitionist supporter, for instance, but it has 
refrained from wholeheartedly supporting the idea of a ban treaty. Most 
importantly, the ban proposal was not formally endorsed by Austria either. 
Vienna’s position is particularly relevant, because in the past few years it has 
grown to become the main champion of the humanitarian approach.  
These illustrious defections show that the abolitionist camp is struggling to 
create a historic bloc. In part this can be attributed to the power of the 
deterrence common sense, which has stymied proposals in the direction of 
disarmament. Nonetheless, another factor resides in the difficulty at 
obtaining internal coherence among the civil society proponents of the 
abolitionist approach. Even among fierce supporters of disarmament there is 
a dominant view, whose background ideas are becoming more widespread 
and less contested, and it can be observed that among abolitionists it is ICAN 
																																																						
36	Interview	n.	17,	April	30,	2014.	
37	Hopes	were	high	that	South	Africa	would	host	another	HINW	conference,	as	demonstrated	in	ICAN	
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website,	 October	 19,	 2015,	 http://www.wildfire-v.org/news2015.html	 (last	 accessed	 24	 October	
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that is acquiring a hegemonic role. Proponents say it is the one proposal that 
can win; in parallel, they have grown in numbers and professionalism. The 
way in which they represent the ban as the logical consequence of the faulty 
governance demonstrates an attempt at naturalizing ICAN’s specific policy 
prescription in the eyes of all the abolitionist community.  
Despite the variety of initiatives and policy proposals for the legal abolition of 
nuclear weapons, it is fair to say that the ban campaign has gained a 
hegemonic role, which remains highly contested. To explain its decision to 
distance itself from the humanitarian initiative, Norway cited the general 
association of the initiative with the proposal for a ban treaty.38 It should also 
be noted that the main global disarmament champion, the United Nations, 
has not given its full support to the ban idea. For disarmament the UN 
recognises five agreed upon standards: verifiability, transparency, 
irreversibility, universality, and the legally binding nature of commitments. 
Advocacy of a legal abolition on nuclear weapons conducted recently under 
the banner of ‘ban the bomb’ or similar, risks hampering the universality 
principle, UN sources have warned.39 
 
8.2.1.2 Popular mobilisation 
As has been seen so far, most of what civil society does in the NPT context is 
engage with states and other nongovernmental actors to publicise their 
message. If we compare this with the mass mobilisation of the 1980s 
described in Chapter Six, we can see that there has been a clear and 
																																																						
38	Richard	 Lennane,	 ‘Expediency	wins	 as	Norway	 abandons	 its	 humanitarian	 principles,’	Wildfire>_	
special	issue,	November	30,	2015.	
39	Virginia	Gamba,	Unfold	Zero	side	event,	New	York,	May	7,	2014.	
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significant shift in strategies. Maintaining political engagement on issues 
related to the bomb in the current situation is an issue reported by most 
people in the civil society community. People’s worries tend to centre around 
more tangible issues, whether global or local, for example the occupation of 
Palestine, as identified by Israeli disarmament advocates, or climate change 
and humanitarian emergencies, as many others pointed out. 
This is a problem both in terms of catalysing political involvement, but also 
for what concerns political opportunity. Regarding the latter, one should 
question whether items that in specific discussions are paramount maintain 
that status in more general engagements. To remain on the same example, 
this is evidenced for instance by the fact that almost no Middle Eastern state 
has raised the proposal for a zone free of WMD in the region when high-level 
delegations have met with President Obama. 40  The priority attached to 
nuclear issues, in fact, is simply overstated in nuclear-related diplomatic 
discussions, which necessarily focus on just one aspect of a more complex set 
of challenges. As for the former, both organisations dedicated to lobbying 
Washington’s decision-makers and organisers of grassroots activism 
lamented with the author that getting people mobilised for the cause of 
nuclear disarmament (whatever its definition) got harder since the end of the 
Cold War, with the associated reduction of the nuclear risk in popular 
perceptions.  
However, it should also be noticed that the appeal to populations is 
remarkably absent in the strategy of most organisations. Although many 
affirm their commitment to education, few activities in practice are like Peace 
																																																						
40	As	reported	in	a	Chatham	House	rule	discussion	on	the	sideline	of	the	RevCon.		
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Boat and the New York-based Hibakusha Stories. From the very start also 
Global Zero combined top-down and bottom-up initiatives, though the 
former has prevailed over the latter. Global Zero has a grassroots dimension 
in its student chapters at 150 universities and high schools. Its leadership 
recognised that ‘experts and former leaders so far are the ones who have had 
the influence’ in virtue of their ability to talk to decision-makers. It was also 
argued that ultimately you need a strong grassroots movement – while 
acknowledging, however, that such a movement ‘is not there yet’.41 Indeed, 
people at Global Zero conceded that before being able to run a grassroots 
movement to influence political change, it is first necessary to build it, and 
they ‘are not running it, but building it now.’42 
As far as top-down, Global Zero gives paramount importance to reports by 
“distinguished commissions”, and its 2015 New York side event served to 
launch the most recent one. Among their strategies we can identify a strong 
focus on high-level support by so-called “movement leaders” comprising the 
likes of Jimmy Carter and Mikhail Gorbachev as well as former foreign 
ministers, ambassadors, military officers, etc.	43 Relying on high-level support 
and direct lines of access with decision-makers is constructed as particularly 
relevant by this community, even beyond Global Zero.  
For instance, there is an expectation that, because of its clout, expertise, 
institutional knowledge, and personal contacts, ‘the Belfer Center is able to 
influence the executive.’44 The European Leadership Network, moreover, was 
purposefully created to gather authoritative voices in a network of political, 
																																																						
41	Interview	n.	12	June	1,	2015.	
42	Ibid.	
43	Gordon	Corera,	‘Group	Seeks	Nuclear	Weapons	Ban.’		
44	Interview	n.	13,	May	28,	2015.	
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military, and diplomatic leaders. As one of its key figures mentioned, ‘the 
most progressive things said in this field are said by people like myself who 
used to be something.’45 In a closed-door confidential meeting organised by 
an NPT member, the rationale for involving civil society representatives was 
laid out: these experts' involvement is important because they have an impact 
on public opinion as well as on decision-making, both in Washington and in 
the world.46   
Moreover, there has been a redirection in the priorities of many organisations 
that were or are working on nuclear disarmament. They have made an 
attempt at ‘finding opportunities to go out to other constituencies where they 
are’.47 Part of this was a progressive widening of the mission to include 
nuclear energy matters and even environmental issues. One of the oldest 
standing organisations, Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR), is a good 
example of this: it was concerned with nuclear war at its funding in 1962, 
grew to include nuclear power in 1978 and by 1990 had also incorporated 
environmental protection. 48  Moreover, it is significant that the lead 
publication on nuclear weapons politics, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
added the risk of climate change to that of nuclear explosion in its assessment 
of how close the world is to its traditional priority of averting a nuclear war. 
Among other things, this agenda enlargement has made it easier to accrue 
funding, as will be explained in the next section. 
 
																																																						
45	Des	Browne,	 intervention	at	NPT	2014	PrepCom	‘Change	 in	Action-	Overcoming	Barriers	to	Non-
Proliferation	in	the	Middle	East,’	May	8,	2014.	
46	Confidential	meeting,	May	8,	2014.	
47	Abolition	2000,	Annual	General	Meeting	Minutes	 (May	2015)	http://www.abolition2000.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/2015_agm_minutes.pdf	(last	accessed	29	June	2016).	
48	Interview	n.	2,	April	8,	2014.	
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8.2.1.3 Funding 
Beyond getting people involved, fund-raising has also become harder since 
the end of the Cold War, as stressed by members of global nuclear civil 
society from all sides of the spectrum. Foundations are the main source of 
support for civil society organisations working across the board, followed by 
states (generally through the MFA or some specialised agency), and, more 
marginally, by voluntary contributions. The generosity of foundations 
dramatically decreased since the 1990s, when the perceived risk of nuclear 
confrontation receded. While some funders went out of business completely, 
others continue to exist but are providing support for other issue areas like 
population control or poverty in developing countries. In Washington they 
worry that ‘Connect US closed, Ford and Hewlett pulled out, Colombe 
Foundation, that was especially for grassroots, pulled out, and even 
Ploughshares, which is the main funder shrunk.’ 49  The MacArthur 
Foundation, which used to fund a variety of organisations, turned its 
attention away from the issue for a while, though it is now back in and has a 
heavy focus on nuclear security.50 Smaller organisations like the Canadian 
Simons Foundation and the British Joseph Rowntree Foundation are some of 
the very few examples of non-US funders for this community. 
Ploughshares Fund is one of the main powerhouses of this galaxy, being one 
of the main funders of the business and probably the only one entirely 
devoted to nuclear matters. Moreover, it is highly embedded in the 
institutional power of the Washington political system. What makes it special 
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50	MacArthur	Foundation,	‘MacArthur	Announces	More	Than	$3	Million	in	Grants	to	Support	Efforts	
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is that it combines the role of funder and think tank, while also having an 
important media component. Ploughshares in fact took the lead in 
coordinating various campaigns working for a nuclear deal with Iran, which 
led its president, Joe Cirincione, to take credit for the 2015 success.  
Arms control experts, regional experts, ethnic groups, peace advocates, 
military leaders and countless others also supported this historic agreement. 
These groups and individuals were decisive in the battle for public opinion 
and as independent validators of the negotiated solutions. They all endorsed 
the deal, but they lacked a common platform – a network to exchange 
information and coordinate efforts. Ploughshares Fund provided that 
network.51 
An in-depth study of the role of Ploughshares in that case would be 
interesting ground for further research. 
Beyond high-impact campaigns such as the one around the Iran deal, getting 
funds for less mediatised issues has become a problem. Not only has the size 
of the funds available dwindled in the past decades, but also the whole 
structure has undergone some changes. If the funding for the Freeze 
campaign in the 1980s was organic, now most of it is project-based.52  
Foundations have also been increasingly asking for quantifiable means to 
assess the viability of projects. One of the criteria is to identify traces of 
language in official documents. This illuminates further the struggle that we 
have identified earlier in this and in the previous chapter on the negotiating 
input of civil society. A further criterion is to include individuals who tend to 
pass through the revolving doors of nuclear politics, which an interviewee 
exemplified with the figure of Robert Einhorn, who worked at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies before being appointed Special Adviser 
																																																						
51	Joe	Cirincione,	‘How	we	won:	The	story	behind	the	Iran	agreement	victory,’	Ploughshares	website,	
September	22,	2015,	http://ploughshares.org/iran-deal-victory	(last	accessed	26	June	2016).	
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for Nonproliferation and Arms Control in the State Department.53 There are 
countless other examples of such revolving-door behaviour at all levels of 
responsibility. 
The impression is that funders prioritise “validators” in their choices, 
attaching a premium to the credentials of those making the policy argument, 
thus preferring individuals who have worked in government or in the private 
sector.	54 According to an expert, NGOs simply do not bear much weight in 
the nuclear debate, because they are considered biased, as opposed to 
institutions like the Belfer Center, which instead is thought of as impartial.55 
Curiously, representatives of the reductionist camp are very quick in 
attributing partisanship to others, but very slow in seeing it in their own 
advocacy. A perfect example of a validator is the character of Valerie Plame, 
one of the godmothers of Global Zero and an often-employed nuclear 
celebrity in Washington. Before being fired in retaliation for her husband’s 
opposition to the Iraq war, Valerie Plame used to be a CIA operations officer 
working on nuclear weapons.56 She is described as being involved in ‘covert 
counter-nuclear proliferation to make sure the bad guys – whether terrorists 
or rogue nation states – did not get a nuclear capability.’57 It is upon this 
experience that her credibility for the Global Zero project is established.  
States have also taken a lead in funding civil society organisations or projects. 
Switzerland and Norway have been recognised by most interviewees as the 
																																																						
53	Interview	n.	19,	May	12,	2015.	
54	Interview	n.	13,	May	28,	2015.	
55	Ibid.		
56 	Global	 Zero,	 ‘Movement	 Leaders:	 Ms.	 Valerie	 Plame	 Wilson,’	 Global	 Zero	 website,	
http://www.globalzero.org/our-movement/leaders/ms-valerie-plame-wilson	 (last	 accessed	 26	
October	2016).	
57	Ploughshares,	‘Video:	Why	Do	We	Care	About	Nuclear	Weapons?,’	Newsletter	email,	December	1,	
2015.	
	 325	
two major funders for nuclear policy. The Fondation pour la recherche 
stratégique (FRS) and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), for 
instance, are entirely funded by France and Germany respectively. 58 
Similarly, the Egyptian Council on Foreign Affairs is supported only with 
Egyptian money, both public and private, because accepting foreign funds is 
seen as potentially limiting independence.59 Several organisations reported 
that they try not to restrict to just one governmental source because there is 
the potential for being pushed around.60 The possibility of strings attached to 
funding was also suggested by an interviewee who raised the issue that the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) would get 70% of its 
funding from one single, little country in the Gulf.61 It would be rather 
interesting to look deeper into the patterns of funding and check the extent of 
criticism that the funding governments get from different organisations. 
The same exercise would be interesting in the case of foundations as well, 
considering there is a feeling among many civil society representatives that 
they want to concentrate nuclear-related activity on certain issues and tactics. 
Funders, in fact, hold a big say in what direction a certain advocacy or 
research should go to be economically viable: ‘with any large funder 
organisation likely to be affected by osmosis if not by directive.’62 The risk is 
that foundations prioritise organisations by associating their funding 
priorities with certain proposals, or even buzzwords like humanitarian or 
nuclear security. IPPNW representatives, for instance, have lamented that 
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‘some foundations decided not to fund us for our support of the humanitarian 
campaign.’63 Moreover, given the paramount role of US foundations, foreign 
proposals have a lower rate of success, sometimes simply because they would 
choose a US organisation for it is easier to execute the grant.64 
While a more thorough analysis would certainly deliver more nuanced 
results, it is quite evident that reductionist approaches that privilege the 
ideology of deterrence, or that do not openly challenge it, are much better 
able to secure the funding needed for their projects. 
 
8.2.1.4 Local vs. global 
Connected to the matter of funding, another issue raised by many civil society 
representatives was their uneasiness when a movement was seen as the 
emanation of a particular state. This was an issue early on for the nuclear 
weapons convention community, for instance, which found it ‘very difficult to 
get diplomats to read, engage and criticise’ the model convention they had 
written because it was perceived as a NAM text.65 On the other side of the 
spectrum, Global Zero had to struggle to shrug off the image of being a US-
only campaign: with its two American co-founders and a plan of action 
heavily focused on US-Russian engagement, it was indeed a difficult task.  
Although many have shown willingness to advance international proposals, 
there is a general belief that domestic lobbying is more relevant. For US 
groups, for example, the main focus of activities has been Washington, DC 
because of the idea that the US Congress is where things happen and where 
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political change can be influenced more easily.66 ICAN also relies on domestic 
lobbying to a great extent, favouring the engagement of governments and 
parliaments directly by its local partners. This extends now to 95 states, and 
in some cases it is aided by an ICAN point of contact, though the absence of 
representatives in Russia and China is recognised as a significant gap.67   
The reason for the prominence of local over global fora is to be found also in 
the ineffectiveness of multilateral institutions dedicated to disarmament, 
what is commonly referred to as the “UN disarmament machinery.” The 
Conference on Disarmament, which is the body designated by the UN to 
negotiate disarmament agreements, has been deadlocked since 1998. Despite 
the reduced membership, it proved impossible to agree upon even a shared 
agenda because of the operation under consensus rule. In the lead-up to 2015 
two additional new fora were instrumental for the discussion of nuclear 
disarmament: the high-level meeting of the General Assembly and the first 
session of the open-ended working group (OEWG) on nuclear disarmament. 
Both operated under General Assembly rules of procedure, that is voting was 
allowed, thus overcoming the usual stumbling block of the consensus rule. In 
a similar vein, ICAN has pointed out the need for a forum ‘open to all and 
blockable by none’.68 
Whether or not a new forum for disarmament will bring more results than 
the existing ones remains to be seen. What is evident from the previous 
discussion is that there is a tension between the global and the national 
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moments of nuclear civil society. Since the United States is so paramount in 
nuclear politics globally, many global initiatives are still markedly national. 
This shows how resistant cultural differences remain in defining the 
boundaries of identificability. Further research could help mapping the 
geographic distribution of a sentiment opposed to nuclear weapons as well as 
the specific local characteristics. 
 
8.2.2 Struggling to create a historic bloc 
To conclude, there are a couple of considerations that can be made on the 
historic bloc’s concept application to civil society in the NPT context in terms 
of unity and of target. Clearly there is not a concerted effort at building a 
single historic bloc of disarmament advocates and the construction of the 
historic bloc is not undergoing that deep and wide engagement with society 
at large that ultimately is needed to change the status quo. 
Regarding the issue of unity, it has been reported that ‘[t]here is a 
complicated history of rivalry and distrust among various groups working on 
these issues.’69  Indeed, civil society groups are not building an integrated 
historic bloc; they are divided among themselves even within the same 
governance mode, but even more across the deterrence-disarmament divide. 
ICAN’s approach has created some tension within civil society as many are 
unconvinced of the utility of a treaty that does not include the possessors and 
beneficiaries of nuclear weapons. If on the one hand ICAN’s intense push for 
the ban produced a coalition by being able to promote a singular and easily 
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understandable aim, it has also created great divisions within the same 
abolitionist camp. According to ICAN’s leadership, civil society needs to work 
on the grassroots, expert, political, and scientific levels – ‘they don’t need to 
work together but all are needed.’70 
This is not the first time that civil society at the NPT splits. In 1995 there was 
a significant difference of views regarding the extension – as Johnson noted, 
civil society ‘divided as sharply as did governments over this issue.’71 For 
example, PSR favoured saving the treaty, being the only one with a 
disarmament obligation, while the German branch of IPPNW feared that an 
indefinite extension would mean giving up a leaver for disarmament.72  That 
same division between radical and accommodating approaches, or between 
abolitionists and reductionists, is still alive today. In sum, as stated by one 
long-time activist, in the anti-nuclear movement ‘the differences are 
significant and material.’73 Instead, all these groups should be encouraged to 
address their differences rather than hiding behind them, or they risk to 
undermine the commonality of their aims. 
In terms of the problem of target, civil society appears to be building the 
historic bloc in all the wrong places. In most approaches seen so far the focus 
of attention has been on decision-makers either local or global, by both 
abolitionists and reductionists. Sure it is more practical to convince 
diplomats and much nicer to work at the UN rather than among the masses, 
but a true change in the ‘common people’ perceptions of nuclear weapons 
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would need to emerge in order to make any international legal milestone 
meaningful and sustainable. So long as deterrence keeps holding power in 
the minds of people everywhere it will be unimaginable to overturn its legal 
infrastructure. More should be done to understand what the public knows 
and believes about nuclear weapons, as well as to spread information and 
focus campaigns among the wider population instead of aiming mostly at the 
top-down approach. 
This requires also a reassessment of the terminology used in this thesis. As 
explained in the research design, civil society working on NPT issues is a very 
limited proxy to gauge into the politics of cultural support for nuclear order. 
The discussions within the NPT tend to be extremely self-referential and with 
little practical relevance for the people at large, resulting in a very limited 
representativeness (both nationally and globally) for the NGOs and other 
organisations that were examined here. In reality this actor is indeed very 
different from the multifaceted image of the civil society from the Gramscian 
analysis. The national-popular, or in our case, the ‘global-popular’ is to be 
looked for in history schoolbooks, pop music, and everyday conceptions. 
Clearly the texts analysed in this thesis are much more removed from this 
sphere of consciousness and can thus only illuminate the higher 
philosophical superstructures rather than the common cultural ones. If we 
are to think of Global Zero and ICAN as the organic intellectuals of Gramsci, 
being directly involved in propagating their groups’ ideology to the masses, 
we should advise them to keep in mind the importance of being part of the 
society one is trying to alter.  
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8.3 Conclusion 
Because of its nature, nuclear governance is said to be not very open to the 
emergence of a mass-based resistance in which organic intellectuals 
challenge statist conceptions with the support of civil society.1 However, 
more care should be taken in emphasising the distinctions therein. Civil 
society is relevant not only for the extent and quality of its activities, but also 
because of the complex relationship that links it to other actors, namely 
states, institutions, business, and media. Moreover, it is the ideological 
component of civil society activism that is particularly well positioned to 
produce new insights. Ideational factors are the underlying drivers of the 
evolution of global nuclear weapons rule.  
In the world of civil society active within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty there are several positions of power, seen as the ability of a civil 
society group to get states to do what they want. It is important to note that, 
because the NPT is a diplomatic context in which states are the ultimate 
decision-makers, civil society exercises power to the extent to which it is able 
to influence states’ rhetoric and practice. This is multifaceted and covers 
several of the classical definitions of power. First of all it is a matter of 
resources: organisations that are present at the Review Conference and are 
there in large numbers have more of a chance to affect the discussions at the 
Conference, for instance by lobbying states to accept new more progressive 
wordings. In addition, how well endowed the groups are has a direct effect on 
their ability to pursue political change, as funding allows effective 
mobilisation – organising events, paying travel costs to speakers, producing 
better information material, etc.  
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Secondly, some of this power depends on the resonance enjoyed by civil 
society’s arguments. In order to influence states, a group must be perceived 
as legitimate, and this can only happen if there is a degree of alignment with 
the views of the state to be influenced. Given the normative variance of 
nuclear governance, such a discriminant can lead in an opposite direction: 
clearly a more marked abolitionist standpoint would resonate well with states 
that have made of nuclear restraint their overarching policy; on the contrary, 
a group that supports deterrence and its mitigation through risk-reduction 
policies is likely to score points among states that base their security upon 
deterrence.  
Finally, one further dimension to the power of NGOs and similar organisms 
derives from their ability to control the agenda. While in the diplomatic 
negotiation context of the NPT review process civil society does not have a 
say on what the states will discuss, it is nonetheless an important contributor 
to the discussion on its margins. As seen before, between civil society session 
and side events, non-state groups have several moments of interaction with 
the broader conference, but who gets represented in these instances is a 
crucial marker of power. This last dimension shows us markedly how the 
struggle in which civil society finds itself involved is not only vis-à-vis the 
states or international organizations to be influenced – it is also and 
importantly a competition within a community that, at least to a certain 
extent, seeks the same money and visibility. 
This chapter has demonstrated the pervasive character of contestation within 
the nuclear civil society realm. With the help of an analysis indebted to 
Gramscian thought, it has demonstrated that, while seemingly united for the 
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elimination of nuclear weapons, groups draw on different ideological 
positions, which in certain cases can be interpreted as instances of common 
sense. Building upon the insights on civil society’s nuclear disarmament 
frames of Chapter Seven, we have inquired into the common sense nature of 
reductionist and abolitionist narratives and the historic bloc to which they 
belong. This chapter has shown that the narratives of disarmament 
constructed by different NPT-active civil society groups are widely different, 
in a way that is similar to the fundamental divide between a regime of 
disarmament and one of deterrence. The hegemony of nuclear deterrence is 
evidenced by the fact that among civil society there are groups that, perhaps 
unwittingly, support its ideological regime. In turn, with the centrality these 
same groups have to policy circles, they contribute to reinforcing the 
operation of deterrence. As the example of Global Zero shows, part of civil 
society actually advocates policies rather similar to the dominant deterrence-
centred paradigm supported by the nuclear weapon states. ICAN’s campaign 
instead indicates that if the referent object of security is taken to be humanity 
the nuclear order status quo itself becomes the problem, showing that 
alternative conceptualisations are possible. 
Moreover, in the second part of this chapter we have shifted from the initial 
hermeneutical attention, with a section on the historic bloc that combined 
language with materiality in an attempt to bring forward that dialogue 
between critical constructivism and Gramscian theory put forward in Chapter 
Five. Both linguistic and non-linguistic practices are recognised by both 
trends as relevant, though more analytic attention has gone to the former 
rather than the latter. Such a turn positions this thesis in a middle ground 
	 334	
between post-structuralist and structuralist accounts. The outlook of Gramsci 
himself, from what can be understood of his thought in his fragmentary 
Prison Notebooks, is precisely halfway between the hard determinism of 
historical course and the productive hermeneutics of ideas. In his own words, 
'the material forces would be inconceivable historically without the form and 
the ideologies would be individual fancies without the material world.'74  
‘To lay bare the nature of a particular historic bloc is to demystify the state 
and open the possibility of constructing an alternative historic bloc and thus 
an alternative state.’75  Such an exercise is more necessary than ever, as 
described in the Introduction: the crisis of deterrence and proliferation are 
being in fact accompanied by a crisis of disarmament, in which it is coming to 
mean everything and nothing. This thesis is merely a sketch of what could be 
done when thinking of nuclear civil society in terms of its involvement in the 
production of common sense, but more is needed in order to better focus the 
current cases, differentiate the various strands as well as show the discursive 
and practical connections with state institutions. 
This analysis has shown that the claim for nuclear disarmament is based on 
morality, for the abolitionists, and for security, according to the reductionists. 
On the one hand, the abolitionists’ focus on morality incurs the problem of 
not taking into consideration the perceived benefits of nuclear weapons for a 
part of the international community. On the other, reductionists’ focus on 
security leads to an underrepresentation of the concerns of those states and 
actors that have renounced nuclear weapons. In sum, both perspectives have 
something to offer in terms of ideas for the management of the nuclear order, 
																																																						
74	Antonio	Gramsci,	Selections	from	the	Prison	Notebooks	of	Antonio	Gramsci,	377.	
75	Robert	W.	Cox,	Production,	Power,	and	World	Order:	Social	Forces	in	the	Making	of	History,	6.	
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but both are aiming only to one sub-set of nuclear governance. A 
fundamental problem with the community of civil society preoccupied with 
nuclear weapons is that it is not involved in one integrated conversation. 
Instead, it carries forward different interpretations of what is the problem 
with nuclear weapons and provides policy solutions that only address one 
side of it.  
I have argued that the way in which nuclear weapons are conceptualised and 
narrated by civil society can help us understand this fundamental distinction. 
As described in previous chapters, the normative diversity of the nuclear 
order results in a fragmented system whereby a regime of deterrence lives 
side by side with a regime of disarmament. These are the foundations of 
those common sense ideologies that the reductionist and abolitionist camp of 
civil society respectively propagate. In practice these communities act as if 
only one part of the deterrence-disarmament spectrum described above 
existed, effectively talking past each other. The first group does not question 
the morality of a nuclear order based on deterrence, while the second does 
not question the security repercussions of one based upon disarmament.  
The tension identified by this thesis is underplayed by civil society 
representatives. ICAN and Global Zero, two movements that are confronted 
and contrasted by the present work, have indeed collaborated at times. For 
instance, Bruce Blair addressed two of the conferences of the HINW. 
Moreover, on more than one occasion, members from the two communities 
were seen speaking favourably of the mutually supporting nature of their 
initiatives.76 The purpose here is not to contradict that, but to highlight that, 
																																																						
76	One	example	was	the	nuclear	disarmament	working	group	of	the	2015	Pugwash	Conference.	
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beyond the political preference for step-by-step or comprehensive 
approaches, there is a deeper divide. This thesis claims that it is necessary to 
engage on that issue if one is to see a more unified movement for nuclear 
disarmament, or even just a more clear debate on it.  
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Chapter 9  
 
Conclusion 
 
On October 27, 2016, just as this thesis was about to be finished, the UN 
General Assembly adopted a resolution mandating actions to bring to reality 
one of the plans for nuclear disarmament examined in these pages.1 With 
that, the UN decided ‘to convene in 2017 a United Nations conference to 
negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading 
towards their total elimination’. 2  Adopted with 123 votes in favour, 38 
opposed, and 16 abstentions,3 this milestone resolution demonstrated the 
relevance and political urgency of the themes developed by this thesis. Most 
importantly, it proved once again how deep the divide is in the attitudes 
towards the bomb.  A negotiating mandate with a grounding in the language 
on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons would have been 
unthinkable a few years ago, yet now it is a reality supported by a strong 
majority. How the process will go forward is yet to be seen, as is the counter-
strategy of those opposed to nuclear disarmament, but what is certain is that 
																																																						
1	To	be	precise,	the	First	Committee	of	the	UN	General	Assembly	approved	the	draft	resolution	L41,	
co-sponsored	by	a	group	of	countries	close	to	the	humanitarian	initiative.	The	General	Assembly	is	
set	to	approve	the	resolution	later	in	2016.		
2	United	Nations	General	Assembly,	‘General	and	complete	disarmament:	taking	forward	multilateral	
nuclear	disarmament	negotiations,’	First	Committee,	Seventy-first	Session,	A/C.1/71/L.41,	October	
14,	2016,	http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/C.1/71/L.41	(last	accessed	28	
October	2016).	
3	Ben	Doherty,	‘UN	votes	to	start	negotiating	treaty	to	ban	nuclear	weapons,’	The	Guardian,	October	
28,	2016,	https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/28/un-votes-to-start-negotiating-treaty-
to-ban-nuclear-weapons	(last	accessed	28	October	2016).	
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the second nuclear age is seeing a new degree of contestation. Indeed, this 
last development made it all the more apparent that disarmament advocates 
have the most convincing message, whereas the supporters of deterrence are 
on the defensive, as Booth had noted.4  
The culture of nuclearism, with its reliance on the bomb for national security, 
has been examined here with reference to civil society, but a broader 
theoretical conclusion that can be drawn is that such culture is in a state of 
crisis. It appears increasingly contested because of the growing wedge 
between those who believe in nuclear deterrence as a way to eliminate war, 
and those who see such a choice as immoral. Indeed, the nuclear common 
sense is certainly shifting if so many states could come to affirm they want to 
start negotiating nuclear disarmament, even in the absence of the nuclear-
armed. This is a very important development for the governance of nuclear 
weapons, showing that the reliance on the bomb is getting unstable from a 
cultural perspective. Whereas it is way too early to affirm that a post-
nuclearist forma mentis is developed, this has at least taken hold among the 
scores of states that decided to reject the possession of the bomb as well as in 
the minds of those who advocate against it. The UN vote of October 2016 has 
reaffirmed this identity distinction by revealing who stands in which camp. 
Such a crucial dimension, however, has not been appropriately tackled in 
nuclear studies, mostly interested in explaining how deterrence works to 
prevent nuclear threats and how nuclear threats can emerge in the form of 
proliferation. Not convinced by realist accounts of the nuclear reality,5 
																																																						
4	Ken	Booth,	‘Nuclearism,	Human	Rights	and	Constructions	of	Security	(Part	1),’	20.	
5	While	the	literature	on	nuclear	issues	from	a	realist	perspective	may	be	too	wide	to	be	treated	
together,	the	rationalism	and	state-centric	nature	of	this	inquiry	remains	a	common	point.	For	
	 339	
presented as the result of a series of rational choices, this project sided with 
those affirming the importance of norms, ideas, and patterns of thinking in 
the exercise of nuclear politics. As Schell famously put it, the bomb exists in 
the mind first of all,6 thus it is in a cultural analysis that we can find an 
answer to the important questions regarding the existence of nuclear 
weapons and how to change that. The approach to the nuclear problem 
offered by this thesis stands opposed to most mainstream takes, which 
typically are rationalist, US-focused, and often imbued with a problem-
solving intent. Instead, Strategies of Disarmament turned all those tenets on 
their head, adopting an interpretive approach that prioritises the global level 
of interaction rather than a particular country, and that maintains a critical 
edge. As such, this work contributed to the theoretical literature on nuclear 
weapons in two ways: 1) by further defining what is meant by nuclear 
governance, and 2) by being the first to apply to that reality concepts drawn 
from Antonio Gramsci. 
The benefit of that approach has been a sensitivitiy to the contribution of all 
those non-state forms of collective organisations active on the nuclear politics 
front, which allowed to make an empirical contribution as well. Examining 
the 2015 NPT RevCon process, in fact, the analysis showed that there is 
growing momentum for nuclear disarmament and that this is so also thanks 
to the role played by civil society. Now the process that culminated (for the 
time being) in the aforementioned UN resolution, demonstrates once again 
that civil society is an important part of the picture. Non-governmental 
groups have catalysed discussion, spread information, and to a degree 
																																																																																																																																																										
examples	from	the	deterrence	literature	see,	on	all,	Thomas	Shelling,	The	Strategy	of	Conflict	and	
concerning	proliferation	Kenneth	Waltz,	‘Nuclear	Myth	and	Political	Reality.’		
6	Jonathan	Schell,	The	Seventh	Decade,	34.	
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mobilised public opinion. They have also worked side by side with 
governmental representatives of friendly states to devise coordinated 
approaches and divide tasks. As Figure 9 shows, representatives of 
abolitionist civil society have owned that development, attesting to the effort 
they have put into this long process.7 
																																																						
7	It	has	not	been	discussed	in	depth	in	this	thesis	because	the	focus	was	the	2015	NPT	Review	
Conference,	but	the	UN	vote	on	resolution	L41	is	the	end	of	a	longer	process,	only	briefly	referred	to.	
The	UN	General	Assembly	had	mandated	already	in	2012	the	formation	of	an	open-ended	working	
group	to	advance	the	discussion	of	disarmament,	which	met	throughout	2013.	In	2015	it	launched	a	
second	OEWG,	which	held	three	sets	of	talks	in	2016	and	concluded	with	a	report	that	
recommended	the	start	of	disarmament	negotiation	the	following	year.		
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Figure	9:	Tweets	after	the	UN	General	Assembly	resolution,	27	October	20168	
 
What this points to is that the politics of nuclear weapons at present cannot 
be understood in their entirety if we do not also look at the input that actors 
other than the state have, as even civil society can contribute to a change in 
the governance of nuclear weapons. This is not to take an idealist position 
that expects the reliance on the bomb to be simply dropped because Austria 
and others have said so. Surely powerful forces (from the military to business 
																																																						
8	Author’s	own	Twitter	feed,	a	few	hours	after	the	vote	on	October	27,	2016.	
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interests germane to the nuclear infrastructure) will be working against these 
developments, and entrenched positions will be hard to challenge. Yet, this 
thesis demonstrated that the role of these non-governmental forces should be 
recognised and their input assessed. This point is certainly not lost on many 
of the scholars reviewed here, particularly those who wrote on civil society 
and security governance. However, it is an important addition to the field of 
nuclear studies, in which the supremacy of the state is assumed. More should 
be done to map the activities and inclinations of civil society in other global 
fora as well as in their domestic realities if we are to understand the stimuli 
under which nuclear governance operates. 
The strength of a Gramscian analysis rests on its vision of a struggle of social 
forces competing for dominance through the linguistic and cultural exercise 
of providing alternative versions of common sense in which others can 
recognise themselves. In this day and age we find ourselves in a nuclear 
interregnum, in which the old deterrence-based common sense still holds, 
but is increasingly challenged by the supporters of a regime of disarmament, 
who see a world free of nuclear weapons as an urgent, not just distant, 
priority. Since the end of the Cold War, the nuclear risk appears to have 
receded, seemingly relegated to the ‘dustbin of history’ because of the end of 
the bipolar – and nuclear-armed – confrontation. The removal of the nuclear 
danger from the sphere of cognition of most individuals generated a degree of 
passivity that changed the face of contemporary global nuclear civil society. 
Indeed, this community is now vastly different from the waves of activism 
during the Cold War, with the massive marches and local meetings that 
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characterised it. Still, organised collective action remains important though 
more so in global diplomatic reunions than in the everyday practice. 
This thesis has inquired into that by questioning the drivers of the current 
nuclear disarmament activism. Such has not been an attempt at providing a 
normative pointer as to what direction the governance of nuclear weapons 
should take, but rather at highlighting the political role of such activism 
through rigorous empirical research. What it aimed to achieve was producing 
insights on the changing nature of the nuclear common sense through a 
direct analysis of civil society and its transformational potential. The 
theoretical framework employed, combining critical nuclear scholarship, 
critical constructivist approaches to security, and Gramsci’s insights on civil 
society, allowed us to ground the analysis on an understanding of the nuclear 
reality centred around ideas and narratives.  Whilst that combination has 
been productive of insights and largely coherent, it also created problems in 
some respects. In particular, an entirely Gramscian analysis would have 
required a more through examination of the economic bases of the civil 
society groups analysed here. Such is a limitation of the present study, but 
also an avenue for further research.9 
This analysis of nuclear civil society has been an exercise at criticism 
conducted in the interest of understanding how much the seemingly 
progressive ideas of disarmament advocates have interiorised dominant 
conceptions about the utility of nuclear arms and their political functioning. 
As such, global nuclear civil society has been unpacked here according to the 
ideological aim of their contestation, or the meaning they have ascribed to 
																																																						
9	Other	avenues	of	further	research	have	been	detailed	in	Chapter	Eight	when	discussing	the	various	
dimensions	of	the	struggle	to	create	a	historic	bloc.	
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nuclear disarmament. Through the analysis of the different frames that 
global nuclear civil society employed in its advocacy, this thesis has been in a 
position to show the tension underlying this community. Considering that 
this is already fraught with infights, the purpose was not fomenting further 
tension, but rather opening the space for a dialogue among diverging 
positions for the benefit of the community at large. It is not unprecedented 
that non-governmental organisations struggle with one another, but what is 
specific about this situation is that such division is underplayed and often 
unacknowledged. 
The strategies of those groups that seek reductions should be separated from 
those that aim for abolition, according to this research, because theirs is not 
just a difference in approach, but also in ideological positioning regarding the 
nuclear risk. Strategies of Disarmament has demonstrated that the 
construction of the nuclear threat operated by reductionist and abolitionist 
groups do not coincide and each builds on rhetorical material that can hardly 
be harmonized. That is because they relate to the common sense conceptions 
on the nuclear order in totally different ways. The reductionists quietly 
support it with their statements defining the nuclear threat as an issue of 
rogue states and terrorism as well as supporting disarmament through a 
step-by-step process centred on the reduction of great power arsenals. This 
orientation, it has been argued, is the same common-sensical notion that has 
been advanced since the end of the Cold War, largely as an effort to find a 
new meaning to nuclear weapons. This shows that civil society has at times 
aided that process of redefining, by throwing its weight behind the new 
nuclear security conception of the risk stemming from the bomb. 
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The construction operated by the abolitionists, instead, markedly differs. 
They claim that the bomb poses a threat to all of humanity and that, in order 
to tackle it, even the least powerful have a role to play in supporting the 
comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons. Not only is the referent 
object an unusual one for a field so marked by national security as nuclear 
politics, but the response also runs counter much of the taken-for-granted 
assumptions about international order. Aided by critical constructivist 
methodological guidance, the thesis affirmed that this frame contestation 
produced silences and hierarchies among more or less resonant discourses. 
Far from more mainstream constructivist interpretations of nuclear politics, 
it is not so much the spread of norms that preoccupied this project; instead it 
is the revelation that power is in action even among those that are seemingly 
most detached from it.   
Such a cleavage at the level of civil society goes to contribute to the situation 
in which nuclear disarmament acquires a shifty meaning, numeric reductions 
for some and abolition treaties for others. For this project, this is a crucial 
point, for it is what has prevented the creation of a unified historic bloc 
among the NPT-attending nuclear civil society. Such fragmentation is a 
problem, if one follows a Gramscian logic, because it subtracts significantly 
from the contribution these social forces could provide if they were united. In 
the NPT Review Conference context, the reductionists can count on the 
endorsement of those states associated with the step-by-step recipe to 
nuclear disarmament, while some abolitionists are actively involved in the 
humanitarian project to ‘fill the legal gap’ of disarmament. The illustrious 
defections from this camp come to demonstrate the difficulty of building a 
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historic bloc upon a counter-hegemonic narrative of humanitarianism that is 
quite far apart from prevailing security conceptions. The UN vote for 
negotiating disarmament in 2017 demonstrates that the consistency of the 
abolitionist historic bloc is all but assured, as important proponents of 
nuclear disarmament like Norway and Switzerland have abstained from the 
resolution. The social forces in support of abolition might have lost some 
pieces, or maybe the shifting of common sense has only just started and these 
states will reverse their stance. Moreover, the difficulty of obtaining internal 
consistency within civil society organisations from the abolitionist camp 
remains an issue, though one that might be progressively solved in light of 
the UN mandate. 
The theoretical and methodological choices adopted by this work have 
allowed productive results, though some issues deserve to be fleshed out. 
While the examination of common sense could build upon critical 
constructivist methodologies, the analysis of the historic blocs of nuclear 
governance was based upon a less mediated application of Gramscian 
thought to the nuclear reality. NPT-active civil society representatives have 
been taken to bear a part in the construction of those abolitionist and 
reductionist historic blocs. Clearly here the metaphor whereby an organised 
group of non-governmental actors engaged with a diplomatic process is taken 
to represent civil society exposes its problems. Gramsci posited the necessity 
to analyse cultural domination in the many spontaneous collective actors that 
operate within a state by examining organised religions, trade unions, media, 
and schools, among others. The creation and, crucially, the spread of 
common sense related to nuclear weapons does happen in those institutions 
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at large, and a more encompassing study of those locales at a transnational 
level would be a welcome contribution. What this thesis has shown is indeed 
only one face of that larger picture. Still, the analysis of the interaction of 
collective non-profit groups with the 2015 NPT Review Conference is a telling 
example of that broader global nuclear civil society. 
Another area that would deserve further work is at the theoretical level for 
what concerns the process of interpellation: if it is quite clear that articulating 
messages can take different forms and many instruments, both quantitative 
and qualitative, are available to the interested scholar, the same depth cannot 
be found in the case of interpellation. As such, the resonance of a certain 
message can certainly be established through many examples and anecdotes, 
but more effort should be made at specifying what should be in place in order 
to argue that a certain community has been hailed in by a message. In this 
move from the ideal world of discourses to the material one of people and 
organisations lays a central issue for interpretative analyses.  
In sum, this thesis does have limitations, but it also provided an original 
contribution on the ideological nature of nuclear governance and the role of 
civil society in the struggle to define nuclear weapons risks. Whether the 
bomb will keep its relevance in the years to come remains to be seen what we 
can say is that most likely there will be civil society working on both sides of 
that ideological struggle.  
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Appendix A 
 
Civil Society at the 2015 Review 
Conference of the NPT 
 
I. Statistics on civil society participation in the 2015 Review Conference of the 
NPT 
 
The data presented here was sent to the author by Soo-Hyun Kim, Political 
Affairs Officer, Information and Outreach Branch, UN Office for 
Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). A specification is to be made: this data does 
not give a completely accurate picture because there are NGOs that have 
annual passes through ECOSOC, for instance, who went straight to the 
conference without having to inform UNODA since they already have access 
to UN grounds. Email exchange: June 4–9, 2016.  
The data is reported as it was transmitted by the UNODA; the graphs and 
the lists of top countries are the author’s own elaboration. 
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Registered organisations 
 
Regional distribution of registered organisations 
REGIONAL	DISTRIBUTION	
Africa	 3	
Asia	 20	
Europe	 40	
Latin	America	and	Caribbean	 3	
North	America	 31	
Oceania	 4	
Unknown	 1	
TOTAL	 102	
 
 
 
Country distribution of registered organisations 
COUNTRY	DISTRIBUTION	
Argentina	 3	
Australia	 2	
Austria	 1	
Belgium	 3	
Canada	 4	
China	 1	
Czech	Republic	 1	
Africa	
Asia	
Europe	
Laân	America	and	Caribbean	
North	America	
Oceania	
	 350	
Egypt	 1	
France	 2	
Germany	 9	
Greece	 1	
Italy	 1	
Japan	 16	
Netherlands	 1	
New	Zealand	 2	
Norway	 3	
Poland	 1	
Republic	of	Korea	 3	
Russian	Federation	 1	
Serbia	 1	
South	Africa	 1	
Sweden	 2	
Switzerland	 4	
Togo	 1	
United	Kingdom	of	Great	Britain	and	Northern	Ireland	 9	
United	States	of	America	 27	
TOTAL	 	 101	
 
 
 
The top countries by number of registered organisations 
COUNTRY	DISTRIBUTION	 	
United	States	of	America	 27	
Japan	 16	
Germany	 9	
United	Kingdom	of	Great	Britain	and	Northern	Ireland	 9	
Canada	 4	
Switzerland	 4	
Argentina	 3	
Belgium	 3	
Norway	 3	
Republic	of	Korea	 3	
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Registered representatives 
 
Regional distribution of registered representatives 
REGIONAL	DISTRIBUTION	
Africa	 18	
Asia	 426	
Europe	 294	
Latin	America	and	Caribbean	 20	
North	America	 373	
Oceania	 20	
TOTAL	 1151	
 
 
 
Country distribution of registered representatives 
COUNTRY	DISTRIBUTION	
Argentina	 5	
Australia	 13	
Austria	 9	
Bahrain	 1	
Belgium	 6	
Brazil	 5	
Cameroon	 2	
Canada	 15	
China	 3	
Africa	
Asia	
Europe	
Laân	America	and	Caribbean	
North	America	
Oceania	
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Colombia	 1	
Costa	Rica	 2	
Czech	Republic	 2	
Denmark	 1	
Ecuador	 1	
Egypt	 5	
France	 99	
Germany	 70	
Ghana	 1	
India	 3	
Indonesia	 1	
Iraq	 2	
Ireland	 1	
Israel	 1	
Italy	 10	
Japan	 374	
Jordan	 5	
Latvia	 1	
Marshall	Islands	 1	
Mexico	 6	
Netherlands	 6	
New	Zealand	 5	
Nigeria	 2	
Norway	 17	
Pakistan	 4	
Philippines	 1	
Republic	of	Korea	 17	
Romania	 1	
Russian	Federation	 7	
Senegal	 3	
Serbia	 2	
South	Africa	 2	
Sri	Lanka	 4	
Sweden	 11	
Switzerland	 11	
Thailand	 10	
Togo	 1	
Turkey	 1	
Uganda	 1	
Ukraine	 1	
United	Kingdom	of	Great	Britain	and	Northern	Ireland	 39	
United	States	of	America	 358	
Zambia	 1	
TOTAL	 1151	
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The top countries by number of registered representatives 
COUNTRY	OF	ORIGIN	 	
Japan	 374	
United	States	of	America	 358	
France	 99	
Germany	 70	
United	Kingdom		 39	
Norway	 17	
Republic	of	Korea	 17	
Canada	 15 
Australia	 13 
Sweden	 11 
Switzerland	 11 
Thailand	 10 
Italy	 10 
 
 
 
Gender distribution of registered representatives 
GENDER	DISTRIBUTION	
Male	 545	
Female	 559	
Unknown	 2	
TOTAL	 1106	
Male	
Female	
Unknown	
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II. List of the organisations of civil society participating in the 2015 Review 
Conference of the NPT 
 
What follows is the official NPT Review Conference list of NGO participants, 
2015NPT/CONF.2015/INF/4, available online at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.201
5/INF/4 (last accessed 2 November 2016). 
  
    NPT/CONF.2015/INF/4 
2015 Review Conference of the Parties 
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons 
 
Distr.: General 
14 April 2015 
 
English only 
 
 
15-05891 (E)    140415     
*1505891*   
New York, 27 April-22 May 2015 
 
 
 
  List of non-governmental organizations 
 
 
1. Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy 
2. Action des Citoyens pour le Désarmement Nucléaire 
3. Arms Control Association (ACA) 
4. Article 36 Limited  
5. Asociacion de Lucha para el Desarme Civil  
6. Asociacion para Politicas Públicas (APP)  
7. Ban All Nukes generation (BANg) 
8. Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs  
9. Bike for Peace  
10. British American Security Information Council (BASIC) 
11. Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)  
12. Canadian Voice of Women for Peace  
13. Center for Policy Studies (PIR Center) 
14. Chatham House 
15. Chinese People’s Association for Peace and Disarmament 
16. Christian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CCND)  
17. Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center  
18. Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of 
Churches  
19. Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs (ECFA) 
20. Friedenswerkstatt Mutlangen e.V. 
21. Friends Committee on National Legislation  
22. Geneva Nuclear Disarmament Initaitive  
23. Georgetown University Department of Government  
24. Global Security Institute (GSI) 
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25. Global Zero  
26. Hidankyo/Hibakusha Organization of Japan  
27. Harmony For Peace Foundation  
28. Heinrich Boell Foundation  
29. Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung  
30. Hiroshima Hypocenter Reconstruction Project  
31. Hiroshima Prefectural Government  
32. Institute for Conflict, Cooperation and Security, University of Birmingham  
33. Institute for Security Studies (ISS) 
34. Institute for Security and Safety at Brandenburg University for Applied 
Sciences  
35. International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA)  
36. International Association of Peace Messenger Cities (IAPMC) 
37. International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) 
38. ICAN Germany 
39. International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR) 
40. International Law and Policy Institute 
41. International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation 
(INESAP) 
42. International Nuclear Law Association 
43. International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) 
44. International Peace Bureau (IPB) 
45. International Peace Research Association (IPRA) 
46. International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) 
47. International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) 
48. Japanese Consumers’ Co-operative Union (JCCU) 
49. Japan Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (JALANA)  
50. Japanese Trade Union Confederation (JTUC-RENGO) 
51. Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network for Nuclear Disarmament 
and Nonproliferation 
52. Los Alamos Study Group 
53. Mayors for Peace 
54. Mouvement de la Paix  
55. Non-proliferation for Global Security Foundation (NPSGlobal)  
56. National Council for Peace and Against Nuclear Weapons  
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57. Nei til atomvaapen (No to nuclear weapons)  
58. New York State Bar Association  
59. Nuclear Age Peace Foundation  
60. Nuclear Information and Resource Service  
61. Nuclear Threat Intiative (NTI)  
62. Nuclear Watch New Mexico  
63. Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance  
64. PCU Nagasaki Council for Nuclear Weapons Abolition  
65. Parliamentarians for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament (PNND)  
66. Pax Christi International, International Catholic Peace Movement  
67. Peace Action  
68. Peace Boat  
69. Peace Depot  
70. People for Nuclear Disarmament (PND) 
71. People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) 
72. PragueVision Institute for Sustainable Security  
73. Project Ploughshares  
74. Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs  
75. Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition (RECNA), Nagasaki 
University  
76. RECNA Supporters  
77. Rideau Institute  
78. Rissho Kosei-kai  
79. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies  
80. School of Political Science and International Studies, The University of 
Queensland  
81. Seoul National University  
82. Soka Gakkai International  
83. Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea (SPARK)  
84. Stichting Samenwerkingsverband IKV - Pax Christi 
85. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik  
86. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)  
87. The International Network of Emerging Nuclear Specialists (INENS)  
88. The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Middlebury Institute of 
International Studies at Monterey  
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89. The Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyo)  
90. The Peace Foundation Aotearoa-New Zealand  
91. The Simons Foundation of Canada 
92. Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research 
93. Tri-Valley CAREs - Communities Against a Radioactive Environment 
94. United Nations Association of Serbia   
95. Union of Concerned Scientists  
96. United Methodist Church - General Board of Church and Society  
97. United Religions Initiative  
98. University of Vienna, Department of Contemporary History  
99. Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) 
100. Visions Solidaires  
101. Western States Legal Foundation  
102. Women for Peace, Sweden  
103. Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)  
104. World Future Council Foundation  
105. World Peace Council  
106. Yale University - International Security Studies  
107. Youth Arts New York  
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Appendix B 
 
List of interviewees 
 
I. List of interviews 
In the following is a list of the interviews quoted in this thesis. The 
interviewees’ names have been anonymized to ensure the maximum level of 
protection. They are listed, together with each interview’s date, in the order 
in which they appear in the thesis. 
 
INTERVIEW	 DATE	
Interview	n.	1	 April	25,	2014	
Interview	n.	2	 April	8,	2014	
Interview	n.	3	 May	22,	2015	
Interview	n.	4	 May	7,	2014	
Interview	n.	5	 April	9,	2014	
Interview	n.	6	 May	4,	2014	
Interview	n.	7	 May	13,	2014	
Interview	n.	8	 May	22,	2014	
Interview	n.	9	 May	13,	2014	
Interview	n.	10	 May	8,	2015	
Interview	n.	11	 April	25,	2014	
Interview	n.	12	 June	1,	2015	
Interview	n.	13	 May	28,	2015	
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Interview	n.	14	 June	19,	2014	
Interview	n.	15	 May	13,	2015	
Interview	n.	16	 April	30,	2015	
Interview	n.	17	 April	30,	2014	
Interview	n.	18	 April	4,	2014	
Interview	n.	19	 May	12,	2014	
Interview	n.	20	 April	4,	2014	
Interview	n.	21	 May	4,	2015	
Interview	n.	22	 April	10,	2014	
Interview	n.	23	 April	3,	2014	
Interview	n.	24	 May	7,	2014	
Interview	n.	25	 May	11,	2015	
 
 
 
II. List of consulted individuals 
In the following is a list of the civil society representatives, diplomats, and 
UN officials consulted by the author for the research project in the period 
2014–2015, mostly at the margins of the reunions of the 2014 NPT 
Preparatory Committee and 2015 NPT Review Conference. For each, name, 
institutional affiliation, and place of the interview are provided. 
 
NAME	 POSITION	 PLACE	
1. Henry	Sokolski	 Executive	Director,	Nonproliferation	
Policy	Education	Center		
By	phone	
2. Michael	Krepon	 Co-Founder	and	Senior	Associate,	
Stimson	Center	
Washington,	DC	
3. Jenifer	Mackby	 Then	Senior	Fellow,	Center	for	Strategic	 Washington,	DC	
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and	International	Studies	(CSIS)	
4. Ashish	Sinha	 Program	Director,	Alliance	for	Nuclear	
Accountability	(ANA)	
Washington,	DC	
5. Togzhan	
Kassenova	
Associate,	Nuclear	Policy	Program,	
Carnagie	Endowment	for	International	
Peace		
Washington,	DC	
6. Ira	Helfand	 Chair,	Security	Committee,	Physicians	
of	Social	Responsibility	(PSR);	Co-
President	of	International	Physicians	
for	the	Prevention	of	Nuclear	War	
(IPPNW)	
By	phone	
7. John	Isaacs	 Then	Executive	Director,	Council	for	a	
Liveable	World	
Washington,	DC	
8. Becca	Cousins	 Then	Program	Director,	British	
American	Security	Information	Council	
(BASIC)		
Washington,	DC	
9. Chris	Lindborg	 Analyst	and	Program	Manager,	British	
American	Security	Information	Council	
(BASIC)	
Washington,	DC	
10. Thomas	
Graham	
Retired	Ambassador;	Executive	
Chairman	of	the	Board,	Lightbridge	
Washington,	DC	
11. Jim	Baird	 Managing	Communications	Director,	
Peace	and	Security	Collaborative,	
ReThink	Media	
By	phone	
12. Peter	Weiss	 President	Emeritus	Lawyers	Committee	
on	Nuclear	Policy	
New	York	
13. Cora	Weiss	 President,	Hague	Appeal	for	Peace	 New	York	
14. Richard	
Lennane	
Heads	of	Wildfire	(NGO)	 New	York	
15. Jim	Barton	 Fellow,	World	Federal	Institute	 New	York	
16. Paul	Meyer	 Senior	Fellow,	Space	Security,	The	
Simons	Foundation;	Adjunct	Professor,	
Simon	Fraser	University	
New	York	
17. Mark	
Versteden		
Deputy	Permanent	Representative	to	
the	Conference	on	Disarmament,	
New	York	
	 362	
Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	the	
Netherlands	
18. John	Burroughs	 Executive	Director,	Lawyers	Committee	
on	Nuclear	Policy	(LCNP)	
New	York	
19. Jackie	Cabasso	 Executive	Director,	Western	States	
Legal	Foundation		
New	York	
20. Tariq	Rauf	 Director,	Disarmament,	Arms	Control	
and	Non-proliferation	Programme,	
SIPRI;	Senior	Advisor	to	the	President	
of	the	2015	NPT	Review	Conference.	
New	York	
21. Carl	Robichaud	 Program	Officer,	International	Peace	
and	Security,	Carnegie	Corporation	NY	
New	York	
22. Soo-Hyun	Kim	 Political	Affairs	Officer,	Information	and	
Outreach	Branch,	UN	Office	for	
Disarmament	Affairs	(UNODA)	
New	York	
23. Randy	Rydell	 Then	Senior	Political	Affairs	Officer	in	
the	Office	of	the	High	Representative	
for	Disarmament	Affairs,	UN	Office	for	
Disarmament	Affairs	(UNODA)	
New	York	
24. Ann	Lakhadir	 Formerly	NGO	Committee	on	
Disarmament	
New	York	
25. Katherine	
Prizeman	
Associate	Political	Affairs	Officer,	
Weapons	of	Mass	Destruction	Branch,	
UN	Office	for	Disarmament	Affairs	
(UNODA)	
New	York	
26. Michael	Spies	 Political	Affairs	Officer,	Strategic	
Planning	Unit,	UN	Office	for	
Disarmament	Affairs	(UNODA)	
New	York	
27. Emilie	
McGloane	
International	Coordinator,	Peace	Boat,	
US	
New	York	
28. Hiro	Sakurai	 Representative	to	the	United	Nations	in	
New	York,	Soka	Gakkai	International	
(SGI);	Executive	Committee,	NGO	
Committee	on	Disarmament,	Peace	
and	Security	
New	York	
29. Ray	Acheson	 Director,	Reaching	Critical	Will,	Women	
International	League	for	Peace	and	
By	phone	
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Freedom	(WILPF)	
30. Lyndon	Burford	 Advisor,	Delegation	of	New	Zealand	to	
the	2015	NPT	Review	Conference	
New	York	
31. Wilbert	van	der	
Zeijden	
Then	Senior	Researcher,	PAX	 New	York	
32. Mohamed	
Shaker	
Chairman	of	the	Egyptian	Council	for	
Foreign	Affairs	(ECFA);	President	of	the	
1985	NPT	Review	Conference	
New	York	
33. Magnus	Løvold	 Advisor,	International	Law	and	Policy	
Institute	(ILPI)	
New	York	
34. Daniela	Varano	 Campaign	Communications	and	Social	
Media	Coordinator,	International	
Campaign	to	Abolish	Nuclear	Weapons	
(ICAN)	
New	York	
35. Sergio	Duarte	 Formerly	UN	High	Representative	for	
Disarmament	Affairs;	President	of	the	
2005	NPT	Review	Conference	
New	York	
36. Vicente	Garrido	
Rebolledo	
Senior	Advisor	for	Non-Proliferation	
and	Disarmament	issues,	Spanish	
Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	
Cooperation;	Director,	INCIPE	
New	York	
37. Julia	Berghofer	 Board	Member,	International	
Campaign	to	Abolish	Nuclear	Weapons	
(ICAN)	Germany	
New	York	
38. Xanthe	Hall	 Disarmament	Campaigner,	
International	Physicians	for	the	
Prevention	of	Nuclear	War	(IPPNW)	
Germany	
New	York	
39. Nickolas	Roth	 Research	Associate,	Project	on	
Managing	the	Atom,	Belfer	Center,	
John	F.	Kennedy	School	of	Government,	
Harvard	University	
Boston	
(Massachusetts)	
40. Matt	Brown	 Co-Founder,	Global	Zero	 Providence		
(Rhode	Island)	
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